What does Japan do if War against USA/UK/DEI postponed to Spring 1942?

[SaparotRob]

I forgot if it was Lexington or Saratoga that successfully "bombed" Pearl Harbor.

 

[WARSPITER]

I forgot if it was Lexington or Saratoga that successfully "bombed" Pearl Harbor.

Before anyone else asks, what altitude did they bomb at ?

 

[GrauGeist]

Before anyone else asks, what altitude did they bomb at ?

Good question.

I would suppose that it would have to be level bombing, as I don't think either carrier was designed for the high-G pull-out needed for dive-bombing...

 

[SaparotRob]

Good question.

I would suppose that it would have to be level bombing, as I don't think either carrier was designed for the high-G pull-out needed for dive-bombing...

 

[Admiral Beez]

Apparently, no thought was given to a carrier-launched attack even though the USN had, I've read, wargamed exactly this scenario.

The US wouldn't have installed radar, deployed over three hundred combat aircraft and moved their own carriers to Pearl if no thought was given to a carrier-launched attack.

 

[Shortround6]

As far as what would happen if Japan had waited longer?
Well, those B-17s that showed up on Dec 7th were not supposed to stay in Hawaii, they were supposed to fly on to the Philippines.
The A-24s for the 27th bomb group were in route to the Philippines when the Japanese attacked, many of the aircrew and ground crew were already in Philippines waiting for the the aircraft.

Waiting several months means the Philippines are also that much harder for the Japanese to crack.

 

[special ed]

Chennault predicted it in 1925 after he embarrassed the Navy brass during Army Navy war games. We know what happened to him.

 

[swampyankee]

Chennault predicted it in 1925 after he embarrassed the Navy brass during Army Navy war games. We know what happened to him.

The USN wargamed carrier-launched attacks on Pearl Harbor. Why the poor readiness is not known to me

 

[nuuumannn]

I'd imagine a bunch of floatplanes flying around on an early Sunday morning would arouse some attention.

Sure, but like I asked, just how much? It's one aircraft flying high above defying identification and given that people didn't exactly know what Japanese aircraft looked like, nor were they expecting them, how would that reaction take shape? I doubt they'd do anything like launch fighters to investigate, not on a Sunday...

 

[NevadaK]

Sure, but like I asked, just how much? It's one aircraft flying high above defying identification and given that people didn't exactly know what Japanese aircraft looked like, nor were they expecting them, how would that reaction take shape? I doubt they'd do anything like launch fighters to investigate, not on a Sunday...

The Japanese fleet received an intelligence update less than 6 hours before the assault began correctly identifying what ships were in the harbor. There was no need for extensive floatplane reconnaissance.

 

[nuuumannn]

The Japanese fleet received an intelligence update less than 6 hours before the assault began correctly identifying what ships were in the harbor. There was no need for extensive floatplane reconnaissance.

Go back a few posts, bud...

 

[NevadaK]

Go back a few posts, bud...

Was just reiterating….Nagumo's intel was pretty fresh. Not sure how any other intel would have changed plans and what value additional aerial reconnaissance would add. Top Secret Assignment

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Sure, but like I asked, just how much? It's one aircraft flying high above defying identification and given that people didn't exactly know what Japanese aircraft looked like, nor were they expecting them, how would that reaction take shape? I doubt they'd do anything like launch fighters to investigate, not on a Sunday...

True enough ... but did the Japanese know the American reconnaissance-flight scheduling and routing? If not, putting a bunch of floatplanes in the air could -- rightly or wrongly -- be seen as too risky by Nagumo, who by most accounts was pretty risk-averse.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I have a friend (really) who is retired U.S.Army. He told me the US military closes for Christmas.

Not all of us did. And more to The Basket 's point, post-PH, the American military was a little more primed against surprises.

 

[Conslaw]

On 7 Dec Saratoga was at San Diego having just completed a routine docking at Bremerton. So she would have survived to arrive, as historical, at PH on the 15th.

Yorktown left Norfolk for the Pacific on 16 Dec, arriving San Diego on the 30th.

Hornet, having only completed at the end of Oct, was undertaking a shakedown cruises Dec-Feb. She sailed for the Pacific 4 March 1942 reaching San Diego on the 20th. In Feb she carried out tests launching B-25 bombers to prove the feasibility of that ahead of the Doolittle Raid. 4-5 months was a typical work up and transit to the Pacific time for a US fleet carrier in WW2. So I doubt she can be got there much quicker. Maybe 2-3 weeks at most.

Wasp and Ranger could have been sent, but the USN was never keen on using Ranger in the Pacific. But needs must. Historically Wasp wasn't earmarked for the Pacific until after the loss of Lexington at Coral Sea.

The first USN reports of units having folding wing F4F-4 was the 17 Feb 1942, with Wasp's VF-71 having just received them in the previous week. That was followed by Long Island and Charger (6 each) and Hornet's VF-8 by the time she sailed for the Pacific. Even fixed wing F4F-3/3A were in short supply with the fighter squadron on either Lexington or Saratoga in this period still flying Buffalos.

You will recall from previous discussions that RN Martlet II with folding wings were only delivered from Oct 1941. Illustrious left with the first batch for squadrons in the U.K. in Dec.

There would be no US "demand" for RN carriers. There might be a "request" for help. But I'm not sure how quickly it could be fulfilled. Illustrious had only begun her work up in Nov and only had one Swordfish squadron aboard. Formidable only completed her repairs at the beginning of Dec after 6 months in dock and had no aircraft. The rest of their squadrons were in the U.K. So both need work up time.

And, if the Lexington and Enterprise Air Groups had survived at PH by being ashore, none of their aircraft are compatible with the British carriers anyway. So they need to return to the U.K. I doubt the RN would be willing to give up Victorious as the sole Home Fleet Carrier at the time. Which only leaves Indomitable. But RN pllans in autumn 1941 were calling for reinforcement of the IO and had a carrier, not necessarily Indomitable, pencilled in. But by the end of the year she is the only one available.

So I'm not sure the RN is in a position to help. The USN might just have to suck it up, rely on their own resources and hope that Lexington and Enterprise can be repaired quickly. It may mean cancellation of some of the strikes against Japanese outposts in the early months of 1942.

When did the production shift to the folding wing Marlet/Wildcat? I thought it was December 1941, but if the British were taking delivery in October it was significantly earlier. This means there must have been a huge drought in the US Navy taking delivery of Wildcats.

 

[EwenS]

Grumman was still operating at peacetime production rates. The monthly figures from July 1940 for the F4F were (from Official US Production figures)

1940 - 1,32,29,21,1,19 total = 103 (Jul-Dec)
1941 - 31,25,25,47,36,29,32,31,18,6,15,28. Total = 323
1942 - 63,81,90,98,107,132,100,135,126,160,190,163 total = 1,445

The 1940 figures include 81 from the French order delivered to Britain. The 1941 figures will include 30 for Greece (taken over by the RN as Martlet III) plus 10 fixed wing Martlet III for the RN and c50 Martlet II delivered Oct-Dec (I don't have the exact figure immediately to hand but the 90 Martlet II were delivered between Oct 1941 and April 1942).

The first F4F-3 rolled off the production line in Feb 1940. I don't have Feb-June production.

The prototype F4F-4 with the folding wing first flew on 14 April 1941, with first deliveries to the RN in Oct. Note that is the month Grumman produced only 6 aircraft. That sounds like a production changeover to me. The USN squadrons did not receive any of this model prior to PH. The first that I can trace from official USN records of their aircraft locations were in the week ending 17 Feb 1942.

Edit: The RN received 49 folding wing Martlet II between 4 Oct and 28 Dec 1941. 8,16 and 25 respectively per "Fleet Air Arm Aircraft 1939 to 1945". So slight discrepancy with US production figures but same totals. That represents ALL of Grumman F4F production for those months. The next RN delivery according to the same source was in March 1942. So balance of British order, 41 aircraft, comes out of the March / April production totals.

Edit 2:- Looking at Francillon's Grumman Aircraft, he notes that the XF4F-4 first flew as noted above on 14 April 1941 and was delivered to the USN on 14 May 1941. He then has the first folding wing G-36B Martlet II for Britain first flying on 8 July 1941. Then the first production F4F-4 for the USN first flew on 7 Nov 1941.

So, contrary to what I said before, it looks like the USN received a handful of folding wing F4F-4 before 1941 was out but none had reached squadron service. When they did, firstly in the Atlantic Fleet, they replaced the entire complement of F4F-3 aircraft in an operational squadron. No operation of two models at the same time.

 

[The Basket]

Thing about ships is they move about. So yesterdays Intel is tomorrow's mistake.

Can never have enough intel.

From what I read you could park Yamato in Pearl Harbour and nobody would bat an eyelid. Not so much surprise but total lethargy.

Anyhoo. If you read about the loss of USS Indianapolis then yeah...nothing changes.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Thing about ships is they move about. So yesterdays Intel is tomorrow's mistake. Can never have enough intel.

I have to wonder how the war would have gone had the Axis invested into foreign intel, including signals intelligence, and especially improved both their encryption and security/sops of diplomatic and military communication. A good intel network may have discovered the Ultra and Magic signals intelligence programs, forever changing the Battle of the Atlantic, Pearl Harbour, Midway, etc.

Some examples of where good foreign intel or even basic research into your opponent would be useful:
- Hitler is informed in early 1941 that the Soviet Union has >25,000 tanks, >18,000 aircraft, >117,000 artillery pieces, >5.7 million men.
- Japan gains an accurate appreciation of the US ability to scale up its military and of its cultural willingness to fight on no matter the losses.
- Mussolini now understands that he has no hope of beating the Allies in North Africa, and that his best course of action is to follow Spain's neutrality.

 

[SaparotRob]

The Abwehr got the best intel Britain could manufacture. Even paying those perfidious sons of Albion to obtain what England wanted them to have.
I think Admiral Yamamoto had an idea about the American economy. Problem was, those with cooler heads in the Imperial government would lose them if they spoke up.

 

[Dimlee]

A case of disbelief? You can train for something for years but it's still training. When the real deal happens, there might be a disconnect between reality and complacency.

As a young deck officer, I have been well trained in firefighting and other courses and conducted drills myself, but when the first real fire onboard incident happened, my initial performance was slow and not very professional. I always remain grateful to our 3rd engineer who shouted at me and brought me to my senses. Later on, in other incidents, I reacted much faster. And shouted at others and kicked some asses (not too hard).