USAAF philopshy of the heavies being able to defend themselfs

We've been using the Norden at our "bomber camp". The servo system that controls the flight controls during the bomb run is not installed so we have made the PDI or Pilot Direction Indicator operational on the panel. As the bombardier sights in on the target from the IP we maintain a specific airspeed and altitude while the bombardier gives us heading corrections via the PDI. We are using 3,000ft as a hard deck and the bombsight is calibrated at 150mph. When the indices cross within the bombsight it trips the releases on the bomb racks and out they go. While this system works we manually release the bombs. Has the bombsigt been accurate...not really but we get close enough to our 150ft target ring to do damage if we were on an actual mission. What does all this mean? The bombsight got you close, having 100 bombers behind you laid waste to alot of landscape below it. I believe they went to a lead toggalier to reduce crew and redundancy. Why have 100 extra men on a mission that could be accomplished by 1 + a few backups in case of any anomolies.

jim

pbfoot said:

I understand the principle but can't see how it works . Thats a noble thought to try and hope your lead Nav , or Bombadier find and hit the target but I just don't buy it , at least every bomber in BC attempted to hit target

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It is simple. Those individuals that repeatedly demonstrate superior competencies are selected to lead others in their assigned tasks.

The RAF picked master Bombers, etc to lead the rest of the RAF to the proper city - but there was nothing past marking the rough center of mass for the ciry they were attacking, based on the visibility provided by descending flare clusters to illuminate the city - and even then there wasn't a mass of formation flying Lancasters to at least achieve a collective footprint of bombs around a small tough target. Nor was the RAF flying in a long straight line over any night target they chose to hit - trying to eliminate being an easy target to find and shoot down by NJG fighters (or searchlight illuminated flak)

Using night bombing by RAF versus daylight, computer aided/optically acquired targeting is a silly comparison - until you take visibility out of the equation.

Every USAAF pilot, navigator and bombadier Tried to hit the target early in their campaign - but pre-lead crew the results were closer to RAF area bombing than subsequent results achieved by lead crew/combat box tight formations under AFCE.

If you believe the RAF achieved better results by daylight bombing against Oil and Chemical Refining targets (as I do) than area bombing the same targets at night, the comparison should work better?

I'm not saying night was better then day alls I'm stating no matter what you call it or who is doing it , its all area bombing its just the USAAF dressed it up a bit by calling it precision bombing .

pbfoot said:

I'm not saying night was better then day alls I'm stating no matter what you call it or who is doing it , its all area bombing its just the USAAF dressed it up a bit by calling it precision bombing .

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We agree to disagree. Not one airpower - Axix or Allied went to night bombing to get better bombing results. If you look at RAF's major triumphs for accuracy (Tirpitz, Jail Break, etc) all were daylight efforts. Night bombing was a priority because of daylight losses - not bombing accuracy. Ditto Germany over well defended target areas.

Speer was far more concerned about the impact of daylight strategic bombing and said so in his biography. Calling daylight precison bombing area bombing is valid for targets like Dresden, and just about any target under 8/10 to 10/10 cover is Ok, but bombing at, and hitting, targets like bridges, submarine pens, ball bearing/aircraft assy plants, refining plant critical equipment may have an 'area spread' for the hits but the target itself was hit - similar to say, Tirpitz. There were a LOT of misses attacking the Tirpitz but the RAF couldn't hope to do it at night.

Drdondog,

I think you and pbfoot are talking past each other. This isn't an argument about whether daylight or night bombing was more or less precise. It's a question of the definition of the term "precision bombing". If only the lead aircraft in a formation has a Norden bombsight, and all other members toggle with the lead, then while there may be some attempt at "precision aiming" by one aircraft, the net result was still "area bombing" because of formation spread, aerodynamic dispersion of the bombs (on top of other errors such as mis-identification of the target by the lead etc).

Just trying to clarify the discussion.

Cheers,
B-N

buffnut453 said:

Drdondog,

I think you and pbfoot are talking past each other. This isn't an argument about whether daylight or night bombing was more or less precise. It's a question of the definition of the term "precision bombing". If only the lead aircraft in a formation has a Norden bombsight, and all other members toggle with the lead, then while there may be some attempt at "precision aiming" by one aircraft, the net result was still "area bombing" because of formation spread, aerodynamic dispersion of the bombs (on top of other errors such as mis-identification of the target by the lead etc).

Just trying to clarify the discussion.

Cheers,
B-N

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Thanks for helping me out. I'm just using my knowledge of controlling (ATC ) and my 190 hours of trying to fly sometimes even the best (place finder) navigator messes up . My best navigation story is 2 106's doing a flyby on a small town (wrong town wrong country) one sunday morning

drgondog said:

Every USAAF pilot, navigator and bombadier Tried to hit the target early in their campaign - but pre-lead crew the results were closer to RAF area bombing than subsequent results achieved by lead crew/combat box tight formations under AFCE.

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You sure it's not the other way around?

French observers, for example, praised the 8th AF for their accuracy on the sub pens early in the campaign. Before tactics were changed

drgondog said:

We agree to disagree. Not one airpower - Axix or Allied went to night bombing to get better bombing results. If you look at RAF's major triumphs for accuracy (Tirpitz, Jail Break, etc) all were daylight efforts. Night bombing was a priority because of daylight losses - not bombing accuracy. Ditto Germany over well defended target areas.

Speer was far more concerned about the impact of daylight strategic bombing and said so in his biography. Calling daylight precison bombing area bombing is valid for targets like Dresden, and just about any target under 8/10 to 10/10 cover is Ok, but bombing at, and hitting, targets like bridges, submarine pens, ball bearing/aircraft assy plants, refining plant critical equipment may have an 'area spread' for the hits but the target itself was hit - similar to say, Tirpitz. There were a LOT of misses attacking the Tirpitz but the RAF couldn't hope to do it at night.

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Possibly Speer was more concerned with daylight bombing because of the targets. Or that the Luftwaffe experienced greater attrition during the day than the night due to teh escort fighters.

I didn't think that strategic bombers were all that effective against bridges?

Do remember that the accuracy of tallboy attacks was compromised by the bomb release system - the bomb was held in place by a chain strap (as was the Grand Slam) which would often not release correctly. Actually more often than not.

wuzak said:

Possibly Speer was more concerned with daylight bombing because of the targets. Or that the Luftwaffe experienced greater attrition during the day than the night due to teh escort fighters.

Speer was concerned about both the targets the 8th AF was concentrating on as well as the increasing effectiveness. He states clearly that had we (8th AF) followed up immediately on the Schweinfurt attack of August 17 1943 it would have been 'disastrous' and he knew 'it was over' when the 8th started the attacks on the Oil Industry on May 12, 1944 in parallel with 15th AF attacks.

I didn't think that strategic bombers were all that effective against bridges?

I used bridges as an example of daylight precision bombing - more likely medium bomber targets but heavies went after them also.

Do remember that the accuracy of tallboy attacks was compromised by the bomb release system - the bomb was held in place by a chain strap (as was the Grand Slam) which would often not release correctly. Actually more often than not.

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Understood on Tallboy - same reply. With or without perfectshackle release, the daylight attacks were a more effective approach.

You also said 'You sure it's not the other way around?

French observers, for example, praised the 8th AF for their accuracy on the sub pens early in the campaign. Before tactics were changed"

We were getting Intelligence feedback that our 2000 pound bombs were inadequate to destroy the pens and the best we were able to hope for is to nail subs in drydock or cruch machine shops surrounding the pens. Having said that the Strategic Bombing Survey evidenced increasing accuracy as the war progressed but also concluded the USAAF typical bomb load out of 500 and 1000 pound bombs were projected as less effective that equivalent destruction projections for 2000 pound bombs.

As to reliability of French observers, one might question relevancy unless they also observed effects at Renault in Paris or Schweinfurt or Bremen shipyards also to establish some comparisons?

pbfoot said:

Thanks for helping me out. I'm just using my knowledge of controlling (ATC ) and my 190 hours of trying to fly sometimes even the best (place finder) navigator messes up . My best navigation story is 2 106's doing a flyby on a small town (wrong town wrong country) one sunday morning

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That might not be a good comparison versus say 12 B-17s with two pilots each and 12 navigators who must by practice and order,record individual Lat-Long and time for waypoints - all essentially checking each other despite the lead navigator's responsibility to perform flawlessly - then compare against typical fighter pilots trying to navigate and fly as one person... with one of the two man system closely observing his lead's wing rather than focus on Navaids.

Not to mention one system of 24 pilots and 12 navigators leisurely flying along at 150 mph IAS while the other two (106 drivers) are steaming along at 450 kts on the deck with little visibility of the big picture? One system can note the approach to the Rhine and see Bingen at the bend, while the other pair sees a Lot of water for an instant - then trying to figure out where they just crossed (was it the Rhine, Old Chap?)

buffnut453 said:

Drdondog,

I think you and pbfoot are talking past each other. This isn't an argument about whether daylight or night bombing was more or less precise. It's a question of the definition of the term "precision bombing". If only the lead aircraft in a formation has a Norden bombsight, and all other members toggle with the lead, then while there may be some attempt at "precision aiming" by one aircraft, the net result was still "area bombing" because of formation spread, aerodynamic dispersion of the bombs (on top of other errors such as mis-identification of the target by the lead etc).

Just trying to clarify the discussion.

Cheers,
B-N

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Maybe a rocket firing Typhoon firing unguided rockets at a target the pilot sees, acquires in his sights and releases based on that 'picture' is a similar example of area bombing in your example - versus say a master Bomber releasing a flare package over a blacked out area to guide trailing bombers to 'mark an area'. The analogy carried out for the Typhoon squadron is that his squdron mates don't see the target but trust their leader and salvo on the same target. If lead misses by big margin, likely all miss following his lead.

The two BG's of the 8th AF bombing the Merseburg Refinery or Messerscmidt factory at Augsburg - in clear daylight - is far closer to the Typhoon analogy than the master Bomber led 1000 plane raid on the same target metropolis. If Neil chooses to call both examples 'area bombing', he is free to express his opinion..

drgondog said:

Speer was concerned about both the targets the 8th AF was concentrating on as well as the increasing effectiveness. He states clearly that had we (8th AF) followed up immediately on the Schweinfurt attack of August 17 1943 it would have been 'disastrous' and he knew 'it was over' when the 8th started the attacks on the Oil Industry on May 12, 1944 in parallel with 15th AF attacks.

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Yes, but the 8th AF were basically incapable of following up the first Schweinfurt mission. Bomber Command were supposed to, but they hit Peenemunde instead.

The 8th were even less capable fo following up the second raid.

On the first mission some 80 bombs hit the target. From aroun 200 bombers each carrying 8-10 bombs.

Don't forget that Bomber Command also contributed to the old campaign, and in some ways were more effective (ie their bombs did more damage because they were bigger).

drgondog said:

I used bridges as an example of daylight precision bombing - more likely medium bomber targets but heavies went after them also.

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The most effective raids on bridges were, I'm sure, by medium bombers at low levels.

Did USAAF mediums bomb on the leader? The RAF mediums certainly did not.

drgondog said:

Understood on Tallboy - same reply. With or without perfectshackle release, the daylight attacks were a more effective approach.

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Yes, but they also didn't all just drop their tallboys when their leader did. They all aimed individually.

drgondog said:

You also said 'You sure it's not the other way around?

French observers, for example, praised the 8th AF for their accuracy on the sub pens early in the campaign. Before tactics were changed"

We were getting Intelligence feedback that our 2000 pound bombs were inadequate to destroy the pens and the best we were able to hope for is to nail subs in drydock or cruch machine shops surrounding the pens. Having said that the Strategic Bombing Survey evidenced increasing accuracy as the war progressed but also concluded the USAAF typical bomb load out of 500 and 1000 pound bombs were projected as less effective that equivalent destruction projections for 2000 pound bombs.

As to reliability of French observers, one might question relevancy unless they also observed effects at Renault in Paris or Schweinfurt or Bremen shipyards also to establish some comparisons?

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Not a question of the effectiveness of the bombs. I think the USAAF didn't actually hold out much hope for destroying the pens. But it was a beginning to their campaign.

The use of a larger number of smaller bombs is, IMO, an indicator of area bombing. The larger bombs would have been more effective when hitting the target, but they would also require better aiming to maximise the chances of hits. The USAAF load outs used even smaller bombs, as well. For the oil campaign they often used 250lb bombs - in order to saturate the area and get the highest probability of damaging something vital.

drgondog said:

Maybe a rocket firing Typhoon firing unguided rockets at a target the pilot sees, acquires in his sights and releases based on that 'picture' is a similar example of area bombing in your example - versus say a master Bomber releasing a flare package over a blacked out area to guide trailing bombers to 'mark an area'. The analogy carried out for the Typhoon squadron is that his squdron mates don't see the target but trust their leader and salvo on the same target. If lead misses by big margin, likely all miss following his lead.

The two BG's of the 8th AF bombing the Merseburg Refinery or Messerscmidt factory at Augsburg - in clear daylight - is far closer to the Typhoon analogy than the master Bomber led 1000 plane raid on the same target metropolis. If Neil chooses to call both examples 'area bombing', he is free to express his opinion..

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As the 8th AF all dropped their bombs at once the bombs must fall in an area on the ground - since the bombing formation had length and width.

In your example, if the Tiffy squadron lined up at the target, marked by the leader's rockets, and shot individually with the leader making aiming corrections for each subsequent pilot (for wind or poor marking or whatever) the error would surely be reduced?

If they all salvoed at the same time while flyiing in formation there may be a good chance that one will hit the target, but the probability is that most will miss.

We seem to be bound by a common language introducing many disconnects.

8th/15th AF were both guided by a strategic doctrine that was correct in concept and left a lot to be desired in execution - namely hit critical choke points until they are destroyed. Ball Bearings and Oil/Chemical plants When the RAF followed the same strategy against targets susceptible to a very large swath of bombs or brilliant execution by a few well directed bombers the RAF achieved excellent results - The Ruhr Dams and Hydroelectric centers.

In both cases the target areas as well as key components within the target complex were identified and attacked with great effect. In all of the above examples the targets were well planned and operationally executed and acquired visually - These, by the definition of 'area bombing' as contrasted by 'precision bombing', were Precision Bombing attacks. Today we may drop 100 JDAMs aimed by a single laser designator or directed by GPS and achieved true precision bombing - but in WWII if the consequence of the attacks were to destroy a specific target the philosophical differences between RAF (as represented by Harris in this discussion) and USAAF was a target selection of Berlin versus the Erkner Ball Bearing complex in Berlin.

The latter choices were what kept Speer awake at night (professionally speaking) while the former (area bomb the entire city) kept him awake when he was 'in town'.

Schweinfurt on August 17 and October 14 were not failures per se - they had a dramatic effect on Ball Bearing Production. The failure was the 8th AF inability to swallow the losses incurred and continue attacking Schweinfurt and then Erkner to get past the German store of reserves for maintenance and spare parts, which enabled German industry to continue to supply ball bearings while Schweinfurt was being repaired.

Another failure by 8th and 15th AF planners was failing to concentrate on aircraft and tank engine production versus airframes. Lots of examples why USAAF Strategic Bombing campaign did not succeed to expectations - but nevertheless were far more of a concern to German planners (Speer) than RAF city busting campaigns - with one very notable exception, namely Hamburg in July 1943.

I am equally tired of parsing area bombing definition as you are. My last comments on this subject in this thread are a.) if you want to know what Speer thought about the comparative results of US Doctrine versus British doctrine on the application and effectiveness against german industry, and b.) you want to know how the USAAF execution could have not only been better, but would have shortened the war considerably via better planning and execution - Read Inside the Third Reich (you probably have).

Simply Precision Bombing in the context of American expectations for Norden Bombsight "Pickle barrel bombing" was a fantasy, but the 8th and 15th AF results of being able to place bombs on a specific facory, operations center, critical components within a factory given adequate intelligence AND clear weather was unmatched day in and day out by any airforce in the world. As the bomb pattern was NOT a JDAM capability you may call it area bombing if you wish and then compare similar results of area bombing by RAF at night in comparable destruction of German Industry.

wuzak said:

Yes, but the 8th AF were basically incapable of following up the first Schweinfurt mission. Bomber Command were supposed to, but they hit Peenemunde instead.

They followed up on October 14 - and nearly lost the authority to continue daylight bombing - but according to Speer the damage was severe (reduction by 67%, pg 286 "Inside the Third Reich") and once again threatened German war production capability

The 8th were even less capable fo following up the second raid.

On the first mission some 80 bombs hit the target. From aroun 200 bombers each carrying 8-10 bombs.

Causing an immediate 38% reduction in production (pg 285)

Don't forget that Bomber Command also contributed to the old campaign, and in some ways were more effective (ie their bombs did more damage because they were bigger).

Smaller bombs were found to be a flaw in Strategic Bombing campaign by USAAF - but they hit and damage so many more interesting targets than Bistros and hospitals and apartment buildings in Berlin. When Harris was left to his own devices the RAF was misused in context of shortening the war. When RAF was directed to Strategic bombing attacks they were effective, when directed to make daylight attacks they were Very effective - as the 'footprint' moved from large urban 'area' to smaller 'regions surrounding important complex' to the 'actual target complex.


The most effective raids on bridges were, I'm sure, by medium bombers at low levels.

The low altitudes were most frequently 12-15000 feet for the mediums - to avoid being easy targets for a full range of flak defenses

Did USAAF mediums bomb on the leader? The RAF mediums certainly did not.

Individual bombing depending on the nature of the target and the best presumed tactics (fromation, trail) to get the job done


Yes, but they also didn't all just drop their tallboys when their leader did. They all aimed individually.

For the Tirpitz, that was the right approach - also IIRC all the crews were highly trained, experienced and competant



Not a question of the effectiveness of the bombs. I think the USAAF didn't actually hold out much hope for destroying the pens. But it was a beginning to their campaign.

Actually the 8th Did expect to destroy the Pens but did not have anything larger than 2000 pound bombs - and did not succeed

The use of a larger number of smaller bombs is, IMO, an indicator of area bombing. The larger bombs would have been more effective when hitting the target, but they would also require better aiming to maximise the chances of hits. The USAAF load outs used even smaller bombs, as well. For the oil campaign they often used 250lb bombs - in order to saturate the area and get the highest probability of damaging something vital.

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Hindsight from the USSBS agrees your observation - but we once again come short on assumption of area bombing.

I've tried to determine how many days of VMC weather several German cities get and was unable , so I'll use what little knowledge I have and that it was usually crap compared to North American weather usually less then 5 miles vis and generally overcast so my Litmus test is how many Northern Europeans have a tan.
No european version of the EPA in the 40's so I'm assuming coal (point from another thread) as the major fuel would also cloud matters . So the pickle barrel is clouded by weather condition more often then not

I agree Neil - and said so man times that 'precision bombing' when complete or major cloud cover present was a ludicrous concept for USAAF - with or without H2X..

I dont have enough time to read all these pages so if i repeat an already discussed point, i apologize for it. was the b-17 designed for a role in which hundreds would form the box formations? or was it just suited towards that role later? secondly even though heavier armament appeared on fighters, a 20mm cannon test was found that you need more than 2 dozen hits on average to take down a b-17. so is it that the b-17s defenses were not necessarily centered solely on the heavy defensive armament, but instead more on the strong structural integrity of the b-17?

drgondog, the way it has been described is that the USAAF area bombed precision targets and the RAF precision bombed area targets.

The fact of the matter is that bombing in formation, as the 8th did, resulted in bombs dispersed over an area. If the lead bomber was any good, hopefully the area would be centred on the target.

The 8th did participate in area bombing, but not as often as the RAF.

The effects of Harris' city busting campaign are not immediately obvious. But it did divert a lot of resources into dfending cities at night, prompted the increase in production of flak guns at the expense of other fiield equipment. Just having the air raid sirens go off in the night also disrupted the lives of the public, many of who were in industries helping teh German war effort.

Also, towards the end I believe the 8th basically carpet bombed the synthetic oil plants.

wuzak said:

drgondog, the way it has been described is that the USAAF area bombed precision targets and the RAF precision bombed area targets.

I get the first part and won't quibble much although a USAAF bomadier might. I think 'precision bombing area targets' is an Oxymoron? What unique aspect of Bomber Command attacks on Berlin constituted any part of 'precision' definition? - as contrast with Tirpitz?

The fact of the matter is that bombing in formation, as the 8th did, resulted in bombs dispersed over an area. If the lead bomber was any good, hopefully the area would be centred on the target.

I think we have beat this to death.

The 8th did participate in area bombing, but not as often as the RAF.

The 8th consciously 'area bombed' when a.) they couldn't see the target, or b.) were compelled to jettison their loads for other reasons. Even Dresden had a 'specific aiming point' of the marshalling yards but the result was every much the same lack of discrimination regarding civilian caualties as London, Coventry, berlin, Hamburg or Tokyo, etc. The 8th 'participated' in area bombing - to this definition - nowhere other than Dresden and perhaps joint RAF/8th AF July 1943Hamburg strikes. What other examples do you have in mind?

The effects of Harris' city busting campaign are not immediately obvious. But it did divert a lot of resources into dfending cities at night, prompted the increase in production of flak guns at the expense of other fiield equipment. Just having the air raid sirens go off in the night also disrupted the lives of the public, many of who were in industries helping teh German war effort.

The RAF precision targets such as the Ruhr dam and hydroelectric attacks and the destruction caused by RAF joining 8th and 15th to attack chemical and petroleum targets were FAR more destructive to the German war making capability than all of Harris' attacks combined (IMO). This claim certainly is an exageration but Speer will echo those sentiments.

Also, towards the end I believe the 8th basically carpet bombed the synthetic oil plants.

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Nah. Depending on your definition of carpet bombing, that is. They had specific target objectives with military and industrial value worth expending hundreds of thousands of gallons of AvGas or the 8th went somewhere else. The bean counters were involved in the spring of 1945 and intense political pressure regarding any loss of US lives was always a consideration.

Dresden was politicaaly driven to show Stalin 'we truly cared' and many of the airfields and refineries were perilously close to being worthless in April - which is why the 8th stood down on the 25th. Stopping short of Berlin and letting the USSR take it was another example.