Was the De Havilland Mosquito a good fighter?

[davebender]

That is a scary thought. The raid commander must have been desperate.

 

[parsifal]

V-1 and V-2 are about as much the same deal as battlecruisers and submarines.

Read the post....its got nothing to do with similar technologies. its about wasted resources on pointless and useless research projects, at least in terms of delivering any tangible benefits to the germans for the foreseeable future. In 1944, for example, the germans spent RM 12,000,000,000 on R&D for the Luftwafdrfe alone, and more than half of this was spent on the experiment5al rocket and jet programs.

Put all the spin on this issue that you like, it cannot, and does not alter the basic truth....the germans managed their available resources very poorly, and at the forefront of that profligate waste are projects like the terror weapons.

 

[davebender]

The Me-262 jet program was a success. Just a few months too late to matter. But that was rather difficult to predict when RLM began funding jet engine development during the summer of 1939.

Not that this has anything to do with the de Havilland Mosquito.

 

[parsifal]

The Me-262 jet program was a success. Just a few months too late to matter. But that was rather difficult to predict when RLM began funding jet engine development during the summer of 1939.

Not that this has anything to do with the de Havilland Mosquito.

Ther4e are a lot of people who would not agree with that. Despite the huge amounts of money spent on its design and development, as you say it6 arrived too late to make any difference. However, even this is a stretch of the truth. It suffered from poor engine life, and had other problems that reduced its operational readiness rate to virtually zero....big white elephant is a term that seems appropriate.

its relevant to the mosquito debate, because issue was raised about the cost effectiveness of the mosquito. if ever there was a case of the pott calling the kettle black, this is one of those occasions

 

[Njaco]

That is a scary thought. The raid commander must have been desperate.

1 August 1940

The task to bomb the airfield near Cherbourg was given to RAF No. 56 Sqd (Coastal Command) based at Thorney Island using Blenheim IV bombers, and these would be escorted by RAF No. 236 Sqd (Long range Blenheim fighters). Ground crews loaded up the thirteen Blenheim bombers with the required bomb loads while ten Blenheim fighters were prepared and placed at readiness. The Blenheims of RAF No.236 Sqd were now taking off. The Blenheim bombers of RAF No.56 Sqd had taken off a little earlier and the Blenheim fighters were to rendezvous with them just prior to the French coast and strafe the Cherbourg aerodrome after the bombs were dropped by the bombers. The forecast given to the crews was that conditions would be fine with good visibility. The Blenheim fighter escort was to take off in three waves, with five minutes separating each wave and the last wave of four was to stay clear of the target area and stay off the French coast covering the withdrawal of the others. But all was not to go according to plan. The forecasters had got it all wrong as heavy low cloud covered the entire French coast around Cherbourg. The leading three Blenheims led by F/Lt R.M. Power missed the Cherbourg Peninsular completely and overtook the Blenheims of RAF No.56 Sqd and flew deeper into German-held territory before deciding to return to base. A break in the cloud appeared just as the Blenheims of RAF No.56 Sqd neared the coast. They were on course and the aerodrome on the peninsula could be seen and they commenced their bombing run. Not far behind were the second wave of three Blenheim fighters led by S/L P.E. Drew. RAF No. 56 Sqd managed to drop their bombs successfully causing considerable damage amidst heavy flak and machine gun fire from aerodrome gun emplacements. S/L Drew led with Australian P/O B.M. McDonough and Sgt R.C. Smith at about 50-70 feet strafing the airfield and gun batteries. Many of the batteries were hit, fires started to follow explosions as hangars and buildings were hit, aircraft in the open were either destroyed or damaged. For the RAF the mission seemed to be a success. But it was short lived. Some of the Blenheim bombers of RAF No. 56 Sqd were hit as they pulled out of their bombing run. Sgt Smith's aircraft received a number of hits as his low level strafing run sustained further damage to the aerodrome. He pulled out on completion, turned and headed back across the Channel losing contact with the others. One of the Blenheims of RAF No. 56 Sqd failed to return. It was piloted by the squadron commanding officer Wing Commander Weld-Smith. Two Blenheims of RAF No.236 Sqd also failed to return.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... the Germans managed their available resources very poorly, and at the forefront of that profligate waste are projects like the terror weapons."

The rocket and buzz bomb projects were in Albert Speer's management 'portfolio' . The Me 262 was NOT. It was in Milsch's domain.

Speer like the 'V Weapon' program because it was POLITICAL - with mystic appeal to the German population - and very suited to domestic propaganda. (Source: Adam Tooze, Wages of Destruction)

Doesn't THAT tell you something about Nazis priorities?

MM

 

[Airframes]

Good info on the Blenheim raid Chris. But one thing - 56 Squadron was a fighter squadron in Fighter Command, equipped with Hurricanes at the time.

 

[Njaco]

Well, well, some sources!! Thanks Terry!

 

[Njaco]

Dyslexic I am!!!! Found it. Supposed to be RAF No. 59 Squadron.

The Battle of Britain - 1940 / August 1st - August 10th 1940

 

[Airframes]

Ah, that makes more sense! 59 Sqn were an Army Co-operation unit (not Coastal Command), mainly involved in reconnaissance, but from July to October 1940 were tasked with bombing operations on Channel ports etc.
Dyslexia lures KO !

 

[riacrato]

Read the post....its got nothing to do with similar technologies. its about wasted resources on pointless and useless research projects, at least in terms of delivering any tangible benefits to the germans for the foreseeable future. In 1944, for example, the germans spent RM 12,000,000,000 on R&D for the Luftwafdrfe alone, and more than half of this was spent on the experiment5al rocket and jet programs.

Put all the spin on this issue that you like, it cannot, and does not alter the basic truth....the germans managed their available resources very poorly, and at the forefront of that profligate waste are projects like the terror weapons.

And you just link the Fi 103 to a huge figure without having any clue whatsoever how much the program in question actually costs. You just automatically assume it must've been a huge waste because after all it's German. Yeah, some researcher you are. The means employed for countering Fi 103 attacks very likely exceed the costs for that program itself.

 

[parsifal]

And you just link the Fi 103 to a huge figure without having any clue whatsoever how much the program in question actually costs. You just automatically assume it must've been a huge waste because after all it's German. Yeah, some researcher you are. The means employed for countering Fi 103 attacks very likely exceed the costs for that program itself.

i have some idea of its cost, but feel free to elaborate if you have any additional information. As to my ability to research, what basis do you have for saying that. As to the statement about me assuming it to be a failure just because it was german....not true, there were many German successes at efficiency, like the MP-38. If you have information that suggests the Germans were more efficient in their production processes, and in their expenditure of resources please feel free to make them known. But i think it more than a little hypocritical to argue my post lacks detail, and then make statements that the costs of the allied defenc were greater than the cost of the Fi103 program without any substantiation. Please post your sources, or at least reasoning for making that statement, if you are going to criticise my lack of detail.

Now, claearly you want facts and figures on which to base your assessment....why was the V-1 an inherent failure, and what makes me think its development cost was high?

Research on the basic technology began as far back as 1928, and the Luftwaffe began serious research and development in 1936. A second development team was added in 1940, and a third in late 1942. A new facility was built for its research and development, as part of the peenmunde complex.

New factories were built to facilitate its construction. more than 24000 were built in 1944 and about 10000 in 1945.

For this outlay, the V-1s managed to kill 46000 people, and render homeless about another 130000. There were almost no military casualties.

Each V-1 required 550 manhours, approximately, and basic production costs were RM 5090, exclusive of transport, construction of launching facilities, fuel, or any other operational cost. A full flak regiment was used to protect the launching sites, for example...

Now, of those 34000 missiles, about 22000 were launched, and about 5000 actually hit a target. A rough estimate of accuracy is therefore, about 25%. So each hit by these weapons , exclusive of operational costs was RM20500 per hit. This cost also does not include the research and development costs. Your right that i dont have a full figure on what the R&D costs were, however just one aspect can be reported, and shows this element to be a significant factor in the final costings.....approximately 4000 were expended in development, which in basic costs alone, add RM20000000 to the production costs.

Still confident that it was a cost effective program?????

A P-51 cost $60000 and was had an average service life of about 10 months. It required a pilot, which added say $30000 to the cost of the aircraft. It might undertake say 4 sorties per month (if anyone has better figures, would love to hear). So a P-51 with its pilot, might be good for around 30-40 missions, or a cost per mission, in terms of unit cost, and like our V-1 assessment, exclusinve of operational and deployment costs, of around $2500 per mision. Now lets get that straight....your attempting to argue that a mission cost of RM20500+ is more cost effective than a mission cost of $2500 (on the assumption that the cost of operating the FC aircraft intercepting the doodlebugs were similar to operating a p-51...). I beg to differ. I think the cost of the German terror campaigns were much higher than the cost of a conventional fixed wing campaign. If we wanted to turn this around and try and estimate just how many airacraft the germans sacrificed to have these weapons, we arrive at a figure of around 8000 aircraft, give or take. Personally if I was in the german camp, i would rather have had another 8000 aircraft than the V-1s in my inventory....

Now, to your last statement about how it cost more for the defences than it would cost for the attacking apparatus. On this issue, I can agree with....except the logic is hopelessly flawed. Whereas the V-1 program had but one purpose and was produced from scratch for that purpose, at enromous cost to the germans, the British defences were put in place to meet a multitude of threats, and possessed an inbuilt flexibility to meet those threats. Mosquitoes attacking V-1s in the defence of London today, might do just that on day1. on days 2 they might interecept a force of german bombers attempting the same stunt, on Day 3 they might escort a force of bombers over germany, and so on. moreover the defences in Southeasst England did not represent any special outlay, or any denial of the forces over the frontlines. They were there to defend south east eangland, and they did that. The doodlebug attacks did not add, substantially to that standiung cost. As you should be able to see, therefore, your reason detre inarguing the higher cost in thye defences is inherently flawed

 

[fastmongrel]

Parsifal I think your casualty figures for the V-Weapon Blitz might be wrong a couple of sources I have give V-1 total casualties in Britain at approx 22,000 of which deaths were approx 6,200. V-2 casualty figures are approx 9,500 of which deaths were approx 2,750.

Oops just read your post again and I realise now you werent specifying British casualties.

 

[riacrato]

Zaloga puts much lower production costs for the V-1 (~350 hours), so likely your number is from the beginning of the program. Second: Where's the maintenance costs for maintaining a squadron of P-51s including staff, airfields, transport logistics, fuel... Where would Germany take another 8000 pilots from. Would the additional planes need more airfields and equally more flak defenses? Where does the figure of 30000 $ training costs for a pilot come from. Where does the number of 20500 RM per hit come from.

Sorry that you don't care about the costs for defense against these attacks, but how do you evaluate a weapon intended to essentially produce terror and havoc without taking that into account? So I'd say your logic is hopelessly flawed. The defenses were not tailored to meet V-1 attacks? Who are you kidding. The thousands of defense sorties would've been flown without the V-1 being present? Yeah right.

I should also add that the US intended to use massive amounts of reverse engineered V-1s in their bombardments of the Japanese main islands as a preperation of the invasion that never happened.

And for the record: I never claimed the program to be particularly cost-effective or having a comparable effect as the Mosquito. But to put it in the same ballpark as the V-2 and claim it to be a huge waste is beyond reality. It had no tactical impact but a significant strategic and psychological one. It enabled germany to keep at least minimal pressure on allied air defenses (who flew about 3-4 sorties for every launch and lost iirc several hundred pilots) at a time of critical resource and manpower situation... for the cost of almost no aircrew lost and much less fuel per ton of ordinance than any conventional bomber campaign they could've fielded. It was all in all probably a zero-sum game.

 

[parsifal]

Zaloga puts much lower production costs for the V-1, so likely your number is from the beginning of the program. Second: Where's the maintenance costs for maintaining a squadron of P-51s including staff, airfields, transport logistics, fuel... Where would Germany take another 8000 pilots from. Where does the figure of 30000 $ training costs for a pilot come from. Where does the number of 20500 RM per hit come from.

Sorry that you don't care about the costs for defense against these attacks, but how do you evaluate a weapon intended to essentially produce terror and havoc without taking that into account? So I'd say your logic is hopelessly flawed. The defenses were not tailored to meet V-1 attacks? Who are you kidding. The thousands of defense sorties would've been flown without the V-1 being present? Yeah right.

I should also add that the US intended to use massive amounts of reverse engineered V-1s in their bombardments of the Japanese main islands as a preperation of the invasion that never happened.

No, my source for production costs, is the average cost..... For items, the initial costs are much greater at the beginning of of a production run than at the end. A prime example of that is the Tiger tank. overall it cost about RM312K per copy, however in 1942 the average cost was closer to RM750K per copy. I suspoect Zaloga may be quoting the end of war costs, when the germans were producing them much more cheaply than at the beginning.

With regard to maintenance costs, I havent included them for either piece of equipment. I do know that an entire flak regiment was assigned to protect the V-1 launching sites , and an unknown number of technicians. Both fixed wing and unmanned RPVs have maintenance costs. and fom expereience there isnt a lot of difference in the cost of either to each other. We can start to factor these additional costs into the equation, and it might make a difference, but not by much, because both items have a maintainence cost.

Whereas a loss of an aircraft over enemy territory would mean almost certain loss of the pilot as well, the loss of an aircraft over friendly territory can safely assume at least a 50% return rate on the pilot. Provided the Germans acted defensively, and used their aircraft over friendly territory, they might need 2-3000 more pilots, not 8000. Fuel is a problem, but actually less so than trying to provide fuel for 34000 V-1s.


Its not that I dont care for the costs of defence against V-1s, or that my logic is hopelessly flawed, but many of therse costs would have arisen anyway. If the british defences were not flying against V-1s, they would have been flying against other targets, either defensively, or offensively. The difference in the costings for the british force of fixed wing aircraft and the RPV force fielded by the germans is the inherent flexibility of the allied force. Having decided to build these defences they had the mobility and the versatility to be used in any number of ways. General Piles defences for example...many of these were transferred to NW Europe for other duties after the Terror campaign over England fizzled out. Same argument for the airborne components....they could, and were, moved to other battle areas, once the threat passed. The maintenence costs dont really count in this costing, because the forces are there anyway, and can be used for other things. The V-1 force cannot be used for any other purpose, its far too specialized.


As for the claim of reverse engineered V-1s for the US, I have no doubt that they considered this, but like all things, considering is not the same as actually doing. I am not saying, incidentally, that long term, the V-1 concept was not without merit....they are a precursor to modern cruise missiles, but these really were not effective until twenty or thirty years after the war. I dont recall their extensive use during the Korean war for example

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal I think your casualty figures for the V-Weapon Blitz might be wrong a couple of sources I have give V-1 total casualties in Britain at approx 22,000 of which deaths were approx 6,200. V-2 casualty figures are approx 9,500 of which deaths were approx 2,750.

Oops just read your post again and I realise now you werent specifying British casualties.

I just did a quick check of the casualties from the terror campaigns, so you might be right....ther was a report by a US colonel that gave these figures, so they may be too high......

 

[riacrato]

No, my source for production costs, is the average cost.....

I'd like to see that calculation. Original research or taken from a historian?

With regard to maintenance costs, I havent included them for either piece of equipment. I do know that an entire flak regiment was assigned to protect the V-1 launching sites , and an unknown number of technicians. Both fixed wing and unmanned RPVs have maintenance costs. and fom expereience there isnt a lot of difference in the cost of either to each other. We can start to factor these additional costs into the equation, and it might make a difference, but not by much, because both items have a maintainence cost.

What experience on unmanned or manned aircraft and their maintenance do you have if I may ask? I find it highly unlikely that costs for the launching sites were anywhere near the costs of keeping airfields for thousands of aircraft operational.

Whereas a loss of an aircraft over enemy territory would mean almost certain loss of the pilot as well, the loss of an aircraft over friendly territory can safely assume at least a 50% return rate on the pilot. Provided the Germans acted defensively, and used their aircraft over friendly territory, they might need 2-3000 more pilots, not 8000. Fuel is a problem, but actually less so than trying to provide fuel for 34000 V-1s.

Pulse jet runs on simpler fuel and are by nature among the most efficient engines. And again: Germany didn't have enough trained pilots as is. May I again ask where the 30000 $ figure for pilot training comes from.

Its not that I dont care for the costs of defence against V-1s, or that my logic is hopelessly flawed, but many of therse costs would have arisen anyway.

Perhaps, but it's hard to tell how much. Certainly not those of the over 44,000 sorties flown.

they would have been flying against other targets, either defensively, or offensively

In other words: against German soil... hmm, might that be a benefit?

The V-1 force cannot be used for any other purpose, its far too specialized.

It is a flying bomb that costs about 5% the man hours of the contempory Bf 109 (pilot not included) and considering the time in the war had at least that %-age in effect, but likely even more.

As for the claim of reverse engineered V-1s for the US, I have no doubt that they considered this, but like all things, considering is not the same as actually doing. I am not saying, incidentally, that long term, the V-1 concept was not without merit....they are a precursor to modern cruise missiles, but these really were not effective until twenty or thirty years after the war. I dont recall their extensive use during the Korean war for example

I don't recall assault rifles being or atomic bombs being used either.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

OK folks - this thread is about the Mosquito, not the V-1. We've been off subject for a while now. If you guys want to continue to discuss this, start a V-1 thread.

 

[cocky pilot]

Just curious - what's your source for that???

The quote about the projected mosquito performance comes from the mosquito home page based on the de havilland design team calculations in fact on the first trial the prototype was 23 MPH faster than a similar engined Spitfire.

Of the famous mosquito raids I have read about all precision bombing had escorts to subdue flak and keep off interceptors where range allowed.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The quote about the projected mosquito performance comes from the mosquito home page based on the de havilland design team calculations in fact on the first trial the prototype was 23 MPH faster than a similar engined Spitfire.

Is it in a flight manual or in an aircraft specific document? I've worked on programs where design team members came up with tons of calculations but when the aircraft actually flew their calculations turned into toilet paper.

Of the famous mosquito raids I have read about all precision bombing had escorts to subdue flak and keep off interceptors where range allowed.

Precision Bombing - you bombed from specified altitude without any deviation from heading with one or more aircraft in the formation carrying a high altitude bomb sight (like a Norden). Any specifics on those raids made my Mosquitoes?