What does Japan do if War against USA/UK/DEI postponed to Spring 1942?

[buffnut453]

The problem is Japan wasn't operating as any sort of unified geopolitical state. The whole reason they were in the China mess was because of Army hot-heads who fomented excuses to invade. Those same Army hot-heads were more than willing to assassinate anyone who criticized their methods. Thus the Army held the political discourse hostage.

Army influence in the political process massively hindered opportunities for anyone in Tokyo to work out a negotiated solution. Any such solution would require, at the very least, Konoe to hold onto power as Prime Minister while also garnering support for his desire for Germany to broker a settlement in China. Unfortunately, for the reasons stated above, Konoe didn't have the political power to pull of such a miracle.

Hirohito and Konoe both elevated Tojo because they thought they could use his ardent nationalism as a means of selling the unpalatable idea of a negotiated China settlement. Unfortunately for them, Tojo proved an unwilling partner. He, along with other Army leaders, was strongly in favour of seeking a military solution in China while preparing for what was curiously termed a "preventative war" against the US.

With hindsight, the logic seems impossibly twisted and illogical. But I'm sure that it seemed to leaders in Tokyo in late 1941 as the only approach available. Sadly, the die was cast.

 

[EwenS]

Good points. As you say the distances are huge and there are few targets on the west coast, but how about a Scarborough Raid? Sail a battlefleet to Seattle, bombard the place.

The biggest problem with that is oil, or rather Japan's ability to supply a fleet at trans Pacific distances.

Setting aside the subs, Japan sent 6 carriers, 2 Battleships, 2 heavy and 1 light cruiser and 9 destroyers to raid Pearl Harbor. It took 8 tankers to support that mission and there are reports that the fuel supply was tight. How many to get it to the US West Coast and back again? How many if you add more firepower in the shape of Battleships and cruisers? How much northerly routing do you need to distance yourself from PH all needing more oil? Double? Triple? And how much of that tanker fleet can you afford to lose?

In 1941 Japan only had about 94 tankers, IJN & merchant, over 500 grt, including a number of whale factory ships. Only 11 of those were IJN fleet oilers. The 32 between 6-10,000 grt and 19 over 10,000 formed about 85% of the entire tanker fleet tonnage. With those ships she needed to supply the fleet and overseas bases and move oil from the oilfields to where it was needed.

And to do it you have to sail past the remaining US Pacific Fleet assets at PH and risk having your retreat cut off.

It really is not a practical proposition for the IJN.

 

[Admiral Beez]

In 1941 Japan only had about 94 tankers, IJN & merchant, over 500 grt, including a number of whale factory ships. Only 11 of those were IJN fleet oilers. The 32 between 6-10,000 grt and 19 over 10,000 formed about 85% of the entire tanker fleet tonnage. With those ships she needed to supply the fleet and overseas bases and move oil from the oilfields to where it was needed.

Beyond refueling IJN and IJAF units in situ, how did they ever expect to utilize their planned seizure of the DEI oil fields with few to no tankers? Was most of the oil shipped to Japan before the sanctions shipped in non-Japanese flagged tankers? D'oh.

 

[EwenS]

Yep, most of the US oil imported by Japan was shipped in US tankers. But Japan had been, and after the outbreak of war continued to, increase its tanker tonnage.

Once war breaks out Japanese oil reserves (held in Japan) do not fall as fast as might be expected because the DEI oilfields and refineries are got up and running again fairly quickly. Also a lot of DEI oil was shipped direct to the front line in places like Truk & Rabaul, without ever going near Japan, or later was consumed there as Japan made arrangements to move its fleet and aircrew training into the region. It all helped cut down on the need for tankers. I'm sure we have discussed this before on other threads.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Good points. And demonstrative that Japan really couldn't do anything to harm the USA. But they could try to terrorize the place? As you say the distances are huge and there are few targets on the west coast, but how about a Scarborough Raid? Sail a battlecruiser force to Seattle, bombard the place. It's about 15,000 km round trip, well within the 19,000 km (@ 14 knots) range of the Kongo class.

Had the USA decided not to redeploy its battlefleet and carriers from the US west coast to Hawaii what would the Japanese have targeted in Dec 1941?

Fuel would have to account for maneuvering and high-speed dashes both into and out of the area, meaning higher fuel consumption. And the base at Bremerton saw regular battleship traffic in that era. Not all of 'em would be in drydock.

Had the US not redeployed, use IJN assets to speed up the conquest of the PI, as well as interdict any possible relief fleet sent from America.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Had the US not redeployed, use IJN assets to speed up the conquest of the PI, as well as interdict any possible relief fleet sent from America.

Ouch, but yep that sounds about right.

 

[GrauGeist]

Good points. And demonstrative that Japan really couldn't do anything to harm the USA. But they could try to terrorize the place? As you say the distances are huge and there are few targets on the west coast, but how about a Scarborough Raid? Sail a battlecruiser force to Seattle, bombard the place. It's about 15,000 km round trip, well within the 19,000 km (@ 14 knots) range of the Kongo class.

Had the USA decided not to redeploy its battlefleet and carriers from the US west coast to Hawaii what would the Japanese have targeted in Dec 1941?

The West Coast was bristling with shore batteries in areas that would have been possible landing locations.

If you look at an overall map of the West coast, it may seem that battery locations seem concentrated in some areas and nothing in between. This is because a large share of the West Coast is rough terrain (cliffs, rocky promontories, steep canyons, etc.) making a shore assault nearly impossible.

Here is a good listing of battery locations in the Southern California area.
The Bolsa Chica battery listed, is in Orange County, just south of Naval Weapon Station Seal Beach and me and my friends used to fool around in it when we were kids.
It was built into the bluffs with tunnels leading to the casemates, storerooms and such.

California Forts: page 6

 

[Shortround6]

Again,

Google map Seattle.
Seattle was just over 90 miles from the actual sea coast.
or look at this. scale may be a bit off.

San Francisco is a much easier target.
Knowing what the weather would be in either Seattle or San Francisco (fog) would have been a real crap shoot for the Japanese.

Old guns there newer ones.

Those snow capped peaks are between Seattle and the Pacific Ocean, Seattle is about 40 miles from the gun pictured.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Again,

Google map Seattle.
Seattle was just over 90 miles from the actual sea coast.
or look at this. scale may be a bit off.

View attachment 658457
San Francisco is a much easier target.
Knowing what the weather would be in either Seattle or San Francisco (fog) would have been a real crap shoot for the Japanese.

Old guns there newer ones.
View attachment 658458
Those snow capped peaks are between Seattle and the Pacific Ocean, Seattle is about 40 miles from the gun pictured.

And given the historical Japanese reticence to deploy heavy ships in Savo Sound, would they risk a bombardment of Seattle with more-constricted waters and a major Navy base handy?

You can at least bombard San Fran or Long Beach without entering constricted waters ... for all the good that'll do you.

Long Beach would provide more targets -- in the form of refineries and one or two aircraft factories -- but expose you to a quick reaction, as LB and SD were both used to harbor major fleet units.

 

[The Basket]

The Japanese army in China was out of control.
Tokyo had no idea what they were up to.
This meant that Japan had to admit their army was rogue or simply take credit for what they did.

This meant the west could deal with politicians and even the military in Tokyo and it meant el Zippo because the Japanese army in China took no notice.

The tail was wagging the dog.

In 1931, there were 3 Prime Ministers.

Hamaguchi Osachi had been shot the year before by an ultra nationalist and was in poor health. He died during this time period.

Wakatsuki Reijirō was the Prime Minster who was in charge during the start of the Manchurian incident but he quickly resigned when he was seen to have zero control of the army.

Next guy up is Inukai Tsuyoshi who had no control of the army either but he was shot dead by navy junior officers in 1932.

Next Prime Minister is Saitō Makoto who was killed in the 26 February incident in 1936.

So the politics of Japan was utterly chaotic in 1931 when things needed to be steady.

 

[Conslaw]

Grumman was still operating at peacetime production rates. The monthly figures from July 1940 for the F4F were (from Official US Production figures)

1940 - 1,32,29,21,1,19 total = 103 (Jul-Dec)
1941 - 31,25,25,47,36,29,32,31,18,6,15,28. Total = 323
1942 - 63,81,90,98,107,132,100,135,126,160,190,163 total = 1,445

The 1940 figures include 81 from the French order delivered to Britain. The 1941 figures will include 30 for Greece (taken over by the RN as Martlet III) plus 10 fixed wing Martlet III for the RN and c50 Martlet II delivered Oct-Dec (I don't have the exact figure immediately to hand but the 90 Martlet II were delivered between Oct 1941 and April 1942).

The first F4F-3 rolled off the production line in Feb 1940. I don't have Feb-June production.

The prototype F4F-4 with the folding wing first flew on 14 April 1941, with first deliveries to the RN in Oct. Note that is the month Grumman produced only 6 aircraft. That sounds like a production changeover to me. The USN squadrons did not receive any of this model prior to PH. The first that I can trace from official USN records of their aircraft locations were in the week ending 17 Feb 1942.

Edit: The RN received 49 folding wing Martlet II between 4 Oct and 28 Dec 1941. 8,16 and 25 respectively per "Fleet Air Arm Aircraft 1939 to 1945". So slight discrepancy with US production figures but same totals. That represents ALL of Grumman F4F production for those months. The next RN delivery according to the same source was in March 1942. So balance of British order, 41 aircraft, comes out of the March / April production totals.

Edit 2:- Looking at Francillon's Grumman Aircraft, he notes that the XF4F-4 first flew as noted above on 14 April 1941 and was delivered to the USN on 14 May 1941. He then has the first folding wing G-36B Martlet II for Britain first flying on 8 July 1941. Then the first production F4F-4 for the USN first flew on 7 Nov 1941.

So, contrary to what I said before, it looks like the USN received a handful of folding wing F4F-4 before 1941 was out but none had reached squadron service. When they did, firstly in the Atlantic Fleet, they replaced the entire complement of F4F-3 aircraft in an operational squadron. No operation of two models at the same time.

Based on this, it seems the US Navy didn't really get folding wing Wildcats in any quantity until February, because Britain got most of the initial batch. It explains the cross-decking to get sufficient fighters for each of the carrier air groups as they were needed. (They also had to somehow get planes to the new Marine groups, and the groups Navy and Marine that were training in the states. If I recall correctly from Lundstrom, the Marines didn't get their Dash-4s until right before being deployed to Guadalcanal.

 

[Conslaw]

While there were minor operations against the mainland USA either carried out or proposed, geography was against the Japanese. With the exception of part of the pre-war aircraft industry, most US war production was based on the eastern part of the country, from the east coast to the Great Lakes. It is over 6,000 miles from Tokyo to Chicago. Over 8,000 to Panama. When, from 1940, new plants were needed, they were being created well away from the coasts.

But we do have examples of the Japanese striking or attempting to strike the mainland USA and shipping in West Coast waters-

Japanese submarine operations in 1941/42 including shelling by I-17 & I-25

Bombardment of Ellwood - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Bombardment of Fort Stevens - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Japanese Submarines Prowl the U.S. Pacific Coastline in 1941

For a week in December 1941, Japanese submarines prowled the U.S. Pacific coastline, searching for merchant ships to sink.

www.historynet.com

These events, occurring in the months following PH certainly added to US hysteria about a possible Japanese invasion, leading to "The Battle of Los Angeles"

Battle of Los Angeles - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Fu-Go balloon bombs in 1944/45

Fu-Go balloon bomb - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Plans to bomb the Panama Canal in 1945. But when conceived in 1942 it meant designing and building a new aircraft and the submarines to carry them.

Japan's Panama Canal Buster

Japan's I-400 class special submarines, known as Sen-Toku, weren't just the largest subs of their time. They were the world's first underwater aircraft carriers, intended to attack the Panama Canal with Seiran bombers.

www.historynet.com

Aichi M6A - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

I-400-class submarine - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Ultimately none of these activities turned out to be more than pin pricks but they do demonstrate Japanese intent.

While there were many plans by countries to assassinate other countries leaders during the war, I can't think of one that was carried out. Always seems more of a Cold War activity. Besides all the issues of access and high levels of security to be overcome, there is a much more difficult question. Who will succeed them? Sometimes it is a case of better the enemy you know, and the hope that, if incompetent, he will continue to make mistakes!

As for the use of chemical weapons in WW2, every major combatant nation had them, tested them and moved them around in their rear areas, and had plans to use them if someone else did. Britain had extensive plans to use gas in the event of a German invasion. The Germans invented nerve gases to sit alongside more "conventional" chemical weapons, but never used them, allegedly because of Hitler's experiences in WW1. The Bari incident was the downside of what could happen due to the secrecy involved in their movement.

But in 1945 with Operation Olympic coming up the US was moving chemical weapon stocks from rear areas in Australia to the Philippines in case they were needed. The Japanese disclosed post war that if the US had used them first then they would retaliate in kind. In a backs to the wall invasion, who knows, they might have adopted the British approach.

Biological weapons were used by the Japanese in China. Churchill wanted to use anthrax against Germany but cooler heads prevailed. The US contemplated using biological weapons against Japanese crops, but then realised that if it invaded in the aftermath it would have to feed the Japanese population as well as its own troops so putting a great strain on logistics.

Japan and weapons of mass destruction - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

The problem with both chemical and biological warfare is that, unless you are using it in a China type situation with a non technologically advanced country, the risk is that you will reap what you sow. But against the industrial might of the USA at least tenfold.

The US was even experimenting with weaponizing anthrax. They made the weapons in my home state of Indiana, just outside of Terre Haute. Vigo Ordnance Plant - Wikipedia

 

[33k in the air]

As for the use of chemical weapons in WW2, every major combatant nation had them, tested them and moved them around in their rear areas, and had plans to use them if someone else did. Britain had extensive plans to use gas in the event of a German invasion. The Germans invented nerve gases to sit alongside more "conventional" chemical weapons, but never used them, allegedly because of Hitler's experiences in WW1. The Bari incident was the downside of what could happen due to the secrecy involved in their movement.

But in 1945 with Operation Olympic coming up the US was moving chemical weapon stocks from rear areas in Australia to the Philippines in case they were needed. The Japanese disclosed post war that if the US had used them first then they would retaliate in kind. In a backs to the wall invasion, who knows, they might have adopted the British approach.

I have read that American soldiers fighting the dug-in Japanese had suggested a quick way of dealing with the extensive underground fortifications and bunkers: put chemical weapons into the ventilation shafts. This idea was apparently nixed at higher levels. Alternatives, such as pouring gasoline down the ventilation shafts and setting it alight, were pursued instead.

 

[The Basket]

Chemical weapons are a giant pain in the ass. You will need special teams to deploy them and a shift in the wind and it's coming back to you.

Plus using it in close proximity to your own troops is again bad idea.

Plus using it against targets that will need to be stormed is again bad idea.

I guess like when Iwo Jima was bombed then use of chemical weapons maybe makes sense but again you have to invade an island which may be awash with agent and you will have to provide your own soldiers with full NBC kit. Hard pass methinks.

 

[GrauGeist]

Fuel was a better option for eradicating the defenders.

It was readily available, didn't need anything more complex than getting the 55 gallon drums from the motor pool and then shooting a signal flare into the mix.

That's also how the Allies dislodged the Japanese from Fort Drum in Manilla Bay.

 

[The Basket]

Running around a tropical climate in full NBC gear?

Maybe use of tear gas or CS gas or smoke grenades or some other form of non lethal chemical agent...then yeah I guess.

Also the ww1 agents are bulk so you need a lot of it and so that becomes another logistics nightmare.

Chemical warfare is more of a problem than a solution.

 

[NevadaK]

Fuel was a better option for eradicating the defenders.

It was readily available, didn't need anything more complex than getting the 55 gallon drums from the motor pool and then shooting a signal flare into the mix.

That's also how the Allies dislodged the Japanese from Fort Drum in Manilla Bay.

In late 1944, the US had begun production of the Tallboy earthquake bomb designated the T-10. Based on European experience, the plan was to begin with a heavy bombardment of Japanese bunker complexes followed by ground assault heavily supported by napalm and flamethrowers. The war ended before the T-10 could be used in combat.

As a return to topic, I just finished reading Twomey's Countdown to Pearl Harbor. The Japanese were well aware that an extended war with the U.S. would go against them and wanted to strike early and hard enough to convince the U.S to stay out of the war. Delaying the attack only gives the US more opportunity to prepare for war. During 1940 and 1941, the US had been stripping the Pacific fleet to support activities in the Atlantic. One of the most crucial items taken from the fleet were PBY Catalina's and the Pacific fleet's capacity for long range patrol was severely compromised. This is not the reason the fleet was caught unprepared on December 7th, but it was a contributing factor. Giving the US time to make up for lost material would only weaken Japan's hand. At the same time, the US was strengthen forward positions such as Wake and Guam and more time to prepare would have made the Japanese plans even more difficult.

 

[EwenS]

In late 1944, the US had begun production of the Tallboy earthquake bomb designated the T-10. Based on European experience, the plan was to begin with a heavy bombardment of Japanese bunker complexes followed by ground assault heavily supported by napalm and flamethrowers. The war ended before the T-10 could be used in combat.

I believe US Tallboy production began earlier than that. An initial RAF order for 325 Tallboys was placed in Feb 1944 with 125 of the casings to be built in the USA. US manufactured casings were constructed differently from those produced in the UK, but were filled with explosive in Britain. Orders for 50 Grand Slam casings from the USA followed in Sept 1944

The USAAF ordered trials in Feb 1945 of a B-29 modified to carry Tallboy with a report of the tests being issued on 30 June 1945. The recommendation from these tests was that Tallboy should be put into combat "...in the shortest possible time..." and that one B-29 group should be equipped to specialise in their dropping. If possible, the modified aircraft should be capable of dropping both 12,000lb (Tallboy) and 22,000lb (Grand Slam) bombs. Bell built B-29 serial 42-63577 had already been allocated for the tests and was under modification by the end of Feb 1945 which took place in Mar/Apr 1945. The operational ceiling of the aircraft with Tallboy was determined to be 27,000ft with the range limited to 1,320 miles, although it was hoped that this could be increased to 1,500 miles by modifications to the cut away bomb doors.

Initial use of the Tallboy in the Pacific theatre was planned to be by the "Special Missions Wing" of the RAF Tiger Force, consisting of 9 and 617 squadrons which had been using the weapon in Europe. Had the war not ended, they would have flown out to Okinawa in Sept 1945 in time to participate in Operation Olympic. Amongst the early targets planned was the Kanmon Railway Tunnel between Kyushu and Honshu, constructed between 1936 and 1942.