What if - alternatives to Midway operation?

[Conslaw]

Wait for Zuikaku and thrown the lot at Midway. Codebreaking can only help the US so far when faced with a single force of seven carriers fielding close to four-hundred aircraft (incl. Zuikaku's renewed CAG), seven battleships, ten heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, fourteen destroyers, thirteen submarines, and thirty-five support/invasion ships.

Yes, we all know the Japanese and IJN in particular liked overly complicated plans, but did any of these IJN higher ups study the Principles of War and the concentration of force?

Carl von Clausewitz:
- Discover how we may gain a preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the decisive point.
- Use our entire force with the utmost energy, with forces concentrated at the main point
Sun Tzu:
- The highest Generalship is...to concentrate superior force

Breaking up your otherwise numerically superior naval force into smaller pieces is just dumb. If the goal is to take Midway and thus force the USN in a decisive battle, then use everything at your disposal to take the island. Yes, there's a chance the USN will see the size of the force and not take the bait, losing the chance at the "decisive battle" but that's better than the alternative of using your damn fleet carriers as bait!!!!

Gosh, there could be so many variables that are significant. How long do you have to wait to get Zuikaku? If it is more than a few weeks, then Saratoga would be available on the American side as an offset. We know that there were enough Avengers with crews available for all of the carriers to have them by the time of the Guadalcanal operation in August. How many would have been available in July? When could the Americans have had the Wasp available? How much more could the Midway air defenses be strengthened?

The 3 American carriers at Midway almost matched the 4 Japanese carriers without the over 100 planes based on Midway. Just adding Zuikaku would not have given the IJN a numerical advantage. If the Americans also added Saratoga, that would offset the light fleet carriers being freed up from the Aleutians duty.

More carriers would mean that Kido Butai would be spread out over an even wider area, making it even harder to coordinate the ships, their attacks and their defense. They would still lack radar or fighter control.

 

[Conslaw]

One thing I find interesting in this thread so far is that nobody has argued for a different objective than Midway, just different ways to attack Midway. I struggle to think of any objective that would have brought out the US Navy to fight 4 IJN fleet carriers in June 1942. Maybe Queensland in Australia?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

One thing I find interesting in this thread so far is that nobody has argued for a different objective than Midway, just different ways to attack Midway. I struggle to think of any objective that would have brought out the US Navy to fight 4 IJN fleet carriers in June 1942. Maybe Queensland in Australia?

Attacking Midway did exactly that. Probably a little easier than biting into Australia, as well.

 

[GrauGeist]

The IJN wanted a "great showdown".

Their attack on Midway had a dual purpose.
Firstly, it was to try and lure the USN out for that much wanted showdown.
Secondly, after taking Midway and defeating the USN, Midway Atoll would be held and used much like the US did, as a staging and supply depot.

While it may have seemed like a good idea, it was poorly planned and executed.
The first lesson the Japanese learned about "simply seizing" a US held island (or Atoll) was not at Midway, but at Wake Island, where they grossly underestimated the tenacity of the defenders.
This lesson would repeat itself at Midway days before the USN arrived with their carriers.

The IJN sent in carrier-born attack waves (just like at Wake) and Midway responded (again, just like Wake), resulting in loss of aircraft and having their ships attacked.

*IF* the IJN had learned their lesson and changed to a "shell by night, bomb by day" tactic, then Midway would not have held out long enough for the USN to save them.

And queried earlier upthread, about how I would have gone about it, I would have had surface elements at the lead with one carrier division to either side with the escort carrier group to the rear. My objective would have been to hammer the Atoll by heavy surface fire from sun down to sun up and then send in ground attack by day until nothing walked or crawled on any of the islands.

Then send in the landing forces and seize terra firma.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Axis knew that they needed to capture oil fields in the Caucuses and DEI, but seemed to have no plan to commence production and protect those fields once captured. THIS should have been the IJN's priority, not capturing Midway. The Japanese captured the DEI but never put in place the engineering and petroleum production staff or plan to produce the stuff, nor any plan to get the oil refined and sent back to Japan.

 

[SaparotRob]

Perhaps logistics wasn't as entertaining as conquering. I'm guessing they thought conquering equals acquirement. They really didn't think it through.

 

[GrauGeist]

Japan saw the USN as an immediate threat and wanted to either neutralize it or damage it to thr point of a negotiated peace so they could go about their business unimpeded.

It *may* have been possible to force the U.S. to a standoff had they not attacked Pearl Harbor.
Once they did that, all bets were off.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Perhaps logistics wasn't as entertaining as conquering. I'm guessing they thought conquering equals acquirement. They really didn't think it through.

It seems to me the Japanese had a bad habit of giving logistics short-shrift in their planning. Further, if the point of taking MI was to use the airstrip, you're gonna have to move avgas in bulk there, and I think the Japanese tanker resources would have been stretched supporting both said air ops as well as supporting fleet units.

Those supporting fleet units would also have to have ammo and victuals, another drain. This doesn't take into account shipping of spares and replacement airplanes for the air units (MI- or carrier-based), or construction units to rebuild the airfield and defenses on the atoll.

I think that a successful Japanese conquest of MI would have been a case of the dog chasing the car -- now that we've caught it, what do we do with it?

 

[SaparotRob]

Japan saw the USN as an immediate threat and wanted to either neutralize it or damage it to thr point of a negotiated peace so they could go about their business unimpeded.

It *may* have been possible to force the U.S. to a standoff had they not attacked Pearl Harbor.
Once they did that, all bets were off.

Ya' got that right!

 

[Admiral Beez]

It seems to me the Japanese had a bad habit of giving logistics short-shrift in their planning.

Not just the Japanese. The Germans invaded the Soviet oil fields but made no plans to use the oil.

 

[Admiral Beez]

This vid explains why even after Japan takes the DEI and has access to more oil, rubber and tin than it needs, it's still screwed.

 

[SaparotRob]

Like I said, they didn't think it through.

 

[Conslaw]

The Axis knew that they needed to capture oil fields in the Caucuses and DEI, but seemed to have no plan to commence production and protect those fields once captured. THIS should have been the IJN's priority, not capturing Midway. The Japanese captured the DEI but never put in place the engineering and petroleum production staff or plan to produce the stuff, nor any plan to get the oil refined and sent back to Japan.

Yeah, the Japanese learned oil doesn't produce itself or refine itself. The Dutch sabotaged the oil fields and refineries, and people with know-how to fix things were in short supply.

 

[Conslaw]

The IJN wanted a "great showdown".

Their attack on Midway had a dual purpose.
Firstly, it was to try and lure the USN out for that much wanted showdown.
Secondly, after taking Midway and defeating the USN, Midway Atoll would be held and used much like the US did, as a staging and supply depot.

While it may have seemed like a good idea, it was poorly planned and executed.
The first lesson the Japanese learned about "simply seizing" a US held island (or Atoll) was not at Midway, but at Wake Island, where they grossly underestimated the tenacity of the defenders.
This lesson would repeat itself at Midway days before the USN arrived with their carriers.

The IJN sent in carrier-born attack waves (just like at Wake) and Midway responded (again, just like Wake), resulting in loss of aircraft and having their ships attacked.

*IF* the IJN had learned their lesson and changed to a "shell by night, bomb by day" tactic, then Midway would not have held out long enough for the USN to save them.

And queried earlier upthread, about how I would have gone about it, I would have had surface elements at the lead with one carrier division to either side with the escort carrier group to the rear. My objective would have been to hammer the Atoll by heavy surface fire from sun down to sun up and then send in ground attack by day until nothing walked or crawled on any of the islands.

Then send in the landing forces and seize terra firma.

 

[Conslaw]

The IJN wanted a "great showdown".

Their attack on Midway had a dual purpose.
Firstly, it was to try and lure the USN out for that much wanted showdown.
Secondly, after taking Midway and defeating the USN, Midway Atoll would be held and used much like the US did, as a staging and supply depot.

While it may have seemed like a good idea, it was poorly planned and executed.
The first lesson the Japanese learned about "simply seizing" a US held island (or Atoll) was not at Midway, but at Wake Island, where they grossly underestimated the tenacity of the defenders.
This lesson would repeat itself at Midway days before the USN arrived with their carriers.

The IJN sent in carrier-born attack waves (just like at Wake) and Midway responded (again, just like Wake), resulting in loss of aircraft and having their ships attacked.

*IF* the IJN had learned their lesson and changed to a "shell by night, bomb by day" tactic, then Midway would not have held out long enough for the USN to save them.

And queried earlier upthread, about how I would have gone about it, I would have had surface elements at the lead with one carrier division to either side with the escort carrier group to the rear. My objective would have been to hammer the Atoll by heavy surface fire from sun down to sun up and then send in ground attack by day until nothing walked or crawled on any of the islands.

Then send in the landing forces and seize terra firma.

Hitting the island first with shore bombardment perhaps would be a good idea most of the time, but in the case of Midway, Midway sighted Japanese forces pretty far out, and in fact radar-equipped PBYs conducted a torpedo attack on one of the formations the night before the main battle. They did not have the element of surprise. Midway-based bombers would have had most of a full day to target the approaching forces before they got a chance to bombard. It was important therefore for the Japanese carriers to take out as much of Midway's airpower as possible.

 

[GrauGeist]

Not much Midway's air elements could do after sundown and certainly not against a force of 7 Battleships and 15 Cruisers at night...

 

[Casor]

The Japanese operated with two fatal flaws during the entirety of WWII. First, their attack plans were extremely intricate and relied upon the enemy doing exactly what they expected it to do and be exactly where they expected it to be and, second, due to their command and cultural structure, they could not adjust their plans on the fly when something did not go according to plan. This MO is in stark contrast to how the US forces operated during the war with American commanders frequently making changes or adjustments depending upon the situation. Midway, Leyte Gulf and a host of other battles are prime examples.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Japanese operated with two fatal flaws during the entirety of WWII. First, their attack plans were extremely intricate and relied upon the enemy doing exactly what they expected it to do and be exactly where they expected it to be and, second, due to their command and cultural structure, they could not adjust their plans on the fly when something did not go according to plan. This MO is in stark contrast to how the US forces operated during the war with American commanders frequently making changes or adjustments depending upon the situation. Midway, Leyte Gulf and a host of other battles are prime examples.

I imagine a lot of local commanders preferred the days (or their father's) when naval HQ could not reach them via wireless comm. At Tsushima, there was no connection with HQ micromanaging Admiral Tōgō on how to conduct the battle - he just got on with it. In the days before Trafalgar, Nelson didn't wait for the word from Admiralty House before leaving his assigned station off the Spanish coast and chasing the enemy into the Atlantic. Even with their more independent thinking I expect many a WW2 USN admiral wished he could cut the wireless comm link and get on with things. A notable victim of micromanagement from HQ is poor Craddock at Coronel, Christopher George Francis Maurice Cradock - The Dreadnought Project. Of course there is the idiocy of Lütjens declaring his location over wireless to an otherwise lost RN - so sometimes it's the local commanders themselves who feel the need to connect with HQ.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Not much Midway's air elements could do after sundown and certainly not against a force of 7 Battleships and 15 Cruisers at night...

... especially given that they only had ten torpedo bombers of limited utility against warships (due to crew unfamiliarity with either the technique itself [Army Marauder pilots] or with a new airframe [Navy TBF pilots).

A good dive-bombing could certainly have hurt the cruisers, and perhaps the BBs, and maybe give the US a mission-kill if we got lucky, but it's pretty hard to sink BBs with 500-lb bombs.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Japanese operated with two fatal flaws during the entirety of WWII. First, their attack plans were extremely intricate and relied upon the enemy doing exactly what they expected it to do and be exactly where they expected it to be and, second, due to their command and cultural structure, they could not adjust their plans on the fly when something did not go according to plan.

If we give the IJN the radar, CIC, radios and CAP discipline that I propose here, how do you see these fatal flaws still playing out?

Assuming the USN knows the IJN has radar, I predict that rather than sending in separate small strikes the Americans would consider a mass strike at multiple altitudes to overwhelm the limited number of Zeros available.