The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
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To be fair, Glorious was lost by a submariner. One who had no business commanding a carrier.HMS Glorious. HMS Eagle was sunk by a submarine.
This has me thinking, if we have radar, radios, CIC and CAP discipline there's an opportunity to operate all four carriers as one. Use two carriers to ready and cycle the fighters, the other two to prep and launch the Vals and Kates (on the flight decks, not in the hangars - requires a doctrine rethink). Radar will prevent the strike carriers from being bounced and give time to clear the flight decks, and give the fighter carriers time to launch and climb to intercept height.Why did Hiryu split the Vals and Kates up? Why not go for all in?
"…Glorious was lost by a submariner ". Classic.To be fair, Glorious was lost by a submariner. One who had no business commanding a carrier.
This has me thinking, if we have radar, radios, CIC and CAP discipline there's an opportunity to operate all four carriers as one. Use two carriers to ready and cycle the fighters, the other two to prep and launch the Vals and Kates (on the flight decks, not in the hangars - requires a doctrine rethink). Radar will prevent the strike carriers from being bounced and give time to clear the flight decks, and give the fighter carriers time to launch and climb to intercept height.
Indeed. Only those who've passed the Perisher were allowed to command HM submarines. It's too bad the RN didn't institute the same rule for their carriers, with some specialized command track course, ideally starting with FAA pilots."…Glorious was lost by a submariner ". Classic.
Considering all the innovations to naval aviation the RN had introduced, I'm surprised the RN didn't require some aviation experience for carrier skippers.
Good catch! Admiral Spruance wasn't an aviator but he sure knew when to listen. For some reason (too lazy to look it up) I think the skippers of the first 3 purpose built U.S. carriers had aviation experience. Not just putting some torpedo guy in charge of a carrier flotillaNot all American skippers were aviators, right? Non-aviators had to have an aviator for exec, though, iirc.
Good catch! Admiral Spruance wasn't an aviator but he sure knew when to listen. For some reason (too lazy to look it up) I think the skippers of the first 3 purpose built U.S. carriers had aviation experience. Not just putting some torpedo guy in charge of a carrier flotilla.
The flight decks of the IJN were clear. The only flying activity was the CAP Zeroes. Not dollar one Val or Kate saw deck space while under constant air attack.
It was against doctrine to launch strike aircraft while under attack.
The obvious thing to do was split up carrier division 1 and 2 so plenty of distance so you find one carrier but not tother. But against doctrine this is. Would have given a free hand to Yamaguchi.
Indeed. SOP and chain of command on the RN's carrier should have been the senior FAA officer has the final say on air Ops. So, if Glorious' air boss wants to put up a CAP of Sea Gladiators and place his five Swordfish on the flight deck aft, fueled, torpedo-armed with engines warmed and aircrew at five mins readiness, her Captain must defer to the former's supposed expertise.Not all American skippers were aviators, right? Non-aviators had to have an aviator for exec, though, iirc.
Indeed. SOP and chain of command on the RN's carrier should have been the senior FAA officer has the final say on air Ops. So, if Glorious' air boss wants to put up a CAP of Sea Gladiators and place his five Swordfish on the flight deck aft, fueled, torpedo-armed with engines warmed and aircrew at five mins readiness, her Captain must defer to the former's supposed expertise.
I'd like to think that Glorious' captain refused his air boss, rather than think that the air boss was so terribly negligent.
Well sure, but if the captain makes a decision outside his area of expertise or simply one of negligence, for example ordering a ship's primary defensive armament to be taken off line in a combat zone, such as disarming a submarine's torpedoes, disconnecting power to a battleship's main turrets or refusing to put an aircraft carrier's aircraft aloft on CAP or have them at readiness, I'd like to think the command structure would have some failsafes prevent this. Clearly it didn't. Does it now?In one sense you're right. But when you consider that launch and recovery have seamanship decisions involved, I'm not sure that the air boss should have final say. Ideally, both leaders would have a relationship where they can hash these things over and come to a mutual decision. But the captain owns the responsibility for the ship, so his word should, in my mind, have more weight.
Well sure, but if the captain makes a decision outside his area of expertise or simply one of negligence, for example ordering a ship's primary defensive armament to be taken off line in a combat zone, such as disarming a submarine's torpedoes, disconnecting power to a battleship's main turrets or refusing to put an aircraft carrier's aircraft aloft on CAP or have them at readiness, I'd like to think the command structure would have some failsafes prevent this. Clearly it didn't. Does it now?
This is one of the reasons I believe the A6M is grossly overrated as a fighter, the IJN based their plans and fighting doctrine around the Zero's shortcomings and that let to armed bombers/torpedo planes being below decks waiting for a penetrating hit.The flight decks of the IJN were clear. The only flying activity was the CAP Zeroes. Not dollar one Val or Kate saw deck space while under constant air attack.
It was against doctrine to launch strike aircraft while under attack.
The obvious thing to do was split up carrier division 1 and 2 so plenty of distance so you find one carrier but not tother. But against doctrine this is. Would have given a free hand to Yamaguchi.
True. Imagine today, sailing USS Nimitz past Iranian waters with all the aircraft in the hangar, no CAP, all pilots stood down, reactor at half steam.Any system of command is only as good as the people it consists of.
True. Imagine today, sailing USS Nimitz past Iranian waters with all the aircraft in the hangar, no CAP, all pilots stood down, reactor at half steam.
One of the few times the Zero seems to have saved its carrier(s) from crippling damage or destruction by air strike is at Ceylon where the A6M encountered Blenheims and Fulmars. Otherwise, the Zeros fail to protect at least eleven IJN carriers from USN air attack: Shōhō at Coral Sea; Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū and Hiryū at Midway; Ryūjō at Eastern Solomons; Zuikaku, Zuihō, Chitose and Chiyoda at Leyte Gulf; and Hiyō at Philippine Sea. Only the Fairey Fulmar in the Med (allowing crippling strikes on Illustrious, Formidable and Indomitable) appears to be a worse fleet air defence fighter.This is one of the reasons I believe the A6M is grossly overrated as a fighter...
Courageous as well, but not on her captain's head.Glorious' loss was definitely dereliction of duty, in my non-sailor opinion.