Was a Dunkirk-like evacuation of Singapore possible?

[Mad Dog]

Here's the list of British convoys to Singapore The Singapore-convoys

Between Jan 3 and Feb 5, 1942 ten convoys arrived at Singapore carrying over 30,000 troops. Had Churchill wanted to, could a Dunkirk evacuation be possible? Send those convoys with empty troopships and it seems doable. The troops need only be shipped to Burma or Calcutta, ideally the latter so to avoid being cut off when Rangoon falls. Though the Australians may want their boys sent home.

Now, I know this would be a disaster for British prestige and for respect from Washington as their own troops hold out at Corregidor, but those evacuated British and CW troops can fight again, likely defending India.

So, that aside, how do we execute this evacuation? And, this being an aviation forum, we need the RAF to play an important role. Someone has to hold the rear guard, and it can't just be the Indians as they'll rightfully revolt back in India. Perhaps command and weapons can be turned over to the Malays and Chinese? And the convoys need protection, perhaps from the RAF on Sumatra and HMS Indomitable (Jan 27th she was off Sumatra)?

Churchill had already authorized the mass retreats from both Dunkirk (June 1940, 338,000 troops evacuated) and Greece (June 1941, 51,000 troops evacuated). A similarly sized evacuation to India shouldn't doom his government. For the rearguard tasked with fighting to the end in Singapore, I can think of no better commander than the useless Percival.

The problem was nobody expected Singapore to fall, so there was no rush to create an evacuation fleet. To the contrary, Wavell was arranging a reinforcement convoy for Singapore. By all rights, Singapore shouldn't have fallen, but it was another example of shockingly bad Army leadership. Lt-Gen Percival simply wasn't up to the job. Whilst he had a record as a brave captain in WW1 (he won the MC), he was a favourite of staff officer General Sir John Dill, and it seems he was promoted beyond his ability due to favoritism. In the event, Percival proved he was another staff officer that was good on paper and cr*p in the field.
Arguably, Percival's biggest failure was that he noted the poor defences of Singapore from mainland attack as early as 1937, but did nothing about it other than write another ignored report. Percival then sat on his hands. He was notoriously unimaginative, doing so much by the book that he banned his troops from practicing jungle fighting as the predominant staff idea of the day was that the Malayan jungle was "impassable" to troops. When the Government only allocated 60,000 pounds to building defences on the landward side of the island, not only did Percival not question this, he did not think of inventive ways to use the manpower and materials available to him to build more defences. Compare this to Malta during the same period, where troops were not just used to build their own emplacements, but also used to repair runways, help refuel/re-arm aircraft, dig shelters, carry ammo for the AA, and even offload supplies from ships at the docks. Troops stationed on Singapore square-bashed and sunbathed even whilst their colleagues were being driven down the Malayan Peninsula by the Japanese.
Unfortunately, when fighting in Malaya did start, the Japanese found Percival as predictable and unimaginative as his own command officers did. By the time Wavell arrived in January 1942 it was too late, and he promptly ignored Percvial for the advice of a more junior officer he knew. Things got worse because Wavell correctly predicted the Japanese route of attack and even the exact place they would attack Singapore. Percival simply went his own way, probably because he thought Wavell was going to sack him anyway. Whilst Wavell had managed to get the RN to commit to a relief fleet (not evacuation), it was predicted to be 70 days before it could be in place. Percival then doomed Singapore in seven.
It might have been possible to mount an evacuation of Singapore if equally poor Naval leadership by Admiral Phillips hadn't already cost us the loss of Force Z, but the RN was so traumatised by the loss of Force Z that they convinced themselves that the Japanese fleet and bombers were just waiting for the RN to send a fleet up to Singapore, hence their insistence on the 70 days to get a relief fleet assembled.

 

[Admiral Beez]

By all rights, Singapore shouldn't have fallen, but it was another example of shockingly bad Army leadership. Lt-Gen Percival simply wasn't up to the job.

I've read that the Japanese captured airfields intact, with RAF fuel and bombs, and that warehouses of ready mix concrete were found after the surrender, as the army engineers had been ordered not to build pill boxes or defensive works, lest to risk annoying the Sultan, locals and disruption of rubber plantations. But this is more Lieutenant-General Bond's and Govenor Sir Shenton Thomas' doing. We must remember that Percival was appointed to Malaya in only April 1941. A lot of rot and neglect was already entrenched.

But it does beg the question, given the same troops, general staff, etc., and arriving in May 1941 (same as Percival) could Britain's arguably best defensive general, Montgomery have held Malaya? A challenge I imagine was that an assignment to Malaya whilst war was raging in Europe and the Mediterranean was considered an insult to most capable generals. Of course, if assigned to CNC Malaya, Montgomery will be needed to take over the 8th Army in North Africa in August 1942.

 

[Mad Dog]

.....lest to risk annoying the Sultan......

The two under-equipped Australian brigades were given defence of the northwest of the island, which Wavell correctly predicted would be the place of attack. Percival ignored Wavell and insisted that any attack on the NW was only a diversion, placing the freshest and best-equipped troops to defend the NE of the island. The Australians were proactive, and as well as sending patrols across the Straits to spy on the Japanese, they had correctly identified the Istana Bukit Serene, one of the Sultan of Jahor's palaces, as the HQ of the Japanese commander, General Yamashita. When the Australian artillery asked for permission to bombard the palace, the Australian commander, Lt-Gen Bennett, had to decline because Percival had ordered that the Sultan was not to be offended.
Bennett was an interesting case - he was a Gallipoli veteran and had a deep mistrust (bordering on hatred) of British staff officers, and had a very stormy relationship with Percival. When Wavell arrived, he soon realised that the no-nonsense Bennett was a far better field commander than Percival, which upset Percival even further. Consequently, Percival went out of his way to ignore Bennett's warnings that the Japanese were massing to attack the NW. When the fall of Singapore was inevitable, Bennet decided to escape rather than surrender. As there was no way to get all his men to safety, he handed command to his Brigadier and escaped with a group of junior officers and some civilians to Sumatra, and then back to Australia. Subsequently he was tried by the authorities as having abandoned his command, though he was then promoted to Lt-General and given command of the important defence of Perth. The British staff unfairly blamed the fall of Malaya on "Australian deserters", which was a gross insult to the Australian troops that fought well during the withdrawal to Singapore, and had to fight two divisions of Japanese in the NW of Singapore with two understrength brigades whilst Percival insisted on holding troops in the NW.
When Percival was released from captivity in 1945, he spitefully wrote a letter claiming Bennett had not received permission to relinquish his command on Singapore. That was complete male bovine manure as Bennett had dual lines of reporting, and had the right to seek approval from and report to the Australian Government, giving him a lot of leeway. The outcome of a subsequent commission was that Bennet had disobeyed Percival's order to surrender, which is ironic given that Churchill had given the order not to surrender Singapore, but to defend it to the last man.
Montgomery was a tank man, so he was ill-suited to the infantry defence of Singapore. At Alamein he inherited from Wavell pre-planned defensive positions. Montgomery might have done a better job of predicting Yamashita's attack from the NW, and he probably would have organised a reserve force and not insisted all the defenders were pushed right up to the beaches in a shallow defence.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The two under-equipped Australian brigades were given defence of the northwest of the island...

Once Malaya has fallen, Singapore is IMO doomed no matter who's CNC. Perhaps a better general could have held out a few more weeks.

But no, Percival's failure wasn't the surrender of Singapore. It was the failure to defend Malaya, where Percival had a numerically superior force. The Japanese essentially walked onto abandoned RAF, RN and army bases and depots with weapons, fuel, food and ammunition intact.

The Japanese offensive down the eastern coast of Malaya was essentially unopposed. Here's the Japanese advance....

....and here's where the British and Commonwealth forces engaged them. The eastern coast was a cake walk for the IJA. That's on Percival.

 

[SaparotRob]

The second map indicates the HIJMS Kongo and HIJMS Haruna were sunk on 4 Jan, 1942. By U.S. submarines. MK 14 torpedoes. This caught my eye as the Haruna may have been sunk more times than HMS Ark Royal. It might hold the record
Which 4 RN cruisers were lost? I remember 2 being sunk, including HMS Dorsetshire. Were 2 escorting destroyers counted with the 2 cruisers?
I'm not holding you responsible for any map errors.

 

[Graeme]

The outcome of a subsequent commission was that Bennet had disobeyed Percival's order to surrender, which is ironic given that Churchill had given the order not to surrender Singapore, but to defend it to the last man.

Bennett had no luck there - Ligertwood citing "International Law"....

(The Fall of Singapore - Timothy Hall. Methuen Publishing 1983)

 

[Mad Dog]

Once Malaya has fallen, Singapore is IMO doomed no matter who's CNC. Perhaps a better general could have held out a few more weeks.....

Well, there was the possibility that Singapore could be used as a shield to keep the Japanese tied down whilst the Allies reinforced Sumatra and Java. The Allies could then have supplied Singapore from Sumatra via the chain of islands over the Singapore Strait, whilst interdicting the long Japanese supply lines up through Malaysia. This would have delayed any Japanese operation against the oilfields in Java and helped keep the Japanese bottled up in the South China Sea, meaning no Japanese excursion into the Indian Ocean and HMS Hermes not being sunk. An extra carrier, even the old Hermes, would have been invaluable, and the Hurricanes Hermes was delivering would have been very useful as well. Of course, that requires more reinforcements for Sumatra to repel the Japanese invasion there.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Well, there was the possibility that Singapore could be used as a shield to keep the Japanese tied down whilst the Allies reinforced Sumatra and Java.

I don't think taking Singapore was a necessary step to taking Sumatra. Once Singapore is neutralized, the Japanese do what the Allies did with Rabaul, Japan's main base.... neutralize it, then ignore it and go on the offensive around it.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Well, there was the possibility that Singapore could be used as a shield to keep the Japanese tied down whilst the Allies reinforced Sumatra and Java.

That only works if the Allies proactively defend the entire Malay peninsula. A shield only works if there's a strong arm behind, holding it in position, in this case, reinforcement and supply access to Singapore. With Yamashita knocking on the gates, Kido Butai readily to hand, and air support working from former RAF bases on the peninsula, that was not going to happen. If Yamashita had been defending Singapore rather than attacking, it would have been a whole different story. Percival reminds one of General Gates at Ticonderoga and Saratoga, and Yamashita of General Arnold.

 

[Admiral Beez]

If Yamashita had been defending Singapore rather than attacking, it would have been a whole different story. Percival reminds one of General Gates at Ticonderoga and Saratoga, and Yamashita of General Arnold.

This makes me think of Operation Mailfist and Zipper. Though, Yamashita had moved to command the Philippines by 1944, replaced in Singapore by General Itagaki.

As for Percival, I'm not sure he deserves all the kicking history gives him, given that he arrived in Singapore in late April or early May 1941, to a territory that had been defensively neglected by his longstanding predecessor General Bond and the governor. Could Montgomery have done better?

 

[Freebird]

We need Repulse in Penang for both its guns and its radar, especially its radar. Unless the decision had already been taken that retreat from the north was the only feasible option. In which case, Percival is the perfect fit for the job. He had experience in planning the retreat to Dunkirk.

OK, so you park Repulse at Penang.
Its destroyed by Japanese air attack.
Then what?

 

[Admiral Beez]

OK, so you park Repulse at Penang.
Its destroyed by Japanese air attack.
Then what?

That's a non-starter.

But, HMS Terror was based at Singapore specifically for this role until withdrawn in 1940. Leave HMS Terror in place, that's your NGFS.

 

[Conslaw]

Singapore is interesting because it is at the end of long supply lines both for Japan and for Britain. Malaya and Singapore were probably more crucial to Japan's war strategy than they were to Great Britain - and the allies in general. For both sides, though, for the resources you commit, some will be in place and some will always be somewhere in the long process of coming and going. All of those are resources that you can't use elsewhere. Even if Britain managed to hold off the initial Japanese offensive against Singapore, there would be continuing difficult resource allocation decisions concerning how much to reinforce it.

I don't see how you could pull off a Dunkirk-type withdrawal. Even if a large quantity of evacuation shipping was available, where would you go?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Even if a large quantity of evacuation shipping was available, where would you go?

To the bottom of the Indian Ocean, courtesy of Kido Butai.

 

[Admiral Beez]

To the bottom of the Indian Ocean, courtesy of Kido Butai.

The KB had no role in the Malayan campaign. British troop ships continued to enter and exit Singapore almost right to before the surrender.

After delivering the troops these ships went to Burma, India, Australia and Ceylon. I expect any evacuation ships would do the same. My choice would be Calcutta so that the troops could be in place to defend India.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

The KB had no role in the Malayan campaign. British troop ships continued to enter and exit Singapore almost right to before the surrender.

You don't think a massive evacuation convoy would attract unwanted attention, like flies to a carcass?

 

[Admiral Beez]

You don't think a massive evacuation convoy would attract unwanted attention, like flies to a carcass?

No more than the convoys that delivered nearly 40,000 troops from mid January to early February 1942.

Here they are here, dozens of ships coming and going to and from Singapore right up to the surrender. Send these ships in empty, load up with wounded, non-combatants and non-Malay and at-risk civilians.

The Singapore-convoys

Here's some pics from the last ships to deliver British troops essentially to Japanese POW camps via Singapore in Feb 1942, IN CONVOY FROM BOMBAY TO SINGAPORE. FEBRUARY 1942, ON BOARD THE TROOPSHIP DEVONSHIRE DURING PASSAGE FROM BOMBAY TO SINGAPORE AND BATAVIA (DJAKARTA) AND RETURN, IN WHAT WAS PROBABLY THE LAST CONVOY TO REACH SINGAPORE WITH TROOPS AND STORES. APART FROM ONE AIR RAID BY JAPANESE PLANES WHILE PASSING THROUGH THE BANGKA STRAIT, THE JOURNEY WAS UNEVENTFUL.