Was the Axis Alliance doomed to failure from the outset?

[davebender]

Professional military forces have contingency plans for all sorts of things. Most of them are never used. Barbarossa was only a contingency plan until the German Government ordered it to be implemented.

I wouldn't be surprised if the American Government still has contingency plans for fighting Britain (and vice versa). Updating these things gives staff officers something to do.

 

[buffnut453]

I think it's stretching things to say Barbarossa was a contingency plan. Hitler's desire for autarky and lebensraum, which were policies espoused from the mid-1930s, pretty much guaranteed an expansion eastwards. His vitriolic hatred of Communism made the USSR a natural target and this was all long before fighting actually broke out in western Europe.

 

[parsifal]

In 1938 Britain was encouraging Poland to reach a deal on Danzig and the corridor. Britain, after all, supported Germany taking control of ethnic German areas of Czechoslovakia.

Britain's position changed in 1939 when the Germans broke the deal brokered at Munich in 1938 and seized control of the rest of Czechoslovakia.

How on earth could Poland reach an agreement with Germany after that? Hitler promised he only wanted part of Czechoslovakia, then broke his word and took it all.

Hitler's betrayal of the Munich agreement changed everything. Prior to that Britain had sided with Germany in recovering territory taken by the treaty of Versailles.

It goes further than that. Hitler biggest worry in 1939 was that the Poles would cave in and war would be avoided. He was actively looking for a fight for three reasons. the first was driven by vengeance. he wanted to avenge the injustices of Versailles. The second was that he saw national survival as only achievable through constant conflict, warfare and dominance. Nazi Germany's very existence was dependant on the subjugation and enslavement of the rest of Europe. It was not just the russians.....he wanted dominance of all Europe. after munich everybody knew that, moreover. And if he had waon Europe, he would have wanted more, and more and more.....

The third reason for Germany wanted open war was economic. Germany was an insolvent state in 1939, and needed loot to prop up the regime.

Assessing hitler and his crackpot regime from the basis of a rational well intentioned state is not only offensive, it gives the wrong impression of how the country was operating at that time. Hitler was regulalry consulting his astrologer for advice on what to do. He was anything but a balanced or professional politician. He was a cheap, uneducated rabble rouser and demagogue who had some serious self esteem issues. He hated democracy and the rule of law, despised the democracies that surrounded him, and expected all nations to serve under slavery for germany.

As to whether Allied victory was assured in 1939, well provided you dont believe in manifest destiny, nothing is assured, and the Axis had every possibility of winning in 1939. Militarily, diplomatically, and politically they possessed the initiative. They were weaker economically, but this was an aberration, Germany should have been the second most powerful nation on earth on the basis of its economic performance. It was not and infact the country ws already going down the drain by 1939.

For Germany to win, they actually had to contain and focus their war effort. Defaet Poland, Defeat France and the Low countries, then throw out the peace feelers....give, it was important to win the hearts and minds in the western hemispheere by not embarking on unrestricted warfare in the Pan american Neutrality zone. But the Germans could not relive themselves of the spots they had acquired in the lead up to war, and this meant no one trusted an untrustworthy regime like the Nazis.....No-one except those nations with either like minds (like italy) or forced by circumstance to make deals with the devil (like Finland, Rumania and Hungary). Anyone able to get out and stay out of bed with the Germans (like Spain) did so.

 

[buffnut453]

Great post Parsifal. As I think I've posted previously, it's interesting that when given a choice of expanding the war or securing gains, the Axis powers pretty much consistently opted for expansion. Perhaps the senior leadership did understand that they had to make their gains quickly because, ultimately, they'd lose in a long drawn-out war of economic attrition. That said, as you have clearly observed, the only way for the Axis to declare any sort of victory, even of a limited nature, was to consolidate, build bridges (where/if possible) and regroup both militarily and economically. Their failure to do so guaranteed their downfall.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... the Axis had every possibility of winning in 1939. Militarily, diplomatically, and politically they possessed the initiative. They were weaker economically, but this was an aberration, Germany should have been the second most powerful nation on earth..."

So, Parsifal, your short answer to the question is "yes"....

I disagree. Germany was part of a coalition in 1914 and didn't fight WW1 alone. By his choice of Alliance partners in 1938 Hitler was doomed:

Italy was all brio and no bite. Bad judgement and too much bravado without the economic muscle to back it up -- or cover Hitler's flank.

Japan could have been a great ally. Economically and industrially resourceful. Militarily bold and steadfast. BUT too far alway and with few common grounds for cooperation.

Hungary and Romania were stalwart allies, militarily and economically, but lacked industrial muscle and size.

Czechoslovakia was a great industrial asset but again, not large enough to make a overpowering difference. Finland, as it always does, punched way beyond its weight BUT WERE NOT AXIS members. Hitler should have been able to get much much more of occupied France ... but you know the Germans and the French clash of civilizations.

Now - compare these partners with Britain's (after the fall of France). Common language. Common traditions and histories. Wealth in both resources and industry.... and it only gets BETTER after December, 1941.

The Axis was an opportunistic "put-together", not an Alliance of equals, and it was doomed from the get go (and would have been with or without Nazi phony-baloney economics.)

But, otherwise, I agree with much you wrote, Parsifal, oh god of Doom .

MM

EDIT: "Wanting War" , "Needing War" or even "Being Ready for war" doesn't always assure success - Germany 1914-18 taught that lesson (though Europeans didn't quite learn the lesson first time out) My question was: Was the Axis Alliance doomed from the get-go?

It was.

 

[davebender]

A perfect summary.

Germany lost WWII during 1938 through poor diplomacy a year before the first shot was fired.

 

[parsifal]

I disagree. Germany was part of a coalition in 1914 and didn't fight WW1 alone. By his choice of Alliance partners in 1938 Hitler was doomed:

Err no, if you compare to the alliance partners that Britain started with (excepting the Commonwealth, and in 1938 as part of the military equation even these nations were a net liability for Britain).

by June 1940, all of Britains prewar alliances were in tatters. Not only were many of these nations defeated, many of them were providing or were prepred to support germany. If Germany had played her cards right she could have organized a semi-united Europe to oppose the Allies. instead they chose to go Feudal and destroy Europe for a short term gain. Within months many who at least not opposed thje germans were now in open opposition to the Germans.

The assuymption at work here is that somehow the new alliances and new capabilities that develop to replace the old ones that had so completely failed the Allies would happen automatically and inevitably. Nothing could be further from the truth. The great achievement of Churchill was to forger new alliances out of defeat.....to use British money and influence to prepre their great hope, the US to start to get ready for war, to spend vast amounts of money to help the Commonwealth nations do the same, to use all their powers of persuasion and proaganda to support tyhe growing resistance movements on the continent. The British worked tirelessly in just about every field imaginable to build opposition to the germans....for example they insisted on keeping international shipping and trade routes open so that neutral nations would continue to trade with them, and not attempt to trade with the germans. They willingly and freely gave military secrets to the US to help them prepre for war. There was nothing comparable in Germany until it was much too late. The German dealings with Rumania, for example make intersting reading, and border on a form of blackmail rather than a coaltiion of nations trying to fight a war.


The alliance partners he di end up with were there for a variety of reasons, and sure they were weak in various ways. Thats because the strong one that had resisted him had all been trampled, and were never offered any olive branches to rebuild and join a greater European co-operative. But even the weak ones that germany found themselves stuck with were not optimised by the germans to get the most out of them....thjey were exploited, sneered at blamed for german failures and badly let down by them. Compare the performnance of say the Italians with the Free Polish forces. The Poles were a defeated nation, demoralised destitute....in far worse condition than the Italians, yet they (the Poles) fought maginficently and effectively. The italians....well, they had their moments, but they were generally a failure, but this failure was made worse by the Germans

Italy was all brio and no bite. Bad judgement and too much bravado without the economic muscle to back it up -- or cover Hitler's flank.

Japan could have been a great ally. Economically and industrially resourceful. Militarily bold and steadfast. BUT too far alway and with few common grounds for cooperation.

Hungary and Romania were stalwart allies, militarily and economically, but lacked industrial muscle and size.

If these countries could have somehow removed themselves from their geographical location and joined Britain as Allies, they would have performed far better. Sure there was some issues with the basic material, but the overwhelming problem was Germany, not her allies. unlike Britain, the Germans never attempted to deal with their allies as equals and gave scant regard to dealing with them fairly. Read Cianos diary about how the Italians found out about the invasion of Russia.

Czechoslovakia was a great industrial asset but again, not large enough to make a overpowering difference. Finland, as it always does, punched way beyond its weight BUT WERE NOT AXIS members. Hitler should have been able to get much much more of occupied France ... but you know the Germans and the French clash of civilizations.

The potential resources at the germans disposal after June 1940 were enormous...potentially they could have rivaled the US in terms of outputs. Its a furphy to argue that Germany did not have the latent acapacity at her disposal to turn the war around. But the problem was the regime itself. After they had conquered western Europe, they didnt make any attempt to intregrate the economic resources of the occupied territories in a respponsible or beneficial way. They adopted a short term smash and grab policy and did not give much support to their allies either. After the fall of france, large quantities of french machine tools were simply uplifted and carried off to Germany, where they spent the war mostly in storage. This of course all but shut down French industry, along with the crazy exchange rates that were forced on these countries. Getting back to thos machine tools, the Italians were screaming for new stuff to replace the worn out gear in their own factories. Italy had been suffering under League sanctions since 1935 and had frittered away what little cash it had developing its colonies as showponies in which the money invested in them could never be recovered.

Now - compare these partners with Britain's (after the fall of France). Common language. Common traditions and histories. Wealth in both resources and industry.... and it only gets BETTER after December, 1941.

No disagreement that the alliance at the feet of the british at the end of the war was far and away more powerful at the end, but at the beginning it did not exist . The US was openly hostile to military involvement and was woefully unprepared for war. Churchilll pursued them relentlessly to get ready for war. If it had been a German style psyche driving the British, the US would not have entered the war, or prepred for it, in the way that they did. In the case of the Dominions, I cannot see Germany spending the money to set up schemes like EATS or providing a replacement cruiser (the Shropshire) for the lost HMAS Canberra


And we have not yet even started with the russians. They had no shared language, they didnt even have a shared set of values. They started out on the other side.....if Churchill had been another hitler, he would have left the Russians to their fate in June 1941, instead he dropped everything and strained avery muscle to support his new allies ("the enemy of my enmy is my friend")... The alliance that the Brits worked toward could have failed in so many ways, but didnt, why, I believe because of the british attitude of self sacrifice, at any cost, to form the alliance to defeat the germans. there was nothing comparable on the Axis side.

The Axis was an opportunistic "put-together", not an Alliance of equals, and it was doomed from the get go (and would have been with or without Nazi phony-baloney economics.)

Agreed, but that was by choice, not by necessity

But, otherwise, I agree with much you wrote, Parsifal, oh god of Doom .

Which bits do we agree on???

God Of Doom.....never been called that one before....should I be happy????

 

[michaelmaltby]

Parsifal wrote: ".... I am Parsifal to you, not Mr Parsifal. Parsifal incidentally is the slayer of evil".

So, if one is EVIL, Parsifal spells DOOM (at least in my understanding of what mythological figures do).

Although talking about the Axis formation in 1938 .... their opposition was Britain, Was there any doubt that the Commonwealth would weight in on Britain's side when the chips dropped in 1939 ...? There was no doubt about Canada's position. {The weird Prime Minister of the time, King, took the appropriate side steps and back steps to appease Quebec and Canadian pacifists, but it was just appearances.}

Germany did all the heavy lifting in the European section of the Axis - manpower wise and equipment wise. If Italy was short-shifted over Barbarossa, maybe it was because Mussolini had blind-sided Hitler in North Africa and the Balkins/Greece.

"... If these countries could have somehow removed themselves from their geographical location and joined Britain as Allies, they would have performed far better.". And if my mother had wheels she'd be a bus.

"... Russia". I agree with you Parsifal, but I intentionally omitted the Soviet Union because they were Axis allies (though not an Axis member) in 1939. I am not discounting the Soviet contribution to the Allied cause in either quantity or intensity - BUT - the effort was entirely self-serving in every aspect, unlike Britain's (as you acknowledge).

"... choice, not by necessity". Agreed. But Hitler was in a far more insecure position in Germany (in 1933 and after) than any British politician. The phony economics along with Nordic mythology stuff was smoke and mirrors to win and hold the German people ... and belay Communism in Germany.

"... Which bits do we agree on?"

I wrote: I agree with much you wrote, Parsifal, oh destroyer of Evil ... (I always do).

In a nutshell - the positive aspects of Britain and the Commonwealth that you touch on (and the US after 1941) are exactly the reasons why the German-led European Axis was doomed. And furthermore, had Germany been a little more patient, diplomatic and "accepting", the German-Japan portion of the Axis could have been much more effective ... (than just sending prototypes and engineering specs).

MM

 

[Glider]

Large parts of the Japanese leadership did not believe that the Axis would win. Before the Japanese signed up to the alliance senior people in Jalan were urging the military leader not to sign up as they knew that the lacked the economic means to win such a war. However the Military Leader in Japan did not believe them and signed anyway

 

[Jenisch]

Large parts of the Japanese leadership did not believe that the Axis would win. Before the Japanese signed up to the alliance senior people in Jalan were urging the military leader not to sign up as they knew that the lacked the economic means to win such a war. However the Military Leader in Japan did not believe them and signed anyway

Before the Barbarossa, the Japanese plan was excellent: put the Soviets in the Axis and use them as a shield to grab the rich resources in the Pacific.