US strategy and tactics for Midway if IJN has radar, CIC and radios in the Zeros

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If Yamaguchi could send the Vals individual like then Nagumo also.

Sounds like something against doctrine to do that.

Since no air strike was launched or could be launched then immaterial.

Maybe Yamaguchi was able to be more of a wild card than Nagumo and was able to roll the dice.

Shokaku was hit hard twice but survived. So need to look how she survived and the others didn't

Read somewhere the damage control commander of Akagi and Taiho was the same guy. Go figure.
 
HMS Glorious. HMS Eagle was sunk by a submarine.
To be fair, Glorious was lost by a submariner. One who had no business commanding a carrier.
Why did Hiryu split the Vals and Kates up? Why not go for all in?
This has me thinking, if we have radar, radios, CIC and CAP discipline there's an opportunity to operate all four carriers as one. Use two carriers to ready and cycle the fighters, the other two to prep and launch the Vals and Kates (on the flight decks, not in the hangars - requires a doctrine rethink). Radar will prevent the strike carriers from being bounced and give time to clear the flight decks, and give the fighter carriers time to launch and climb to intercept height.
 
To be fair, Glorious was lost by a submariner. One who had no business commanding a carrier.

This has me thinking, if we have radar, radios, CIC and CAP discipline there's an opportunity to operate all four carriers as one. Use two carriers to ready and cycle the fighters, the other two to prep and launch the Vals and Kates (on the flight decks, not in the hangars - requires a doctrine rethink). Radar will prevent the strike carriers from being bounced and give time to clear the flight decks, and give the fighter carriers time to launch and climb to intercept height.
"…Glorious was lost by a submariner ". Classic.
 
Not all American skippers were aviators, right? Non-aviators had to have an aviator for exec, though, iirc.
Good catch! Admiral Spruance wasn't an aviator but he sure knew when to listen. For some reason (too lazy to look it up) I think the skippers of the first 3 purpose built U.S. carriers had aviation experience. Not just putting some torpedo guy in charge of a carrier flotilla ;).
 
Good catch! Admiral Spruance wasn't an aviator but he sure knew when to listen. For some reason (too lazy to look it up) I think the skippers of the first 3 purpose built U.S. carriers had aviation experience. Not just putting some torpedo guy in charge of a carrier flotilla ;).

Yeah, I'm not sure if the rule applied only to fleet commanders (Spruance wasn't a flier, Halsey was, and each had to have an executive officer from the counterpoised component) -- or if it trickled down to carrier command as well.

Definitely don't have a sub skipper doing that without more training.
 
The flight decks of the IJN were clear. The only flying activity was the CAP Zeroes. Not dollar one Val or Kate saw deck space while under constant air attack.

It was against doctrine to launch strike aircraft while under attack.

The obvious thing to do was split up carrier division 1 and 2 so plenty of distance so you find one carrier but not tother. But against doctrine this is. Would have given a free hand to Yamaguchi.
 
The flight decks of the IJN were clear. The only flying activity was the CAP Zeroes. Not dollar one Val or Kate saw deck space while under constant air attack.

It was against doctrine to launch strike aircraft while under attack.

The obvious thing to do was split up carrier division 1 and 2 so plenty of distance so you find one carrier but not tother. But against doctrine this is. Would have given a free hand to Yamaguchi.

I think it's fair to say that doctrinal problems delivered headaches to Nagumo at Midway, starting with being short Zuikaku because doctrine attached specific air groups to specific ships, then having cruisers do spotting (resulting in Tone's flopping one leg of the search), and then insisting on building a complete strike package instead of immediately launching a partial attack, which led directly to disaster.

Yamaguchi had the luxury of ignoring doctrine because by the time Hiryu launched against Yorktown is was the last serviceable IJN carrier. He still saw fit to rearm Kates with torpedoes.
 
Not all American skippers were aviators, right? Non-aviators had to have an aviator for exec, though, iirc.
Indeed. SOP and chain of command on the RN's carrier should have been the senior FAA officer has the final say on air Ops. So, if Glorious' air boss wants to put up a CAP of Sea Gladiators and place his five Swordfish on the flight deck aft, fueled, torpedo-armed with engines warmed and aircrew at five mins readiness, her Captain must defer to the former's supposed expertise.

I'd like to think that Glorious' captain refused his air boss, rather than think that the air boss was so terribly negligent.
 
Indeed. SOP and chain of command on the RN's carrier should have been the senior FAA officer has the final say on air Ops. So, if Glorious' air boss wants to put up a CAP of Sea Gladiators and place his five Swordfish on the flight deck aft, fueled, torpedo-armed with engines warmed and aircrew at five mins readiness, her Captain must defer to the former's supposed expertise.

I'd like to think that Glorious' captain refused his air boss, rather than think that the air boss was so terribly negligent.

In one sense you're right. But when you consider that launch and recovery have seamanship decisions involved, I'm not sure that the air boss should have final say. Ideally, both leaders would have a relationship where they can hash these things over and come to a mutual decision. But the captain owns the responsibility for the ship, so his word should, in my mind, have more weight.
 
In one sense you're right. But when you consider that launch and recovery have seamanship decisions involved, I'm not sure that the air boss should have final say. Ideally, both leaders would have a relationship where they can hash these things over and come to a mutual decision. But the captain owns the responsibility for the ship, so his word should, in my mind, have more weight.
Well sure, but if the captain makes a decision outside his area of expertise or simply one of negligence, for example ordering a ship's primary defensive armament to be taken off line in a combat zone, such as disarming a submarine's torpedoes, disconnecting power to a battleship's main turrets or refusing to put an aircraft carrier's aircraft aloft on CAP or have them at readiness, I'd like to think the command structure would have some failsafes prevent this. Clearly it didn't. Does it now?
 
Well sure, but if the captain makes a decision outside his area of expertise or simply one of negligence, for example ordering a ship's primary defensive armament to be taken off line in a combat zone, such as disarming a submarine's torpedoes, disconnecting power to a battleship's main turrets or refusing to put an aircraft carrier's aircraft aloft on CAP or have them at readiness, I'd like to think the command structure would have some failsafes prevent this. Clearly it didn't. Does it now?

Any system of command is only as good as the people it consists of.
 
The flight decks of the IJN were clear. The only flying activity was the CAP Zeroes. Not dollar one Val or Kate saw deck space while under constant air attack.

It was against doctrine to launch strike aircraft while under attack.

The obvious thing to do was split up carrier division 1 and 2 so plenty of distance so you find one carrier but not tother. But against doctrine this is. Would have given a free hand to Yamaguchi.
This is one of the reasons I believe the A6M is grossly overrated as a fighter, the IJN based their plans and fighting doctrine around the Zero's shortcomings and that let to armed bombers/torpedo planes being below decks waiting for a penetrating hit.
 
This is one of the reasons I believe the A6M is grossly overrated as a fighter...
One of the few times the Zero seems to have saved its carrier(s) from crippling damage or destruction by air strike is at Ceylon where the A6M encountered Blenheims and Fulmars. Otherwise, the Zeros fail to protect at least eleven IJN carriers from USN air attack: Shōhō at Coral Sea; Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū and Hiryū at Midway; Ryūjō at Eastern Solomons; Zuikaku, Zuihō, Chitose and Chiyoda at Leyte Gulf; and Hiyō at Philippine Sea. Only the Fairey Fulmar in the Med (allowing crippling strikes on Illustrious, Formidable and Indomitable) appears to be a worse fleet air defence fighter.

To be fair, Zuikaku did survive Coral Sea intact, so we can give the Zeros credit there, but basically if you're an IJN carrier you cannot depend on the A6M to protect you whatsoever. With few guns, little ammunition, no working radios and no protection for the pilot or fuel the Zero seems to be about the worst you could get in a single seat, monoplane fleet defence fighter.
 
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The weaknesses of the Zero would have been on any other fighter.

So I say no. By the loss of Shokaku and Zuikaku the jig was up and no Zero could have done much.

Remember with the Kamikaze airplanes were still getting through. Even against radar direction and high performance aircraft and better flak.
 

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