33k in the air
Staff Sergeant
- 1,261
- Jan 31, 2021
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I'm sure many of us, at one time or another, wondered about Mosquitos instead of B-17s. I have. What if the RAF went with Mosquitos instead of the Lancaster?
But wait - if the Mosquitos came in low, their bombs would be more accurate, right?!?The striking power issue is even larger there.
The Lancaster could haul 10,000 lbs of bombs to Berlin; the Halifax, about 8,000 lbs. That means to replace them with 4,000-lb capable Mosquitos means 2.5 for each Lancaster and 2 for each Halifax. Double those numbers in the case of the 2,000-lb capable Mosquito.
Well the UK was an aircraft carrier, it just needed a bigger stowage area.
I recall seeing that.There was one at an airshow at El Toro MCAS IIRC, this was right after the Falklands. It was sitting on the ramp proudly waving the RAF flag from an open window in the cockpit.
Yup. Just what I thought. I thought I'd try to change my perspective a bit. Mosquito replaces a different heavy. Nope, not bias for the Boeing. It just doesn't work even with a switch from a night bombing specialist to the Mossie.The striking power issue is even larger there.
The Lancaster could haul 10,000 lbs of bombs to Berlin; the Halifax, about 8,000 lbs. That means to replace them with 4,000-lb capable Mosquitos means 2.5 for each Lancaster and 2 for each Halifax. Double those numbers in the case of the 2,000-lb capable Mosquito.
But wait - if the Mosquitos came in low, their bombs would be more accurate, right?!?
2+2=6
No agree, I was being a bit facetious. So that 2.5 Mosquitoes for each Lancaster would drop to 1.5, right?Well, to be fair, the lower the altitude, the greater the accuracy, in general. Though I would expect diminishing returns below a certain altitude. While Bomber Command certainly used the ~20,000 ft region for raids over Germany, in some raids over France in the run-up to D-Day it was down to ~8,000 feet to achive better accuracy (thus minimizing friendly civilian damage).
Actually, the bombing raids leading up to, and after D-Day saw a considerable amount of destruction inflicted on French towns, resulting in over 50,000 deaths. Caen alone saw over 1,000 dead between 6-7 June, 1944.in some raids over France in the run-up to D-Day it was down to ~8,000 feet to achive better accuracy (thus minimizing friendly civilian damage).
No agree, I was being a bit facetious. So that 2.5 Mosquitoes for each Lancaster would drop to 1.5, right?
Actually, the bombing raids leading up to, and after D-Day saw a considerable amount of destruction inflicted on French towns, resulting in over 50,000 deaths. Caen alone saw over 1,000 dead between 6-7 June, 1944.
Most of dad's attacks were below 20,000'. On the raid to Pforzheim he bombed at 8,500'. Most bombed at less than 9,000'. Bombing heights depended in part on the town's defences.Well, to be fair, the lower the altitude, the greater the accuracy, in general. Though I would expect diminishing returns below a certain altitude. While Bomber Command certainly used the ~20,000 ft region for raids over Germany, in some raids over France in the run-up to D-Day it was down to ~8,000 feet to achive better accuracy (thus minimizing friendly civilian damage).
One of the reasons that bombers were flying lower, was because the Luftwaffe was not on strength and the number of Allied aircraft in the air over the landing areas (and inland) from 6 June onwards was overwhelming, so there was no need to fly at higher altitudes.The minimization efforts were sometimes not successful.
Caen is a whole other mess (which ended up helping the Germans more than than hurting them.)
Most of dad's attacks were below 20,000'. On the raid to Pforzheim he bombed at 8,500'. Most bombed at less than 9,000'.
Bombing heights depended in part on the town's defences.
I saw (and heard) these two critters running up their engines at Elvington, it was like some Sci-Fi mechanical mating ceremony.
It is so easy to play armchair quarterback 75 years after the fact! (I think we kinda said the same thing)
I find it interesting that you strongly press your position, yet don't already know this. First, see Bowyer and Sharp Mosquito, pages 203-205. The first mission was late May 1942, the last was late May 1943, with nearly all the May '43 missions being dusk (not daylight) raids. Somewhere in my four linear feet of reports on US evaluations of the Mosquito is a memo noting that the RAF reported the end of unarmed Mosquito daylight missions as a result of increasing losses.
The US was very interested in the Mosquito for a variety of missions - I did a short article on the subject in Airfix Modelworld back in 2017, though I can't find my copy at the moment.
Finally, don't forget that the first very-long-range P-51 escort missions didn't come in any numbers until 1944. Large numbers of unarmed, unescorted Mosquitos did not stand any better chance than heavily armed B-17s and B-24s.
It's been an intersting discussion, but this just wasn't going to happen - and if it had happened, the results weren't gonna be pretty...
Cheers,
Dana
Thanks. I have the following heights for dad's sorties, Lancaster X aircraft, 419 Squadron:I'm presently going through the ORBs for 433 Squadron for 1944 working on a little (actually large) project. The lowest reported altitude so far was 2,500 feet on the evening of June 6/7. Here is what is reported as the bombing altitudes for the missions in January through March, 1944:
Jan. 20/21 vs. Berlin = 20,000 to 21,700
Jan. 21/22 vs. Magdeburg = 20,000 to 22,500
Jan. 28/29 vs. Berlin = 20,000 to 22,500
Jan. 30/31 vs. Berlin = 20,000 to 21,000
Feb. 16/17 vs. Berlin = 20,000 to 23,500
Feb. 19/20 vs. Leipzig = 21,000 to 25,000 (I suspect the latter is a typo)
Feb. 20/21 vs. Stuttgart = 21,000 to 23,000
Feb. 24/25 vs. Schweinfurt = 21,000 to 23,400
Feb. 25/26 vs. Augsburg = 21,500 to 22,000
Mar. 6/7 vs. Trappes = 13,000 to 13,600
Mar. 7/8 vs. Le Mans = 13,000
Mar. 13/14 vs. Le Mans = 11,500 to 12,000
Mar. 15/16 vs. Stuttgart = 20,000 to 23,500
Mar. 18/19 vs. Frankfurt = 20,000 to 22,100
Mar. 24/25 vs. Berlin = 19,500 to 22,000
Mar 26/27 vs. Essen = 19,300 to 22,000
Mar. 30/31 vs. Nuremberg = 21,000 to 22,000
Yes, that was certainly a part of the consideration as well..
Ok - if the Mosquito was such a glaring solution, why didn't they?You can draw whatever conclusions you like. I am not unschooled on the Mosquito, I have five books about that aircraft specifically and probably another 20 about air combat in Theaters where it was active within sight of me as I type this post. But I'm not arrogant enough to presume that I know everything there is to know. I am neither trying to shut down the debate on a spurious basis nor being more concerned with pretending I 'won the argument' than actually trying to explore the scenario in the OP and determine it's genuine feasibility.
Instead, since this discussion kicked into gear, I've read a lot of attempts to shut it all down on the basis of:
1) A Mosquito can't carry as many bombs as a B-17 or Lancaster therefore it's inferior in that role. (Because strategic bombing = high altitude and / or night time area bombing)
2) A Mosquito once killed civilians therefore it's inaccurate.
3) The Mosquito wasn't actually used as a Strategic bomber therefore it couldn't have been.
4) They couldn't build more Mosquitos because US industry couldn't manufacture wooden aircraft.
5) They couldn't build more Mosquitoes because couldn't make enough engines.
And etc.
None of these types of arguments are actually true. Some of them are plausible until you look deeper into them, but a couple of those imply a lack of basic logical thinking ability. People declare an end to the discussion, without ever really having one (I think there was one for a few pages, but then it was drowned out). I didn't spend time posting in this thread just to argue round and round and round. And I'm not going to do that for much longer because it's apparently pointless.
Discussion of the actual operational details of the outcome of Mosquito bomber raids (whether they were from Bomber Command or Fighter Command is totally irrelevant to this) could actually tell us, one way or another, whether this was technically feasible. I would be interested in looking closer at those specific details. You seemed to be implying you had some such data at hand, but instead you are posting about generalities. I'd like to know specifics.
When did Mosquitos start taking 'unacceptable' losses on bombing raids? Did these approach the 49% of bomber crew losses suffered by bomber command by the way? How closely does this correlate with the arrival of P-38s, P-47s and then P-51s in Theater?
What was the loss rate for different types of Mosquito (strike) missions?
What was the bombing accuracy for different types of Mosquito (strike) missions? Including both day and night-time? Do we have any hard numbers? I'd love to look at specific cases and add them up.
What was the main problem for Mosquitos? Interceptors? Heavy Flak? Light Flak?
In 1942, at the Eindoven raid, Mosquitos were able to outrun the FW 190s sent to intercept the strike, and were even able to act as bait to draw those fighters away from the other, far more vulnerable fighters. I am sure this would end as soon as a German fighter is available in numbers which can catch a Mosquito, because it's defense is speed - so I have no doubt that as faster fighters arrived, Mosquito units ran into trouble. But Mosquitos got faster too. And escort fighters became available and then got better and better range.
The main thing I call into question in all this is the whole idea of the 'bomb truck'. Just bringing 10 tons of bombs into the general vicinity of a target area is not going to win the war. The whole school bus analogy was brought up. I agree a Lancaster or a B-24 is a far better "school bus" than a Mosquito. I just don't think a "school bus" is a good weapon for destroying strategic, operational, or tactical targets, except in very special cases.
I would warn against falling for the myth that the only thing Bomber Command did was incendiary raids on German cities. The peak year for incendiary bomb usage, both in terms of percentage of bombs dropped and actual tonnage, was 1943. In actuality Bomber Command expended plenty of ordnance against military targets.
For 1944-45, of the total tonnage dropped in Combined Bomber Offensive, Bomber Command, for example, accounted for 14.9% of the tonnage dropped on airfields; 64.4% of the tonnage dropped on V-weapon installations; 42.4% of the tonnage dropped on oil targets; and 28.0% of the tonnage dropped on transportation targets.
While towns and urban areas accounted for 78.2% of the tonnage dropped by Bomber Command in 1942, and 83.5% in 1943, it fell to 35.7% in 1944 and 36.8% in 1945.
Certainly, Bomber Command could have done more in regards to going after industrial targets, but for that to happen, you either need to change Harris' mind about 'panacea' attacks (highly unlikely), or else replace him.