What if - alternatives to Midway operation?

[Casor]

If we give the IJN the radar, CIC, radios and CAP discipline that I propose here, how do you see these fatal flaws still playing out?

Assuming the USN knows the IJN has radar, I predict that rather than sending in separate small strikes the Americans would consider a mass strike at multiple altitudes to overwhelm the limited number of Zeros available.

My feeling is that radar or any other comparable in the day modern technology that would have had the effect of reducing or leveling the USN's advantage would still not have overcome the IJN's complicated battle plans or their inability to make decisions on the fly that would have, in essence, countermanded a higher up's orders.

 

[SaparotRob]

I'm under the impression that the USN assumed the Japanese did have radar (not a strongly held position).
I don't think the USN could organize a large coordinated multi altitude strike at Midway. The small groups of attacks at Midway were because the USN were still working on it.
Yorktown's group was the best at it but I think you mean a combined strike by all three American carriers.

 

[Casor]

I'm under the impression that the USN assumed the Japanese did have radar (not a strongly held position).
I don't think the USN could organize a large coordinated multi altitude strike at Midway. The small groups of attacks at Midway were because the USN were still working on it.
Yorktown's group was the best at it but I think you mean a combined strike by all three American carriers.

From what I have read it appears that they attempted to make a coordinated attack but, due to weather, navigation and timing along with the extreme range of the target, they could not.

 

[GrauGeist]

The USN also assumed the the IJN's carrier divisions would be operating separately like they (the USN) did.
When the Japanese were spotted and called in, only a few carriers were identified and seemed to confirm the USN's assumption.
This is why the Hornet's flight followed a logical course to find the other carriers, not knowing that carrier division one and two were actually operating in one group and ended up missing the fight altogether.

Had the USN known beforehand that all four carriers were in one group, it would have changed things considerably.

 

[cherry blossom]

Since many others have tried this, I will add my plan biased by hindsight as usual but keeping as many of the features of the original plan as possible.

Firstly, the original Midway Occupation Force is sent almost exactly as in Yamamoto's plan with the same escort under Tanaka and Kurita's 4 cruisers are also attached. The only change is that Chitose (and also Nisshin and Chiyoda) are sent immediately to be converted into aircraft carriers, so that only Kamikawa Maru with 12 float planes can give air support to the landing.

Secondly, a reinforced Kido Butai is sent to make the first attack exactly on its historic course. The carrier reinforcements are Zuikaku, which carries aircraft and aircrews from Shokaku and includes aircraft and crews pulled back from Hiyo (Hiyo's commissioning will be delayed), and Zuiho. I am going to load as many A6Ms onto these ships as I can find.

Most of the warships of Kondo's 2nd Fleet will sail with the Kido Butai up to the point when the first wave is launched at 04:30 on 4th June from 240 miles NW of Midway. Kondo then heads directly towards Midway at 24 knots with Kongō, Hiei, Atago, Chōkai and most of his escort. Kondo's two battleships should be in range of Midway at around 13:30, so no second wave attack should be necessary (I am willing to have Kondo steam faster and arrive earlier if it will not leave his tanks empty but he can clearly steam at 24 knots for days).

Myōkō and Haguro have been transferred to support the carriers as have also been Nachi, Takao and Maya together with a couple of 5,500 ton light cruisers and their associated destroyer screens from the delayed Aleutian invasion. One effect is that we have seven extra cruisers launching search aircraft as the Kido Butai launches its first wave. We could also suggest that Zuiho sends its 12 B5Ns to assist with the search, so that its deck and its 12 A6Ms are available for CAP until they return.

A further force will be created including the battleships Yamato, Nagato, Mutsu and Ise (Ise is the only ship in the fleet with radar and Hyuga needs repair after an accident). This force will sail with the carriers Ryūjō, Jun'yō and Hōshō, their destroyer escorts and most of the supply group that either already have or will refuel Kondo and Nagumo's ships. These ships will come from Japan rather than Truk but will hopefully reach a position to the NNW of the Midway Occupation Force and then sail a parallel course at a distance of 100 to 150 miles. Their aircraft will hopefully be able to attack any American force attacking Tanaka and Kurita. This force will be about 600 miles west of Midway at 12:30 on the 3rd June when B-17s unsuccessfully attacked the Midway Occupation Force. If they advance West at 18 knots (constrained by the support ships), they will be perhaps 200 miles west of Midway at 10:30 next morning and within range of the American fleet by late afternoon. They could advance at about 22 knots if they left the tankers behind (with escorting destroyers), which would allow Ryūjō and Jun'yō to launch aircraft towards the American fleet by midday. I am guessing zigzagging converts a speed in knots to the same speed in mph. I am also assuming that they do not have to manoeuvre to avoid air attacks.

I should mention that these changes will be implemented without the need to send extensive radio signals as the ships transferred are all from Japan after I take temporary command of the Combined Fleet after Admiral Yamamoto falls down a ladder suffering severe concussion and several broken bones. Thus I am expecting no change in American forces until possibly extra carriers might be reported West of Midway on the 3rd June.

 

[Conslaw]

Since many others have tried this, I will add my plan biased by hindsight as usual but keeping as many of the features of the original plan as possible.

Firstly, the original Midway Occupation Force is sent almost exactly as in Yamamoto's plan with the same escort under Tanaka and Kurita's 4 cruisers are also attached. The only change is that Chitose (and also Nisshin and Chiyoda) are sent immediately to be converted into aircraft carriers, so that only Kamikawa Maru with 12 float planes can give air support to the landing.

Secondly, a reinforced Kido Butai is sent to make the first attack exactly on its historic course. The carrier reinforcements are Zuikaku, which carries aircraft and aircrews from Shokaku and includes aircraft and crews pulled back from Hiyo (Hiyo's commissioning will be delayed), and Zuiho. I am going to load as many A6Ms onto these ships as I can find.

Most of the warships of Kondo's 2nd Fleet will sail with the Kido Butai up to the point when the first wave is launched at 04:30 on 4th June from 240 miles NW of Midway. Kondo then heads directly towards Midway at 24 knots with Kongō, Hiei, Atago, Chōkai and most of his escort. Kondo's two battleships should be in range of Midway at around 13:30, so no second wave attack should be necessary (I am willing to have Kondo steam faster and arrive earlier if it will not leave his tanks empty but he can clearly steam at 24 knots for days).

Myōkō and Haguro have been transferred to support the carriers as have also been Nachi, Takao and Maya together with a couple of 5,500 ton light cruisers and their associated destroyer screens from the delayed Aleutian invasion. One effect is that we have seven extra cruisers launching search aircraft as the Kido Butai launches its first wave. We could also suggest that Zuiho sends its 12 B5Ns to assist with the search, so that its deck and its 12 A6Ms are available for CAP until they return.

A further force will be created including the battleships Yamato, Nagato, Mutsu and Ise (Ise is the only ship in the fleet with radar and Hyuga needs repair after an accident). This force will sail with the carriers Ryūjō, Jun'yō and Hōshō, their destroyer escorts and most of the supply group that either already have or will refuel Kondo and Nagumo's ships. These ships will come from Japan rather than Truk but will hopefully reach a position to the NNW of the Midway Occupation Force and then sail a parallel course at a distance of 100 to 150 miles. Their aircraft will hopefully be able to attack any American force attacking Tanaka and Kurita. This force will be about 600 miles west of Midway at 12:30 on the 3rd June when B-17s unsuccessfully attacked the Midway Occupation Force. If they advance West at 18 knots (constrained by the support ships), they will be perhaps 200 miles west of Midway at 10:30 next morning and within range of the American fleet by late afternoon. They could advance at about 22 knots if they left the tankers behind (with escorting destroyers), which would allow Ryūjō and Jun'yō to launch aircraft towards the American fleet by midday. I am guessing zigzagging converts a speed in knots to the same speed in mph. I am also assuming that they do not have to manoeuvre to avoid air attacks.

I should mention that these changes will be implemented without the need to send extensive radio signals as the ships transferred are all from Japan after I take temporary command of the Combined Fleet after Admiral Yamamoto falls down a ladder suffering severe concussion and several broken bones. Thus I am expecting no change in American forces until possibly extra carriers might be reported West of Midway on the 3rd June.

Cherry Blossom: Thanks for playing and giving so much thought to this. I'm Chester Nimitz. I see from coded message intercepts that the Aleutians operation has been suspended and the forces have been re-allocated to the Midway strike. To preserve my assets I decline to send my carriers to battle at Midway. In fact, I consider withdrawing all the forces at Midway but ultimately I decide not to. I pull my submarines in closer to Midway with the majority of my subs in areas where I think the invasion fleet is going to approach. These ships may be less lucrative than the fast carriers but perhaps easier to hit. I'm not sure what I would do with my carriers. I think I would try to get them well clear of Pearl Harbor, but keep them a couple hundred miles farther East Northeast. My hope is my submarines and Midway-based airpower can cause enough attrition on the invasion force to make the invasion unsuccessful. If the invasion is ultimately successful, we'll just have to wait until the Japanese fleet leaves, starve Midway atoll for a few months then retake it.

Your plan seems stronger than Yamamoto's because it concentrates forces. That being said at best you are getting one thing done with this amount of resources, but in the historical plan they intended to occupy both the Aleutians and Midway. With the heavy use of fuel in this operation, there isn't enough fuel left in the stockpiles to occupy the Aleutians (Check out Jon Parshall's article on Japan's oil situation. )Japan used more oil in the Midway operation than it had ever used in a year in peacetime operations.), and you lose the weather window as well. How important is that? I don't know.

 

[Conslaw]

Not much Midway's air elements could do after sundown and certainly not against a force of 7 Battleships and 15 Cruisers at night...

But with a very good scouting program, they could spot the Japanese ships a full day before they could get to Midway, and that should give the American planes the chance to get in the first blows.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I pull my submarines in closer to Midway with the majority of my subs in areas where I think the invasion fleet is going to approach. These ships may be less lucrative than the fast carriers but perhaps easier to hit.

Let me know how that works out for you.

 

[GrauGeist]

But with a very good scouting program, they could spot the Japanese ships a full day before they could get to Midway, and that should give the American planes the chance to get in the first blows.

If you recall, historically, the IJN fleets scouts and CAP detected and deflected Midways's air elements.
Why would any change in the timeline alter that?
The battleships and cruisers were actively rotating long range and proximity scouts as they approached the Atoll.
With the exception of the B-17s, nothing approached the fleet unchallenged.

 

[The Basket]

Submarines are not good at point defence. It might be a target rich environment but its also a submarine rich environment. There is a reason fleet subs got nowhere.

Any bombardment will have to be done under cover of darkness.

Daylight is just too risky. Although the big guns are needed so either Kongo or bigger.

If I had spare carriers then I would be like more Vals and Kates please. Bombers win wars and fighters make movies. Don't need more Zeroes cos I need Midway flattened and carriers sunk. So leave the Zeroes at home.

At Coral sea, land based recon could be used which is not possible at Midway. So every big ship had float planes so more hulls equal more float planes but this is not a panacea or a cure. Bad weather could easily hide a carrier and more floatplanes can equal more confusion. Saying carrier here and there when its a rowboat with ambition.

So what should have happened is I need to sink carriers so lets sink carriers. Send out a screen of destroyers and cruisers and submarines plus float planes until I find something and then strike like a woodpecker at an oak tree. Don't bother with Midway at all.

 

[Conslaw]

If you recall, historically, the IJN fleets scouts and CAP detected and deflected Midways's air elements.
Why would any change in the timeline alter that?
The battleships and cruisers were actively rotating long range and proximity scouts as they approached the Atoll.
With the exception of the B-17s, nothing approached the fleet unchallenged.

That's not exactly true. A PBY scored a torpedo hit in the early morning hours of June 4.

 

[GrauGeist]

Two of the four PBYs scored hits and all three (the fourth had become lost enroute and turned back) strafed the ships.
However, this was the landing force element and not the First/Second carrier division element.

My comment was in regards to the carrier force, which was to the northwest and had yet to be detected when the PBYs made their attack.

 

[cherry blossom]

Cherry Blossom: Thanks for playing and giving so much thought to this. I'm Chester Nimitz. I see from coded message intercepts that the Aleutians operation has been suspended and the forces have been re-allocated to the Midway strike. To preserve my assets I decline to send my carriers to battle at Midway. In fact, I consider withdrawing all the forces at Midway but ultimately I decide not to. I pull my submarines in closer to Midway with the majority of my subs in areas where I think the invasion fleet is going to approach. These ships may be less lucrative than the fast carriers but perhaps easier to hit. I'm not sure what I would do with my carriers. I think I would try to get them well clear of Pearl Harbor, but keep them a couple hundred miles farther East Northeast. My hope is my submarines and Midway-based airpower can cause enough attrition on the invasion force to make the invasion unsuccessful. If the invasion is ultimately successful, we'll just have to wait until the Japanese fleet leaves, starve Midway atoll for a few months then retake it.

Your plan seems stronger than Yamamoto's because it concentrates forces. That being said at best you are getting one thing done with this amount of resources, but in the historical plan they intended to occupy both the Aleutians and Midway. With the heavy use of fuel in this operation, there isn't enough fuel left in the stockpiles to occupy the Aleutians (Check out Jon Parshall's article on Japan's oil situation. )Japan used more oil in the Midway operation than it had ever used in a year in peacetime operations.), and you lose the weather window as well. How important is that? I don't know.

I don't believe that my changes to the Midway plan would lead to any changes in the American response for two different reasons.

Firstly, the naval forces involved in the Aleutian Invasion were based at Ominato in Northern Honshu up to 27th May. Thus messages to then could be sent by courier on a train if a telephone was considered insecure. The Army forces might have received radio signals but the first Allied break into Army codes was over a year ahead. Traffic analysis would not help much as the forces will go to sea at almost exactly the same time, just sail a different course after leaving harbour.

Secondly, Nimitz was very confident of the superiority of American technology. For example, Kaga was initially allocated to Operation MO, the Port Moresby Invasion and this was identified by code breaking. Kaga's later replacement by the 5th Carrier Division, Shokaku and Zuikaku, was not fully interpreted. Nimitz was still willing to commit Lexington and Yorktown against Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Shoho and even it was suspected Kasuga Maru (Taiyo). Even had Nimitz begun to suspect that Ryūjō and Jun'yō would be near Midway, he would not view a very small carrier and a converted liner as a serious threat.

I failed to explain my orders to Nagumo. These are obviously to launch the initial attack but also stress that Midway was much closer to Pearl Harbor than to Japan or Truk. Thus it was quite plausible that enemy traffic analysis or submarine observation of one of the forces might lead to an enemy response as had apparently happened with both Operation C and MO. An enemy force might in any case be at sea to carry out a raid on any Japanese island base or even just to deliver aircraft to Midway itself. Thus a strong search should be launched on the morning of the 4th.

I will explain to Nagumo and his staff (note that I cannot have a worse relationship with them than Yamamoto) that I am searching everywhere for A6M2s and pilots to load onto the carriers assigned to the operation as it might be necessary on the morning of the 4th to have three different objectives for the fighters of the Kido Butai. If we use hindsight and just look at Kaga with a total of 27 A6Ms, 9 were sent as escort for the initial attack on Midway but almost all of the rest were used for CAP operations. Thus at 8:30, 22 A6Ms were in the air including the 9 sent to Midway, and at 10:00 after the initial strike had landed, 20 were fighting off American attacks. However, the MO Operation as well as other attempts to attack American carriers with limited or no escort had already revealed that strong escorts were critical for preserving Japan's limited supply of trained attack crews. Thus increasing the number of fighters embarked seems an obvious step.

I don't know exactly how many A6Ms have been produced or are available but 1130 fighters were apparrently produced for the IJN and the IJA over the first six months of 1942 according to the USSBS. Thus I hope that I can find a few. I also hope that I can find enough qualified pilots. If I become desperate, I may even take the pilots from the float planes of Chitose, Chiyoda and Nisshin and send them for a "crash" conversion to flying the A6M2 off carriers. Their Mitsubishi F1M "Pete" seaplanes were often used as fighters, so they have at least some of the training required (did the IJN have a clear signal to landing aircraft that they had not lowered their undercarriage?). As well as filling Zuikaku's complement of 72 aircraft, I need more aircraft for Jun'yō as she sailed for the Aleutians with 18 A6M2s and 15 D3A1s whilst she had 21 A6M2s, 18 D3A1s and 9 B5N2s at Santa Cruz. I also note that Akagi had 3 fewer aircraft at Midway than for Pearl harbor.

 

[Tkdog]

Moving planes around like that only works with hindsight. Because you're moving them from areas where it was assumed they might be needed. Without hindsight you don't know where it is safe to move them from.

 

[Conslaw]

I don't believe that my changes to the Midway plan would lead to any changes in the American response for two different reasons.

Firstly, the naval forces involved in the Aleutian Invasion were based at Ominato in Northern Honshu up to 27th May. Thus messages to then could be sent by courier on a train if a telephone was considered insecure. The Army forces might have received radio signals but the first Allied break into Army codes was over a year ahead. Traffic analysis would not help much as the forces will go to sea at almost exactly the same time, just sail a different course after leaving harbour.

Secondly, Nimitz was very confident of the superiority of American technology. For example, Kaga was initially allocated to Operation MO, the Port Moresby Invasion and this was identified by code breaking. Kaga's later replacement by the 5th Carrier Division, Shokaku and Zuikaku, was not fully interpreted. Nimitz was still willing to commit Lexington and Yorktown against Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Shoho and even it was suspected Kasuga Maru (Taiyo). Even had Nimitz begun to suspect that Ryūjō and Jun'yō would be near Midway, he would not view a very small carrier and a converted liner as a serious threat.

I failed to explain my orders to Nagumo. These are obviously to launch the initial attack but also stress that Midway was much closer to Pearl Harbor than to Japan or Truk. Thus it was quite plausible that enemy traffic analysis or submarine observation of one of the forces might lead to an enemy response as had apparently happened with both Operation C and MO. An enemy force might in any case be at sea to carry out a raid on any Japanese island base or even just to deliver aircraft to Midway itself. Thus a strong search should be launched on the morning of the 4th.

I will explain to Nagumo and his staff (note that I cannot have a worse relationship with them than Yamamoto) that I am searching everywhere for A6M2s and pilots to load onto the carriers assigned to the operation as it might be necessary on the morning of the 4th to have three different objectives for the fighters of the Kido Butai. If we use hindsight and just look at Kaga with a total of 27 A6Ms, 9 were sent as escort for the initial attack on Midway but almost all of the rest were used for CAP operations. Thus at 8:30, 22 A6Ms were in the air including the 9 sent to Midway, and at 10:00 after the initial strike had landed, 20 were fighting off American attacks. However, the MO Operation as well as other attempts to attack American carriers with limited or no escort had already revealed that strong escorts were critical for preserving Japan's limited supply of trained attack crews. Thus increasing the number of fighters embarked seems an obvious step.

I don't know exactly how many A6Ms have been produced or are available but 1130 fighters were apparrently produced for the IJN and the IJA over the first six months of 1942 according to the USSBS. Thus I hope that I can find a few. I also hope that I can find enough qualified pilots. If I become desperate, I may even take the pilots from the float planes of Chitose, Chiyoda and Nisshin and send them for a "crash" conversion to flying the A6M2 off carriers. Their Mitsubishi F1M "Pete" seaplanes were often used as fighters, so they have at least some of the training required (did the IJN have a clear signal to landing aircraft that they had not lowered their undercarriage?). As well as filling Zuikaku's complement of 72 aircraft, I need more aircraft for Jun'yō as she sailed for the Aleutians with 18 A6M2s and 15 D3A1s whilst she had 21 A6M2s, 18 D3A1s and 9 B5N2s at Santa Cruz. I also note that Akagi had 3 fewer aircraft at Midway than for Pearl harbor.

Nice info. Parshall & Tully mentioned in Shattered Steel that the Japanese carriers were sent off for the Midway mission significantly short of their original complement of aircraft. Somewhere between 80-90% of the normal number were on board. Japan had stopped the production lines for the D3A and B4N, but their replacements weren't ready, so the lines had to be started back up.