Was Air Power decisive in the two battles of El Alamein? (1 Viewer)

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You are cherry picking your images. There are plenty of pictures of dug in 88s such as this one taken in the desert in November 1942 View attachment 703465


View attachment 703462

To quote from the above "A direct hit is necessary to knock out any AA position."
"However very little if any damage was caused by a bomb falling more than 15 feet away."
View attachment 703464

Call me crazy, but I think

1) Flak positions are easier to locate and hit in the desert than in the jungle
2) Japanese did not have a lot of Flak 18 sized guns in the South Pacific
3) It's much easier to dig in a 20mm or 37mm AA gun than an 88 mm heavy AT gun.
4) It's much easier to dig in in soft ground than rock, and in the North African campaign quite often the ground was hard rock below a thin layer of sand.
5) I didn't cherry pick a God Damn thing, I did a google image search for "88mm at gun Afrika Korps" and that is what came up. Try it yourself.
6) Even the 88mm in that photo is only partly protected. When deployed for AT use, the gun barrel has to be poking over any kind of revetment or sandbag wall, and part of the gun rises above that. In an AA deployement by contrast, it can basically be completely inside a hole since it's shooting up.

e0c3f41c995c914c73bfd463dc8e63e2.jpg


Burnt-out_88_mm_Flak_36_near_El_Alamein_1942.jpg

7) All these other images of 88mm AT guns deployed without revetments and with little or no protection also appear to me to be real and from the war, or are you saying they are staged? made up by AI?

One of the points Hooton made is that the Germans lost 63% of their flak guns by November 17, so the question just remains how many of these were hit by air strikes and how many were captured or destroyed by ground forces. That is a concrete data point which should be obtainable. We don't have to debate abstracts which is clearly pointless.
 
I think this thread has gotten a bit prickly because certain people can't stand any implication that US weaponry or personnel made significant contributions to British / Commonwealth victories in WW2 (they certainly did, especially for 2nd El Alamein and nearly all subsequent battles in the Mediterranean) because of the implication that British equipment alone was not sufficient or adequate for victory (it categorically wasn't).

In any discussions of this type one apparently has to tread carefully less you overturn certain closely cherished fantasies. If you ever want to know what really happened in WW2 air combat, you have to keep an open mind.

When many of us were young, a certain amount of mystery was associated with all aspects of the war. We could read things like unit histories and pilot memoirs from the Allied side, and could read memoirs of Axis pilots as well, but we didn't really have the numbers to look at and see what really happened.

Today it becomes more and more possible as more data continues to become available through efforts of people like Christopher Shores and his many collaborators, John Lundstrom, Russell Brown, Christer Bergstrom, and Michael Clarinbould among others, who actually look at loss data from both sides. But this data doesn't always fit with certain long held preconceptions, so some people get cranky and try to derail discussions.

Neither US nor British equipment or weaponry were 100% adequate to the tasks in WW2, which is why it's fortunate that they collaborated so closely. Nationalism is fine to a point but you shouldn't let it get in the way of actually knowing history if you are a history enthusiast.
 
Speculating as to the motivations of those who don't agree, or ascribing nationalism as the reason for their disagreement, or worse yet, ascribing "fantasies" to them that they may or may not hold, is very definitely poisoning the well.

I just call it like I see it, and I've seen this before many times, not always in threads I was participating in directly. I've already had one guy in here more or less openly criticizing one source because "Canadian". YMMV.
 
I just call it like I see it, and I've seen this before many times, not always in threads I was participating in directly. I've already had one guy in here more or less openly criticizing one source because "Canadian". YMMV.

You call it like you see it, and so do I. I don't see that Geoff aspersed any source solely for being Canadian. But I think poisoning the well is shoddy argumentation. It's great that you have an opinion, so do we all. But rather than delivering solid support for your claims, you've resorted to this. Sorry, it's unconvincing.
 
You call it like you see it, and so do I. I don't see that Geoff aspersed any source solely for being Canadian. But I think poisoning the well is shoddy argumentation. It's great that you have an opinion, so do we all. But rather than delivering solid support for your claims, you've resorted to this. Sorry, it's unconvincing.

He directly alleged the Canadian guy was emphasizing the Canadian general in his history of the war. That's pretty clear.

And I'm not trying to explain 'disagreement', I'm giving my best guess for the 'prickly' attitude I'm seeing from certain people. From others I won't speculate.
 
He directly alleged the Canadian guy was emphasizing the Canadian general in his history of the war. That's pretty clear.

And I'm not trying to explain 'disagreement', I'm giving my best guess for the 'prickly' attitude I'm seeing from certain people. From others I won't speculate.

I don't have a dog in this fight. I'm just reading at this point because you've made it plain you're not interested in my point of view. You're trying to convince others of your view, and as I said, I don't think you're succeeding. Others may find you convincing, great, but I think your argumentation is not taut.
 
I don't have a dog in this fight. I'm just reading at this point because you've made it plain you're not interested in my point of view. You're trying to convince others of your view, and as I said, I don't think you're succeeding. Others may find you convincing, great, but I think your argumentation is not taut.

Well buddy, I don't think your analysis or interpretation is 'taut', or makes any sense. And I give up trying to figure it out.

I posted hard data here, from a source that everyone agrees is a good source, but in spite of that I get multiple pages of arguments debating whether "tail shot away" and "tail shot off" is the same thing, or whether "tail damaged" could also mean either of the previous.

I get somebody then claiming that it's impossible for a plane to land (or crash land) with it's tail "shot off". I'm not sure what this is supposed to mean, is Shores lying then? I think: 'Maybe the guy making this claim isn't on the level, but it's best not to assume that out the gate. Maybe this he legitimately doesn't understand.' So I post a photo of the same type of aircraft from the war in the same Theater of what I believe they were probably referring to, i.e. control surfaces on the tail shot off, as routinely happened to WW2 aircraft.

main-qimg-98328cfd0e046087a154c92f58656933-lq.jpg


As I pointed out to you privately, an aircraft with a "shot away" port elevator and a heavily damaged rudder was I promise you not an easy or safe aircraft to land. The landing of the aircraft in the image was quite likely 'forced' or at least rough. If the guy did manage to land on his gear as it appears from the photo, he was a gifted and probably pretty lucky pilot. I never said it was a photo of the aircraft Shores was referring to. I was trying to help you and one other guy understand what Shores meant. I don't ultimately care if you understand though, and clearly you can't. None of that matters though because the data speaks for itself.

The point being made and reflected in the data was that the DAF was taking a beating, especially their fighters were taking a beating. On Feb 8, they either lost 5 aircraft shot down and 3 crash landed, or 2 crash landed, depending on how you want to count it. The Axis lost none. The overall rate of Allied to Axis losses from Feb through May 1942 was, according to Shores data, about 2-1 overall and 3-1 on fighters. That, in my opinion, was a problem. And it reflects that the Axis forces generally had control in the sky.

My original plan was to summarize this data for the whole year, on the premise that some people here will find that data useful, and because it will also support my earlier assertion that the air combat situation began to change in mid 1942. This in turn was amidst a host of other positive changes for the Allied air forces at that time, and had losses had swung around to near parity by the mid-year. You can see this in the two days of data I just posted in post 319, and the summary I already mentioned a couple of times for the fighting during October 1942. In these examples the losses on both sides are roughly equal.

But to have a discussion, you have to be able to agree on basic things. 2+2=4. The earth is a sphere. Water is wet. That kind of stuff. I'm really not seeing a lot of that from some people in the thread. So it's probably pointless to continue to make the effort to transcribe all that data.
 
Keeping on the original subject of the thread I would tend to believe that land power was much more decisive, at least at the 2nd battle of EL Alamein, compared to airpower. Monty's advantage on the ground was large, 2 to 1 in tanks and infantry. The tanks included some of the best the allies had, 250 Shermans, 170 Grants , 80 Crusader IIIs and of course the 6 Churchills of King Force. Add to this over 800 6pdrs and Rommel really doesn't have much hope.

The respective air forces are much closer to parity in numbers.

I think this thread has gotten a bit prickly because certain people can't stand any implication that US weaponry or personnel made significant contributions to British / Commonwealth victories in WW2 (they certainly did, especially for 2nd El Alamein and nearly all subsequent battles in the Mediterranean) because of the implication that British equipment alone was not sufficient or adequate for victory (it categorically wasn't).
This is a little more controversial and perhaps deserves a thread of its own. I believe that most people in this forum realize that no one side or country had a monopoly on all the best gear and tech. I personally believe that as far as the air battle is concerned at El Alamein that you could switch all of the Hurricanes for P40s or all of the P40s for Hurricanes and it wouldn't affect the outcome. Tropical Hurricane2B =Kittyhawk I

Slaterat
 
I posted hard data here, from a source that everyone agrees is a good source, but in spite of that I get multiple pages of arguments debating whether "tail shot away" and "tail shot off" is the same thing, or whether "tail damaged" could also mean either of the previous.
Not to be disrespectful to anyone or any writer or researcher, I wouldn't use the term hard data. From much of what I have read I would classify most of the post war accounting of losses as approximate at best. There are just too many conflicting accounts and or incomplete and missing records. Again this could be a subject for a new post.
 
Keeping on the original subject of the thread I would tend to believe that land power was much more decisive, at least at the 2nd battle of EL Alamein, compared to airpower. Monty's advantage on the ground was large, 2 to 1 in tanks and infantry. The tanks included some of the best the allies had, 250 Shermans, 170 Grants , 80 Crusader IIIs and of course the 6 Churchills of King Force. Add to this over 800 6pdrs and Rommel really doesn't have much hope.

The respective air forces are much closer to parity in numbers.

From what I see, the numbers of aircraft was about 2-1 in favor of the Allies. Though I guess it depends which aircraft you count, around where they were based etc.

I do, and did say originally when I started this thread, also believe that the M4 and M3 tanks were also a major factor. Crusader IIIs probably as well because they had effective anti tank capability, though I think the HE was more important on attack. Probably the M7 too though maybe it was too early for that to play a major role yet.

This is a little more controversial and perhaps deserves a thread of its own. I believe that most people in this forum realize that no one side or country had a monopoly on all the best gear and tech. I personally believe that as far as the air battle is concerned at El Alamein that you could switch all of the Hurricanes for P40s or all of the P40s for Hurricanes and it wouldn't affect the outcome. Tropical Hurricane2B =Kittyhawk I

Slaterat

Part of my point is that the aircraft and the major changes tactics in tactics were decisive. As I stated earlier in the thread, if they were relying on Hurricanes and Blenheims, they would not have won at Second El Alamein. Even with the M4 tanks. And you can say a Hurricane IIB = a Kittyhawk I (I don't agree but let's say that's true for sake of argument), it's definitely not the equivalent of a Kittyhawk II or a Spitfire Vb.

Nor was a Blenheim IV the equivalent of a Boston III, a Baltimore III, or a B-25.

Nor was the Wellington equal to the B-24 and B-17 heavy bombers, which were a class of their own.

I believe the data shows that the use of these newer aircraft types, and a host of tactical and strategic or operational changes made starting in the second half of 1942 are what contributed to the DAF becoming decisive in Second El Alamein. That is what I'd much rather discuss in the thread, in fact.
 
Not to be disrespectful to anyone or any writer or researcher, I wouldn't use the term hard data. From much of what I have read I would classify most of the post war accounting of losses as approximate at best. There are just too many conflicting accounts and or incomplete and missing records. Again this could be a subject for a new post.

Fair point, but in 2023, Shores is about the best source we have available for WW2 aircraft loss data in this region which includes both Axis and Allied data, and in both cases he seems to be quite accurate including based on the double checking done in this thread. He might be off by a few percentage points over several months of data, but I'd call his reporting pretty 'firm'.

It's not a time machine though I'll grant you that.
 
One of the things about Shores is that he gives you the serial numbers of all the lost, damaged, MiA, FTR, crash landed etc. aircraft, so you can go and double check yourself. As people were doing in this discussion.
 
Well buddy, I don't think your analysis or interpretation is 'taut', or makes any sense. And I give up trying to figure it out.

I posted hard data here, from a source that everyone agrees is a good source, but in spite of that I get multiple pages of arguments debating whether "tail shot away" and "tail shot off" is the same thing, or whether "tail damaged" could also mean either of the previous.

I get somebody then claiming that it's impossible for a plane to land (or crash land) with it's tail "shot off". I'm not sure what this is supposed to mean, is Shores lying then? I think: 'Maybe the guy making this claim isn't on the level, but it's best not to assume that out the gate. Maybe this he legitimately doesn't understand.' So I post a photo of the same type of aircraft from the war in the same Theater of what I believe they were probably referring to, i.e. control surfaces on the tail shot off, as routinely happened to WW2 aircraft.

View attachment 703518

As I pointed out to you privately, an aircraft with a "shot away" port elevator and a heavily damaged rudder was I promise you not an easy or safe aircraft to land. The landing of the aircraft in the image was quite likely 'forced' or at least rough. If the guy did manage to land on his gear as it appears from the photo, he was a gifted and probably pretty lucky pilot. I never said it was a photo of the aircraft Shores was referring to. I was trying to help you and one other guy understand what Shores meant. I don't ultimately care if you understand though, and clearly you can't. None of that matters though because the data speaks for itself.

The point being made and reflected in the data was that the DAF was taking a beating, especially their fighters were taking a beating. On Feb 8, they either lost 5 aircraft shot down and 3 crash landed, or 2 crash landed, depending on how you want to count it. The Axis lost none. The overall rate of Allied to Axis losses from Feb through May 1942 was, according to Shores data, about 2-1 overall and 3-1 on fighters. That, in my opinion, was a problem. And it reflects that the Axis forces generally had control in the sky.

My original plan was to summarize this data for the whole year, on the premise that some people here will find that data useful, and because it will also support my earlier assertion that the air combat situation began to change in mid 1942. This in turn was amidst a host of other positive changes for the Allied air forces at that time, and had losses had swung around to near parity by the mid-year. You can see this in the two days of data I just posted in post 319, and the summary I already mentioned a couple of times for the fighting during October 1942. In these examples the losses on both sides are roughly equal.

But to have a discussion, you have to be able to agree on basic things. 2+2=4. The earth is a sphere. Water is wet. That kind of stuff. I'm really not seeing a lot of that from some people in the thread. So it's probably pointless to continue to make the effort to transcribe all that data.

Of course it's everyone else's fault. Little Billy has nothing to do with it at all. What a waste.

*plonk*
 
Call me crazy, but I think

1) Flak positions are easier to locate and hit in the desert than in the jungle
2) Japanese did not have a lot of Flak 18 sized guns in the South Pacific
3) It's much easier to dig in a 20mm or 37mm AA gun than an 88 mm heavy AT gun.
4) It's much easier to dig in in soft ground than rock, and in the North African campaign quite often the ground was hard rock below a thin layer of sand.
5) I didn't cherry pick a God Damn thing, I did a google image search for "88mm at gun Afrika Korps" and that is what came up. Try it yourself.
6) Even the 88mm in that photo is only partly protected. When deployed for AT use, the gun barrel has to be poking over any kind of revetment or sandbag wall, and part of the gun rises above that. In an AA deployement by contrast, it can basically be completely inside a hole since it's shooting up.

View attachment 703471

View attachment 703472
7) All these other images of 88mm AT guns deployed without revetments and with little or no protection also appear to me to be real and from the war, or are you saying they are staged? made up by AI?

One of the points Hooton made is that the Germans lost 63% of their flak guns by November 17, so the question just remains how many of these were hit by air strikes and how many were captured or destroyed by ground forces. That is a concrete data point which should be obtainable. We don't have to debate abstracts which is clearly pointless.
if you look at the first picture the gun is pointed in the wrong direction. There is a wall behind it. The second picture is a gun in the process of being transport. And I never said your pictures were staged. You made a blanket statement that it was not possible to dig in an 88 I simply submiTed an image of one that was dug in.
 
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if you look at the first picture the gun is pointed in the wrong direction. There is a wall behind it. The second picture is a gun in the process of being transport. And I never said your pictures were staged. You made a blanket statement that it was not possible to dig in an 88 I simply submiTed an image of one that was dug in.

That's fair enough, I don't know how to tell a gun is pointed in the wrong direction(?) but you see many wartime images of 88s deployed without being dug in, and also wartime accounts from unit histories etc. of 88s being rapidly deployed (with no time to dig in). I didn't cherry pick any of it.

And as I previously noted, in AT mode, the gun barrel has to be above whatever barrier is protecting it, unlike an AA gun intended as such, which can actually be fully inside a proper 'gun pit', like in the example of Japanese positions in the Pacific. Soft mud is also better protection against bombs than hard rocky desert.

I concede that it is apparently possible to dig in an 88, what I should have said instead is that it is hard to dig in a gun that big, especially on rocky terrain, and they seem to have often not done it when these were deployed.

In part this is because they could be deployed so far from the battlefield, as they had an excellent, very long range. An 88 could be positioned well beyond the range of an M4 tank for example and still be able to kill the latter. That's one of the reasons why you need the air support so much.
 

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