Was Port Moresby the first rea defeat of the IJN in the air?

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Correction to my earlier data, A29-73 and A29-145 both crashed on their delivery flight to the RAAF, it was -73 that was officially not delivered.

As usual, I really don't know what you are getting at, and I don't think you do either.

It must be quite comforting to know if you do not understand something the explainer is mentally defective.

1) Almost everything you wrote about the early RAAF P-40 is wrong or misleading.

2) Many of the original documents needed to come up with a reasonably accurate account are available online, the aircraft cards (with handwriting deciphered via the ADF serials site), the accident cards, some courts of inquiry, the unit histories and the Chiefs of Staff reports (aircraft in and out, repair system aircraft in and out). The RAAF is apparently spending money to make its WWII documents available. The usual care is needed about damage reports, causes not recorded, the fact any damage tends to need a threshold before it is recorded, inconsistent reporting and so on.

The first 3 P-40 the RAAF collected from the USAAF hit bad weather during a ferry flight, all three came down, 2 totally destroyed. You can see the basis for the two thirds lost by the RAAF while being moved to the combat zone story but rather than deal with the way 3 became the entire RAAF P-40 force, we were treated to a grab bag of stuff, no consistent time period, no consistent examination of damage, any recorded incident declared a loss. One accident report explicitly states there was no damage.

I'll reiterate a couple of things I already said, though I know from previous experience that it won't help:

It has been noticed how you imagine your shortcomings are shared by others. Use the air force definitions, data first, conclusions second, think about how true the story could really be.

1) I noted already that many of these aircraft were repairable. "Lost" is a vague term, I probably should have said 'crashed'. I never said they were permanently destroyed.

Lost has a specific meaning, permanently destroyed.

2) I never once suggested that crashing these planes was unique to the Australians.

Now go and find the accusations you were picking on the RAAF.

3) My point was that the Aussies, just like the Americans, had to go into combat without any time to train on type.

A point you near buried under a heap of inaccurate information.

When you think about it the early RAAF P-40 force makes for a useful test subject. After the initial arrivals in early to mid 1942 there were no more until mid January 1943. No complications from reinforcements or transfers to other theatres and lots of useful data online.

Looking at the documents, not delivered -73, -145 (crashed on ferry flights but 145 counted as RAAF). Delivered damaged and returned not flown -87. Written off during war -83, Written off post war -31, -33, -39, -45, -49, -51, -52, -53, -54, -55, -58, -66, -67, -75, -79, -96, -103, -104, -105, -107, -129, -132, -133, -135, -140, -144, -151, -154, -157, -159, -161, -162 (32), All up 163 serials, 162 officially received, 1 crashed on delivery flight to RAAF, 1 arrived damaged and returned, 1 write off during war, 32 write off post war, 127 lost during war. Including 26 combat losses, 6 in March, 12 in April, 1 in May, 7 in August 1942 (23 in 75 squadron, 3 in 76 squadron), 101 non combat losses. 1 combat damage requiring depot repair listed March 1942. Damaged, 92 repaired by unit, 81 by depot (but one of these in March 1942, no actual damage), No accidents recorded for -31, -53, -54, -79, -151, -159 . Note some entries listed as depot repair are because that is who had the aircraft when the accident happened. 2 Operational Training Unit had 103 incidents, repaired 61 of them on base, 3 sent to depot and 39 write offs, not surprisingly it had a big repair section.

RAAF Branch of the Air Member for Engineering and Maintenance, report number 153, dated 30 December 1942

RAAF units, overhaul and repair numbers, start of week 33 Kittyhawk present, 4 in and 4 out for week, 28 being repaired, 3 awaiting spares, 2 repairs not commenced. All types, 176 present at start of week, 30 in, 34 out, 118 repairing, 33 need spares, 21 work not commenced. At start of week 3 Kittyhawk under conversion to spares/produce, 1 done during the week.

At start of week 43 RAAF Allison engines in repair system, 1 input, 3 output for week, 8 being repaired, 28 awaiting spares, 5 repairs not started. Allison engines for the USAAF 84, 0 in, 4 out, 8 under repair, 28 awaiting spares, 44 repairs not started.

Accident and loss statistics for 1942, month is when the incident occurred, then where repairs needed to be done. As of end 1942, losses were 65, 1 had been returned to USAAF and another 33 were under repair from the 162 officially received.

Month	Repaired	Repaired	Lost in	Lost non	Incident
Month	at Unit	at Depot	Combat	Combat	Total
194203​	2​	3​	6​	5​	16​
194204​	4​	3​	12​	5​	24​
194205​	9​	3​	1​	4​	17​
194206​	6​	3​	0​	2​	11​
194207​	7​	6​	0​	3​	16​
194208​	1​	6​	7​	10​	24​
194209​	3​	5​	0​	1​	9​
194210​	5​	4​	0​	1​	10​
194211​	4​	10​	0​	3​	17​
194212​	1​	6​	0​	3​	10​
Total	42​	49​	26​	37​	154​

Since I had to look the report up for loss figures, for those who want to do a time machine aircraft purchase, as of end October 1945 the RAAF had 94 Spitfire, 14 Vengeance, 37 US built Mustang and 12 Auster most probably all in their shipping crates and they probably stayed that way for quite a while. With the post war cut backs and local production the RAAF kept the P-51D-25 it received in active service, earlier block numbers were considered reserves.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Correction to my earlier data, A29-73 and A29-145 both crashed on their delivery flight to the RAAF, it was -73 that was officially not delivered.


It must be quite comforting to know if you do not understand something the explainer is mentally defective.

1) Almost everything you wrote about the early RAAF P-40 is wrong or misleading.

2) Many of the original documents needed to come up with a reasonably accurate account are available online, the aircraft cards (with handwriting deciphered via the ADF serials site), the accident cards, some courts of inquiry, the unit histories and the Chiefs of Staff reports (aircraft in and out, repair system aircraft in and out). The RAAF is apparently spending money to make its WWII documents available. The usual care is needed about damage reports, causes not recorded, the fact any damage tends to need a threshold before it is recorded, inconsistent reporting and so on.

The first 3 P-40 the RAAF collected from the USAAF hit bad weather during a ferry flight, all three came down, 2 totally destroyed. You can see the basis for the two thirds lost by the RAAF while being moved to the combat zone story but rather than deal with the way 3 became the entire RAAF P-40 force, we were treated to a grab bag of stuff, no consistent time period, no consistent examination of damage, any recorded incident declared a loss. One accident report explicitly states there was no damage.


It has been noticed how you imagine your shortcomings are shared by others. Use the air force definitions, data first, conclusions second, think about how true the story could really be.


Lost has a specific meaning, permanently destroyed.


Now go and find the accusations you were picking on the RAAF.


A point you near buried under a heap of inaccurate information.

When you think about it the early RAAF P-40 force makes for a useful test subject. After the initial arrivals in early to mid 1942 there were no more until mid January 1943. No complications from reinforcements or transfers to other theatres and lots of useful data online.

Looking at the documents, not delivered -73, -145 (crashed on ferry flights but 145 counted as RAAF). Delivered damaged and returned not flown -87. Written off during war -83, Written off post war -31, -33, -39, -45, -49, -51, -52, -53, -54, -55, -58, -66, -67, -75, -79, -96, -103, -104, -105, -107, -129, -132, -133, -135, -140, -144, -151, -154, -157, -159, -161, -162 (32), All up 163 serials, 162 officially received, 1 crashed on delivery flight to RAAF, 1 arrived damaged and returned, 1 write off during war, 32 write off post war, 127 lost during war. Including 26 combat losses, 6 in March, 12 in April, 1 in May, 7 in August 1942 (23 in 75 squadron, 3 in 76 squadron), 101 non combat losses. 1 combat damage requiring depot repair listed March 1942. Damaged, 92 repaired by unit, 81 by depot (but one of these in March 1942, no actual damage), No accidents recorded for -31, -53, -54, -79, -151, -159 . Note some entries listed as depot repair are because that is who had the aircraft when the accident happened. 2 Operational Training Unit had 103 incidents, repaired 61 of them on base, 3 sent to depot and 39 write offs, not surprisingly it had a big repair section.

RAAF Branch of the Air Member for Engineering and Maintenance, report number 153, dated 30 December 1942

RAAF units, overhaul and repair numbers, start of week 33 Kittyhawk present, 4 in and 4 out for week, 28 being repaired, 3 awaiting spares, 2 repairs not commenced. All types, 176 present at start of week, 30 in, 34 out, 118 repairing, 33 need spares, 21 work not commenced. At start of week 3 Kittyhawk under conversion to spares/produce, 1 done during the week.

At start of week 43 RAAF Allison engines in repair system, 1 input, 3 output for week, 8 being repaired, 28 awaiting spares, 5 repairs not started. Allison engines for the USAAF 84, 0 in, 4 out, 8 under repair, 28 awaiting spares, 44 repairs not started.

Accident and loss statistics for 1942, month is when the incident occurred, then where repairs needed to be done. As of end 1942, losses were 65, 1 had been returned to USAAF and another 33 were under repair from the 162 officially received.

Month	Repaired	Repaired	Lost in	Lost non	Incident
Month	at Unit	at Depot	Combat	Combat	Total
194203​	2​	3​	6​	5​	16​
194204​	4​	3​	12​	5​	24​
194205​	9​	3​	1​	4​	17​
194206​	6​	3​	0​	2​	11​
194207​	7​	6​	0​	3​	16​
194208​	1​	6​	7​	10​	24​
194209​	3​	5​	0​	1​	9​
194210​	5​	4​	0​	1​	10​
194211​	4​	10​	0​	3​	17​
194212​	1​	6​	0​	3​	10​
Total	42​	49​	26​	37​	154​

Since I had to look the report up for loss figures, for those who want to do a time machine aircraft purchase, as of end October 1945 the RAAF had 94 Spitfire, 14 Vengeance, 37 US built Mustang and 12 Auster most probably all in their shipping crates and they probably stayed that way for quite a while. With the post war cut backs and local production the RAAF kept the P-51D-25 it received in active service, earlier block numbers were considered reserves.

God, I love these data dumps!
Keep it up, G Geoffrey Sinclair !

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

A crazy person might look at your numbers and see 37 Kittyhawks lost non Combat, 26 Lost in Combat, and 91 repaired. Though it's unclear from your data how many were lost to accidents, and (I think) you are mixing losses in Australia with those on New Guinea, but it looks like quite a few losses from "non combat" reasons and the ratio of non combat to combat losses is almost precisely 2/3.

Anyway, so I have found the source for the detailed, day by day, almost minute by minute account of how the US 49th Fighter Group fared in getting their P-40s into action at Darwin. This very interesting and engaging account can be found here. I made a mistake in my original remark in conflating the US with the RAAF Kittyhawks, although there seems to have been a very similar rate of accidents. Some of these same aircraft were given to the RAAF. I think some people will find if you read these, you'll notice the almost comedy of errors in getting these aircraft to the front that i was referring to originally.

There is a short overview here:

Brereton Route through Australia during WW2

...and there is more detail here:

49th Fighter Group, formerly known as 49th Pursuit Group

Some quotes from this source:

This route was part of what was known as the "Brereton Route" from Brisbane to Java. It was a total distance of 3,600 miles.

The Corporal in charge of the refuelling crew at Cloncurry in November 1942 described the "Brereton Route" as follows:-

"You won't have any trouble finding your way to Darwin. Just follow the trail of crashed Kittyhawks, you can't go wrong."​

Within two weeks more than 30 planes had been wrecked during training.

The original 49th FG allocation was flown up in four groups.

Group One of 25 Kittyhawks originated in Perth, only 10 of which made it to Darwin though they only list one crash.
Group Two of 20 Kittyhawks de-crated at Brisbane, then flown up to Darwin. 3 Kittyhawks crashed along the way.
Group Three of 25 Kittyhawks and a B-17 via Brisbane. They lost 2 to mechanical problems, 2 damaged in 'heavy landings', four got lost in a storm. 15 remaining Kittys stopped for three days in Daly Waters. One more was lost in a crash, one more had mechanical problems, 14 made it to Darwin. The four lost in the storm came later, with one more crashing at Daly Water.s.
Group Four had one forced landing and was abandoned.

It doesn't say how many were in Group Four but it looks like of 70 original P-40s in groups one two and three, only 21 actually got to Darwin ready for combat. I think 10 were given to RAAF and maybe another 10 in reserve. Quite a few had mechanical problems but according to the site, they lost quite a few just getting to the battle area, and "more than 30 planes had been wrecked during training".

 

[Shortround6]

Not sure what the point of this is.

There were quite a number of forced landings on the sub Sahara route.
And/or landings that required repair.
There was a movement by a US Squadron from California to the East Coast by a P-40 squadron, Planes wound up scattered over number of states. None were declared "lost" as in wrecked but it took just about 2 weeks from the initial fly off to fully assemble the squadron at their destination.
A fuel pump here, a fuel filter there, a new tire over there, more spark plugs, etc.

Maybe it took a week for the last plane to show up, maybe a few trickled in the last week. A nearly 3000 mile move was not easy at the time although things got better very quickly.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I certainly never said this didn't happen in other Theaters. In 1942 I'd say much more of an issue with US kit than in later eras, simply due to the lack of familiarity by the pilots and mechanics, as well as issues with spare parts and to some extent, teething issues with aircraft.

Most of the US and RAAF pilots in the Pacific had very little training on type before going into action in 1942, most were used to older types of aircraft with fixed undercarriages, lower landing speeds and less torque. British pilots in the Middle East got a bit more training before being thrown into combat, but not much - for example many of the DAF fighter units didn't get any gunnery training.

But as for most of the thread, I really don't know what the point is either though to be honest. Neither of us were disagreeing with the OP as fr as I know.

My post being reacted to was:

"My impression so far is that if you include the next several months, through to the Battle of Milne bay and other engagements, then Port Morseby / New Guinea in 1942 was a defeat for the Japanese. In February, the Allies were very much holding on by the skin of their teeth. The heroism of those fighter pilots and the ground forces are almost unbelievable, and the conditions they had to survive in were equivalent to desperate refugees. It's amazing some of these guys could even walk, let alone fly high performance planes in combat. They also got to the battle area with almost no training on type - the Aussies lost about 2/3 of their P-40s just flying them across Australia to get to the battle area. But they held on... just."

This was followed by a ton of statistics intended to prove... I'm not sure what exactly.

I would also add that a fair number of aircraft which crashed on takeoff or landing in the Australian Theater were indeed writeoffs or totally lost, some with pilots killed. Others were damaged but repairable at the airfield, some others were repaired back at depots.

 

[Buz101]

Bill

"You won't have any trouble finding your way to Darwin. Just follow the trail of crashed Kittyhawks, you can't go wrong."

The comment is very interesting however actually doesn't refer to the 49th PG P-40's only but also the Provisional USAAC units. These Units consisted of the 17th Pursuit Squadron (Provisional), the 20th, 3rd, 13th, and 33rd.

17th PS (Prov) - Lost/damaged 2 of 18 on the flight to Darwin - Remaining aircraft went forward to Java
20th PS (Prov) - Lost/damaged 2 of 25 on the flight to Darwin (1 replacement flown up), - Aircraft went forward to Java but lost another 7 before getting there to enemy aircraft and accidents).
3rd PS (Prov) - Lost/damaged 5 of 25 on the flight to Darwin, 2 remained in Darwin, with only 8 reaching Java (lost further aircraft post Darwin - weather/fighters?)
33rd PS (Prov) and 13th PS (Prov) - (both 25 Aircraft) re-routed south, and across to Western Australia - with 15 aircraft of the 33rd diverting North to Darwin from Port Pirie (South Australia not Perth), and losing 3 which remained at Port Pirie (not damaged - one later crashing on a test flight), and losing 3 aircraft on the flight up. 9 aircraft that reached Darwin and meet up with an additional aircraft left by 3rd PS (Prov) - one of the two left (other had been lost in combat with a IJN flyingboat (Mavis iirc) off Darwin on the 15th Feb 42). All 9 aircraft of the 33rd were written off on the 19th Feb 1942 raids on Darwin (think they were all shot down or destroyed whilst taking off) - the remaining 3rd PS aircraft survived.

The remaining aircraft that went to West Australia were loaded on the USS Langley (32 airframes) - all these were lost when that ship was sunk South of Java. The other 3 aircraft, 2 were returned back to the east coast of Australia, one badly damaged on landing in Western Australia.

These are some of the Groups you refer to (Group 1 was actually the 4th and 5th Units provisional Squadrons formed (33rd and 13th) - references for this data is Photos, various documents/Messages from USAAFIA and Squadron records). Concur with the 49th accidents, their pilots had little to no experience on type, or were out of practice, and broke a lot of aircraft during training, when based out of Richmond, Williamtown and Fairburn - numbers lost are very similar to your numbers.

The 49th moved up to Darwin in mid March 1942, the first Unit (9th PS) had some excitement as per Group 3), 11 aircraft of the 7th PS went to Horn Island (North Queensland) first, leaving a couple of aircraft en-route (some of which later caught up there), before flying across to Darwin late March, I cannot recall when the 8th Went to Darwin, but I believe it was April 1942 (will look and see how many they lost on the way up). Of the aircraft damaged on the flight up, some were destroyed, however a number were repairable. The 9th PS got up to Darwin with the 21 aircraft (originally the 14 from Group 3 and then the stragglers) out of 25 aircraft, not 21 out of the whole group

To the RAAF, they received the first 25 Aircraft (10 from Bankstown (ex 7th PS) - 3 crashed on the flight up to Townsville), 15 from Amberley (5 may have come from Archerfield, I cannot recall off the top of my head) transferred on the 6th March 1942, these went to 75 SQN, 76 SQN got their aircraft a little later from Amberley/Archerfield, 77SQNs first aircraft were all delivered to Fremantle via ship. The RAAF Units had quite a number of fairly experienced Pilots, however mostly on different types (such as Wirraway, not fixed Undercarriage aircraft, but certainly less powerful, less torque etc). However there were quite a number of accidents, mostly minimal damage, seeing most aircraft returned to service in a few days.

Buz

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

It seems it was quite a challenge to get used to a ~ 1,000 hp aircraft with a comparatively high landing speed and so on. From watching YouTube videos, I'd say there is a fairly bewildering (to me) number of procedures and things you have to be aware of or keep in mind before takeoff in a P-40, any of which neglected or done wrong could cause a significant problem, much more so than say in a Cessna 172 which I have done. I'd be very concerned about attempting takeoff in a P-40 lol needless to say.

The 49th FG was very lucky in that they had an experienced commander and XO. I think they were also not under quite as much duress as 75 RAAF was initially, though that can be tricky to quantify.

Circumstances for the Allies in general were quite brutal in early 1942. The British lost many of their most experienced pilots in the Battle of Britain. A lot of their pilots in North Africa had flight training but not for example gunnery training. In 1942 the Australians had most of their trained fighter pilots already engaged in North Africa (and in quite a pickle over there). Many of the USAAF pilots, while trained to fly, were not trained on type or necessarily very well as fighter pilots. In the Pacific, only the US Navy fighter pilots could be considered very well trained IMO.

I'm not sure of the details of what Chennault did with the AVG but he must have had a very good system in place, but they had a lot of accidents as well particularly early on. They were also lucky that their initial combat encounters were mostly against unescorted Ki-21s and occasional Ki-27s, for which Chennault had adequately prepared them based on his own experiences flying for the Chinese.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Clive Caldwell was also still facing many of these same problems, especially in the realm of maintenance and supply, in 1943 with his Spitfire Vs.

 

[Greg Boeser]

It seems it was quite a challenge to get used to a ~ 1,000 hp aircraft with a comparatively high landing speed and so on. From watching YouTube videos, I'd say there is a fairly bewildering (to me) number of procedures and things you have to be aware of or keep in mind before takeoff in a P-40, any of which neglected or done wrong could cause a significant problem, much more so than say in a Cessna 172 which I have done. I'd be very concerned about attempting takeoff in a P-40 lol needless to say.

The 49th FG was very lucky in that they had an experienced commander and XO. I think they were also not under quite as much duress as 75 RAAF was initially, though that can be tricky to quantify.

Circumstances for the Allies in general were quite brutal in early 1942. The British lost many of their most experienced pilots in the Battle of Britain. A lot of their pilots in North Africa had flight training but not for example gunnery training. In 1942 the Australians had most of their trained fighter pilots already engaged in North Africa (and in quite a pickle over there). Many of the USAAF pilots, while trained to fly, were not trained on type or necessarily very well as fighter pilots. In the Pacific, only the US Navy fighter pilots could be considered very well trained IMO.

I'm not sure of the details of what Chennault did with the AVG but he must have had a very good system in place, but they had a lot of accidents as well particularly early on. They were also lucky that their initial combat encounters were mostly against unescorted Ki-21s and occasional Ki-27s, for which Chennault had adequately prepared them based on his own experiences flying for the Chinese.

Chennault was skimming experienced pilots from USAAC, USN and USMC. Most were reserve officers whose AD service was about up. They also had a chance to familiarize on type before the shooting started. So his pilots were a bit more experienced than the pilots that were pinning their wings on and getting shipped straight to Australia.
The 49th was a mix of new pilots and survivors of P.I. and Java. 35th and 8th were mostly new pilots with a handful of more experienced pilots.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

One thing which kind of amazes me about the AVG, is how did they keep everything running? Where did they get their mechanics, armorers etc.? His supplies? Chennault seems to have been really well connected with some kind of Chinese mafia organizations, or Chiang was just that effective. Most dictators of that ilk (e.g. Mussolini) didn't seem to be..

Were they getting everything down the Burma Road or did they have another supply route?

 

[Greg Boeser]

Chennault didn't just recruit pilots. He also recruited mechanics. The whole thing was bankrolled by the US government as aid to China. Chennault wanted it to be an American show because he had plenty of experience dealing with the corruption in China.
The planes were shipped to Rangoon and assembled there. Training took place in Burma. When the Japanese attacked, Chennault left one squadron at Rangoon, the other two flew up to China. As the Japanese pushed the British out of Burma, the AVG and RAF fought a fighting withdrawal northward until the AVG withdrew into China and the RAF into India. They hauled as much stuff up from Rangoon as they could. Supplies after that had to be flown over "the Hump" from India. The AVG was incorporated into the USAAF as the 23rd FG 4 July, 1942, but most of the original members elected to return to the States. Many went on to illustrious war careers in their original services. Boyington and Howard come to mind, Tex Hill as well.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

A crazy person might look at your numbers and see 37 Kittyhawks lost non Combat, 26 Lost in Combat, and 91 repaired. Though it's unclear from your data how many were lost to accidents, and (I think) you are mixing losses in Australia with those on New Guinea, but it looks like quite a few losses from "non combat" reasons and the ratio of non combat to combat losses is almost precisely 2/3.

Good to see once again if you do not understand the other person is mentally defective. What is your definition of non combat loss and how does it differ from accidents and write offs? Also it is rather obvious the figures include 75 and 76 squadrons which spent a lot of time in New Guinea, how else to get so many combat losses? Start with the unsupported claim 2/3 of all RAAF P-40 lost before entering combat, keep the 2/3 now announce it is a 2 to 3 ratio in 1942 of combat to non combat losses. 2/3 and 2 to 3, since people who can add are classified crazy you can see how this new mathematics works.

Anyway, so I have found the source for the detailed, day by day, almost minute by minute account of how the US 49th Fighter Group fared in getting their P-40s into action at Darwin. This very interesting and engaging account can be found here. I made a mistake in my original remark in conflating the US with the RAAF Kittyhawks, although there seems to have been a very similar rate of accidents. Some of these same aircraft were given to the RAAF. I think some people will find if you read these, you'll notice the almost comedy of errors in getting these aircraft to the front that i was referring to originally.

Good to see the 49th and other units mentioned were the RAAF ones referred to originally,

the Aussies lost about 2/3 of their P-40s just flying them across Australia to get to the battle area. But they held on... just.

Good to see once again conclusion first, announcement of evidence that is claimed to agree with conclusion second.

But as for most of the thread, I really don't know what the point is either though to be honest. Neither of us were disagreeing with the OP as fr as I know.

My post being reacted to was:

"My impression so far is that if you include the next several months, through to the Battle of Milne bay and other engagements, then Port Morseby / New Guinea in 1942 was a defeat for the Japanese. In February, the Allies were very much holding on by the skin of their teeth. The heroism of those fighter pilots and the ground forces are almost unbelievable, and the conditions they had to survive in were equivalent to desperate refugees. It's amazing some of these guys could even walk, let alone fly high performance planes in combat. They also got to the battle area with almost no training on type - the Aussies lost about 2/3 of their P-40s just flying them across Australia to get to the battle area. But they held on... just."

This was followed by a ton of statistics intended to prove... I'm not sure what exactly.

As for me.

1) Almost everything you wrote about the early RAAF P-40 is wrong or misleading.

2) Many of the original documents needed to come up with a reasonably accurate account are available online, the aircraft cards (with handwriting deciphered via the ADF serials site), the accident cards, some courts of inquiry, the unit histories and the Chiefs of Staff reports (aircraft in and out, repair system aircraft in and out). The RAAF is apparently spending money to make its WWII documents available. The usual care is needed about damage reports, causes not recorded, the fact any damage tends to need a threshold before it is recorded, inconsistent reporting and so on.

So I went and looked at the documents to see how they differed from those 2/3 figures being stated as the losses on the way to the front, in an example of evidence first idea.

The original USAAF ferry route was for heavy bombers, they did not need the intermediate stages in Australia, and originally flew to Port Moresby then to Darwin. The second part of Brereton's mission was to initiate base construction for USAAF units in Australia, at least for training and possibly combat, so intermediate airfields were required.

One useful item to try and locate are atlases published just before and just after WWII lots of useful information. Population figures in the following exclude aborigines.

Brereton Route: Already in use by the RAAF. Brisbane (312,250 people) to Charleville (3,200 people) 500 miles then to Cloncurry (6,300 people) 550 miles, joined by Townsville (19,200 people) to Cloncurry 400 miles then to Daly Waters (too small for a population count to make the Atlas) 500 miles, then 310 miles to Darwin (950 people). Alice Springs around 2,000 people, the Northern Territory as a whole 4,600 people. While some of these places feature prominently in the history of Qantas and the Royal Flying Doctor Service, think what the population sizes mean in terms of pre existing facilities, the problems of shipping material there to improve facilities (or just sending fuel and having fuel storage) and the ability to find them after flying for a few hours given the lack of accurate weather forecasting. The world had an acute shortage of airfield construction ability, radio aids and trained staff, so why should these bases be given priority? There was also an inland ferry route going near due north from Melbourne to Longreach then to Cloncurry.

By mid 1944 Darwin was a class A, lighted airfield, Cloncurry and Charleville class A-1 lighted, Daly Waters class A-1. An A-1 had at least a 1,500 yard runway, and at least another of 1,000 yards, with a 1 in 30 minimum approach angle. Class A was minimum 1,200, 800 and 1 in 20. There was a Strategic Air Route System of designated airfields. The RAAF formed what it called 30 Operational Base Unit to look after Cloncurry on 31 December 1942, disbanding it on 30 September 1945, 15 OBU at Charleville 4 March 1943 to 14 December 1944, after which 14 OBU looked after the airfield along with Lowood. RAAF Station Daly Waters formed 18 March 1942, became OBU Daly Waters 15 May, became 56 OBU 1 September then disbanded on 30 July 1943.

By the way in a world of rubber shortages grass airfields caused less wear to tyres.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I made an off-hand remark that you pounced on. I already acknowledged 2/3 wasn't precise, and not all 'lost' in landing accidents etc. were permanently destroyed. But it does appear that close to that number were lost in accidents, and it's clear that I was substantially correct. Both the Australians and Americans lost a lot of planes - in particular kittyhawks - in Australia before even getting into combat. That is abundantly clear from the data.

The exact ratio varies by unit, and some were repaired, but clearly a lot of them were lost.

There was never any question of cutting off the Australians from their supply of 'precious' kittyhawks as you stated.

The reason for all this was largely because of the lack of training on type, which was my original point, as well as problems with airfields, navigation, maintenance, and weather. And some teething issues with the very early P-40Es they were getting.

I appreciate all the data you posted, but the rest of your comments seem to be fiercely engaged in a debate that nobody else is having.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Chennault didn't just recruit pilots. He also recruited mechanics. The whole thing was bankrolled by the US government as aid to China. Chennault wanted it to be an American show because he had plenty of experience dealing with the corruption in China.
The planes were shipped to Rangoon and assembled there. Training took place in Burma. When the Japanese attacked, Chennault left one squadron at Rangoon, the other two flew up to China. As the Japanese pushed the British out of Burma, the AVG and RAF fought a fighting withdrawal northward until the AVG withdrew into China and the RAF into India. They hauled as much stuff up from Rangoon as they could. Supplies after that had to be flown over "the Hump" from India. The AVG was incorporated into the USAAF as the 23rd FG 4 July, 1942, but most of the original members elected to return to the States. Many went on to illustrious war careers in their original services. Boyington and Howard come to mind, Tex Hill as well.

I have about a dozen books on the AVG, including Olga Greenlaw's book (prior to Dan Fords strange edit) and Boyingtons autobiography (and his thinly veiled, quite amusing novel), and Scott's book and a couple of biographies of Chenault, and others. I am still a little baffled as to how they managed the supply and maintenance situation, seemingly better than USAAF units in the same period.

As you seem to suggest here, they must have quite carefully selected both pilots and maintenance personnel, though some of the pilots (like Boyington) seem to have had rather checkered careers to say the least prior to recruitment and many were not even fighter pilots. Most of them seem to have turned out very well regardless.

 

[Shortround6]

Remember your books, Many of the men recruited were men that did not fit well into the existing military structure. Promotion was slow, repeat SLOW, and men that rocked the boat were not looked at favorably. Chenault was basically hiring mercenaries at a much higher rate of pay. And to some men that were going to be stuck without promotion due to some infraction that had little to do with actual job performance. This may apply to ground crew as well. Getting the job done may have been more important than filling out the forms correctly. Setting up a different supply line was one way of getting around the Chinese corruption.

They may have had a lot more applicants than they had positions.
"At a time when military pilots received an average of $260 a month, salaries in the AVG were $750 for squadron leaders, $675 for flight leaders, and $600 for wingmen, with a bonus of $500 for each confirmed aircraft kill. Ground crews, while receiving less ($150 to $350 per month) were also better compensated."
Enlisted personnel in the air forces were much lower paid than the pilots (officers).

 

[Greg Boeser]

And Chennault continued to have problems with the US military echelons long after the AVG was disbanded. One constant complaint being he did not maintain proper records.

 

[Buz101]

I am still a little baffled as to how they managed the supply and maintenance situation, seemingly better than USAAF units in the same period.

Bill

Apart from the spares that were sent (part of any shipment of aircraft at the time although I'm uncertain if this was RAF or USAAC level of spares (I know Russian parts allocation was to the British standard (at least as shipped by the UK) - so maybe the same for the AVG). Additionally you have to recall that they had a fair number of wrecked aircraft to cannibalise and some quite senior P-40 enlisted maintenance pers that were hired with the skills to keep the system running (and aircraft).

Certainly I'd suggest they had access to order parts post 7th Dec 1941, and after March 1942 they would also had access to some more common P-40 parts going into India (again how much I don't know) That said they did a outstanding job servicing (although serviceability rates was never particularly high - but certainly operationally sustainable), along with the additional support from the Camco Aircraft Factory, which did a lot of refurbished parts, rebuilding various airframes, wing panels etc.

Buz

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

How much help were they able to get from Camco, I thought that came into existence a bit later?

 

[Shortround6]

Curtiss had a presence in China going back to 1934 if not before. It was in 1934 that an American owned assembly plant was set up ( planes were shipped in knocked down) and this later became Camco so don't get to hung up on when the name or cooperate structure that was Camco came into existence.
Camco was in existence in early 1938.
A number of the Hawk biplanes were partially assembled in China.

Perhaps it was this that Chennault was trying to get away from? doesn't mean he wouldn't make use of it if he had to but perhaps he didn't want to rely on it.

Camco was reformed as HAL (Hindustan Aircraft Ltd, in Bangalore India after escaping from China.

 

[Buz101]

How much help were they able to get from Camco, I thought that came into existence a bit later?

CAMCO Personnel assisted in the assembly of the airframes at Mingaladon airport (organised by the Pawley Brothers) on arrival Aug 1941 onwards (I think it was Aug for the first arrivals) , and the factory was at Loiwing (opened in 1939). The factory was used in support of the AVG (rebuilding airframes etc) until the Spring offensive in 1942 pushed the allies back from Burma (a number of airframes were lost when the factory was lost - would need to read up on if these were destroyed on departure or not).

So based on the above I'd suggest they got a fair bit of support.

Buz