UK and France holding out in Brittany in 1940

[mikewint]

Many in the Allied command considered Montgomery to be arrogant and self-infatuated, while he viewed himself as the world's greatest military mind. He resented that Eisenhower was his superior, openly expressing disdain and privately belittling his generalship. Eisenhower displayed heroic patience in his dealings with Monty, but still came close to sacking him. Eisenhower was particularly frustrated with Montgomery's refusal to make a move unless ensured that a vast superiority in troops and weapons guaranteed victory and maintained his reputation. Eisenhower respected Montgomery's abilities though, and Monty, in his own fashion, found Eisenhower difficult to dislike. Montgomery even admitted that Eisenhower was the only one who had the personality to get all the Allies to cooperate and win the war

 

[ivanotter]

Well, Monty had a habit of rubbing the US generals up the wrong way. With the Ardennes, that he somehow had a hand in, telling the entire world that this was a very interesting battle and thanks God he was there to save the US forces, etc etc. and the press conference later.

Patton hated him with a passion I believe.

However, could Brooke have done Eisenhower's job better in terms of uniting the command? Could Brooke have finished the war in 1944 as Eisenhower was without any clue on how to drive the war as a land commander?

reg,

 

[parsifal]

there were severe personality clashes within the allied hih command, that continues to filter down through discussions like these.

With regard to Monty's extreme caution there is no denying his temperament was cautious. however his caution was more than justified by the extreme manpower shortages that bedevilled the british army in the latter half of the war. From 1939 through to the end of 1944, the British were forced to scrap or demobilise over 25 divisions or equivalent, the overiding reson being a lack of manpower. Quite literally, at the end, every man lost was not replaced. Britain was past the point of exhaustion with regards to manpower by wars end.

I would pit montys abilitities against Pattons anytime. Patton got the job done, but he was profligate with the lives of his soldiers. This made him a manpower costly general compared to monty

 

[ivanotter]

The personality clashes were indeed severe. Amazing also to see how the British did not want to be too hard on Eisenhower, lest they offend Marshall. Instead of telling him (and the US chiefs) that his plan from September were "useless" (as Mnty liked to phrase things), they let the war drift, hoping for the best. That cost lives.

I think there is a bit of myth involved with Patton. After all, hid did not get the "job done". He was knocking his head on the Mosel for weeks and months with nothing to show.

Even Brooke says about him: "German offensive appears to be held in the north, but I am a little more doubtful about the south. Patton is reported to have put in a counter-attack; this could only have been a half-baked affair, and I doubt its dong much good" (22 Dec 1944).

Patton's hurling things at it piecemeal contrasted with Monty's "grip" is telling I think.

Despite all Monty's lying later and his arrogance,e tc, etc. I think that he did get the job done: creating a proper battle plan, getting the resources in place and driving the battle from 3 Jan onwards as the Germn thrust was drawing down.

Patton's bravado was probably good for his press releases, but they didn't exactly impress the Germans.

Patton surely did great things but I think it is myth to elevate him too high.

Comments?

 

[mikewint]

In December 1941 Brooke succeeded Field Marshal Sir John Dill as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), the professional head of the British Army, in which appointment he also represented the army on the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In March 1942 he succeeded Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, holding both posts until retirement from active service in 1946.
For the remainder of the Second World War, Brooke was the foremost military adviser to Winston Churchill (who was also Minister of Defense), the War Cabinet, and to Britain's allies. As CIGS, Brooke was the functional head of the Army, and as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which he dominated by force of intellect and personality, he took the leading military part in the overall strategic direction of the British war effort. In 1942, Brooke joined the Western Allies' ultimate command, the US-British Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Brooke's focus was primarily on the European theatre of operations. Here, his key issues were to rid North Africa of Axis forces and knock Italy out of the war, thereby opening up the Mediterranean for Allied shipping, and then mount the cross channel invasion when the Allies were ready and the Germans sufficiently weakened.
Brooke's and the British view of the Mediterranean operations contrasted with the American commitment to an early invasion of Western Europe, which led to several heated arguments at the many conferences of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
During the first years of the alliance it was often the British who got their way. At the London conference in April 1942 Brooke and Churchill seem to have misled George Marshall, the American chief of staff, about the British intentions on an early landing in France. At the Casablanca conference in January 1943 it was decided that the allies should invade Sicily under the command of the American general Dwight D. Eisenhower, a decision that effectively postponed the planned invasion of Western Europe until 1944. The Casablanca agreement was in fact a compromise, much brokered by Brooke's old friend Field Marshal Dill, Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington DC. "I owe him [Dill] an unbounded debt of gratitude for his help on that occasion and in many other similar ones", Brooke wrote after the war. But many American planners later saw Casablanca as a setback and that they had been outgeneraled by their better prepared British counterparts, with Brooke as chief spokesperson.
However, with a growing American strength it became increasingly harder for Brooke and his staff to influence the western allied grand strategy. In May 1943 a fixed time was set for Operation Overlord, an agreement that Brooke, who insisted on a flexible strategy, continued to have doubts about for many months. And later in 1944 Brooke was overruled when seven American divisions were transferred from Italy to take part in the landings in southern France, an operation which Brooke and the British were skeptical about.
The post of CIGS was less rewarding than command in an important theatre of war, but the CIGS chose the generals who commanded those theatres and decided what men and munitions they should have. When it came to finding the right commanders he often complained that many officers who would have been good generals had been killed in World War I, and that this was one reason behind the difficulties the British had in the beginning of the war." However, he does not seem to have reflected on the fact that the Germans did not suffer from the same problem, which they must have had to the same extent. When General Sir Claude Auchinleck was to be replaced as the commander of the Eighth Army in 1942, Brooke preferred Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery instead of Lieutenant-General William Gott, who was Churchill's candidate. Soon thereafter Gott was killed in an air crash and Montgomery got the command. Brooke would later reflect upon the tragic event which led to the appointment of Montgomery as an intervention by God. Earlier in 1942 Brooke had himself been offered the command of British forces in the Middle East. Brooke declined, believing he now knew better than any other general how to deal with Prime Minister Churchill.
A year later, the war had taken a different turn and Brooke no longer believed it necessary to stay at Churchill's side. He therefore looked forward to taking command of the Allied invasion of Western Europe, a post Brooke believed he had been promised by Churchill on three occasions. But during the first Quebec conference, in August 1943, it was decided that the command would go to US General George C. Marshall. In the event that Marshall's work as US Army Chief of Staff became too important for him to leave Washington DC, Dwight D. Eisenhower would assume the command instead. Brooke was bitterly disappointed, both at being passed over and of the way the decision was conveyed to him by Churchill, who according to Brooke "dealt with the matter as if it were one of minor importance".
He was a cautious general with a great respect for the German war machine. Some American planners thought that Brooke's participation in the campaigns of World War I and in the two evacuations from France in World War II made him lack the aggressiveness they believed necessary for victory. According to historian Max Hastings, Brooke's reputation as a strategist is "significantly damaged" by his remarks at the Trident conference in Washington in May 1943, where he claimed that no major operations on the continent would be possible until 1945 or 1946.

 

[mikewint]

WoW, Ivan, Geore Patton is a thread unto itself. As far as the stalemate at the Metz though, while it is true that General Patton's offensive came to a screeching halt on August 31, 1944, as the Third Army literally ran out of gas near the Moselle River, just outside of Metz, France. The reason had very little to do with Patton or his abilities. One explanation is that Patton's ambition was to conquer Germany, and he refused to recognize that he was engaged in a secondary line of attack. Another is that General John C.H. Lee, commander of the Zone of Communication, chose that time to move his headquarters to the more comfortable environs of Paris. Some 30 truck companies were diverted to that end, rather than providing support to the fighting armies.
Patton also expected that the Theater Commander would keep fuel and supplies flowing to support successful advances. However, Eisenhower favored a "broad front" approach to the ground-war effort, believing that a single thrust would have to drop off flank protection, and would quickly lose its punch. Still, within the constraints of a very large effort overall, Eisenhower gave Montgomery and his 21st Army Group a strong priority for supplies for Operation Market Garden. The combination of Montgomery being given priority for supplies, and diversion of resources to moving the Communications Zone, resulted in the Third Army running out of gas in Alsace-Lorraine while exploiting German weakness. In late September, a large German panzer counter attack sent expressly to stop the advance of Patton's Third Army was defeated by the 4th Armored Division at the Battle of Arracourt. Despite the victory, the Third Army stayed in place as a result of Eisenhower's order. Ironically, the Germans believed this was because their counterattack had been successful.
Patton's rapid drive through the Lorraine demonstrated his keen appreciation for the technological advantages of the U.S. Army. The major US and Allied advantages were in mobility and air superiority. The U.S. Army had a greater number of trucks, more reliable tanks, and better radio communications, which all contributed to a superior ability to operate at a high tempo. However, probably the key to Patton's success compared to all of the other U.S. and British forces, which had similar advantages, was his intensive use of close air support; the Third Army had by far more G-2 officers at headquarters specifically designated to coordinate air strikes than any other army. Third Army's attached close air support group was XIX Tactical Air Command, commanded by Gen. Otto P. Weyland. Developed originally by Gen. Elwood Quesada of IX TAC for the First Army at Operation Cobra the technique of "armored column cover" whereby close air support was directed by an air traffic controller in one of the attacking tanks was used extensively by the Third Army. In addition, because Patton's rapid drive resulted in a salient that was vulnerable to flanking attacks and getting trapped by the Germans, Weyland and Patton developed the concept of using intensive aerial armed reconnaissance to protect the flanks of this salient. Microwave Early Warning (MEW) radar, another technique pioneered by Quesada, was also used by XIX TAC to both cover against Luftwaffe attacks and to vector flights already in the air to new sites as an air traffic control radar. As a result of the close cooperation between Patton and Weyland, XIX TAC would end up providing far more air sorties for ground support for the Third Army than the other attached Tactical Air Commands would for the First and Ninth Armies. Despite their success, however, Eisenhower had faith only in the traditional method of advancing across a broad front to avoid the problem of flanking attacks, which most account for the decision to halt the Third Army.
The halt of the Third Army during the month of September was enough to allow the Germans to further fortify the fortress of Metz. In October and November, the Third Army was mired in a near-stalemate with the Germans, with heavy casualties on both sides. By November 23, however, Metz had finally fallen to the Americans, the first time the city had been taken since the Franco-Prussian War.

 

[parsifal]

brookes caution was more than justified up to the middle of 1943. The allies assumed until the end of 1942 that the Soviet Union would surrender, and the british were alarmed at the relatively poor showing and inexperience of the US ground forces up to and including the invasion of Sicily and italy. The slow expansion of the US forces, both air and ground were also grounds for concern. The US had planned an expansion of the army to 200 divs, but this proved too manpower intensive even for the Americans. Even the more modest 70 divs (for Europe)necessitated that formations raised by the Americans had to be broken up as cadres repeatedly throughout 1942-3. And this affected the US Army's performance in combat. They had to earn their spurs the hard way really, and in this regard the choice of North Africa and then Sicily gave the American Army invaluable combat experience, that seasoned up its frontline combat formations.

There were other reasons why Brooke and indeed almost the entire British army establishment was cautious. At the top of the list was the continuing threat of the U-Boats. No-one could have predicted just how quick the Allies could bring this menace to heel,until that was achieved, no major invasions were at all feasible.

The second major issue was the relatively slow reinforcement of US air assets in Europe. Until the end of 1942, the lions share of USAAC assets continued to flow to the pacific. The first operational fighter sorties were not until July 1942, the first squadron sized bomber strikes were not until a month or two later.

What threw Brookes assessments off kilter were the unexpected turns of good fortune....the rapid collapse in North Africa, the early surrender of italy, the surival of Russia, the mastery over the U-Boats, the rapid improvemnts in US combat performance and the rapid ramping up of US air assets in Europe after 1942. These coupled with the waning levels of german resistance gave the allies the window of opportunity they needed, and from the british point of view meant they would not be called upon to decimate their meagre manpower resources protecting the Americans in what would be a most diabolical combat situation. It meant that the planners could calculate the build up of forces on the continent after y-Day and predict with confidence that the allies would achieve a numerical superiority by Y(+50).

 

[ivanotter]

Dunno know what happened to my response. I'll try again.

Patton ought to be a thread all by himself. A most remarkable character.

I forgot about Lee and his strange ways in terms of logistics.

Looking at it, Monty's priority should probably have been to open Antwerp (Shelde) and get the supplies in faster. It would have made a difference in terms of Patton's drive and (maybe!) Patton would not have "liberated" Monty's fuel, hampering all movements.

On the other hand, fighting for Antwerp would not have been particular spectacular and after all, Monty's was probably the only UK general also trying to catch the head lines. He must have seen how much mileage Clark got our of having his own press corps attached to his HQ.

Maybe the only time Monty got "courageous" was Market Garden, after having been heckled by the US for being slow, no imagination, fighting the last war, etc etc.

Brooke was not so sure on Market Garden, but maybe his view was also clouded?

Brooke does come across as very very European in his views. I don't think he really understood the magnitude and scope of King's drive in the Pacific. It must have been a bit of a paradigm shift.

I read somewhere (not Brynt's books) that Brooke started to realise that the US/UK generals were outclassed compared to the German generals in the likes of Model, Manstein, etc. The one's they had not seen or heard about. The one's who could command big formations like 500,000 to 1 million troops.

Nobody in the US/UK camp got even close to numbers like that. Apparantly it also impacted his view in 43/44. Comments?

Brooke, for all his briliance, must have been very very cautious, to the point of pessimistic. Whether it was painting a bleak picture to be able to come with good news, I don't know.

Parsifal/Mike: Did it also have something to do with his experinces in 1940 France?

Gort, as Mike points out, was close to sacking him as too pessimistic n 1940 France. Whether Gort was out of touch and Brooke was realistic is a good question. Surely there was not too much to be happy about in 1940 France.

There is a reference to his discussion with Marshall on the invasion (1942 apparantly). Marshall pushing for a 3division invasion. Broke asking him: so, if you get ashore with yor 3 division, then waht? Do you want to go North, South , East? Where? Marshall did not ahve an answer to that.

I think it is a pity that the US felt Brooke was underhanded in his dealings with them. Was Brooke ever underhanded and "sharp practice".

What he also said was that it was unforgivable that the US wanted to bargain resources (Italy campaign) for strategy. Landing craft held as a carrot if the UK would give in. They didn't and the promiose of landing craft got cancelled.

Comments?

Ivan

 

[Smokey Stover]

Many in the Allied command considered Montgomery to be arrogant and self-infatuated, while he viewed himself as the world's greatest military mind. He resented that Eisenhower was his superior, openly expressing disdain and privately belittling his generalship. Eisenhower displayed heroic patience in his dealings with Monty, but still came close to sacking him. Eisenhower was particularly frustrated with Montgomery's refusal to make a move unless ensured that a vast superiority in troops and weapons guaranteed victory and maintained his reputation. Eisenhower respected Montgomery's abilities though, and Monty, in his own fashion, found Eisenhower difficult to dislike. Montgomery even admitted that Eisenhower was the only one who had the personality to get all the Allies to cooperate and win the war

Exactly what Monty did in Africa. Waited until the US had supplied him with enough tanks and guns. War material along with superior airpower. Nothing of Rommels supplies were getting through as the allies knew exactly when and where to intercept them. And i believe on the night of the final battle, when the bombardment by the allies started, Monty was so assured of victory he simply went to bed! The mans talent was as overrated as his own ego.....

 

[buffnut453]

So where do you stand on the statement "Good generals think about tactics; great generals think about logistics"? Surely a general who deliberately offers his enemy a chance of success is doing it wrong?

 

[yulzari]

Monty was not a lightning fast mover. /QUOTE]
It may be worth your while to look at his training and exercising of his Division in France in 1939/40 and their quick reactions to events that overtook the BEF. He had formed his Division into a truly tactically mobile Division and continued this in Britain afterwards. I am no personal fan of him but his unwillingness to act until his forces were at their best was founded upon his WW1 and French experiences.

 

[yulzari]

Exactly what Monty did in Africa. Waited until the US had supplied him with enough tanks and guns. War material along with superior airpower. Nothing of Rommels' supplies were getting through as the allies knew exactly when and where to intercept them. And i believe on the night of the final battle, when the bombardment by the allies started, Monty was so assured of victory he simply went to bed! The mans talent was as overrated as his own ego.....

He came over as arrogant and self centred for certain but the above was his talent. That he had confidence in his talent never made him friends in his career but it was not without reason.

 

[Glider]

There is one talent that Monty and Patton had, which is both rare and precious, their troops trusted and respected them. Its not often mentioned but without it neither would have got very far.
My father who was serving in the ME in a medical unit and father in law, who was in the Artillery both told the some story but at different events. Churchill and Montgomery both spoke together, to the troops on a quick tour. When Churchill spoke he was booed and whistled at, when Montgomery spoke there was silence and he was cheered at the end.

It's not surprising that this was never reported.

 

[redcoat]

Exactly what Monty did in Africa. Waited until the US had supplied him with enough tanks and guns. War material along with superior airpower. Nothing of Rommels supplies were getting through as the allies knew exactly when and where to intercept them. And i believe on the night of the final battle, when the bombardment by the allies started, Monty was so assured of victory he simply went to bed! The mans talent was as overrated as his own ego.....

The planning and everything were already organised, there was nothing he else he could do in the short term, so he might as well go to bed. It also played well with the staff at headquarters, it showed he was confident about the coming battle.
Monty was not a nice person, but then again neither were most of the successful generals of WW2, Ike was the exception not the rule.

 

[redcoat]

Against that, Monty was not a lightning fast mover.
]

Monty's 21st Army Group advanced 250 miles in four days after the breakout from Normandy.

 

[swampyankee]

Both Montgomery and Patton were wounded in action: Monty at the First Battle of Ypres, where he was shot in the lung, Patton near the end of the war. After Monty's recovery, he served at the battles of Passchendaele and Arras; the incredibly bloody and, possibly the worst-run and worst-planned major military operations of the era. Monty was cautious because he saw the costs of poor planning and optimism.

 

[Smokey Stover]

When World War II started, the British Army was dominated by class-conscious officers who valued pedigree over battlefield skill. This made it, as historian Maj. Gen. Lord Michael Fitzalan-Howard noted, "not very good." One exception was Montgomery, son of a bishop of Tasmania. Short, thin, with a large beak-like nose and arresting blue-grey eyes, possessing an incisive, brilliant mind and an iron will, Montgomery was a masterful and inspiring trainer of men. He had almost single-handedly modernised the sclerotic British Army through his influential reorgonization and training of the Fifth and Twelfth Corps and the South-Eastern Army in England during 1940-41. At least, that's how the story goes. However i dont think Africa can be attributed to any major skill on Monty's part. He could hardly have got it wrong.
However his traits had important consequences when it came to Montgomery's relationship with Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the supreme Allied commander in the Mediterranean in 1943 and later in northern Europe. Given their differences in personalities, a falling out between the two was more a question of "when" rather than "if." Unfortunately, the "when" happened immediately and dramatically.

Though Montgomery didn't smoke, drink, or chase women, he did love to gamble. No wager was too small or unusual. In spring 1943, as Montgomery was preparing his attack on German troops in Tunisia from the east, Eisenhower's chief of staff Maj. Gen. Walter Smith made the mistake of telling Monty that if his troops captured the Tunisian town of Sfax by April 15, he'd give Montgomery a B-17 complete with American crew to use as his personal airplane. Smith meant it as a joke. Monty took it at face value and entered it into his book. Needless to say this raised the eyebrows of the senior Army Air Force commanders in North Africa and deeply embarrassed Smith. Eisenhower was furious. In fact he was so incensed that weeks later he vented about it to Brooke during a meeting they had, backed up by Smith's explanation. In vain Brooke tried to smooth things over. Brooke later had a meeting with Montgomery and raked him over the coals for his "crass stupidity." Monty contritely apologized for his insensitive transgression. The incident proved a harbinger of worse to come. The B-17 was written off in a crash-landing about a month later and was never replaced. He was indeed much like Patton, both equally loved and loathed by soldiers and officers alike. He certainly had a talent for rubbing his superiors up the wrong way. Not to mention sometimes leaving Brooke on the brink of exasperation. But much of the liberation of europe was political appeasement as much as combat effectiveness. I think D-day (And the amendments he made to the overall plan was his finest hour) The key to the whole plan was simplicity. And despite the drama at Omaha it went pretty well, although Germany made some huge tactical errors at the most important time. The first 48hrs of the invasion. But then when you look at operations after that ie: Taking Caen (Operations Cobra) and the Market Garden disaster. The doubts and ego of Monty was beginning to show some fatal flaws in his character. Not to mention ability. Was he bold, and innovative, or was he just cautious to the point where victory was assured. Idk. But his true nature and combat aptitude are very much debated to this day.

 

[redcoat]

The doubts and ego of Monty was beginning to show some fatal flaws in his character. Not to mention ability. Was he bold, and innovative, or was he just cautious to the point where victory was assured. Idk. But his true nature and combat aptitude are very much debated to this day.

It's probably true to say that Monty was not as good as some British say he was, but better than a lot of Americans think he was.
What cannot be denied is that Monty knew how to beat the Germans on a regular basis at a tolerable cost to his own forces.
Rommel probably gave Monty his greatest complement when he said " When Monty arrived in North Africa the war stopped being a game".

 

[pbehn]

It's probably true to say that Monty was not as good as some British say he was, but better than a lot of Americans think he was..

Churchill said of Monty "In defeat unbeatable, in victory unbearable" so on the British side Monty wasn't universally loved. However to criticize a commander for ensuring he had the maximum of elements in his favour before attacking in a desert battle is a bit rich.

 

[redcoat]

Churchill said of Monty "In defeat unbeatable, in victory unbearable" so on the British side Monty wasn't universally loved. H

He wasn't universally hated on the US side either. Those US Generals who served under him normally had good relations with him, Simpson, Hodges, and Gavin all stated that he created a good impression with them.
Even Bradley, before his big falling out with Monty over Ike giving Monty control of his Northern forces during the Battle Of the Bulge had a good working relationship with him.