I don't think one can say that anymore, the production of Ordinance in the 3rd Reich seems to have been very efficient and organised and able to produced weapons at low labour costs.
The problem in Aviation was they were making the wrong types of aircraft. I can think of only two types of successful weapon introduced after 1940: the Fw 190 and the V1/Fi 103 and one could argue the V1 was 6 months too late.
It goes beyond aviation, but I was a bit vague in my comment: I was commenting on logistical/economic management on the government bureaucracy end of things, not on the industry end (or those in government actually interested in practical efficient production). That includes putting priority to the wrong projects, being inconsistent with priorities (often for less than practical reasons) and mis-allocating material resources. The broad problems with government and bureaucracy and leadership is also the only area I was really likening to the USSR. (comparisons on the industry level -from firm to workforce to production lines)
These abortive programs that chopped and changed meant they never got the production volumes needed to assure efficiency. Think of 12000+ workforce involved in He 177 production. That workforce could generate 12000 x 58 hours per week theoretically enough to manufacture 116 Me 262 per week or over 400 month of any aircraft in its early stage of development when production was still relatively inefficient.
Also think of the Me 210/410, Heinkel He 177, the time wasted on the Ta 154 Moskito for no result. Types such as the Ju 252 or He 219 that might have been somewhat successful were abandoned for other types that came to nothing.
Indeed, and that's one of the simpler examples pointing out on the overemphasis on offensive weapons and lack of concentrated defensive development. (though the He 177 and Me 210/410 are both particularly bad examples of wasted resources, and like many projects, further hampered by politics) You could also throw in the Ju 252 as a project far more valid and necessary (yet held back) compared to the 210 or 177.
The Fi 103 and As 014 are a bit tougher to criticize as, even if you go to the 'severely cutting back on purely offensive weapons' angle, it was still one of the more cost effective and practical projects in that vein. I think the bigger problem was focusing too narrowly on that technology and not considering broader applications and experimental development of pulse jet propulsion, possibly collaboratively with ramjet development (there is some overlap, and potential for hybrid engines there). That could also include longer lasting (especially valveless) pulsejets and conversely, short-life/inexpensive ramjets. Maybe more emphasis on using fairly conventional solid fuel rockets for take-off assist too, due to avoiding the sensitive/corrosive chemical issues. (lack of exploring thrust augmentors -air induction ducts or cowlings- for pulse/ramjets or rockets seems a major missed opportunity in all fields except maybe turbojets)
Alternate fuels don't seem to have been investigated as much as they could/should have either, including ones for jet engines and including ones that would avoid some engineering difficulties in the interim if not possibly add long-term advantages as well. (the burning properties of methanol and ether -possibly acetone, LPGs, and some others- would have had some very interesting potential in pulse, ram, and turbine driven jet engines, including lower combustion temperatures, easier vaporization, and/or smokeless flames even during poor/incomplete combustion -while all being more practical for real-world use than the hydrogen gas Heinkel and Ohain resorted to for easing initial development)
The fact that the soviets managed to have fairly functional (if not practical for their piston aircraft) small booster ramjets being tested pre-war and considered for numerous designs while the germans didn't is a but puzzling as well.
This means that only 3 types were produced in volumes that were efficient. Me 109, Fw 190 and Ju 88 series and maybe Me 110. Only the Fw 190 was satisfactory, the Me 109G from early 1943 to early 1944 was inferior and only became partially satisfactory with the appearance of the water methanol boosted versions, the Ju 88 was only good as a night fighter by then, likewise Me 110.
Restricting allocation of the DB-601/605 to Me-109/110/210 (and 606/610 production) rather than allowing more potential designs to explore the use of those engines and provide more reason to discontinue or reduce production of the aging Messerschmitt aircraft monopolizing those engines was one of the bigger faults there. Perhaps had the larger wing of the 109T been more widely adopted, the 109 would have been more useful as a fighter-bomber and generally more flixble as an aircraft (higher ceiling, lower takeoff/landing speed, higher max takeoff weight, possibly fewer takeoff and landing accidents, etc -at the cost of some drag).
The Hurricane, Spitfire, P-40, and Wildcat were at least relatively friendly aircraft to fly and not particularly accident prone, and even the spitfire had similar issues with falling behind in sheer performance along with limited utility as a multirole aircraft similar to the 109.