Was Operation Pedestal a greater Axis air attack than any faced by the USN in 1942?

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Lundstrom writes that altitude could be estimated roughly, but that still doesn't alleviate the issue, because it's terribly inefficient. When combined with the F4F's mediocre climb, it resulted in several cases of Japanese attackers getting through.

Lundstrom also notes that American IFF was at times unreliable and that as a result, CAP fighters had to spend time investigating bogeys that were often enough friendlies.
 
RCAFson said:
The Axis formations came in close enough in time, in each wave, that it was impossible for the CAP to concentrate on any single formation and 12 Me109Fs, for example, would probably have outnumbered the CAP directed against any single formation.
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The F4Fs seem to have managed to disrupt IJN attacks even with 2-3 fighters when there was ~18 A6Ms flying escort (twice during Coral Sea).

And again when it was 19 G4Ms attacking on Jan 20, during the second attack it came down to two F4Fs to break it up, which they did. So something was working right, I'd say.

In some cases, such as the big strike on the 11th during Pedestal, there were no escorts but the CAP didn't seem to be able to stop the strike coming in.
 
Here's how it was done:

The actual report on HMS Hood's Type 279M starts about 1/3 of the way down the page and is entitled:

Report on the Installation, Performance and Trials of 279M in H.M.S. Hood.
( H.M.S. Hood Association-Battle Cruiser Hood: H.M.S. Hood Reference Materials - DM 220/76: Reports of performance in H.M.S. Hood, H.M.S. Illustrious, H.M.S. King George V and smaller vessels of RDF279 )
As the aircraft flew through the different lobes, the range of detection was compared to the plot of the lobe and the height was then estimated. However, issues arose if the aircraft were changing altitude, or if they under or over flew the lobes:

 
In some cases it was the crew/s.

You had Thach with may years of experience, some them as a gunnery instructor, as a squadron commander. There was a low turn over rate in the US Navy in 1939-30-41.
In 41 Thach had over half of his pilots receive "E" for excellence awards for gunnery. O'Hare had been assigned to Thach's squadron in the summer of 1940 and Thach saw something in his flying and took him as his wingman and mentored him. O'Hare made his first flight in an F4F in July of 1941.
The Americans had not seen combat but many of them had a lot of hours and more gunnery practice than some other forces. You also some squadrons with had commanders who just didn't follow orders but worked out tactics before they got caught by the enemy.
 
yes very true - gunnery training (often neglected in many other Theaters) is cited as a major advantage for the USN pilots at this time (fighter and also the SBD 'scout' squadron pilots) which is maybe in part why Thach weave worked well. Training is also clearly part of why the Japanese carrier bombers and the SBDs hit their targets at such a high rate.

It's hard to fully separate the performance of certain aircraft from the pilot training. But no amount of training made TBDs viable, sadly for the poor crews.

But i will say that the F4Fs seemed to get around pretty well. Their endurance was also a key factor. In one case above there were six F4Fs lined up to land on their CV after a mission, but they were able to get into the fight on an emergency basis.

There is also the factor of morale or esprit de corps. F4F pilots following the D3As into their dives was extremely brave, costing several of them their lives. SBDs coming back from a mission and encountering IJN strike aircraft attacked them and vice versa, again quite a high ratio of aggression.

The effect of the lack of protection and lack of robust search and rescue for the Japanese really starts to tell in the later battles in 1942, which I'm going to post shortly. Both sides generally lost around the same amount of aircraft, but the US lost maybe 1 pilot for every 3 or 4 shot down, whereas for the Japanese it was more like 9 out of 10 aircraft was lost with all crew.

The importance of recon and efficiency of radio communications also continues to be a major and very fraught factor in all of these battles. Another commbination of training and technical factors.
 
From the Wiki on Pedestal:

"Fliegerkorps II sent 650 sorties against Pedestal from 11 to 14 August and claimed twelve aircraft shot down for eighteen losses. Total Axis losses were 62 aircraft, 42 Italian and 19 German, including losses on the ground and those shot down by their own side. Royal Navy gunners and Fleet Air Arm fighters claimed 74 aircraft shot down but destroyed 42 Axis aircraft, 26 from the Regia Aeronautica and 16 Luftwaffe aircraft.[99] The Fleet Air Arm lost thirteen aircraft on operations and sixteen Sea Hurricanes when Eagle was sunk, the RAF lost a Beaufighter and five Spitfires; a Sunderland was shot down by Giada. The Allies could not risk such losses again and another large convoy to Malta was not attempted until November 1942, when the re-capture of airfields in Egypt and Libya after the Second Battle of El Alamein made it much easier to provide land-based air cover.[64][l]"
 
Shortround6 said:
Like O,Hare's wingman who stuck with him even though his guns were jammed.
Divided the defensive fire and had an extra set of eyes for look-out.
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The other side of this coin is going home alone and defensive. There is some safety to be had by staying with a shooter when one can't shoot. Their skill as a wingman and visual acuity will go up several notches when one has no ability to prosecute an attack.
 
I guess you mean Feb 20 1942 (Bougainville)?

The 2nd formation consisted of 8 Bettys and it was O'Hare who basically took it on single handed, as his wingman's guns had jammed. The IJNAF formation lost 4 aircraft, but actually went on to make a fairly accurate bomb run. It seems probable that without O'Hare's marksmanship that Lexington would have been hit.
 

Apparently one other guy got one of them, O'Hare got 3
 
Aggression and a very high educational and skill level were the the USN's aces

Pre war USN pilots were the cream of the bunch, vastly better material than any other air arm, not only physically, but also mentally, pilots were bright and highly intelligent Graduates and standards never dropped when war broke out.

The pre war FAA was a very dire enterprise, the RAF creamed off anyone with any ability to its fighter Squadrons, and by the time the down selects had done their toll, the FAA was by and large very much. manned by the left overs the RAF didn't want.

This only changed post 1939 when the FAA was returned to the RN, and it was only post 1940 when the FAA started to receive USN trained aviators that the standards started to improve. It was the loan of HMS Victorious to the USN in 1943 that was the huge wake up call to the Royal Navy. The copious and details AAR's detailed how far off the pace the FAA was and what steps needed to be taken to improve maters.
Its to the great credit of the RN that it did indeed accept fully it needed to improve - drastically - and over the next year, with the unstinting help of the USN, (NO!, contrary to popular Myth Admiral King didn't hate the British), it rebuilt itself in the USN's image and forged a formidable naval air arm.
 
Wild_Bill_Kelso said:
I thought in the RAF pre-war all the best and brightest pilots were recruited to fly bombers?
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Glider said:
I think you will find that this mainly applied during the war. Pre war there were more opportunities for the pilot to have at least some say in the selection
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I suspect neither was actually the case. Operating a single-seat fighter requires the ability to respond quickly to a 3-dimensional battle while also being able to navigate and operate radios etc. That's a LOT of information, even back in the 1930s, that had to be assimilated by the solitary pilot.

On a multi-engined aircraft, response times are typically slower (because it's less manoeuvrable), and there are other people onboard to navigate, operate radios etc., so the pilot doesn't have the same cognitive demand. Conversely, the multi-engine pilot typically must lead a larger crew, which requires different leadership skills than those of a fighter pilot.

That's not to say fighter pilots are better than multi-engine pilots (or vice-versa). I'm simply indicating that they require different skills.

Against that context, it makes little sense to take a person who is temperamentally suited to a multi-engined aircraft and plonk him in a single-engined fighter where he may be unable to cope. Operational exigencies did change priorities over time (e.g. taking Fairey Battle pilots and turning them into Fighter Pilots during the Battle of Britain). However, a training system that does not put the right skillset into the right cockpit will not succeed and will cause unnecessary casualties.

Certainly, the RAF has been managing its pilots based on skillset for the past 50 years. Pilots who failed to become fast jet pilots during training were often restreamed to multi-engine or helicopter training paths. I see no reason why that same pattern would not exist in the 1930s and 1940s.
 
The very best of the newly qualified pilots were often chosen to stay in the training schools as instructors. One of the inducements often used was to give them a commission. Notice, 'inducements', they could insist on going back to the UK as Sgt Pilots. The most extreme case I read of was one where the head of the flying school promised that if he didn't stay in the USA he would ensure that he was posted there as a pilot of a target tug. Clearly this wasn't a threat that could be carried out but it shows the thinking. The next best pilots were sent to Bomber Command, then fighter command and finally the rest.
They were very clear on that. A BC pilot had the lives of other people in their hands, almost invariably flew at night in all weathers and often damaged. Skill was the first priority.
I
A number of years ago I spent a day in the National Archives in London and there was a folder on everything to do with the training of pilots from before the war to the end. It had all been collated to write a book on the training. Unfortunately the book was never written, but they kept all the research in the one folder. It was quite fascinating as it also compared the training the pilots received in the UK, overseas and in the USA both in the British training schools in the USA, and in the USAAF training schools.
 
Wild_Bill_Kelso said:
If you could summarize it, how would you compare them?
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I did a thread on the topic which I think you will find useful

RAF Pilot Training in WW2

All I said that I would look into this and let you know what I found. It’s been interesting and some ways informative as some assumptions that I had proved to be incorrect. Basically RAF training was covered in three main sections which will be dealt with individually. These are:- a)...
ww2aircraft.net
 
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