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I suspect the "Caidinism" behind the Italian P-38 had a grain of truth that he built into a legend.This is good but how are students going to understand this whole picture if they don't understand "the process" and not search archives to SEE was was ACTUALLY written by the decision makers of the day?
Again, forget Caidin - he was entertaining but in many cases, putting it bluntly a big liar!!!
Have you read "The Fork Tailed Devil"? He blatantly lied about an episode with a captured P-38 being operated by the Italians and about the destruction of P-38s in Korea just before the Korean War started. To me, unless his work is vetted against other sources, it's ALL suspect!
So do I have to burn all my copies written by him? I have that one and two more and I do recall the Italian-operated P-38 factoid.
Agree but be advised that there is still a wealth on knowledge on the internet and the source of information grows yearly. Look on this site, we have a library of flight manuals that would have been impossible to attain in one place say 30 years agoI'm suggesting that we consider the most likely uses of the Internet, now that so many students are being homeschooled. Caidin is in the libraries, but like most WW2 books, no longer widely read. Interest in WW2 planes is nearly nonexistent among schoolkids; the fact that they were still on cereal boxes played a large part in my youthful interest.
I think that's a good approach as long as they know that there are more detailed recourses available to them to do further research (if the interest is there)I'm suggesting the Mosquito as an entry point since it allows many related topics to be brought in, but then we have to consider Bowman's book as the most likely available sourcebook. Researching archives is only something college kids might do if forced. They are much more likely to view a video first such as the one on HistoryNet that I mentioned and the scintillating Timeline treatment, "The Luftwaffe's Nightmare." Any discussion bending off one of the topics raised there stands a chance of being researched.
Caitlin? , No burning but put it on the comic pile. As, i think you said so, you were teacher once, should very well understand this. In the land of the blind etc... we are not blind anymore. In fact some if us are better informed then those guys in tears long gone.So do I have to burn all my copies written by him? I
Oh, he had a historical basis for his stories but really laid on the bovine fecal matter beyond that. Lt. Rossi, Gina, a YB-40....I suspect the "Caidinism" behind the Italian P-38 had a grain of truth that he built into a legend.
Yes, the captured Italian P-38 shot down a single bomber (flown by Col. Tondi, not some mythical Lt. Rossi), no it didn't operate as bait - due to lack of proper fuel, the P-38 was soon grounded.
I submit that if a Doctrine of maximum military disruption was paramount, the Mosquito would have been the most likely beneficiary. Recognizing the lack of available bombers, I'm suggesting that all available should have been specifically targeted for pinpoint raids with none doing nuisance or civilian-directed bombing. Perhaps that was mostly the case, and my argument is moot.Your last paragraph in my opinion is correct for ETO/MTO and existing German defense strategy. As to Doctrine drive Capability?
I would draw your attention to a leader that carefully examined the deficiency of results achieved by the B-29 bombing and target strategy as framed by "Doctrine' - and changed the Game to transform the B-29 into a long range low altitude, individual routes and altitudes instead of close formations performed by B-17/B-24/B-26 to bomb by Norden/Sperry computing bombsight. Perhaps a 'Big, Fast Mosquito' in performance and tasking lo level bombing with outstanding results.
Could the Mosquito have been tasked for low level incendiary attacks in ETO with similar results? Iffy based on comparing German defenses and fire fighting and night fighter capability versus Japan.
We need an insightfull award. I never would have thought of the B-29 performing the role of a "Big, Fast Mosquito". You're right.Your last paragraph in my opinion is correct for ETO/MTO and existing German defense strategy. As to Doctrine drive Capability?
I would draw your attention to a leader that carefully examined the deficiency of results achieved by the B-29 bombing and target strategy as framed by "Doctrine' - and changed the Game to transform the B-29 into a long range low altitude, individual routes and altitudes instead of close formations performed by B-17/B-24/B-26 to bomb by Norden/Sperry computing bombsight. Perhaps a 'Big, Fast Mosquito' in performance and tasking lo level bombing with outstanding results.
Could the Mosquito have been tasked for low level incendiary attacks in ETO with similar results? Iffy based on comparing German defenses and fire fighting and night fighter capability versus Japan.
Again, an "insightful" would be nice.Doctrine is based on what you know, or think you know (to get into known unknowns territory) But things change quickly, for example when did anyone in the USA "bomber mafia" become aware of RADAR and specifically Dowdings system combined with Chain Home? Even those in the RAF who knew about it couldnt be sure it would work. The CH system only started to be installed in 1938 and you have to be actually shown the Dowding system in operation to understand it. This completely changed ideas on attack and defence. On a different subject, who prior to 1940 considered the possibility of France Belgium Netherlands Denmark and Norway being in German hands in 10 weeks and Germany being allied with Italy. Just with those two events, introduction of RADAR CaC and Germany suddenly controlling Western Europe put almost all planning on the scrap heap of history, as did "blitzkrieg" itself.
There seem to have been contemporary Mosquito proponents ignored, Elliott Roosevelt being one of them. Why? We could have produced some of the damn things.
You could pose the question "Why did two aircraft (Mosquito and P-51)ordered in 1940 by the British have few friends to start with were kept alive by being produced for a role they were never designed for, come to be in demand by both UK and USA forces in 1944 for roles that didnt exist in 1940". The short answer is no one knows what the future holds, the long answer can be as long and involved as you like.I'm suggesting the Mosquito as an entry point since it allows many related topics to be brought in, but then we have to consider Bowman's book as the most likely available sourcebook. Researching archives is only something college kids might do if forced. They are much more likely to view a video first such as the one on HistoryNet that I mentioned and the scintillating Timeline treatment, "The Luftwaffe's Nightmare." Any discussion bending off one of the topics raised there stands a chance of being researched.
Plus, at that time, the US had the A-20, B-25 and B-26.As mentioned, the Mosquito of 1941 was a lot different from the Mosquito of 1943 or 1944. Arnold saw the demonstration in April 1941, there wasn't an inkling of thought of the US mounting a massive bombing campaign over Europe during that time, we were not in the war and it would seemed the P-38 could do everything the Mosquito can do.
I would draw your attention to a leader that carefully examined the deficiency of results achieved by the B-29 bombing and target strategy as framed by "Doctrine' - and changed the Game to transform the B-29 into a long range low altitude, individual routes and altitudes instead of close formations performed by B-17/B-24/B-26 to bomb by Norden/Sperry computing bombsight.
That is the sort of stuff that interests me. I was watching a documentary about Bletchley Park last night, not the usual stuff about Turing and Enigma but about the Lorenz. The Lorenz machine was incredibly complicated, with 1.6 million billion combinations. To crack it should have been impossible, it would need an operator to do something like transmit the same message of 4,000 characters twice in the same "key" and these two messages to be given to a mathematical genius (Bill Tutte) who figured out the workings of two of the rotors just by using paper, the working of the other rotors were figured out by people like Turing but to actually decode in a useful timeframe needed a computer, just by coincidence on the same team at Bletchley was Tommy Flowers a electrical engineer, who saw the mechanical solution that had been tried and said "I can do that purely by electrical means", then the computer was born. I have read the story before, but it was in part narrated by a man who worked on the team (in the same office as Tutte). It is hard to believe those people and those events happened by pure coincidence. Luck, good and bad played a major part in these events.Again, an "insightful" would be nice.
They didn't, but as soon as they got involved with the British they developed an almost unnatural obsession with the weather.Why did it need another twin-enguned bomber?
Plus, at that time, the US had the A-20, B-25 and B-26.
It was also evaluating the B-23 plus had the option of the Martin A-22 & A-30.
Why did it need another twin-enguned bomber?
What was the target radius as a function of cruise speed, fuel load out, and altitude - with a 2000 pound or 2x1000 pound bombs. How does it compare to B-17 5000 pound or B-24 6000 pound payload strike at Brux or Posnan?
Shorter question than above. Was there ever critical mass of the proposed Mosquito type to prosecute a strategic bombing campaign in partnership to USSTAF, assuming that it Was mission capable?
As an aside, I've read that when XXI Bomber Command launched the Tokyo firebombing they had the pathfinders inscribe a large "X", in incendiaries, crossing near the center of the city, as the aiming-point.
Can you or anyone else tell me if this is apocryphal BS, or is there a kernel of truth in the matter? It sounds pretty synthetic and after-the-fact to me, but I've read it several times from different authors.
I don't want to derail this thread, but I'm curious and figure if there's an answer I can find it here.
I submit that if a Doctrine of maximum military disruption was paramount, the Mosquito would have been the most likely beneficiary. Recognizing the lack of available bombers, I'm suggesting that all available should have been specifically targeted for pinpoint raids with none doing nuisance or civilian-directed bombing. Perhaps that was mostly the case, and my argument is moot.
The Major issue with your thesis is that Strategic Doctrine in the US in 1940/41 was codified or airpower in two primary modes - One Long range bombardment with aircraft that were fast (competitive with existing interceptors at 25,000 feet) and capable of carrying a heavy bomb load to targets 600+ miles from base. Two - Battlefield air supremacy via attack bombers and fighters to interdict lines of supply as well as CAS.
The B-29 and B-36 evolved as critical procurement priorities when ultra log range was contemplated and deemed crucial should England fall.
At that point in time, the Norden was producing excellent accuracy at the bomb ranges in California and Nevada. Precision bombing was planned for. ETO weather and combat conditions were the primary factors reducing bombing accuracy.
The Plans were based on US R&D, Procurement and Production - not deemed feasible or practical to jointly plan and procure with Great Britain as a partner.
Of course we're looking through hindsight now, but my research would be mostly directed toward the thinking of that period considering what was available. That would be my focus in the classroom. There seem to have been contemporary Mosquito proponents ignored, Elliott Roosevelt being one of them. Why? We could have produced some of the damn things.
Mentioning Elliott Roosevelt as a 'person of interest' as a trusted consultant to AAC/AAF War Plans is rather a stretch. Arnold did have Roosevelt's trust and it was well placed. FDR wasn't taking counsel on aircraft selection from Elliott Roosevelt.
Arnold can be faulted for making mistakes but he was crucial in organizing superior civilian thought leaders for R&D ideas and input. It is impossible to speculate on another US Army individual with the same vision and executive ability to grow an AAC from a banana republic staffed air force to the greatest Airpower on earth from 1940 to 1944.
IMO his single biggest blind spot was support for Oliver Echols leading Materiel Command responsibility for R&D, Procurement and Operational Testing in the 1938 through 1942.