Top 11 Misconceptions of World War 2 #Eurocentric Edition

FLYBOYJ said:

Mosquito was not going to saturate huge industrial areas with the same amount of bombs at low altitude, compare the bombloads and ranges of US and RAF heavy bombers and the distances they were able to fly with them, again you would have needed twice or three times the amount of Mosquitoes to accomplish the same missions and the Mosquito would have been range limited. It was a great strike aircraft and precision bomber but to use it in any other capacity would have diminished it's effectiveness

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The Mosquito had a much lower per-mission loss rate. This article mentions loss rates during raids on Berlin from Nov 43 to March 1944. I don't know how broadly applicable it is but lets call it a baseline. They show Lancaster (or all the heavies together) with a 5% loss rate, and Mosquito with a 0.5%.

The accuracy of the Mosquito was also higher, especially for precision targets. The same article for example mentions that for B-17 raids against V-weapon sites, it took an average of 165 tons of bombs dropped to destroy the target, whereas with Mosquitos it took 40 tons. About 1/4. And I daresay night bombing heavies were even less accurate.

So if you take these two factors into consideration, you could argue that it would take 1/4 as many tons of bombs to hit the target, and you would take 10% of the losses.

When you say 'saturation bombing' I really don't think that is what is needed. I don't think 'saturation bombing' worked that well.

FLYBOYJ said:

Again, you're not considering the technology of the day. Fighter bombers became more effective once the technology was there to deliver a precision strike better than a high altitude bomber. You can say strategic bombing was basically a failure in WW2 in hindsight but again at the risk of repeating myself, look at the technology of the day

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Fighter bombers were more accurate mainly because they bombed from 500-1,000 ft (or lower) instead of 20,000 or 30,000 ft, IMO.

FLYBOYJ said:

That is 100% not true. As ineffective as we may look at the Allied bombing campaign by today's standards, it was that effort that crippled the German war machine to the point where a tactical campaign (using your P-47s and Typhoons) was able to be accomplished.

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P-47s and Typhoons (and P-51s and P-40s and P-38s) didn't just hit tactical targets, in fact I think they were actually more valuable hitting Operational targets, such as C3I like rail-heads, locomotives, bridges, supply columns, barges and cargo boats, radio towers, supply and fuel dumps and so on. I think that (again) was far more effective to the war effort than the Schweinfurt raid.

The video in the OP pointed out that something like 2.5% (I forget the precise number) of the Strategic bombing targeted the oil industry and that was by far the most effective Strategic bombing. I agree with him on that, but my point is that most of the other 97.5% was a waste, and they could have taken out the oil with fast bombers or fighter bombers instead, for much less loss of life (both in terms of aircrew and civilians).

They built 7700 Mosquitoes, 7300 Lancasters, 12,731 B-17s, and 18,000 B-24s. I don't think they needed more than about 300 Heavy Bombers all around, and only for specialized missions. Build another 7000 Mosquitoes, get the A-26 going a little earlier. Develop some of the others I mentioned. And keep developing the Fighter bombers into more and more effective long range fast strike aircraft.

FLYBOYJ said:

1. Even at 350 you're opening yourself up to interception
2. At what stage of the war would the Mk.XVI been made available in numbers to be used in a strategic capacity?

Again - take that Mk.XVI with the 4,000 pound bomb and drop it on a high value precision target at low level.

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1. Yes, but its better than 200-ish mph of the B-17 and 250-ish mph of the Lancaster.
2. Not before 1944. Probably 2nd quarter 1944 at earliest.

The 4,000lb HC was not suitable for low level use, so it would have to be the 4,000lb MC bomb with a lower charge-to-weight ratio.

wuzak said:

Oil refineries covered a lot of area. With a lot of separate targets. So precision might not be the easiest thing to achieve.

The RAF bombed oil refineries less than the USAAF, but they generally used bigger bombs (4,000lb and 1,000lb against 1,000lb, 500lb and even down to 100lb).

The smaller bombs cause small amounts of damage in lots of places, the large bombs cause a large amount of damage in a few places.

Using the smaller bombs the USAAF had to visit refineries more frequently, since the damage was easier for the Germans to repair. The refineries would return to partial or full capacity quickly, which meant the race was between the Germans fixing the damage and the USAAF bombing the refinery again.

The idea behind using a large number of smaller bombs is that the chances of one hitting something vital were increased.

The large bombs were far more destructive. The effective radius of their blast was much wider than for the smaller bombs. So even if they missed the target they may still cause significant damage. And if they did hit, the damage would be much worse. And harder to repair. So the RAF had to return less frequently.

The frequency of visiting these sites is important, since they were some of the most heavily defended targets in the Reich. I'm sure the crews were happy to visit them less often.

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I don't disagree with any of that but I think the calculus is different with more accurate type bombers (i.e. Mosquito).

wuzak said:

1. Yes, but its better than 200-osh mph of the B-17 and 250-ish mph of the Lancaster.
2. Not before 1944. Probably 2nd quarter 1944 at earliest.

The 4,000lb HC was not suitable for low level use, so it would have to be the 4,000lb MC bomb with a lower charge-to-weight ratio.

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The bottom line is the Mossie proved it could fly raids deep into Germany and not take heavy losses, so I think the proof is in the pudding.

Schweik said:

The Mosquito had a much lower per-mission loss rate. This article mentions loss rates during raids on Berlin from Nov 43 to March 1944. I don't know how broadly applicable it is but lets call it a baseline. They show Lancaster (or all the heavies together) with a 5% loss rate, and Mosquito with a 0.5%.

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It did - and it flew a different type of mission to a different of target. You're comparing apples to oranges

Schweik said:

The accuracy of the Mosquito was also higher, especially for precision targets. The same article for example mentions that for B-17 raids against V-weapon sites, it took an average of 165 tons of bombs dropped to destroy the target, whereas with Mosquitos it took 40 tons. About 1/4. And I daresay night bombing heavies were even less accurate.

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And there the Mosquito was more effective. Could the same effectiveness happen against Schweinfurt–Regensburg at the same altitudes?

Schweik said:

So if you take these two factors into consideration, you could argue that it would take 1/4 as many tons of bombs to hit the target, and you would take 10% of the losses.

When you say 'saturation bombing' I really don't think that is what is needed. I don't think 'saturation bombing' worked that well.

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Again, you're ignoring the large industrial targets (and cities) that were eliminated by tonnage from the AAF and RAF

Schweik said:

Fighter bombers were more accurate mainly because they bombed from 500-1,000 ft (or lower) instead of 20,000 or 30,000 ft, IMO.

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They can be but in a WW2 capacity, you're not going to take down large industrial area

Schweik said:

P-47s and Typhoons (and P-51s and P-40s and P-38s) didn't just hit tactical targets, in fact I think they were actually more valuable hitting Operational targets, such as C3I like rail-heads, locomotives, bridges, supply columns, barges and cargo boats, radio towers, supply and fuel dumps and so on.

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All those are Tactual Targets

Schweik said:

I think that (again) was far more effective to the war effort than the Schweinfurt raid.

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Wrong - there were key industrial elements to the German war machine that had to first be eliminated. Ball bearing production was one of them

Schweik said:

The video in the OP pointed out that something like 2.5% (I forget the precise number) of the Strategic bombing targeted the oil industry and that was by far the most effective Strategic bombing. I agree with him on that, but my point is that most of the other 97.5% was a waste, and they could have taken out the oil with fast bombers or fighter bombers instead, for much less loss of life (both in terms of aircrew and civilians).

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I disagree - wuzak pointed out the effectiveness of the bombs

Schweik said:

They built 7700 Mosquitoes, 7300 Lancasters, 12,731 B-17s, and 18,000 B-24s. I don't think they needed more than about 300 Heavy Bombers all around, and only for specialized missions. Build another 7000 Mosquitoes, get the A-26 going a little earlier. Develop some of the others I mentioned. And keep developing the Fighter bombers into more and more effective long range fast strike aircraft.

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Again, your opinion, many, and I mean many would disagree.

Hindsight is 20-20

Schweik said:

They built 7700 Mosquitoes, 7300 Lancasters, 12,731 B-17s, and 18,000 B-24s. I don't think they needed more than about 300 Heavy Bombers all around, and only for specialized missions. Build another 7000 Mosquitoes, get the A-26 going a little earlier. Develop some of the others I mentioned. And keep developing the Fighter bombers into more and more effective long range fast strike aircraft.

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Building another 7000 Mosquitoes would be some sort of effort.

There was a delay to getting the A-26 into production. I think, maybe, because continued production of the A-20 took precedence.

The problem for fighter-bombs is that the place they attach bombs is also the place they attach their long range drop tanks. There is a big compromise.

I think Spaatz figured he needed 600 bombers for effective raids that could be sustainable. He couldn't get that until 1944.

Are you familiar with selection experiments?
I did one in college in a biology course.
Here's how it worked. Dump a bunch of colored bits of paper onto a background sheet. Pick up as many as you can within a set time. Count the survivors.
Now, in a hostile aerial environment, the predator will seek out the easiest kills. A Mossie is small and fast. Four engined heavies are larger and slower. As an interceptor, which am I more likely to shoot down?
Remove the heavies from the equation and the loss rate for Mossies will increase. An interceptor trained to shoot down big slow bombers will naturally shoot down more big slow bombers. But if there are no big slow bombers the interceptor will become better at shooting down fast small bombers.
As to fighter-bombers, USAAF fighters suffered a monthly attrition of about 4% during the period prior to Doolittle releasing them to attack German fighters wherever they could be found, including on the ground. After that date monthly attrition went up to 22%. It got so bad that at a certain point late in the war ground strafing was forbidden, since the damage inflicted was not worth the loss of skilled airmen. An attempt by 15th AF to bomb Ploesti with bomb laden P-38s was an abysmal failure.

Schweik said:

I dispute that, I think it was a huge waste of blood and treasure. They had the ability to make precision strikes, even at fairly long range. They hit prisons, gestapo HQs, warships, nuclear plants, dropped a French flag on the Arc de Triumph in occupied Paris, even used Lancasters to take out dams. I think they could have made much better use of those Mossies, not just for the special raids, but for general purpose. They should have had the Americans making some.

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If nothing else, the 8th AF bombing campaign force Germany to defend its air space. And with that the attrition of the Luftwaffe fighter force began, especially in 1944 when the P-51 arrived and the P-38 and P-47 got longer legs.

It was something that the RAF tried to do "Leaning into France", but a handful of Blenheims escorted by dozens of Spitfires did not make a compelling case for interception.

Schweik said:

I would argue that P-47s and Typhoons did more damage to the enemy war effort than B-24s heavy bombers and Lancasters. (now B-24 as an ASW aircraft, that's a different story...)

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But not B-17s?

Lancasters destroyed cities. Destroyed dams. Destroyed special weapons testing facilities. Destroyed oil facilities.

Though Mosquitoes could destroy closer range oil facilities, the others were beyond their capability and/or range. Let alone fighte-bombers.

Didn't we have a recent thread about the Mosquito versus heavy bombers?

If the Germans saw the shift of high altitude bombers to low/medium altitude medium bombers, they would have immediately addressed that with AA killing zones and fighters adjusted to compensate.

FLYBOYJ said:

It did - and it flew a different type of mission to a different of target. You're comparing apples to oranges

And there the Mosquito was more effective. Could the same effectiveness happen against Schweinfurt–Regensburg at the same altitudes?

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My whole point is that they should have left Schweinfurt alone and they never should have tried to bomb anything from 25,000 ft. The whole thing was a waste.

FLYBOYJ said:

Again, you're ignoring the large industrial targets (and cities) that were eliminated by tonnage from the AAF and RAF

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I think eliminating cities was a tragic mistake, and eliminating industrial targets didn't actually work (read Speer)

FLYBOYJ said:

They can be but in a WW2 capacity, you're not going to take down large industrial area

All those are Tactual Targets

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To me those are Operational targets. Tactical targets are the tanks and artillery pieces.

FLYBOYJ said:

Wrong - there were key industrial elements to the German war machine that had to first be eliminated. Ball bearing production was one of them

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It didn't work. It was a failure.

FLYBOYJ said:

I disagree - wuzak pointed out the effectiveness of the bombs

Again, your opinion, many, and I mean many would disagree.

Hindsight is 20-20

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Most of the Strategic bombing in WW2 was not effective, and that I believe is a fact. The question is how could they have done better, or was that just as good as was possible. I say they could have done better, but I know that is speculation. And of course I do agree about hindsight.

wuzak said:

If nothing else, the 8th AF bombing campaign force Germany to defend its air space. And with that the attrition of the Luftwaffe fighter force began, especially in 1944 when the P-51 arrived and the P-38 and P-47 got longer legs.

It was something that the RAF tried to do "Leaning into France", but a handful of Blenheims escorted by dozens of Spitfires did not make a compelling case for interception.

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Agreed, this was the other effect of the Strategic bomber raids... although I think the same thing would have happened with high speed precision raids too. The Germans needed to protect their oil refineries and infrastructure every bit as much as they needed to defend their cities.

wuzak said:

But not B-17s?

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Maybe, B-17s were used that way too to some extent, but the B-24 seems to have really settled into the maritime niche.

wuzak said:

Lancasters destroyed cities. Destroyed dams. Destroyed special weapons testing facilities. Destroyed oil facilities.

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I think destroying cities was a tragic mistake, whether done by Lancasters, B-17s, or B-29s

wuzak said:

Though Mosquitoes could destroy closer range oil facilities, the others were beyond their capability and/or range. Let alone fighte-bombers.

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Well the devil is in the details. I'd like to crunch some numbers on that. I think Mossies could make it from Tunisia or Malta or Sicily or Naples or somewhere in the Med.

And I don't know for sure but I suspect P-38s and / or P-51s might be able to make it too eventually. P-38s were escorting those poor B-24 crews. Could they fly out with one drop tank and one bomb or some rockets?

Greg Boeser said:

Are you familiar with selection experiments?
I did one in college in a biology course.
Here's how it worked. Dump a bunch of colored bits of paper onto a background sheet. Pick up as many as you can within a set time. Count the survivors.
Now, in a hostile aerial environment, the predator will seek out the easiest kills. A Mossie is small and fast. Four engined heavies are larger and slower. As an interceptor, which am I more likely to shoot down?

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I'm not so sure about that - if you are talking about daytime anyway, attacking a B-17 or B-24 formation is a lot riskier than trying to catch a Mosquito. I think the Mosquitoes were just hard to intercept, high cruise speed etc.

Greg Boeser said:

Remove the heavies from the equation and the loss rate for Mossies will increase. An interceptor trained to shoot down big slow bombers will naturally shoot down more big slow bombers. But if there are no big slow bombers the interceptor will become better at shooting down fast small bombers.

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And the bombers and the escorts would get better too ... which brings us to the attrition of the Luftwaffe Wuzak mentioned.

Greg Boeser said:

As to fighter-bombers, USAAF fighters suffered a monthly attrition of about 4% during the period prior to Doolittle releasing them to attack German fighters wherever they could be found, including on the ground. After that date monthly attrition went up to 22%. It got so bad that at a certain point late in the war ground strafing was forbidden, since the damage inflicted was not worth the loss of skilled airmen. An attempt by 15th AF to bomb Ploesti with bomb laden P-38s was an abysmal failure.

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Those are the kind of numbers, and scenarios, I find interesting. I know that one raid with P-38s was a failure but that may be down (in part) to that model of P-38. Could P-51s make that trip? What if you sent say, 500 of them along with 1,000 Mosquitoes. I suspect the gas is shut off for a while.

Schweik said:

My whole point is that they should have left Schweinfurt alone and they never should have tried to bomb anything from 25,000 ft. The whole thing was a waste.

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And Germany just keeps producing ball bearings???

Schweik said:

I think eliminating cities was a tragic mistake, and eliminating industrial targets didn't actually work (read Speer)

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So we should have just left Messerschmitt keep producing hundreds of aircraft? All the supporting machine shops and raw material suppliers?? Allow the civilian population to work in those factories???

Schweik said:

To me those are Operational targets. Tactical targets are the tanks and artillery pieces.

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Have you served in the military or studied military operations? Those are tactical targets as well as tanks and artillery pieces.

Schweik said:

It didn't work. It was a failure.

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And again you're wrong - Germany had to import ball bearings from Sweden as a result. The "failure" of Schweinfurt–Regensburg raids was the fact that B-17s couldn't defend themselves without escorts

Schweik said:

Most of the Strategic bombing in WW2 was not effective, and that I believe is a fact. The question is how could they have done better, or was that just as good as was possible. I say they could have done better, but I know that is speculation. And of course I do agree about hindsight.

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I can agree with you to a point - there were some missions that "should have" been done with more tactical type aircraft like the Mosquito (Ploesti is one of them) But I'll repeat myself, for the technology of the time, large 4 engine heavy bombers was the most effective way to destroy large industrial areas and at the beginning of the war you weren't going to do that with fighter bombers, especially with a very capable Luftwaffe at hand.

FLYBOYJ said:

And Germany just keeps producing ball bearings???

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They did keep producing ball bearings. See Speer. For a variety of reasons the heavy bomber raids were ineffective against most of German industry, except for oil.

FLYBOYJ said:

So we should have just left Messerschmitt keep producing hundreds of aircraft? All the supporting machine shops and raw material suppliers?? Allow the civilian population to work in those factories???

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Again, production went up in spite of the heavy bombing. They distributed it into smaller shops, moved stuff underground, made other adjustments.

Note the numbers for the Bf 109 from 1942- 1944...


And yes, I don't think "de-housing" civilian population worked either, it was just a tragic mistake. It didn't work in Britain when the Germans did it to the Brits and it didn't work against German civilians. Much like some of the nasty stuff done to civilians in other places by other nations in WW2.

FLYBOYJ said:

Have you served in the military or studied military operations? Those are tactical targets as well as tanks and artillery pieces.

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Yes, I did serve in the military and yes I have studied military operations. I disagree.

FLYBOYJ said:

And again you're wrong - Germany had to import ball bearings from Sweden as a result. The "failure" of Schweinfurt–Regensburg raids was the fact that B-17s couldn't defend themselves without escorts

I can agree with you to a point - there were some missions that "should have" been done with more tactical type aircraft like the Mosquito (Ploesti is one of them) But I'll repeat myself, for the technology of the time, large 4 engine heavy bombers was the most effective way to destroy large industrial areas and at the beginning of the war you weren't going to do that with fighter bombers, especially with a very capable Luftwaffe at hand.

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We probably have to agree to disagree.

Greg Boeser said:

Now, in a hostile aerial environment, the predator will seek out the easiest kills. A Mossie is small and fast. Four engined heavies are larger and slower. As an interceptor, which am I more likely to shoot down?

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The four-engined heavies are harder to bring down, but their speed is such that there is time for multiple attempts. The Mosquito is harder to get into position to shoot down.

Greg Boeser said:

Remove the heavies from the equation and the loss rate for Mossies will increase. An interceptor trained to shoot down big slow bombers will naturally shoot down more big slow bombers. But if there are no big slow bombers the interceptor will become better at shooting down fast small bombers.

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Mosquito bombers often operated independent of the heavies. And all the time during daylight missions.

The Mosquito loss rate was low because they switched to night operations in the Pathfinder Force. In this role they had a significant performance advantage over their adversaries. Later the Light Night Striking Force was used for diversionary raids in an attempt to draw the nightfighter force away from the target for the heavies.

And in the context of the night campaign shooting down the pathfinders would go a long way to reducing the raid's effectiveness.

Switching back to day missions would, inevitably, see loss rates rise, since the Bf 109 and Fw 190 had a small performance advantage over the Mosquito. But the solution to reduce loss rates could be the Americans did - send a larger number of bombers.

wuzak said:

The four-engined heavies are harder to bring down, but their speed is such that there is time for multiple attempts. The Mosquito is harder to get into position to shoot down.




Mosquito bombers often operated independent of the heavies. And all the time during daylight missions.

The Mosquito loss rate was low because they switched to night operations in the Pathfinder Force. In this role they had a significant performance advantage over their adversaries. Later the Light Night Striking Force was used for diversionary raids in an attempt to draw the nightfighter force away from the target for the heavies.

And in the context of the night campaign shooting down the pathfinders would go a long way to reducing the raid's effectiveness.

Switching back to day missions would, inevitably, see loss rates rise, since the Bf 109 and Fw 190 had a small performance advantage over the Mosquito. But the solution to reduce loss rates could be the Americans did - send a larger number of bombers.

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And long range escort fighters I think Mossies could operate as they did historically, in both day and night time missions.

FLYBOYJ said:

And again you're wrong - Germany had to import ball bearings from Sweden as a result. The "failure" of Schweinfurt–Regensburg raids was the fact that B-17s couldn't defend themselves without escorts

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And redesign some equipment to use plain bearings.

The Mosquito played a role in the Sweden side as well. A BOAC Mosquito flew diplomats to Sweden to negotiate the purchase of their entire production.

The big problem with the Schweinfurt raid was that the 8th AF could not follow up quickly enough. The RAF was supposed to bomb Schweinfurt that night, but were instead busy bombing Peenemünde.

The 8th didn't have enough bombers for a sustained campaign at that point. And they needed long range escorts.

They hit Schweinfurt several times

Schweik said:

They hit Schweinfurt several times

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2 months between first and second raids.

They hit it in Big Week too...

From the wiki (I swear I didn't write this but the bold emphasis is mine)

"Although losses of production bearings and machinery were high and much of the industrial and residential areas of the city were destroyed, killing more than a thousand civilians, the factories were restored to production and the industry dispersed. Although German planners initially thought it essential to purchase the entire output of the Swedish ball-bearing industry, losses in the production of bearings were actually made up from surpluses found within Germany in the aftermath of the first raid. The decentralized industry was able to restore output to 85% of its pre-bombing level"