US strategy and tactics for Midway if IJN has radar, CIC and radios in the Zeros

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Can I get an Amen if the Wildcats had self sealing tanks at Midway?
Beyond the radio, the biggest problem with the Zero at Midway is there wasn't enough of them. Each carrier only had 17-18 as a standard complement. That's not enough to escort a strike and have a standing combat air patrol, with a relief refueling and rearming. That's especially not enough if, because you won't have radar warning of an attack, you have to have fighters out covering multiple directions of attack, preferably at multiple altitudes.
 
Beyond the radio, the biggest problem with the Zero at Midway is there wasn't enough of them. Each carrier only had 17-18 as a standard complement. That's not enough to escort a strike and have a standing combat air patrol, with a relief refueling and rearming. That's especially not enough if, because you won't have radar warning of an attack, you have to have fighters out covering multiple directions of attack, preferably at multiple altitudes.
The spec to Mitsubishi should have demanded narrow folding wings, just outbound of the cannons.

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I think the F4F-4 had a reduced firing time due to reduced loadout per gun.
I do agree that the USN fighters were better equipped for the job.
Any other country, any other plane, we would accept that pre-war experten were not the best judge of "90 day wonders" ability and that more rounds during the brief moment they lined up the target were required. Galland argued much the same to Molders that average Bf.109 pilot needed the 20mm cannons in wings in addition to MG & Cannons in fuselage even if they didn't - the increase in firepower was worth the loss of maneuverability. Grumman added a circuit breaker for each pair of 50s, so experts like Thach could disable a pair if he wanted and actually extend the firing time beyond the F4F-3, although, with reduced firepower.

The pertinence to this discussion - D'Oyly-Hughes had his wings and couldn't understand why the average FAA pilot found it so difficult to fly off and land on the CV*. He had over ruled his Air Boss on the suitability of targets the Gladiators/Swordfish were attack (separating Allied from German troops in Norwegian woods noting the terrain is very mountainous) and the pilots ability to do so through defenses by Luftwaffe and Heer. To which end, D'Oyly-Hughes had his original Air Boss sent back to UK to stand trail at court marshal for disobeying orders in face of enemy.

So, it's no wonder the replacement Air Boss wasn't telling the Captain what he should or shouldn't be doing with CAP.

Also, besides increasing octane to make more power on premium feed stock i.e. 100 octane, tetraethyl lead could be added to lower feedstock e.g. 80 octane to make 87 octane leaded. And leaded fuel has advantage of "lubricating" exhaust valve seats. "Lubricated" exhaust valves/seats lasted dramatically longer = longer times between overhauls. The Swordfish operating on Glorious didn't have advantage of leaded fuel, so their engine TBO ratings were abysmal - right up there with Russian's 25 hours/late war German 50 hours - Bristol putting more effort into sleeve valves than poppet ones.

*If you look at D'Oyly-Hughes' WWI exploits its almost the stuff of movies - he was an incredible athlete. I've also read he liked to hit on subordinate's wives.
 
Courageous as well, but not on her captain's head.

What I know of that, which is not much, indicates to me that that was operational rather than derelict. Courageous turned into the wind to launch, setting up the U-boat's shot, and that it was shy two escorts due to another ship in trouble.

If what I know is incomplete, and it probably is, I certainly welcome correction.
 
What I know of that, which is not much, indicates to me that that was operational rather than derelict. Courageous turned into the wind to launch, setting up the U-boat's shot, and that it was shy two escorts due to another ship in trouble.

If what I know is incomplete, and it probably is, I certainly welcome correction.
True. This remind me of my earlier thread Better luck for the RN carrier force 1939-1941
 
An F4F-4 had about 18 seconds of firing time if firing all guns together.
An F4F-3 had about 32 seconds of firing time for 4 guns.

The Zero used at Midway had about 7 seconds of firing time for the 20mm cannon and over 30 seconds for the cowl mounted 7.7mm machine guns.
I think times are a bit longer for both as the early M2s didn't fire quite 800 rpm, and belt drag further slowed the -3 version when it was pulling the last of the belt out of the magazine.

But if one turned off the breaker for the outer guns, F4F-4 got 18 seconds for 4 guns, then turn breaker back on and you get 18 more on the outer pair - better than Zero after it had expended its cannon rounds.
 
Beyond the radio, the biggest problem with the Zero at Midway is there wasn't enough of them. Each carrier only had 17-18 as a standard complement. That's not enough to escort a strike and have a standing combat air patrol, with a relief refueling and rearming. That's especially not enough if, because you won't have radar warning of an attack, you have to have fighters out covering multiple directions of attack, preferably at multiple altitudes.
Would keeping Ryūjō with fleet and adding 18 additional Zeros have made a difference? I know her std compliment was 12 Zeros and 18 Kates but I'm assuming that could be reversed.

I don't think any of the other IJN CVs had the speed/range to have kept up. Jun'yō also went North to Aleutians, but she is a little slow for maneuvers with fleet.

It's too early to think of adding Zeros to Tone, Chikuma, Chiyoda or Nisshin - even as replacement for combat losses.
 
A lot of things went wrong. But more importantly the IJN put themselves in a position for things to go wrong.

A few highlights.

No Shokaku or Zuikaku.
Within range of attack from Midway.
No knowledge of where the carriers were.
No land based aircraft helping out.
No radar or fighter control.

The problem with the ratio of bombers to fighters on a carrier is an issue. Zeroes are nice but it's the bombers doing the do. USN got round this as Hellcats could launch with a bombload so it could double as a bomber. So more Hellcats.

There was no big book of carrier warfare so mistakes were made. This was still the only second time carrier battles were done so it was a learning curve.

The guy who shoots first, wins first. So the issue is the Americans got there attack in first. Had the Japanese got thier full strike in first and knew where all 3 carriers were then this would be a thread critical of the USN.
 
A lot of things went wrong. But more importantly the IJN put themselves in a position for things to go wrong.

A few highlights.

No Shokaku or Zuikaku.
Within range of attack from Midway.
No knowledge of where the carriers were.
No land based aircraft helping out.
No radar or fighter control.

The problem with the ratio of bombers to fighters on a carrier is an issue. Zeroes are nice but it's the bombers doing the do. USN got round this as Hellcats could launch with a bombload so it could double as a bomber. So more Hellcats.

There was no big book of carrier warfare so mistakes were made. This was still the only second time carrier battles were done so it was a learning curve.

The guy who shoots first, wins first. So the issue is the Americans got there attack in first. Had the Japanese got thier full strike in first and knew where all 3 carriers were then this would be a thread critical of the USN.
The IJN's first mistake was letting Kido Butai range ahead of the fleet.
Yamamoto should have closed with Midway Atoll and shelled the island with his battleships and cruisers while his carriers (he had six) provided fleet cover and interdiction.
Instead, allowing the first and second carrier divisions to take the lead against the well defended Atoll was literally letting his arse dangle in the breeze.

Considering how Wake Island put up a ferocious defense despite the odds only a few months prior, they should have learned from that and expected a similar reception and planned accordingly.
 
Use the carriers as air cover. Send in A few Kongos and cruisers and destroyers and shell Midway to bejesus under cover of darkness.

Use float planes to drop flares for BDA and direction.

Then retreat before dawn to the carriers for air cover.

A few overflights to assess damage.

Carriers are outside effective Midway strikes and the islands are a mess.

If you lose a cruiser or destroyer then price of doing business.

Can anyone see any flaws? Pretty air tight.
 
I think times are a bit longer for both as the early M2s didn't fire quite 800 rpm, and belt drag further slowed the -3 version when it was pulling the last of the belt out of the magazine.

But if one turned off the breaker for the outer guns, F4F-4 got 18 seconds for 4 guns, then turn breaker back on and you get 18 more on the outer pair - better than Zero after it had expended its cannon rounds.
The faster fire rate was adopted/approved in 1940. Existing guns could be modified with a parts kit. Even if the adoption/approval was in Dec 1940 they had about 1 1/2 years to modify the guns on the F4F-3s. This didn't solve the belt pull problem though which also changed on various aircraft depending on exact lay out of the ammo boxes. Belt pull was changed at some point but even that didn't solve everything (P-51B & Cs). Since the ammo was most often held in layers instead of one long flat box pull shouldn't have changed that much on an F4F.

Firing time for the Zero's 7.7mm guns is actually longer due to synchronization.

Basic point is that the F4F-4s even using all six guns at once had about 2 1/2 times the firing duration of the Zero's 20mm guns.
Need for the US fighters to constantly land and take-off to resupply with ammunition was much less.
 
But how much metal is thrown downrange and what is the energy?

20mm is more destructive per gallon than 50 cal.
 

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