Weather limitations in carrier aviation in the interwar and WWII eras (3 Viewers)

[Thumpalumpacus]

The Wasp damage report (posted previously) suspects that only two torpedoes struck her.

According to USNI Proceedings, it was indeed three:

The Wasp had just taken in planes and all her gasoline lines were running when at 1442 she reached a position only 500 yards from I-19. The submarine fired four torpedoes, three of which hit the carrier in almost the same place, on the starboard side forward.

The Loss of the "Wasp"

Most military actions are t

www.usni.org

Note that if they're wrong and you're right, that only reinforces my point about torpedo vulnerability.

 

[RCAFson]

According to USNI Proceedings, it was indeed three:

The Loss of the "Wasp"

Most military actions are t

www.usni.org

Note that if they're wrong and you're right, that only reinforces my point about torpedo vulnerability.

By 'if you're right' I hope you mean the USN damage report.

To add to the damage report, here's Lundstrom's assessment:

"While circling the carrier, Ens. Millard "Red" Thrash, a VF-71 CAP pilot, looked goggle-eyed at "two water spouts rearing high above the superstructure; smoke and flame bursting out amidships."7​ The first torpedo slammed into the Wasp's starboard bow, ruptured aviation gasoline tanks, and let the sea into the five-inch gun handling room and powder magazines. A few seconds later the second fish struck the hull under the forward 1.1-inch gun mount just ahead of the island, tore open more aviation gasoline storage tanks, and flooded the bomb magazines. Twenty seconds later a third explosion traveled up the bomb elevator trunk and blew its armored hatch cover onto the flight deck. Gasoline vapor from leaking tanks triggered this blast, which many incorrectly thought came from another torpedo..."

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

By 'if you're right' I hope you mean the USN damage report.

To add to the damage report, here's Lundstrom's assessment:

"While circling the carrier, Ens. Millard "Red" Thrash, a VF-71 CAP pilot, looked goggle-eyed at "two water spouts rearing high above the superstructure; smoke and flame bursting out amidships."7​ The first torpedo slammed into the Wasp's starboard bow, ruptured aviation gasoline tanks, and let the sea into the five-inch gun handling room and powder magazines. A few seconds later the second fish struck the hull under the forward 1.1-inch gun mount just ahead of the island, tore open more aviation gasoline storage tanks, and flooded the bomb magazines. Twenty seconds later a third explosion traveled up the bomb elevator trunk and blew its armored hatch cover onto the flight deck. Gasoline vapor from leaking tanks triggered this blast, which many incorrectly thought came from another torpedo..."

And eyewitness reports are surely always right?

 

[RCAFson]

And eyewitness reports are surely always right?

This is from the USN damage report:

"16. About 20 seconds after the torpedoes struck, a third
explosion - somewhat less severe - was felt. This was reported
by the Commanding Officer to have been a torpedo, but
it is believed to have been of internal origin inasmuch as
the flight deck cover to bomb elevator A-423-ET was blown
violently upward and flames appeared in the shaft. The cause
of this explosion is unknown, but possibly gasoline vapors
from the gasoline tank A-l3-Gas passed through the bomb magazine
and into the bomb elevator trunk A-7ll-ET where they
might have collected. Or possibly, they might have collected
in the bomb arming stations A-309-L and A-310-L. The explosion
was witnessed by a survivor who was on the first platform
deck in trunk A-6l9-T..."

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

This was reported by the Commanding Officer to have been a torpedo, but
it is believed to have been of internal origin inasmuch as
the flight deck cover to bomb elevator A-423-ET was blown
violently upward and flames appeared in the shaft. The cause
of this explosion is unknown, but possibly gasoline vapors
from the gasoline tank A-l3-Gas passed through the bomb magazine
and into the bomb elevator trunk A-7ll-ET where they
might have collected.

I've emphasized the crucial portion of your quote for you.

 

[RCAFson]

I've emphasized the crucial portion of your quote for you.

Wasp's sinking was analyzed, in detail, by the experts from BuShips, after a review of crew and external witness accounts and the probable survival characteristics of the ship with 2 or 3 torpedo hits. The fact the Wasp continued afloat until scuttled argues for 2 hits. In any event, you're arguing with the USN and Lundstrom, not with me.

 

[cherry blossom]

I-19 fired a salvo of 6 torpedoes Imperial Submarines and we know that one hit North Carolina, one hit O'Brien and another missed Hornet. Thus it is possible that three hit Wasp but the eye witness accounts suggest two.

 

[Ovod]

The SBD-3 (1000hp at TO) didn't have the TO performance needed to operate successfully from most FAA carriers, even with fixed wings. Add another ~400lb for folding wings and things get even worse.

The RN operated the Blackburn Skua from carriers and it was not exactly overpowered - why not the SBD-3? SBDs were even successfully operated from short and slow escort carriers in the Atlantic.

 

[EwenS]

In June 1943, Victorious engaged in a cross-decking exercise with Saratoga while in the South Pacific. 6 SBD-3 from Saratoga spent the final day of exercises on Victorious in case future emergencies required it.

Following these exercises, it was decided to operate Vic as a fighter carrier, and transfer the Avengers of 832 squadron to Saratoga during forthcoming operations.

 

[GrauGeist]

The SBD-3 (1000hp at TO) didn't have the TO performance needed to operate successfully from most FAA carriers, even with fixed wings. Add another ~400lb for folding wings and things get even worse.

Why not?

Most early war RN carriers were about the same size as the USS Ranger (CV-4) and she operated SBDs without issue.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

This article turned up on another site, published last year, that refutes the argument that the USN couldn't / wouldn't use Ranger in the Pacific.

https://redirect.viglink.com/?format=go&jsonp=vglnk_172080165288410&key=e4fd14f5d7f2bb6d80b8f8da1354718c&libId=lyiwvuk001029rr0000ULe9ot1zyk&subId=df652cbb333e27fd83dbc0e212b73016&loc=https%3A%2F%2Fpropnturret.com%2Ftully%2Fviewtopic.php%3Fp%3D37895%23p37895&v=1&out=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnrs-scrn.org%2Fnorthern_mariner%2Fvol33%2Ftmn_33_2_207-244.pdf&ref=https%3A%2F%2Fpropnturret.com%2Ftully%2F&title=Interesting%20article%20on%20wartime%20use%20of%20USS%20Ranger%20-%20Tully%27s%20Port&txt=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnrs-scrn.org%2Fnorthern_mari%20...%2007-244.pdf

Synopsis

Since World War Two, the USS Ranger (CV-4) has become perceived as incapable of combat in the Pacific Theater. Digitization has provided a new opportunity to examine its perception by commanders responsible for the carrier's employment. These records reveal that the common perception of the carrier stemmed from diplomatic necessity, from an overworked bureau uneager for additional projects, and from commands eager to acquire Ranger for non-combat duty. Ranger was considered by the US Navy as fit for combat in the Pacific Theater during WWII, but other requirements overrode the need for one additional combatant carrier in the Pacific.

This essay ignores the issue I have always found puzzling. If the Ranger was a fully capable fleet carrier why did the USN borrow Victorious? The effort to convert Victorious into a quasi USN fleet carrier was substantial. It spent a month in Norfolk being substantially modified to handle Avengers which it was incapable of landing at that time. As it turned out these modifications were not enough and in the end Victorious operated Wildcats only while its Avengers were transferred to Saratoga. In addition its communications systems were replaced with American equipment. After conversion it spent another month working up at Norfolk learning how to operate as a US carrier. It spent another 2 months in Pearl Harbor working up and getting further modifications to the arrestor gear to try to solve the Avenger's landing issues. It took 4 1/2 months to get Victorious combat capable. in the mean time a lot of Avengers had been lost in accidents, some fatal.
Ironically at the same time Victorious was in Norfolk, Ranger was also in Norfolk undergoing a refit and doing 2 ferry trips to Casablanca. Victorious sailed for the Pacific on February 31. Ranger was back in Norfolk on March 10 and embarked the 4th AG. After some training she set sail for Argentia Newfoundland arriving on April 4. I'm not sure exactly what Ranger did there for the next 3 months but I am sure the Royal Navy could have covered it particularly since they would have retained Victorious. In the meantime Victorious was still working up In in Pearl Harbor. Ranger could have completed her vital ferrying trips and still been in have been in Pearl Harbor at the beginning of May ready for action at the same time Victorious was. She could also have stayed in the Pacific all though 1943. There would have ben no need for Ranger to go to Scapa Flow as Victorious would be there.

The point is that it would have been far more expedient to send Ranger to the Pacific instead of Newfoundland. The simplest solution is usually the best.
The Ranger only participated in 2 actual combat missions in the entire war. There are a litany of excuses given as to why it was kept out of combat except for these two occasions but applying Occam's Razor the simplest explanation is that the USN did not have confidence in this ship as a combat vessel.

 

[RCAFson]

Why not?

Most early war RN carriers were about the same size as the USS Ranger (CV-4) and she operated SBDs without issue.

Ranger's flight deck was ~710ft* long vs ~530ft for Furious and ~580ft for Glorious and Courageous. We know from it's operational use in the USN that SBD-3s ranged forward, even on Yorktown class carriers, which could easily exceed 30 knots, had to reduce bomb loads to 500lbs to safely TO in light winds, as per Midway on 4 June 1942. The RN carriers would have to reduce the number of aircraft in the range and reduce the bomb and/fuel load during mission planning to safely TO, especially as wind over deck was variable, and they couldn't afford to have flight deck ops stalled if the winds died down. The long and short of all this is that the Skua was the superior aircraft to the SBD-3 (which didn't exist in 1939/40) as it had a superior power to weight ratio and folding wings and had been designed to suit the operational characteristics of RN carriers. Similarly the Albacore, which was delayed into carrier service until about the time that the SBD-3 arrived, had better STOL characteristics and a much larger bomb load. Unlike the USN and IJN, the RN's fleet carriers were conversions of fully built battlecruisers (if we can call F-G-C that) and they suffered in comparison to early USN fleet carriers that were converted during building or purpose built, such as Ranger.

By 1939 F-G-C max service speed was about 28 knots and they typically could only range ~9 to 12 aircraft at a time.

*Friedman in US Aircraft Carriers, states ~750ft by 1943.

 

[EwenS]

This essay ignores the issue I have always found puzzling. If the Ranger was a fully capable fleet carrier why did the USN borrow Victorious? The effort to convert Victorious into a quasi USN fleet carrier was substantial. It spent a month in Norfolk being substantially modified to handle Avengers which it was incapable of landing at that time. As it turned out these modifications were not enough and in the end Victorious operated Wildcats only while its Avengers were transferred to Saratoga. In addition its communications systems were replaced with American equipment. After conversion it spent another month working up at Norfolk learning how to operate as a US carrier. It spent another 2 months in Pearl Harbor working up and getting further modifications to the arrestor gear to try to solve the Avenger's landing issues. It took 4 1/2 months to get Victorious combat capable. in the mean time a lot of Avengers had been lost in accidents, some fatal.
Ironically at the same time Victorious was in Norfolk, Ranger was also in Norfolk undergoing a refit and doing 2 ferry trips to Casablanca. Victorious sailed for the Pacific on February 31. Ranger was back in Norfolk on March 10 and embarked the 4th AG. After some training she set sail for Argentia Newfoundland arriving on April 4. I'm not sure exactly what Ranger did there for the next 3 months but I am sure the Royal Navy could have covered it particularly since they would have retained Victorious. In the meantime Victorious was still working up In in Pearl Harbor. Ranger could have completed her vital ferrying trips and still been in have been in Pearl Harbor at the beginning of May ready for action at the same time Victorious was. She could also have stayed in the Pacific all though 1943. There would have ben no need for Ranger to go to Scapa Flow as Victorious would be there.

The point is that it would have been far more expedient to send Ranger to the Pacific instead of Newfoundland. The simplest solution is usually the best.
The Ranger only participated in 2 actual combat missions in the entire war. There are a litany of excuses given as to why it was kept out of combat except for these two occasions but applying Occam's Razor the simplest explanation is that the USN did not have confidence in this ship as a combat vessel.

It doesn't ignore your point at all. It addresses it.

The USN had a requirement for an aircraft carrier to support its operations in the western Atlantic. Page 229-230 post Torch

"The solitary Saratoga was then in need of reinforcement, but the lone Ranger was already the only fleet carrier
in the Atlantic, as it had been since June without any radical improvement to
the Atlantic situation. The role of the Atlantic Fleet, the calls upon it, and the
threats faced in the European Theater had changed but little. At the close of
1942 the danger of the Vichy fleet was finally settled for good, but the status of
the German and Italian fleets was no less threatening. Indeed, the new Allied
supply lines to a tenuous beachhead could have been inducement to greater
activity by Germany or Italy."


"Churchill's request for Ranger revealed a new concern for the possible
resurgence of German naval forays into the Atlantic. Intelligence had assessed
the German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin as nearly ready.67 The implications
of a balanced German squadron operating against either the Atlantic or Arctic
convoys were manifest. German capital ships with integral air support would
be harder to track, harder to catch, and harder to overpower. Half a year prior
during the Indian Ocean Raid, Japan had demonstrated in the Bay of Bengal
how effectively a carrier teamed with cruisers could sweep a sea of shipping.
The quick dispatch of all shadowing Catalinas by Zeroes indicated how difficult
it would be for aircraft to shadow a force protected by Messerschmitts. The
German fleet in Norway was a menace in itself but development of the Graf
Zeppelin played upon the worst fears of the Allies."

At that point in time the Allies had virtually no knowledge of the state of completion of the Graf Zeppelin. In March 1940 the Admiralty thought that she might complete in April / May 1940. Then the Germans moved her from Kiel to Gdynia where aerial recce had difficulty keeping tabs on her due to the range involved. She was then moved back to Kiel in Nov 1942 to allow work on her to restart. It didn't finally cease until April 1943 when she was moved to Stettin and laid up. So it is only with hindsight that we can know that the threat was not real.

Despite the failure of the KM at the Battle if the Barents Sea in Dec 1942, Donitz persuaded Hitler to keep some of the big ships operational. By spring 1943, Tirpitz, Lutzow and destroyers had been joined by Scharnhorst in northern Norway and a breakout attempt into the North Atlantic couldn't be ruled out. Through most of 1943 the USN maintained a number of its fast battleships in the Atlantic Fleet to cover such an eventuality. And they needed a fleet carrier to support them.

South Dakota Feb after her repairs post Guadalcanal -Aug 1943
Alabama - from completion until Aug 1943

Just because a breakout didn't occur, that does not mean that the Allies didn't perceive a threat that had to be covered. If the Home Fleet didn't successfully intercept a breakout attempt, US interests in the western and central parts of the Atlantic would be immediately threatened.

US policy since 1941 had been to maintain a reasonably strong Atlantic Fleet with at least one carrier. That served as a backstop for the RN allowing the latter to redeploy ships from home waters to crisis areas like the Med and IO. For example, in 1941 by the US agreeing to use the Atlantic Fleet to escort convoys to the MOMP south if Iceland, the old R class battleships could be withdrawn from convoy escort, refitted and sent to the IO late 1941/early 1942.

And then later at the Casablanca Conference in the second half of Jan 1943 (bottom of page 231).

"King achieved success at the conference. He obtained the acknowledgement
that the fleet dispositions present in the Atlantic were sufficient and that all of
America's new construction could be deployed to the Pacific.70 For the price
of one fast carrier and two fast battleships, King obtained the right to deploy
all new battleships and fleet carriers to the Pacific"

And that is where Ranger became a pawn in, for Admiral King, in a far bigger game than simply sending another carrier to the Pacific.

The naval war in WW2 was played out on a world stage with navies moving pieces around with thoughts, not just for the immediate use of the ships involved but also with a view to a much bigger picture.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

It doesn't ignore your point at all. It addresses it.

The USN had a requirement for an aircraft carrier to support its operations in the western Atlantic. Page 229-230 post Torch

"The solitary Saratoga was then in need of reinforcement, but the lone Ranger was already the only fleet carrier
in the Atlantic, as it had been since June without any radical improvement to
the Atlantic situation. The role of the Atlantic Fleet, the calls upon it, and the
threats faced in the European Theater had changed but little. At the close of
1942 the danger of the Vichy fleet was finally settled for good, but the status of
the German and Italian fleets was no less threatening. Indeed, the new Allied
supply lines to a tenuous beachhead could have been inducement to greater
activity by Germany or Italy."


"Churchill's request for Ranger revealed a new concern for the possible
resurgence of German naval forays into the Atlantic. Intelligence had assessed
the German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin as nearly ready.67 The implications
of a balanced German squadron operating against either the Atlantic or Arctic
convoys were manifest. German capital ships with integral air support would
be harder to track, harder to catch, and harder to overpower. Half a year prior
during the Indian Ocean Raid, Japan had demonstrated in the Bay of Bengal
how effectively a carrier teamed with cruisers could sweep a sea of shipping.
The quick dispatch of all shadowing Catalinas by Zeroes indicated how difficult
it would be for aircraft to shadow a force protected by Messerschmitts. The
German fleet in Norway was a menace in itself but development of the Graf
Zeppelin played upon the worst fears of the Allies."

At that point in time the Allies had virtually no knowledge of the state of completion of the Graf Zeppelin. In March 1940 the Admiralty thought that she might complete in April / May 1940. Then the Germans moved her from Kiel to Gdynia where aerial recce had difficulty keeping tabs on her due to the range involved. She was then moved back to Kiel in Nov 1942 to allow work on her to restart. It didn't finally cease until April 1943 when she was moved to Stettin and laid up. So it is only with hindsight that we can know that the threat was not real.

Despite the failure of the KM at the Battle if the Barents Sea in Dec 1942, Donitz persuaded Hitler to keep some of the big ships operational. By spring 1943, Tirpitz, Lutzow and destroyers had been joined by Scharnhorst in northern Norway and a breakout attempt into the North Atlantic couldn't be ruled out. Through most of 1943 the USN maintained a number of its fast battleships in the Atlantic Fleet to cover such an eventuality. And they needed a fleet carrier to support them.

South Dakota Feb after her repairs post Guadalcanal -Aug 1943
Alabama - from completion until Aug 1943

Just because a breakout didn't occur, that does not mean that the Allies didn't perceive a threat that had to be covered. If the Home Fleet didn't successfully intercept a breakout attempt, US interests in the western and central parts of the Atlantic would be immediately threatened.

US policy since 1941 had been to maintain a reasonably strong Atlantic Fleet with at least one carrier. That served as a backstop for the RN allowing the latter to redeploy ships from home waters to crisis areas like the Med and IO. For example, in 1941 by the US agreeing to use the Atlantic Fleet to escort convoys to the MOMP south if Iceland, the old R class battleships could be withdrawn from convoy escort, refitted and sent to the IO late 1941/early 1942.

And then later at the Casablanca Conference in the second half of Jan 1943 (bottom of page 231).

"King achieved success at the conference. He obtained the acknowledgement
that the fleet dispositions present in the Atlantic were sufficient and that all of
America's new construction could be deployed to the Pacific.70 For the price
of one fast carrier and two fast battleships, King obtained the right to deploy
all new battleships and fleet carriers to the Pacific"

And that is where Ranger became a pawn in, for Admiral King, in a far bigger game than simply sending another carrier to the Pacific.

The naval war in WW2 was played out on a world stage with navies moving pieces around with thoughts, not just for the immediate use of the ships involved but also with a view to a much bigger picture.

The Victorious wasn't as capable of facing the Graf Zeppelin as the Ranger? The Alabama and South Dakota were integrated with the Royal Navy at Scapa Flow. The Ranger was based at Argentia. It didn't go to Sapa Flow until after the Alabama and South Dakota had left for the Pacific.

 

[EwenS]

The Victorious wasn't as capable of facing the Graf Zeppelin as the Ranger?

No. The RN Home Fleet at Scapa (eastern Atlantic) would have had a carrier. AND the US Atlantic Fleet (western Atlantic) would have had a carrier. Two fleets 3,000 miles apart each with capital ships and a supporting carrier. No bets on which one might engage the enemy first depending on the route taken, weather etc.

The Alabama and South Dakota were integrated with the Royal Navy at Scapa Flow. The Ranger was based at Argentia. It didn't go to Sapa Flow until after the Alabama and South Dakota had left for the Pacific.

Again you need to understand the bigger picture.

Alabama & South Dakota and escorting destroyers, were detached from the US Atlantic Fleet as TF22 on 2nd April 1943, passing through Argentia on the way to Scapa Flow, where they arrived on 19th May 1943. They were sent there to fill a gap in the RN battlefleet caused by the detachment of KGV & Howe (which left on 1 & 21 May respectively) to join Force H in the Med to cover the landings on Sicily (Operation Husky) and on the Italian mainland at Salerrno (Operation Avalanche). They didn't arrive back in UK waters until mid-Oct. Alabama & SD left again for the USA on 1 August.

Having only DoY & Anson as fast capital ships in the Home Fleet was considered inadequate to meet the threat posed by the German ships in Norway at thatvtime. Renown was in refit until July and then went to transport Churchill to the Quadrant Conference in Canada. A & SD participated in Operation Governor in July, a distraction operation to draw attention away from the Med and lure out the German Fleet.

Governor | Operations & Codenames of WWII

codenames.info

When Ranger and her supporting cruisers and destroyers were sent to join the Home Fleet at Scapa Flow it was to fill a gap in the Home Fleet line up.

16th July 1943, Indomitable, one of 2 carriers in Force H in the Med, was torpedoed and had to be sent to the USA for repair. With the Italian Fleet then still a threat, the principal Home Fleet carrier, Illustrious, had to be sent out as a replacement. She left Britain with the Unicorn, which had also been operating with the Home Fleet in a light carrier role, on 13 Aug 1943.

Ranger left Halifax to join the Home Fleet on 11 Aug 1943, arriving at Scapa on the 19th. She left again for the USA on 26th Nov, by which time British carriers were returning from the Med & the Pacific.

The other important event in this timeframe was Operation Source, the midget sub operation that disabled Tirpitz on 22nd Sept

Operation Source - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

As I said, all about moving the pieces on the chessboard. US ships move in to release RN ships for operations elsewhere.

 

[z42]

"Half a year prior
during the Indian Ocean Raid, Japan had demonstrated in the Bay of Bengal
how effectively a carrier teamed with cruisers could sweep a sea of shipping.
The quick dispatch of all shadowing Catalinas by Zeroes indicated how difficult
it would be for aircraft to shadow a force protected by Messerschmitts. "

So was the operating procedure here that the scout aircraft would spot the targets and then cruisers would run them down and sink them, or were the cruisers there only as escorts for the carriers, and aircraft did the sinking part as well?

 

[EwenS]

So was the operating procedure here that the scout aircraft would spot the targets and then cruisers would run them down and sink them, or were the cruisers there only as escorts for the carriers, and aircraft did the sinking part as well?

Detailed article about this by Rob Stuart

http://www.combinedfleet.com/Stuart-20-Ships-Operation-C.docx