Hi Syscom
I have to strongly disagree with the aserions you are making, even if they are supported, as you say, by a good source.
Here are some basic facts about the never executed Midway invasion, an eyewitness appraisal, and a comparison to the Battle Of Bloody ridge, where the remnants of Ichiki Shitai were destroyed, whilst attached to the Kawaguchi Brigade, where a substantial proportion of the force was destroyed.
1) The Forces Involved
The principal defenders of the two atolls consisted of "C" "D" Companies of the 2nd Raider Bn, and the 6th Coastal Defence Bn of the USMC. As at June 1942, the Bn consisted of Main force at Midway Island, 33 officers, 810 enlisted men (843). The two companies of the raider Bns added I think about another 200 defenders (approx) . Total estimated strength of the defenders was a little over 1000 combat effectives (for comparison about twice the size of the ill-fated Wake defence formations)
The attack force consisted of roughly 5500 men in the assault forces, with some specialist echelons. The principal assault formations were the Marine 5th Yokosuka SNLF (about 1500 men), the "Ichiki" Shitai (Force or Detachment) (based around the 28th Infantry Regiment, normal establishment about 2500 men, but reinforced for this operation), and the 11th 12th Pioneer Bns (about 1000 men, but records are unclear). Providing immediate gunfire support to the amphibious assault were the units of the "Midway Occupation Force", consisting of no less than 4 x CA, 1 x CL, and 12 x DD. Further artillery support was less than 12 hours behind that, consisting 2 x BC, 4 x CA and a further 8 x DDs. A single CVL (Zuiho) was assigned the task of providing direct air support to the invasion forces.
There is no doubt that the Japanese plan was overly complex, and that in wargaming it had not run well. By comparison, neither had the testing that preceded Watchtower….The main problem with the Japanese plan was that it overly complex, and assumed the US forces would be utilized in a predetermined way. However as far as I can tell, there was nothing inherently wrong with the assault planning. It had been rehearsed on a number of occasions, the last at Saipan, where modifications were made to the Daihatsu LCI, to give them some measure of indigenous fire support as they made their runs to the shore. To compare it with the later Allied assaults on Japanese islands is not valid, because Midway was not nearly so well prepared as say Iwo, or even Saipan, and the Japanese had already showed that they were prepared to die to a man to achieve their objectives. This could not be expected or relied upon in Allied operations (thank goodness).
If the Japanese had won the naval battle, which is disiitnctly possible, given just how lucky the USN was in the final end runs)….I believe the remainder of the operation would have gone off like clockwork. I should say, incidently, that whilst at staff college, this was the subject of a major paper by myself, I don't think I still have it but will try and find the paper..
2) An Eyewitness Account
Ed Fox was serving on Midway with the 6th Defense Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, at the time of the Battle of Midway, 4-6 June 1942. His post was a machine-gun bunker on the south-eastern shore of Sand Island, the larger of the two islands situated at the southern end of the Midway Atoll lagoon.
If the United States Pacific Fleet had been destroyed at Midway in accordance with Admiral Yamamoto's plan, the Japanese would have launched amphibious landings from the southern side of Midway Atoll. Ed Fox's bunker would have faced an intense barrage from the guns of Japanese warships and would have been directly in the path of crack Japanese assault troops when they stormed ashore to capture the last American-garrisoned base west of Hawaii.
His Assessment
"On paper our Midway defenses may have looked great, but the issue would have been in doubt if we'd been invaded. At the time I was untried, untested, too young and cocky to realize the consequences of combat. Iwo Jima taught me how foolish I had been at Midway.
Had the IJN begun to shell us, my position would not have held up. Even a near miss would have brought the coral sand down in front of the port, blinding us for sure. Had the enemy gained the island where would we go? We would stay and fight, doing what we had been trained for.
Since then, I have given much thought to that "what if". Here we are holding off the IJN landing parties. Just maybe, the Army Air Corps or Navy air from Pearl could come to our rescue. We should have had a sizable force in Hawaii air and afloat, at least enough to distract the enemy from landing.
We would have held the ground we were assigned to protect at a terrible loss. I just pray that I would have been as brave as the Navy and Marines that attacked the carriers that day, but were unable to return.
After Midway, I trained as a forward observer for artillery and air support with the 5th Marine Division. I was on the third wave at Iwo Jima and called in several emergency barrages from a battleship. It might have been the Iowa. I experienced then what a Navy bombardment and two divisions of Marine artillery can do. If the tables had been turned around, we would have been hurting at Midway".
3) Why is Midway not comparable to the final destruction of the Ichiki Shitai at Bloody Ridge
Kawaguchi"s original plan called for a three pronged attack by his 2500 main force (not all of the original 6500 strong force was now under his command), attacking from the south. He had the aim of capturing a low ridge from which they would be in a commanding position to execute its final capture. Kawaguchis plan was overly complex, and anticipated by Col Edsall, one of the canniest marines in history.
Kawaguchis attack plans relied on a naval bombardment in support. He also placed great importance on the support of his own Light artillery , equipped with either 4 or 12 (I am unable determine which)Type 92 70 mm pack howitzers. Kawaguchis plan was to attack along three axes, with the eastern and western contingents aiming to divide the attentions of the defenders.
By September 8th, most of Kawaguchis Bns had plunged into the Jungle. However the artillery detachment had not yet left the beach-head area, when it was hit by a marine raid near Taivu Point. The unit was destroyed there…..there would be no artillery support for this operation. Worse, the detachments ammunition stores were also captured. If the attack was to continue, the Japanese would have to undertake with only the ammunition they carried. This meant, in effect, that they would have to take the position by cold steel alone…..Any sane commander would have stopped the operation at that point, but not Kawaguchi. He was so disdainful of the Americans, that he believed his could in fact take the position in that way, and then hold of all counterattacks until help arrived…what an idiot!!!!!
Kawaguchi might have succeeded, but there was one further obstacle that caused his plans to completely unwind. The Japanese had no maps of the area, and soon got lost in the Jungle. The distance to the front appeared short, but it was, at that time a trackless, dense jungle….There were soon many sick and wounded in the Japanese ranks, and only one of the subsidiary arms of this attack made it to the jumping off point (and late at that). Kawaguchi refused to stop, and his attack went in regardless.
Despite all of these obvious impediments, Kawaguchis men almost succeeded. The marines were dismayed at the ferocity of the attacks, and the refusal of the Japanese to give up. Nearly all the assault teams were destroyed amounting to nearly 900 casualties…one of the supporting elements never made any serious attacks. The battle itself was a close run thing….there was a great deal of individual bravery, but the soul of the defence that night was Edson himself….Never more than 10 or 20 yards from the front line (remember he was a full colonel….) his clothes were pierced at the collar and at the waist by stray bullets. Exhorting to those that showed signs of wavering, "get back where you came from. The only thing they've got which you don't, is guts!!!!" Only one of the two supporting elements in Kawaguchis plan, on the eastern flank, made any attempt at support.
By morning it was over, 900 Japanese lay dead or dying, to just under 100 Americans. There had been no bombardment in support, there was no indigenous artillery support, and the attack had been fought largely without ammunition or proper supplywith the attack badly disjointed and illconceived…this is hardly comparable to Midway……
.