Wasn't the P-51 the best escort fighter of the war?

FLYBOYJ said:

Points taken but it isn't that clear cut. How about maintenance and ease of operation? Which aircraft requires more pilot skill, training? Operating cost per hour?

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How much new tech was on the P-47 that might tax maintenance and pilot operation? That supercharger assembly looks pretty advanced for the early 1940s. Is there an accurate TBO for these aircraft?

Admiral Beez said:

How much new tech was on the P-47 that might tax maintenance and pilot operation? That supercharger assembly looks pretty advanced for the early 1940s. Is there an accurate TBO for these aircraft?

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It's going to depend on certain factors - for maintainers it's going to be a matter of experience. The P-47 is a big machine, labor intensive. There is an engine TBO chart posted on here somewhere. Maintenance out doors is also a factor. As flight ops - again a big aircraft for a single engine fighter. Learning characteristics, landing speeds, power settings for cruise and combat, understanding how the aircraft will accelerate and decelerate during formation flying as some examples and that's why training for both pilots and maintainers is so important during the deployment of new equipment.

In the bigger picture it seems the P-51 was easier to maintain and fly

PAT303 said:

I've been in maintenance of heavy equipment for 30 years, you don't send your gear out on important work without giving it some lovin.

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During combat operations EVERY MISSION is important work and aircraft maintainers are trained to keep their aircraft at 100% "Mission Capable" when possible.

FLYBOYJ said:

During combat operations EVERY MISSION is important work and aircraft maintainers are trained to keep their aircraft at 100% "Mission Capable" when possible.

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It amazes me that the aircraft mechanics could get any work done in the tight hangars on CVs. Look below, our maintainers need to have parts on hand, the skill set and the space to maintain what looks like a mix of Hellcats, Seafires and Fireflies (or is that a Tarpon?).

Admiral Beez said:

It amazes me that the aircraft mechanics could get any work done in the tight hangars on CVs. Look below, our maintainers need to have parts on hand, the skill set and the space to maintain what looks like a mix of Hellcats, Seafires and Fireflies (or is that a Tarpon?).

View attachment 657273

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I'd rather try to work there than outdoors in freezing weather.


photo credit shown

FLYBOYJ said:

I'd rather try to work there than outdoors in freezing weather

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Agreed. I had to change the brake lines on a Fokker 100 outside, when it was -45.
I don't recommend it

Admiral Beez said:

How much new tech was on the P-47 that might tax maintenance and pilot operation? That supercharger assembly looks pretty advanced for the early 1940s. Is there an accurate TBO for these aircraft?

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Does anyone have stats which reflect the operational readiness rates of the two during the time they flew ETO escort missions?

For example, during the Solomon campaign the allies had a multitude of fighters based there in December 1943 to help neutralize Rabaul. Of them, 71 F4Us were at a 66 percent mission ready rate, 58 F6Fs were at over 90 percent, 39 American/ New Zealand P-40s which also maintained a 90 percent rate, followed by 31 P-38s which understandably had the lowest rate at 38 percent. Sorry, I do not have the rate for the 69 P-39s which were stationed there too.

Knowing this, I think it would be more useful to compare the P-51 and P-47 rates, being that they were maintained by similarly trained and equipped service personnel (unlike in the Solomons where there were a mix of US Navy, Marine, and Army maintainers, along with New Zealand personnel).

PAT303 said:

From what I read there was no mention of Lindbergh being a fighter pilot so it could be that he was an adviser to the AF before joining?, I will do some research to refresh my memory.

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While barnstorming in southern Minnesota, Lindbergh met a graduate of the Army Flying School who told him that cadets flew the most modern and powerful airplanes. Lindbergh enrolled right away. He arrived at Brooks Field in San Antonio, Texas, on March 15, 1924. Lindbergh was joined by 103 other young men.

The cadets learned the essentials of aerodynamics, navigation, meteorology, and military law. Already a skilled pilot, military training taught Lindbergh precision flying techniques. In his first year, Lindbergh earned a 93.39 average, the second highest in his class.

But the training was tough. Only 32 cadets advanced to the next term held at nearby Kelley Field. The cadets trained in pursuit, attack, observation and bombardment. In one instance, Lindbergh was forced to parachute to safety when his plane collided with another while practicing formations.

On March 14, 1925, only 19 flying cadets graduated. This time, Lindbergh finished first in his class.

DarrenW said:

Does anyone have stats which reflect the operational readiness rates of the two during the time they flew ETO escort missions?

For example, during the Solomon campaign the allies had a multitude of fighters based there in December 1943 to help neutralize Rabaul. Of them, 71 F4Us were at a 66 percent mission ready rate, 58 F6Fs were at over 90 percent, 39 American/ New Zealand P-40s which also maintained a 90 percent rate, followed by 31 P-38s which understandably had the lowest rate at 38 percent. Sorry, I do not have the rate for the 69 P-39s which were stationed there too.

Knowing this, I think it would be more useful to compare the P-51 and P-47 rates, being that they were maintained by similarly trained and equipped service personnel (unlike in the Solomons where there were a mix of US Navy, Marine, and Army maintainers, along with New Zealand personnel).

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I'm sure this will come up soon, but this is "in the weeds" information that needs to be considered when we make these comparisons.

Completed sorties
Mission Capable Rates
Fully Mission Capable Rates
Mission Abort Rates

Then bounce that against Claims vs losses and you'll know statistically how well your fighter unit is doing.

What's the difference between "mission capable" and "fully mission capable"? Is mission capable "Okay, I'll go, but I'm not really feeling it"?

SaparotRob said:

What's the difference between "mission capable" and "fully mission capable"? Is mission capable "Okay, I'll go, but I'm not really feeling it"?

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Fully Mission Capable (FMC) usually indicates that all systems on the aircraft are operations. Mission Capable (MC) will indicate that an item or system isn't working or needs repair but the aircraft can still fly the mission.

SaparotRob said:

What's the difference between "mission capable" and "fully mission capable"? Is mission capable "Okay, I'll go, but I'm not really feeling it"?

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Today we call it code 1, 2, or 3. Code 1 means fully mission capable, 2 means some stuff is broke but can still do combat, AKA mission capable, or code 3 which means it needs work before it flies again.

BiffF15 said:

Today we call it code 1, 2, or 3. Code 1 means fully mission capable, 2 means some stuff is broke but can still do combat, AKA mission capable, or code 3 which means it needs work before it flies again.

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Ah yes - "Code 1" What we always strive for!

I spent time in Plans and Scheduling with a bunch of old dogs from the SAC/ TAC days.

I love that kinda' talk.

drgondog said:

The max Combat Radius for -47N for max internal fuel (556) and external (440) for CR of 1000 mi.

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The claim by Admiral Beez, was based on an article that compared the P-47D and P-51D.

For Combat Range*, the article claims:
P-47D: 1,030 mi (1,660 km; 900 nmi)
P-51D: 750 mi (1,200 km; 650 nmi)

*Is that supposed to be radius?

So while the P-47N could outrange the P-51D, could the P-47D?

wuzak said:

The claim by Admiral Beez, was based on an article that compared the P-47D and P-51D.

For Combat Range*, the article claims:
P-47D: 1,030 mi (1,660 km; 900 nmi)
P-51D: 750 mi (1,200 km; 650 nmi)

*Is that supposed to be radius?

So while the P-47N could outrange the P-51D, could the P-47D?

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First - I will only comment on the October 1943 bar chart that was classified above as it dovetails to the USAAF Combat Radius Charts (and assumptions) reproduced by Dean in AOHT. The values below are for 25,000 feet, CR increases as altitude decreases.

The P-47C/D modified to add external wing racks and plumbing with internal capacity of 305 gal, plus 2x150 plus 1x110external tanks had a combat radius of 425 miles. Historically these were available late March-April 1944.

The P-47D-25 through D-40, Pre- P-47M and N, had an internal fuel capacity of 370gal. Its crafted USAAF Combat Radius with 2x150gal 'flat' (less drag) tanks was stated as 600 miles (statute). The D-25 was in combat ops in mid May, 1944 but not in squadron force until post D-Day.

The P-47N with 556 plus 440 gal (2x165 plus one C/L 110 gal) stated as 1000 miles. Also stated in notes is that Combat Radius only increases to 1025 miles when using 2x300 plus 1x110 ga tanks because of increased drag. P-47N and M operational in squadron force ~ March-April 1945

The P-51D with 269 gal internal plus 2x110 external tanks had a Combat Radius of 750 mi. The P-51B had about 25 mi greater CR due to lighter Gross Weight for comparable load outs. With 2x 165gal tanks the range was extended to ~950 mi CR. The P-51B with 85 gal fuselage tank was squadron level operational in late January 1944, the P-51D was squadron level operational in June 1944.

At 10,000 feet the CR is ~ 3-4% greater.

The problem with every book chart overlay I have seen is that the assumptions and load outs and combat engagement criteria are rarely presented. It one author lifting from another from another, dropping important facts surrounding the presentation.

IMO, Range and Combat Radius are the two least understood topics by WWII aviation historians. I had some interesting arguments with Jeff Ethell on several subjects, but this is one where I had to bring in several mutual NAA/USAF test pilot acquaintances (Al White, Bob White and Jim Brooks) that not only understood the assumptions, understood the calculations at the weed level - but also LIVED it in combat operations during WWII in ETO/MTO. Jeff's fighter pilot dad Irv understood the subject but Jeff had never asked him. Jeff was somewhat notorious for copying and pasting the technical stuff as required.

Americas One Hundred Thousand by Dean lifts and reproduces the actual USAAF Tactical Planning Doc from 1945.

I spent a lot of time comparing those tables to all the reproduced charts in the posts above (and many more), as well as published flight test data, as well as performed Breguet equations to look at straight line cruise (clean)that could check 'return from combat at 25,000 feet at posted 'max cruise RPM/Boost' using flight test consumption rates per hour from extreme target radius (say Prague for P-51D or P-47M) to look at fuel consumed to reach Dutch/French Coast for let down point. I also pored over the Pilot Operating Manuals to cross check. They agree in the key segments required to build a flight plan to reconstruct a Combat Radius based on Max Cruise range power/rpm settings but I wasn't interested enough to look at all other power settings, save WEP and MP.

The calcs indicated that the Charts/Tables contained in AOHT are somewhat conservative, but rational and consistent

ALL Ranges cited are for 25K altitude.


The P-51D and P-51H were about the same. The P-51H had 255 gal (vs 269) internally, but lighter and slightly cleaner.

33K in the Air presented the baseline AAF combat Radius estimates and assumption in his post #623. This chart was modified in 1944 as flight testing on the P-47 with external racks was performed on the 150 gal 'flat tank'. Note also that neither 2x150 gal or 2x 165 gal external was tested on P-38 nor was the 110/108 gal external tank tested on the P-51B - at this time (10-43).

What is presented is a richer set of data about TAS cruise and the assumption that the fighters stay with bombers in Ess at Fighter cruise (~300mph TAS/210I AS).....

Later analysis and testing refined the inbound cruise speeds and fuel consumption with the varying drag increases associate with each external store combination. The final product is embodied in Dean's AOHT. In my book I combined all combinations and extracted gross internal fuel consumed for the definable legs Namely, TO and Climb before switching to external, Combat and Reserve/Loiter upon return. The TO and Climb was conservative and represented Tankless (clean) airframe for worst case.

Note also that there is a mistake re: B-17 TAS = 165mph. The B-24 formation cruise was 165-170mph IAS at 25K but B-17 operations dictated 150 IAS at 25 K to accommodate old tired aiframe/engines.

Another flaw (from actual operations) is that Break Escort usually occurred closer to Amsterdam/Brusselss, etc on a Withdrawal escort and closer to target on Penetration escort. One Size did not fit all. Somewhere in my archives is the clarification in communications from VIII Air Service Command and HQ MC at Wright Field to clarify that the Relay system had escort legs 'one way' in which the fighters were tethered to split ess covering bombers to maintain ~ same TAS over the ground for the entire gaggle. No P-47D (-1 to 023) EVER escorted to max Combat Radius from RV to Target and back to B/E to the oncoming Withdrawal escort relief.

This has been posted before but may be of interest

drgondog said:

In my book I combined all combinations and extracted gross internal fuel consumed for the definable legs Namely, TO and Climb before switching to external, Combat and Reserve/Loiter upon return. The TO and Climb was conservative and represented Tankless (clean) airframe for worst case.

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Pardon my ignorance, but which book is that? I'm still trying to connect board names to author names.

Regarding combat radius, there are also the Standard Aircraft Characteristics publications by the USAF.

The P-47N, carrying 997 gallons of fuel, had a basic combat radius of 800 nautical miles (920 statute miles).
The P-51H, carrying 480 gallons of fuel, had a basic combat radius of 770 nautical miles (886 statute miles).

The parameters were:

(a) Start engine, warm-up, take-off at sea level; 10 minutes at normal power.
(b) Climb to 25,000 feet at normal power.
(c) Cruise out with long range operation at 25,000 feet (external tanks are dropped when empty).
(d) Combat at 25,000 feet for 5 minutes with maximum power (fluid injection) and 15 minutes with maximum power (dry).*
(e) Cruise back with long range operation at 25,000 feet.
(f) Reserve: 5% of total useable fuel at take-off.

* 5 minutes of maximum power and 15 minutes of military power for the P-47N