What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress?

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Were Packard-Merlins interchangeable with Rolls-Royce Merlins as far as mounting it in an airplane?

For the most part.

Packards used the injection carburetor, and UK built Merlins a regular carburetor, until late in the war, so there were some different control systems.

At least, that's what I read about the Lancaster B.I (Rolls-Royce Merlin) and the Lancaster B.III (Packard Merlin).
 
Not sure where you draw data/information regarding LW 'upgunning' emrging in early 1944
As stated, shown by the holes in the returning bombers, the 8th AF counted things like that.
The biggest mystery would be source of air to air ratio of LW fighters vs USAAF heavies. US intelligence sources grossly overstated number of LW fighters destroyed in combat in 1942/43 and 44.
In 1943 the calculation is simplified by the number of unescorted missions, as more were escorted it comes down to estimating the accuracy of the fighter kill claims, leaving the rest to the bombers, the noting the US figures for bombers shot down by fighters.
This is great, all I have to do is mention one factor effecting accuracy and the group can expect a whole list of other factors mentioned, but not their relative contribution.

USSBS Bombing Accuracy report, order of box over target, percentage of boxes placing at least 10% of their bombs within 1,000 feet of the aiming point.
1, 82%
2, 60%
3, 48%
4, 47%
5 or more, 30%.

Increasing the time between attacks increased accuracy but increased the risk from the defences. After the table comes a list of other factors, depth of penetration, fighter opposition, flak, smoke screen haze, direction of attack and type of target complex. There are further factors mentioned like the size of formation, the B-17 versus B-24, Weather etc.
The Japanese had been trying to send out peace feelers to America via the USSR after the Potsdam declaration in Jul 45; they wanted the assurance that the Emperor would be allowed to retain the throne, which America would not give.
Looking at the messages involved in the exchange between the Japanese Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the USSR you can see the Ambassador noting how vague the idea was, for example what sort of proposal was to be presented. The talk within the Japanese government was for polity, the basic preservation of the existing system. The acceptance of the Potsdam declaration message included "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler" Those prerogatives were in the Japanese Constitution.

There were a number of possibilities when it came to deciding what to do about the Emperor.

Firstly would the Emperor retain the status of a living god or simply become the human at the head of the religion?

Then comes the secular power, four outcomes,
1) Existing Emperor under existing constitution.
2) Existing Emperor under new constitution.
3) New Emperor under existing constitution.
4) New Emperor under new constitution

The Meiji constitution devoted the first 17 articles on the powers of the Tenno, (Emperor). Must be male, is sacred and inviolable, sanctions laws, can open, close and prorogue both houses of parliament, can issue ordnances (which the legislature has to approve), organise the government, including salaries, appointments and dismissals, the size and organisation of the military, along with the usual powers to declare war, make peace and grant pardons.

The Teikoku Gikai, the legislature, has two houses, the upper house is composed of members of the Imperial Family and nobility appointed by the Emperor. Sessions last 3 months unless an Imperial order extends them. Laws are required to pass both houses and be signed by the Emperor before they can come into use.

The Emperor's finances also have special consideration, under another two articles in the constitution. Imperial House Law changes do not require the legislature. Any amendments to the constitution must be submitted to the legislature by the Emperor.

There are 86 articles in the constitution, the Emperor or Imperial House is mentioned in 27, including the emergency powers if the legislature is not in session and cannot be called into session.

The idea Hirohito stays on the throne with all powers intact, or can abdicate in favour of his son who still has all the powers. The first would be the Japanese peace factions' ideal, the second probably acceptable, though what they would do with a living ex Emperor is another matter.

If the constitution is to be changed, which at least would be to eliminate the rule about serving officers serving as military ministers, just how much does the role of the Emperor change? How long is going to be allowed for the constitutional debate, including presumably laying out the changes for the Japanese public to approve.

The post war constitution has only the first seven articles devoted to the Emperor, they firmly make the point the Emperor rules with the will of the people and is subject to the legislature. The upper house is now elected. And so on. Not so many prerogatives.

If in July 1945 the Japanese government had adopted a policy of surrender as long as the Emperor is safe then that is the obvious reply to the Potsdam declaration, with what safe means.
 
Was relative pilot and crew training and experience included in the etc? You see Germany produced circa 24,000 Bf109s and Fw190s in 1944. However during 1944 the LW was wiped out as an effective fighting force. Bodenplatte represented 1% of the aircraft produced in 1944 how did that come about (asking for a friend).
 
I've always wondered about the fake production figures for German fighters in 1944. Raised as I was in the days of the "old math," I've always believed that if you have one fighter and you build one new fighter you should have two fighters. In Speer's version of "fur-Gott's-zake-keep-Adolf-happy-or-you-know-vot-happens" math, you have one fighter, you rebuild it as a different version, which is then destroyed on a train but you still get to report one new-production aircraft with an entirely new serial number. It begs the question "How many Fw 190s are displyed at the National Air and Space Museum?" The inflated figures for German production are often quoted by those trying to prove that strategic bombing was a complete failure.

I've never seen a proper statistical analysis of how many new aircraft were really built and delivered in Germany during WWII.

Cheers,



Dana
 
Any aircraft being manufactured in Germany ran a considerable gauntlet from completion to deployment.

*IF* it survives the factory being bombed, it still has to be tested, loaded onto transport or flown to a receiving area (depending in where it was destined) then added into a Gruppe and assigned a pilot.
In the last year of the war, there was no point where the aircraft was safe from Allied attack (bombing, ground attack or shot down during ferry).

I have a book that has an exhaustive accounting of all Me262 types manufactured and it's amazing to see the contrast between all the airframes built versus how many actually managed to get into operation.
 
That was in part my point, reliance on numbers. By 1944 German people were producing aircraft to stop having a rifle shoved in their hands, conscripted and slave labour was producing aircraft they didnt want to be airworthy, some sabotaged and many of poor quality.

However for the Battle of Britain there are statistics showing monthly production of new aircraft of around 500 and a similar number of damaged aircraft returned to service, so one thousand aircraft per month being used by a force that never exceeded 700. Those returned to service are obviously frequently the same plane because it includes all minor damage, but it shows the amount of "churn" their is in intense combat.
 
Excellent question Dana - and coupled with another consideration, namely "What damage estimate constituted an airframe selected for salvage rather than repair?" LW used 60% for Salvage threshold, but I could never find the factors defined to arrive at 60%.

IMO, this factor accounted for highest differential between 8th/9th AF Victory Credits (vs Claims) for LW aircraft destroyed versus LW records. Many LW aircraft shot out of the sky and into forced crash landing probably fell below 60% and were sent to repair depot.

It isn't personally very hard for me to imagine Day Fighter production in 1944 despite damage to airframe manufacturing and engine producers - change of priorities from bombers, transport etc and shift to 109s and 190s made sense and in Milch's plans in 1943.
 
As stated, shown by the holes in the returning bombers, the 8th AF counted things like that.
Oh, they determined upgunning by counting holes in the returning a/c? to estimate change in LW fighter lethality in 1943 vs 1944?

So, how many did they salvage from N. Sea, the Channel, Holland, Belgium, France, Germany to estimate the size of THOSE holes? In other words you are an acolyte of some obscure metric offered by some yet another summary report with some obscure logic to extract armament data in lieu of seeking source documents again? Like Production records for Messeschmidt and Focke-Wulf?

The LW counted 'things' like produced type and armament, which units they went to and when. Simply stated for your benefit, the twin cowl mounted MG 17 .92mm were long gone by Jan 1 1944 - and purt' near gone in mid 1943.


And yet post VE investigations of LW loss records (intact for 1939-most of 1944) show that 8th/15th AF claims for destroyed LW fighters ran about 10:1 (average over 1942 thriugh 1944) by returning crews claims for destroyed LW fighters. Severly overstated by 8th AF/15th AF. Some were off by only 7:1 but there ya go.

Further, beginning in November 1943, the range of P-38H with 300 gals internal fuel were used to escort bombers at the target. In mid December both the early P-51B-1-NA (and P-51B-5-NA and C-1-NT) and P-38H/J were performing target escort, expanding numbers of available long range fighters steadily through May 1944 - closing the target 'donut hole' during Big Week for most deep strikes. So tell me again about bomber claims, differentiating from fighter claims?

Further complicating the discussion is that P-47C/D were escorting bombers from April/May 1943 - for Penetration/Withdrawal Escort - leaving all conversation to the Donut Hole Gap of unescorted B-17/24 limited to a shrinking gap in coverage between 1942 and late 1943/early 1944.

So, 'esplain 'simplified by th number of unescorted missions?'

This is great, all I have to do is mention one factor effecting accuracy and the group can expect a whole list of other factors mentioned, but not their relative contribution.
Well, maybe you are gaining clues that telephone book data dumps are less than satisfying to many of the cold hearted viewers of your deathless prose?

Context Sir, Toujours la Context.
USSBS Bombing Accuracy report, order of box over target, percentage of boxes placing at least 10% of their bombs within 1,000 feet of the aiming point.
1, 82%
2, 60%
3, 48%
4, 47%
5 or more, 30%.
Ah, another macro insight trying to make a micro analysis?
And of course you carefully annotated, en bloc, the useful discriminants like:
1. Target unobscured - cloud and target smoke cover inefficient in hiding either the Initial point or the aiiming point.
2. Target AP partially obsured but offset feature clearly observable and capable of use to accurately calculate AP
3. Target obscured initially but clears during bomb run for some of the wings in strke force.
4. Target obscured (very typical Fall and Winter).

Your phonebook data specifically is incorrect for all cases save case 1. Then the questions are:
1942, 1943, 1944, 1945?
Pre-lead crew and formation control data?
Primary Target or Secondary Target or Targets of Opportunity - or all three in aggragate for clear weather?
For 8th AF in Aggragate for 1942-VE Day
Differences in accuracy over time? (Yes)
Differences between 1st, 2nd and 3rd AD?


Increasing the time between attacks increased accuracy but increased the risk from the defences.
Your presented data - fact based upon what acquisition methodology? (Reviewing the Aiming Point briefed as compared to Bomb Damage Assessment report(s) for each BG and each composed Bomb Wing of two BG's, time based (i.e. 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945)? Time based on each quarter to attempot filters for large quantities of 100% target obscurity for some Boxes/AD and Task Force but clear for others? Which risks do you think apply? Difference in risk between Berlin and Rouen and Merseburg and Kassel? Difference inflaks risks for different routes to different targets.

What example pool presented to explain missions with significant lapse in time between strikes on same target for which your claim is based?
Good. Although other factors essential for context as well as methods to apply judgment/conclusion - such as fighter escort assigned and executed, was course Berlin Trolley in which most inbound flak defenses bypassed by virtue of course over Denmark and Baltic Sea and Rugen Island - or?

Bombing altitude of B-24 dominantly 19-22K, B-17 24-27K - huge difference in flak vulnerability as well as implied reduction in capability of Norden bombsight for bombing at 20% higher altitudes. Weather, smoke screen, cloud cover over most way points to IP, were all factors. How do we apply statistically to draw conclusions?
 
Remember this also applied to the Spitfire, and probably other Brit aircraft. If a Spitfire was salvaged and rebuilt as a different model it got a new serial.
 
Remember this also applied to the Spitfire, and probably other Brit aircraft. If a Spitfire was salvaged and rebuilt as a different model it got a new serial.
And today the opposite is true, if you salvage a Spitfire from the sea bed as long as you have the "data plates" to identify it you can rebuild it with all new parts to original drawings and call it a WW2 veteran.

There was a similar thing going on with Lancasters, there are various pictures of modules of Lancasters being transported by truck.
 
So the 8th AF was counting bullet holes to determine what armament the Luftwaffe was using?

Interesting.

So what was the 8th AF's proceedure for counting R4M "holes"?

View attachment 648299
Evaluating battle damage became a very involved science. One of the many roles of ground fire was to damage an attacking bomber formation, as well as shoot it down or force it higher or spread it out. If you damage a bomber and knock it out of formation it becomes a vulnerable straggler that is hard to defend, from that it may be taken down by fighters. From the planes that got back it was very difficult to establish what was happening and what was going on, but it was certainly more than counting holes that got to the bottom of it. I am getting tired of being talked down to with simplistic nonsense and I certainly dont mean you.
 
Damage evaluation was certainly an evolving science, especially in determining crew protection.

But to claim that by examining holes to determine what armament a certain fighter had, is curious at best.

Bomber formations were attacked by different types in successive waves as the bombers ingressed/egressed, so "holes" could be made by Bf109s, Fw190s, Bf110s, Me410s, Ju88s, Me262s, etc. as well as a wide range of variants of each type, with or without rustsatze kits.

Then there was the issue to figuring out the difference between flak damage and minengeschoss damage or figuring out what hit first, projectiles or flak and what altitude, what angle and so on and so on.

And I wholeheartedly agree with your closing statement.
 
From the planes that got back it was very difficult to establish what was happening and what was going on, but it was certainly more than counting holes that got to the bottom of it.

Not to mention that if that's your only heuristic, then you're probably going to miss the killer guns in detail, and have to rely solely upon eyewitness accounts from nearby a/c, which won't tell you things like caliber or rate of fire in most cases.
 
Not to mention that if that's your only heuristic, then you're probably going to miss the killer guns in detail, and have to rely solely upon eyewitness accounts from nearby a/c, which won't tell you things like caliber or rate of fire in most cases.
Yes, well quite obviously examining the planes that survived and flew hundreds of miles back to base gives limited information on those that didnt.
 
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