What air victory was more important?

[Marcel]

My bad, I read this in the book Midway by Philip D Grove. H gives a number of over 2000 highly trained support personal, maintenance staff and engineers perised during tha battle. The aircrew was indeed replaced, but never by fliers of the same quality (again according mr. Grove).

 

[drgondog]

The Guadalcanal campaign is what broke the back of the IJN for both warships and aircrews.

Guadalcanal is a null issue if Japs win Midway

After Midway, the Japanese were still on the offensive, and the carrier numbers still equal between the two combatants.

If Japs win Midway, Japs stay on offensive for next 15 months and US has zero carriers until we divert everything West. Midway Island falls and becomes IJN jump off base for Hawaii. Guadalcanal is consiloidated, New Guinea goes down, Australia is in peril.

And untill the Avengers were deployed in numbers throughout the fleet, the US was without any torpedo bomber.

The USN didn't need Torps at Midway. All four Jap carriers was killed by SBD's. The one existing Avenger force was wiped out, but thankfully they pulled the Zero CAP to the deck to allow the SBDs the first three carriers.

Additionally, we still had major issues with our torps until mid 1943. TBF's were no factor at either Midway or Guadalcanal as far as killing cariers, why even bring that up?

 

[parsifal]

Hi Guys

Interesting argument and counterargument. Some basic facts, as i see them.

In terms of materiel lost, Guadacanal is far more important than Midway, yet Guadacanal cannot happen unless a Midway victory is achieved. This is both for materiel reasons and for psychological reasons, which i maintain the opinion, is actually as important as the materiel stuff you guys want to concentrate on.

An interesting what if is what might have happened if Midway had not been won so convincingly. Say for example, the IJN had lost two carriers, and the USN three. Would this have affected the subsequent events. IMO yes, In the real history, the solomons battles actually saw the weakened IJN claw their way back in terms of carriers lost. The US , from memory lost the Hornet, the Wasp, Sareatoga was heavily damaged, and Enterprise was moderately so. The IJN lost Ryujo, with Shokaku and Zuiho moderately damaged. The IJN received as reinforcement the Hiyo and the Junyo. So, I am going to go out on limb and say obviously the IJN staged somewhat of a recovery in terms the hulls comparison ()not so in terms of the aircrew situation....the last of the pre-war veterans, on which so much of the japanese capability depended, were lost at Santa Cruz).

Now, if the USN was even two carriers down from the start, and the IJN two carriers up, a Guadacanal style counterattack was out of the question....A non-defeat at midway give the IJN the priceless advantage of having a forward base, from which they can observe the movements and activities at Pearl (the primary reason for the operation in the forst place). This, of itself severely curtails the operations of the US in the South pacific (Pearl was still the major base of operation and not being able to use it properly is a major problem for them. When the situation was reversed in 1944, the loss of Truk had a similar effect on the IJN).

With less US opposition, and greater remaining IJN capability, and no Watchtower (guadacanal), IJN can return to Mo (II) (Pt Moresby). Likley to win after a protracted battle. Then where????

The operational plans for the IJN was the capture of Fiji and New caledonia, but these will severely stretch IJN shipping. Will take time to concentrate the necessary forces, Meanwhile US has concentrated what forces it can in these areas, so the attritonal battle shifts from Guadacanal, to Fiji/New Caledonia. Beyond that point it gets too difficult to predict, but I would hazard a guess and say that history corrects itself, and the IJN ends up losing its experienced aircrew, has a couple more carriers, and probably loses a greater amount of shipping in the process. But this last bit is conjecture and highly speculative.

 

[syscom3]

My bad, I read this in the book Midway by Philip D Grove. H gives a number of over 2000 highly trained support personal, maintenance staff and engineers perised during tha battle. The aircrew was indeed replaced, but never by fliers of the same quality (again according mr. Grove).

Read the book "Shattered Sword" that used Japanese documents from the battle to see what really happened.

We are talking about the "here and now" of what actually transpired.

The Japanese lost 4 carriers, but not as many air and deck crews that we have been led to believe.

Japan lost far more heavily in the Guadalcanal campaign when it came to aircrews lost. Thats what did them in. Their carriers were eventually repaired, but the quality of the pilots was definetly impacted.

BTW, has anyone given thought of the actual Japanese invasion of Midway? The IJN marines would have been slaughtered and it would have been a debacle that would put Galipoli to shame.

 

[drgondog]

Read the book "Shattered Sword" that used Japanese documents from the battle to see what really happened.

We are talking about the "here and now" of what actually transpired.

The Japanese lost 4 carriers, but not as many air and deck crews that we have been led to believe.

What if we had lost 3 carriers and the IJN none

Japan lost far more heavily in the Guadalcanal campaign when it came to aircrews lost. Thats what did them in. Their carriers were eventually repaired, but the quality of the pilots was definetly impacted.

Aircrews are replaced faster than carriers. How did IJN trepair the ones (carriers) that went to bottom of pacific? Which ones were repaired? how long did Soryu, Hiryu Akagii take to get back on line? We must have missed that event

BTW, has anyone given thought of the actual Japanese invasion of Midway? The IJN marines would have been slaughtered and it would have been a debacle that would put Galipoli to shame.

LOL - how many Marines versus Turks in your comparison? I love the USMC but you may be stretching an anology a wee bit? What defensive features did Midway have that remotely approached Saipan for example? Absent pacific fleet carrriers how does USMC defeat IJN?

Syscom - how does Guadalcanal happen if US carriers go to the bottom in June 1942? You haven't gotten around to that explanation yet.

 

[syscom3]

LOL - how many Marines versus Turks in your comparison? I love the USMC but you may be stretching an anology a wee bit? What defensive features did Midway have that remotely approached Saipan for example? Absent pacific fleet carrriers how does USMC defeat IJN?

Syscom - how does Guadalcanal happen if US carriers go to the bottom in June 1942? You haven't gotten around to that explanation yet.

Midway was a win for the US this thread is not about what ifs.

The book I mentioned looked at the IJN problems they had for the invasion.

1) No doctrine integrating fire control parties and air support and naval gunfire.

2) A lack of specialized landing craft to negotiate the reef (Tarawa again?)

3) Lack of staying power for the IJN aircraft carriers.

4) A Marine raider battalion was in place with fire lanes sited and barbed wire in place

5) Even more Marines available with fire lanes sited and barbed wire in place

6) A couple of squadrons of B17's AT Oahu that could contest the invasion. In fact a flight of them arrived the last day of the battle.

7) More than a few howitzers and mortars ready and dug in.

8 ) And finally, even if they did manage to win the battle and occupy it. They had no capability to hold it. It was beyond their logistics capability.

More than a few people have called this battle "the IJN's most brilliantly planned defeat".

 

[parsifal]

I think it would not be unreasonable to argue the Marines would have put up a good fight and caused losses on the japanese. I think however, if the Japanese had won the air and sea battle, that the japanese would have taken the island. Some of what you are saying is just not true, or at least not relevant to japanese technique.

The japanese had faced opposed landingsbefore, and had done quite well out of it. i can think of three major occasions...Kuantan, Sunda Strait, and Phillipines, where they had managed the opposed amphib quite well. They did not use the same tactics as the west, and accepted casualty rates much higher than was acceptable in the west, but it was a still a system that worked.

It is just unbelieveable to suggest that their amphibious assault would not work. Some sources quote an amphibious force of just 2500 men, in fact the figure was nearer to 6500 men, known as the Kawanishi Detachment. They were decimated at Guadacanal some three months later, but this is in no way comparable to the situation that they would have faced at Midway.

The Japanese had wargamed this out prior to the commencement of the operation. They had allocated three days for the capture of the island, with the assualt to go in in three waves (if I remeber correctly). I have to say i just cannot accept this assertion, though i will look into the issue more carefully

 

[syscom3]

I think it would not be unreasonable to argue the Marines would have put up a good fight and caused losses on the japanese. I think however, if the Japanese had won the air and sea battle, that the japanese would have taken the island. Some of what you are saying is just not true, or at least not relevant to japanese technique.

The Japanese were woefully short on bombers (dive and level) to begin with. Now factor in a best case scenario of the IJN not losing a carrier and managing to push the three US carriers out of the battle. The battle losses in itself would have been heavy.

The Japanese simply had to many targets on Midway to hit, with too few aircraft, with too little time to do it.

The japanese had faced opposed landingsbefore, and had done quite well out of it. i can think of three major occasions...Kuantan, Sunda Strait, and Phillipines, where they had managed the opposed amphib quite well. They did not use the same tactics as the west, and accepted casualty rates much higher than was acceptable in the west, but it was a still a system that worked.

You have it wrong. The one invasion they had on a defended atoll, it was a disaster. And that was on Wake Island in Dec 1941, when it wasn't even prepared for war. The other was on Bataan where it to was also a disaster. Malaya and the PI cannot be compared because the Japanese could land nearly anywhere where the allies were not. Atoll warfare doesnt give you this option.

It is just unbelieveable to suggest that their amphibious assault would not work. Some sources quote an amphibious force of just 2500 men, in fact the figure was nearer to 6500 men, known as the Kawanishi Detachment. They were decimated at Guadacanal some three months later, but this is in no way comparable to the situation that they would have faced at Midway.

Why not? Same scenario ..... having to advance across an exposed reef and beach, with presighted MG's and fire lanes. Anything is possible, but look to the Tarawa example where several MG's could hold up an invasion.

The Japanese had wargamed this out prior to the commencement of the operation. They had allocated three days for the capture of the island, with the assualt to go in in three waves (if I remember correctly). I have to say i just cannot accept this assertion, though i will look into the issue more carefully

Their planning was horrible and based completely on best case scenarios. More than a few IJN admirals were appalled at how the war games were handled. Not a way to handle the inevitable setbacks in your plans is it?

 

[parsifal]

Hi Syscom


I have to strongly disagree with the aserions you are making, even if they are supported, as you say, by a good source.

Here are some basic facts about the never executed Midway invasion, an eyewitness appraisal, and a comparison to the Battle Of Bloody ridge, where the remnants of Ichiki Shitai were destroyed, whilst attached to the Kawaguchi Brigade, where a substantial proportion of the force was destroyed.

1) The Forces Involved
The principal defenders of the two atolls consisted of "C" "D" Companies of the 2nd Raider Bn, and the 6th Coastal Defence Bn of the USMC. As at June 1942, the Bn consisted of Main force at Midway Island, 33 officers, 810 enlisted men (843). The two companies of the raider Bns added I think about another 200 defenders (approx) . Total estimated strength of the defenders was a little over 1000 combat effectives (for comparison about twice the size of the ill-fated Wake defence formations)

The attack force consisted of roughly 5500 men in the assault forces, with some specialist echelons. The principal assault formations were the Marine 5th Yokosuka SNLF (about 1500 men), the "Ichiki" Shitai (Force or Detachment) (based around the 28th Infantry Regiment, normal establishment about 2500 men, but reinforced for this operation), and the 11th 12th Pioneer Bns (about 1000 men, but records are unclear). Providing immediate gunfire support to the amphibious assault were the units of the "Midway Occupation Force", consisting of no less than 4 x CA, 1 x CL, and 12 x DD. Further artillery support was less than 12 hours behind that, consisting 2 x BC, 4 x CA and a further 8 x DDs. A single CVL (Zuiho) was assigned the task of providing direct air support to the invasion forces.

There is no doubt that the Japanese plan was overly complex, and that in wargaming it had not run well. By comparison, neither had the testing that preceded Watchtower….The main problem with the Japanese plan was that it overly complex, and assumed the US forces would be utilized in a predetermined way. However as far as I can tell, there was nothing inherently wrong with the assault planning. It had been rehearsed on a number of occasions, the last at Saipan, where modifications were made to the Daihatsu LCI, to give them some measure of indigenous fire support as they made their runs to the shore. To compare it with the later Allied assaults on Japanese islands is not valid, because Midway was not nearly so well prepared as say Iwo, or even Saipan, and the Japanese had already showed that they were prepared to die to a man to achieve their objectives. This could not be expected or relied upon in Allied operations (thank goodness).

If the Japanese had won the naval battle, which is disiitnctly possible, given just how lucky the USN was in the final end runs)….I believe the remainder of the operation would have gone off like clockwork. I should say, incidently, that whilst at staff college, this was the subject of a major paper by myself, I don't think I still have it but will try and find the paper..

2) An Eyewitness Account
Ed Fox was serving on Midway with the 6th Defense Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, at the time of the Battle of Midway, 4-6 June 1942. His post was a machine-gun bunker on the south-eastern shore of Sand Island, the larger of the two islands situated at the southern end of the Midway Atoll lagoon.

If the United States Pacific Fleet had been destroyed at Midway in accordance with Admiral Yamamoto's plan, the Japanese would have launched amphibious landings from the southern side of Midway Atoll. Ed Fox's bunker would have faced an intense barrage from the guns of Japanese warships and would have been directly in the path of crack Japanese assault troops when they stormed ashore to capture the last American-garrisoned base west of Hawaii.

His Assessment
"On paper our Midway defenses may have looked great, but the issue would have been in doubt if we'd been invaded. At the time I was untried, untested, too young and cocky to realize the consequences of combat. Iwo Jima taught me how foolish I had been at Midway.

Had the IJN begun to shell us, my position would not have held up. Even a near miss would have brought the coral sand down in front of the port, blinding us for sure. Had the enemy gained the island where would we go? We would stay and fight, doing what we had been trained for.

Since then, I have given much thought to that "what if". Here we are holding off the IJN landing parties. Just maybe, the Army Air Corps or Navy air from Pearl could come to our rescue. We should have had a sizable force in Hawaii air and afloat, at least enough to distract the enemy from landing.

We would have held the ground we were assigned to protect at a terrible loss. I just pray that I would have been as brave as the Navy and Marines that attacked the carriers that day, but were unable to return.

After Midway, I trained as a forward observer for artillery and air support with the 5th Marine Division. I was on the third wave at Iwo Jima and called in several emergency barrages from a battleship. It might have been the Iowa. I experienced then what a Navy bombardment and two divisions of Marine artillery can do. If the tables had been turned around, we would have been hurting at Midway".

3) Why is Midway not comparable to the final destruction of the Ichiki Shitai at Bloody Ridge
Kawaguchi"s original plan called for a three pronged attack by his 2500 main force (not all of the original 6500 strong force was now under his command), attacking from the south. He had the aim of capturing a low ridge from which they would be in a commanding position to execute its final capture. Kawaguchis plan was overly complex, and anticipated by Col Edsall, one of the canniest marines in history.

Kawaguchis attack plans relied on a naval bombardment in support. He also placed great importance on the support of his own Light artillery , equipped with either 4 or 12 (I am unable determine which)Type 92 70 mm pack howitzers. Kawaguchis plan was to attack along three axes, with the eastern and western contingents aiming to divide the attentions of the defenders.

By September 8th, most of Kawaguchis Bns had plunged into the Jungle. However the artillery detachment had not yet left the beach-head area, when it was hit by a marine raid near Taivu Point. The unit was destroyed there…..there would be no artillery support for this operation. Worse, the detachments ammunition stores were also captured. If the attack was to continue, the Japanese would have to undertake with only the ammunition they carried. This meant, in effect, that they would have to take the position by cold steel alone…..Any sane commander would have stopped the operation at that point, but not Kawaguchi. He was so disdainful of the Americans, that he believed his could in fact take the position in that way, and then hold of all counterattacks until help arrived…what an idiot!!!!!

Kawaguchi might have succeeded, but there was one further obstacle that caused his plans to completely unwind. The Japanese had no maps of the area, and soon got lost in the Jungle. The distance to the front appeared short, but it was, at that time a trackless, dense jungle….There were soon many sick and wounded in the Japanese ranks, and only one of the subsidiary arms of this attack made it to the jumping off point (and late at that). Kawaguchi refused to stop, and his attack went in regardless.

Despite all of these obvious impediments, Kawaguchis men almost succeeded. The marines were dismayed at the ferocity of the attacks, and the refusal of the Japanese to give up. Nearly all the assault teams were destroyed amounting to nearly 900 casualties…one of the supporting elements never made any serious attacks. The battle itself was a close run thing….there was a great deal of individual bravery, but the soul of the defence that night was Edson himself….Never more than 10 or 20 yards from the front line (remember he was a full colonel….) his clothes were pierced at the collar and at the waist by stray bullets. Exhorting to those that showed signs of wavering, "get back where you came from. The only thing they've got which you don't, is guts!!!!" Only one of the two supporting elements in Kawaguchis plan, on the eastern flank, made any attempt at support.

By morning it was over, 900 Japanese lay dead or dying, to just under 100 Americans. There had been no bombardment in support, there was no indigenous artillery support, and the attack had been fought largely without ammunition or proper supplywith the attack badly disjointed and illconceived…this is hardly comparable to Midway……
.

 

[parsifal]

Quick correction

The marine commanders name is Edson, not edsall. Just a spelling mistake, sorry about that