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It was but it's range was only a few hundred miles with that loadWhat 'comparable' bomb load?
Maximum bomb load of a B-17 was 17,600lbs
1 on 1 the Mosquito doesn't have the striking power, in sheer weight of bombs. But with the bulged bomb bay they were able to use more destructive bombs - the 4,000lb High Capacity (the cookie) and Medium Capacity bombs.
And the 8th AF bombers were quite accurate in early missions by each aircraft bombing individually. However, this put the bomber formation under more danger, since it took some time for all to bomb. The formation bombing tactics were devised to minimize time over target and provide better mutual defensive fire. The downside is that the bombing became less accurate, as it was spread over the width and length of the formation.
The B-17 had two external racks (one under each wing) that could accommodate up to a 4,000 pound bomb (per rack).
Yes, but how far could they carry them? What was their performance?
B-17s did carry 2 x 4,500lb "Disney" bombs in 4 missions, the longest being to Hamburg. Did they use the external racks at other times?
The B-17 was rated at 1,000 mile radius with a 6,000lb internal loadout.
Altitude, weather and such will create differences.
With only a load of two 4,000lb external bombs, the range (factoring for drag penalty) will of course be less.
What 'comparable' bomb load?
Maximum bomb load of a B-17 was 17,600lbs
The problem with the 4.000 lb HC was that it was about as aerodynamic as a brick. Little chance of aiming it with any degree of accuracy. (The U.S. 4,000 lb bomb was at least shaped like a typical bomb. Both the B-29 and B-32 could carry it.)
Formation bombing could be very accurate. It all depended on the lead bombardier. If he was on target, the formation was too. If he missed, so did the formation.
I realize this is a late reply, been consulting with doctors about biopsies etc, no fun.
Doesn't matter if Red Army or U.S. Army or British Army, as long as the German people got the message. As for Hamburg... I have no comment, any nation that gasses and incinerates millions of it's own (and other nations) people gets very little sympathy
As far as Japan goes, yeah, I've read the ideas that the Japanese weren't worried about the Americans it was the Russians that really won the war. Perhaps the Japanese government was concerned about the losses in Manchuria but I doubt the average Japanese civilian, which is who we are talking about here would agree. I think they VERY much were influenced by the U.S.A.A.F. bombing campaign.
Sorry for the poor quality, that ain't cordwood stacked up, if you think for a moment that the fire bombing campaign and the atomic attacks had nothing to do with the Japanese surrender I should be interested to hear your views on what did. Also, don't take this as a combative stance from me, far from it, just debate in a friendly way.
My point was that they made tens of thousands out of woodOK and my original statement was "depending on the aircraft, they were partially made of wood" So your point?
I think that is a gross overstatement. Most of that production (aside from the I-16s and I-153s) was done after Barbarossa and many of those fighter types, Yak series, La 5 series, were and are considered successful.A a large portion of the aircraft you listed were destroyed on the ground and shot out of the sky, especially during Barbarossa, so again what's your point?
Most mentioned were actually composite, wood and tube/ fabric with primary structures metal, old fashioned production techniques but still produced good aircraft for the time period. Almost immediately after WW2 wood was no longer used as a primary method of construction on combat aircraft so I think this irrelevant.My point was that they made tens of thousands out of wood
Again irrelevant.I think that is a gross overstatement. Most of that production (aside from the I-16s and I-153s) was done after Barbarossa and many of those fighter types, Yak series, La 5 series, were and are considered successful.
What USSR produced is otally irrelevant to his debate.
The key questions are a.) When is the earliest possible recognition that the Special Mosquito is a plausible alternative to B-17/24 for long range strategic bombing, b.) when can design/configuration be decided - leading to GFE procurement of specific engine variant of Packard Merlin, and c.) how early could a decision be made to prioritize production. If Merlin 61 series is the engine selected, then the A1 Priority for NAA P-51B must be the loser for Super Mosquito to procede. Alternative would be to seek and fund separate source for both.
This makes certain assumptions and combines several arguments. My point was that (I believe) they had the technical means and industrial to have made many more Mosquitoes, and conversely, fewer heavy bombers. Convincing generals of this is a completely distinct issue. I didn't say that "Bomber Mafia" or various others could have necessarily been talked into it, because we know they obviously weren't.Time is not your friend. Single point decision is not practical. AAF, War Production Board, stakeholders in Packard Production (by international agreement with BAM/RAF) must all agree on path forward.
You seem to pass and wave at serious milestones for both available technology (Merlin 61 or equivilant for combined high/low altitude options) and priority production allocations - for engines, raw material sourcing, labor training, tooling and critical materials. It is boring when you declare victory and state with zippo that some persuasive alien parasite infects AAF top command, R-R and DeHaviland senior officers, with a compulsion to forecast the specifications for a wooden two engine/zero defensive armament bomber as the highest probability successful daylight strategic bomber to go to War against Germany -
In or before 1940.
I would agree that any conflict with producing Mustangs or engines for Mustangs would be counter-productive. My point in mentioning Hurricanes, Defiants etc. was that some of the industrial capacity used in making those aircraft could have been better used making Mosquitos. I know they didn't use precisely the same engine and I know it requires more effort and materials to make a two-stage engine, intercoolers etc., but if you are making an extra ~5-8,000 Hurricanes after 1942, presumably some of that same industrial capacity could have gone into a couple thousand Mossies. As SR mentioned, Packard did end up producing 17,000 single stage Merlins, out of 55,000 total. I think there was a lot of slack in terms of sub-optimal and even fairly useless aircraft designs being producedFrom a technology perspective the Merlin 61 (IMO) was on critical path, leading to best possible earliest delivery of Special Mosquito as mid 1943 for early (and few Packard 1650-3 engines @2 each per ship). For that to happen the P-51B must be delayed for a significant length of time for the 'new' Packard plant to build 1650-3 for Mustangs. The decision to produce the Merlin by license must go to a US based, bigger Packard type company. This project was never going to be high enough priority in Britain for R-R to produce for American Mosquito, as the demand for Spitfire and Lancaster exceeded supply.
As pointed out earlier, I brought that up to address a different argument someone was making about the production of wooden airframes.Question - how in hell does USSR experience in building with wood assist in speeding up American made Special Mosquito to improve the above project initiation to delivery cycle?
As I said, there are three distinct arguments in this:Note: To this critical point, not even the very knowledgable contrbutors on this forum have presented a clear aircraft model, mission profile (presumably by daylight given precision delivery requirements, presumably low level at point of attack) that actual combat results demonstrate before 1943 - point to a solid plan for USAAF to duplicate for 8th AF. But to your constant 'we could do this, we could do that - your words are meaningless until the 'why and how and when' can be nailed down as a basis for review, you can not expect folks to take your dream seriously. It might just be me, but if you can't present logic and facts to support how USAAF leaders could see - and agree- your vision, then you can't baffle them with a blizzard of non correlated examples such as 'what the USSR did'
But if RAF recognized that the proposed strategic capability of the Super Mosquito was better for daylight role- and deemed suitable to attack power grids, refineries, ball bearings, etc. with low losses - why would RAF not take the mission as its own? There would be no replacement of 8th AF B-17s, just a change in RAF doctrine.
I agree. As to the issue of whether Mosquito production should interfere with or take priority over Mustangs, I would say definitely not. Any solution to number 2 above would have to be done in such a way that did not inhibit production of P-51s. The ideal scenario would be to have Mosquito raids causing sufficient problems for German military high command and production that they would be forced to commit their fighters, which is where the Mustangs (and P-38s and P-47s and Spitfires) would come into play.Last point, arguably introduction of P-51B and resultant destruction of LW Day Fighter ability to resist Overlord - was more important than improving daylight bombing target destruction efficiency. There is no scenario (realistic, fact based) that projects Super Mosquito as more important than P-51B and thus unrealistic that Mosquito could divert NAA committed Merlin 61 based engines from Packard to achieve eary 1944 delivery.
If the Army had swallowed it's pride and had their A-24 pilots go through the Navy's SBD training, it would have been far more potent in the PTO and thus, a potential Ground attack platform in the MTO/ETO. As it was, A-24 pilots were trained to attack at a 30° to 45° angle, more of a "glide-bomb" profile, than using the A-24 as designed.
In all, the Army received 168 A-24 (SBD-3), 170 A-24A (SBD-4) and 618 A-24B (SBD-5) types. That was nearly 1,000 potentially lethal dive-bombers that could have yeilded results at time when it was much needed.
This thread is the best.
It seems to me that the contributors to this thread who favor the Mosquito all cite the Mosquito's speed as making it invulnerable. In the world of what ifs, we shouldn't assume that the Luftwaffe would over arm its fighter force as it did to combat the fleets of heavy bombers, but would instead concentrate on the development of faster interceptors. One could easily imagine that aircraft such as the ME-262 and DO-335 that suffered from poorly managed development programs, would instead be identified early on as solutions to the Mosquito's speed advantage and rather than languish in development hell begin to enter service in 1943. With the speed advantage gone, the Mosquito's value as a daylight bomber significantly diminishes.
The day missions didn't all run at low level. About 1/3 of them were at medium/high altitude. The higher altitude missions were largely in the first few months of operations. The loss rate was trending down with more low level missions.
The big trick to reducing loss rates was to increase the number of bombers on a mission. The example I use is a similar number of B-17s were being shot down in missions over Germany in early 1944 as were used in mid-late 1943. The main difference in loss rates was that 3 to 4 times s many bombers were being sent.
It is doubtful that had double the number of Mosquitoes (1,452) been sent on the same number of missions that there would have been the double the number lost (96). More likely the number lost would be similar to the historic number.
For the same period what were the losses for B-17s operating over Germany unescorted?
I would suggest that most oil and industrial targets did not have the same level of protection as the U-boat pens.
I think thatdrgondog 's thinking is that the AP bombs will penetrate areas were regular HE bombs would not.
In December 1944 the Pölitz synthetic oil refinery was bombed by 200+ RAF bombers, including 617 Squadron using Tallboy bombs.
The Luftwaffe was phasing out the Ju87 in the MTO because they were losing air supremacy.Agree for PTO - I think that was a lost opportunity. But I think A-24 / SBD was too slow for MTO by say, mid-1942. Both due to fighters and German light AAA. They were phasing out Stukas in the MTO some time in late 1942 right? They seem to be mostly replaced by Fw 190s by the time the fighting heats up in Sicily / Italy.
If you're talking about the Battle of Casablanca, the USN DID NOT take a beating on that one!!!I don't remember the exact numbers off hand but I do remember the USN took a pretty good beating in that action ... I posted all the numbers in another thread somewhere.