What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress? (3 Viewers)

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

What is your reference for 'only really able to hit marshaling yards?

Try instead of
In the disputes over heavy bomber targets pre D-day it was understood the heavies were really only able to hit marshalling yards
In the disputes over heavy bomber targets pre D-day it was understood the heavies were really only able to hit marshalling yards as part of the transport plan
If you like you can add invasion before transport plan.
I omitted the target phrase since I have already posted things like what the top targets of the 8th were at the time, which showed plenty of other targets being hit, were they consulted before the reply was sent? When I was writing at the time I thought the expression pre D-day and the lists previously supplied were enough without an additional qualifier.

 

[drgondog]

Try instead of
In the disputes over heavy bomber targets pre D-day it was understood the heavies were really only able to hit marshalling yards
In the disputes over heavy bomber targets pre D-day it was understood the heavies were really only able to hit marshalling yards as part of the transport plan
If you like you can add invasion before transport plan.
I omitted the target phrase since I have already posted things like what the top targets of the 8th were at the time, which showed plenty of other targets being hit, were they consulted before the reply was sent? When I was writing at the time I thought the expression pre D-day and the lists previously supplied were enough without an additional qualifier.

You presume that I (and others) would pore over deathless prose to seek clarification regarding clarification for what you may have intended? The Transport Plan was important to Eisenhower, Portal, Tedder, and Leigh Mallory - and genrally adhered to as a component of POINTBLANK leading to D-Day, but the 8th AF was tasked to destroy the LW as a critical component to Overlord.

Perhaps in your mind pre-Day was limited to only 30 days of bombing marshaling yards - but a variety of attacks on road, rail and infrastucture and Crossbow were undertaken in early May - for which the 8th and 9th AF dutifully followed orders - but the 8th and 15th initiated attacks on Oil, and continued attacks on ball bearings and aircraft industry.

BTW the 15th did have a 'few' heavy bombers and they made more attacks on M/Y and A/F than the 8th AF in both in April and May - though only a few in southern France as a build up to Dragoon.

Leigh-Mallory, and his control of the Transport Plan, was removed when he (and Spaatz) were forced to report to Tedder. The Transport Plan, while accepted by Eisenhower in late March, 1944 was still under debate in April because the Primary focus was tactical - in France - with expected heavy causalties. Additionally the Brits escalated Crossbow priority to the point that Spaatz felt that the undue influence of Portal, Tedder and Leigh-Mallory on 8th AF mission was no longer tolerable in HIS assigned mission (Marshall/Arnold) to destroy the LW. While the 8th did pound M/Y and infrastructure like the Loire river (9th AF destroyed Seine Rive bridges), the USSTAF attacks, granted by Eisenhower, on oil/chemical targets in mid and late May reduced delivery of aviation fuel from 180,000 tons in May to 50,000 tons in June.

No matter how you re-phrase 'the heavies were only able to hit marshaling yards' it is a.) inadequate describe to the broad scope of 8th, 9th and 15th AF pre D-Day operations, but b.) also out of context.

References include Forged in Fire by Copp, Global Mission by Arnold, Carl Spaatz by Davis

 

[pbehn]

Try instead of

In the disputes over heavy bomber targets pre D-day it was understood the heavies were really only able to hit marshalling yards as part of the transport plan

Is the subject "heavies" or "marshalling yards" or "the transport plan"? If you take marshalling yards out of the transport plan what do you have left that would be a suitable target for heavies? Bridges? They are very hard to hit with a strategic bomber and frequently easy to repair. Locomotive service and repair facilities? Almost always part of a marshalling yard anyway.

One thing not taken into account as far as I can see is where these places were, targets in France like Aulnoye were surrounded by French people who were allies. Targets in Germany like Hamm were surrounded by German people who werent.

 

[MikeMeech]

Is the subject "heavies" or "marshalling yards" or "the transport plan"? If you take marshalling yards out of the transport plan what do you have left that would be a suitable target for heavies? Bridges? They are very hard to hit with a strategic bomber and frequently easy to repair. Locomotive service and repair facilities? Almost always part of a marshalling yard anyway.

One thing not taken into account as far as I can see is where these places were, targets in France like Aulnoye were surrounded by French people who were allies. Targets in Germany like Hamm were surrounded by German people who werent.

Hi
There were quite a few of the 'larger' marshalling yards in Germany to choose from (as contained in Vol IV of the German book set):

Mike

 

[MikeMeech]

That's what I first thought of when I read the list of cities targeted. I wasn't aware of any other strategic value of Nuremberg. Its manufacturing value never seems to be mentioned in the cursory histories I've read.

Hi
From Vol III of the German set is information of industries in Nuremburg:

Mike

 

[SaparotRob]

That's way more than I knew before. Very informative.

 

[SplitRz]

Had a little time to kill this morning and read the entire thread. It seems to me that the original post is based on the inherent belief that "precision" placement of ordinances will be the ultimate game changer in conflict. This was the same precision delivery of ordinance belief that the Bomber Mafia based their theories of air combat on, but differing in the platforms for delivery. I think the postwar studies by the 8th Air Force are insightful on how effective the bombing campaign was, or wasn't, and how wrong allied planners were in what targets were most critical to the German war effort. IIRC, where the air campaign was most successful was in the inadvertent (as in unplanned) destruction of Germany's coal stocks and infrastructure as Germany ran on coal vs oil for industry/transportation/power. This had a greater effect on hindering German war efforts than any of the other targets. Second was the attack on German mobility especially leading up to D-Day and its impact Nazi military effectiveness. Third was the destruction of the Luftwaffe. Fourth, and last was the drain on the German economy and resources to support ever greater anti-bombing defense infrastructure and damage repair. These successes are far less about targeted precision attacks and more about campaigns that rely on mass and overbearing weight of attacking forces.

The Mosquito is a formidable aircraft and it has a devoted cult following, but it wasn't the aircraft to carry out the type of air campaign that ultimately proved most decisive. The belief in targeted precision air attacks often overestimates actual effectiveness and in the 1940's that precision was very hard to achieve on a regular basis. Even today, with the kinds of technologies that we have precision is not always that precise, I'm still struck by how many dumb bombs vs smart bombs are dropped in combat today.

Hmmmm.... interesting! But maybe more nuanced than that? Yes to your points from a USAF perspective - but it was neither designed for, nor employed for that kind of mass strategic bombing role as a heavy-lifting bomb-truck.

"...it wasn't the aircraft to carry out the type of air campaign that ultimately proved most decisive." Not directly. But it supported its delivery.

"...These successes are far less about targeted precision attacks and more about campaigns that rely on mass and overbearing weight of attacking forces."

...and yet it was a key aircraft of the RAF area bombing campaign - with constant demand for more airframes and squadrons - in RAF Bomber strategy; as a nuisance bomber and for decoy raids as part of the light night strike force, a pathfinder, recon and later on, as a night-fighter within the bomber streams and as an intruder over Luftwaffe night-fighter airbases... Roles which very much helped deliver the larger overall objective

REMEMBER, I've not been arguing for American production of Mosquitos, BUT it was a fundamental part of that same late war RAF bombing campaign. More Mosquitos would surely have made that more effective - but more or less, that lay with the British.

And out of interest, it was clearly also capable of real precision low level attacks too... Finally, an aircraft which is more difficult to intercept, and that not only means greater survivability and increased likelihood of delivering its mission, but it also bleeds more resources from its opponents as they seek to counter it.

So, I think I'm both agreeing and disagreeing with you!

 

[drgondog]

Hi
There were quite a few of the 'larger' marshalling yards in Germany to choose from (as contained in Vol IV of the German book set):
View attachment 646930

Mike

The 'Transport Plan' was all about interdicting logistics to the battlefield - and inherently about French road, rail and water transport to future Overlord site of invasion. Th political concerns which went to the Churchill level and required showering the targets with leaflets to warn French civilians to get outta town'

 

[pbehn]

Hi
There were quite a few of the 'larger' marshalling yards in Germany to choose from (as contained in Vol IV of the German book set):
View attachment 646930

Mike

I mentioned Hamm and Aulnoye because I worked at both. I worked in the steel industry and in the early days steel plants attracted rail infrastructure, they need each other. I have worked at a few on that list, in Mulheim ad Ruhr my guest house was next to the steel works and its marshalling yards, the old boy who owned it was a boy when it was gutted in a raid in WW2.

 

[NevadaK]

After seeing the lengthy discussion about the ball bearing plant raids, I took a few minutes to track down the summary from the Strategic Bombing Survey. I located it at this link:

United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (European War)

United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (European War)

www.anesi.com

I suspect some of you may have the entire set of reports on your shelves.

Here is what the report says about the ball bearing attack:

The German anti-friction bearing industry was heavily concentrated. When the attack began, approximately half the output came from plants in the vicinity of Schweinfurt. An adequate supply of bearings was correctly assumed to be indispensable for German war production.

In a series of raids beginning on August 17, 1943, about 12,000 tons of bombs were dropped on this target -- about one-half of one per cent of the total tonnage delivered in the air war. In an attack on August 17 by 200 B-17's on Schweinfurt, the plants were severely damaged. Records of the industry taken by the Survey (and supplemented and checked by interrogation) show that production of bearings at this center was reduced sharply -- September production was 35% of the pre-raid level. In this attack 36 of the 200 attaching planes were lost. In the famous and much-discussed second attack on October 14, 1943, when the plants were again severely damaged, one of the decisive air battles of the war took place. The 228 bombers participating were strongly attacked by German fighters when beyond the range of their fighter escort. Losses to fighters and to flak cost the United States forces 62 planes with another 138 damaged in varying degree, some beyond repair. Repeated losses of this magnitude could not be sustained; deep penetrations without escort, of which this was among the earliest, were suspended and attacks on Schweinfurt were not renewed for four months. The Germans made good use of the breathing spell. A czar was appointed with unlimited priority for requisitioning men and materials. Energetic steps were taken to disperse the industry. Restoration was aided by the circumstance -- which Survey investigations show to have been fairly common to all such raids -- that machines and machine tools were damaged far less severely than factory structures. German equipment was redesigned to substitute other types of bearings wherever possible. And the Germans drew on the substantial stocks that were on hand. Although there were further attacks, production by the autumn of 1944 was back to pre-raid levels. From examination of the records and personalities in the ball-bearing industry, the user industries and the testimony of war production officials, there is no evidence that the attacks on the ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war production.

I think there is a lingering belief that the ball bearing raids could have succeeded in bringing the war to an early end, but based on what the survey found was not the case. Following the ball bearing attacks the bombing campaign targeted aircraft manufacturing and the destruction of the Luftwaffe. As this was stated earlier by others, this was the primary mission of the USAAF in late 1943 and early 1944 in preparation of the Normandy landings. Once achieved the USAAF returned to a strategic bombing campaign, the attack on oil. Here is what the summary says:

With the reduction of German air power, oil became the priority target in the German economy. The bomber force for several months had been adequate for the task. A preliminary attack was launched on May 12, 1944, followed by another on May 28; the main blow was not struck, however, until after D-day. In the months before D-day and for a shorter period immediately following, all available air power based on England was devoted to insuring the success of the invasion.....

The Germans viewed the attacks as catastrophic. In a series of letters to Hitler, among documents seized by the Survey, the developing crisis is outlined month by month in detail. On June 30, Speer wrote: "The enemy has succeeded in increasing our losses of aviation gasoline up to 90 percent by June 22d. Only through speedy recovery of damaged plants has it been possible to regain partly some of the terrible losses."

And then lastly, the Summary states this about the attack on transportation:

The attack on transportation was the decisive blow that completely disorganized the German economy. It reduced war production in all categories and made it difficult to move what was produced to the front. The attack also limited the tactical mobility of the German army.

To me, the picture that emerges from this is that the bombing campaign's success was that it eroded a large interwoven system to the point of collapse, but no single element in that system was capable of bringing the system down on its own. As I see it, focusing on the bomb mix for a series of attacks on one kind of target that was actually incapable of crippling the enemy is still looking at the trees instead of the forest.

 

[pbehn]

To me, the picture that emerges from this is that the bombing campaign's success was that it eroded a large interwoven system to the point of collapse, but no single element in that system was capable of bringing the system down on its own. As I see it, focusing on the bomb mix for a series of attacks on one kind of target that was actually incapable of crippling the enemy is still looking at the trees instead of the forest.

That is the eternal debate between Harris wanting to weaken the whole and other wanting to target specific parts of of it. Even now I am undecided as to which was the best option.

 

[ThomasP]

I do not know enough about the bombing campaign to address specifics, but I have a question for any of you who do:

Would it have been practical to attack the oil/gasoline industries earlier??

To my mind, from what I have read on this forum (for the most part), that is the only change that would have(may have?) made a significant difference.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

You presume that I (and others) would pore over deathless prose to seek clarification regarding clarification for what you may have intended?

What I expected was common sense in the knowledge these messages are not written over days, then edited and proof read. I am now watching an exercise by some of the main voices pushing the local orthodoxy and marking their territory.

Perhaps in your mind pre-Day was limited to only 30 days of bombing marshaling yards

Very good, invent a bad idea, pass it to someone else, hoping the readership does not notice how smart they are thought to be in order to fall for the tactic.

BTW the 15th did have a 'few' heavy bombers and they made more attacks on M/Y and A/F than the 8th AF in both in April and May - though only a few in southern France as a build up to Dragoon.

BTW in the January to May 1944 period the 8th AF dropped 112,003.1 tons of bombs, the 15th 73,194.3. No 15th AF attacks on French marshalling yards in April, 15th AF Southern France M/Y strikes on 25, 26 and 27 May 1944, 4 targets on 25th, 6 in the 26th and 2 on the 27th, 3,249.1 tons of bombs out of the 11,019.6 tons of bombs dropped on Marshalling yards that month, to give the number. As to made more attacks on marshalling yards and airfields, half correct.
A/f \ 15th \ \ 8th
Month \ Apr \ May \ Apr \ May
A/F Tons \ 1028.8 \ 3715.6 \ 7001.6 \ 6722.8
A/F % \ 5.30% \ 13.3 \ 28.1 \ 18.7
M/Y Tons \ 9392.8 \ 11091.6 \ 2278.9 \ 10019.1
M/Y % \ 48.4 \ 39.7 \ 9.1 \ 27.8
1,599.5 tons of 15th AF marshalling yard bombs in April and 814.3 tons in May were on the Ploesti raids, where as we know the context was the USAAF was not supposed to be attacking oil targets but found a marshalling yards surrounded by refineries and bombed it, with at times deliberately dispersed bomb drops.

Leigh-Mallory, and his control of the Transport Plan, was removed when he (and Spaatz) were forced to report to Tedder. The Transport Plan, while accepted by Eisenhower in late March, 1944 was still under debate in April because the Primary focus was tactical - in France - with expected heavy causalties. Additionally the Brits escalated Crossbow priority to the point that Spaatz felt that the undue influence of Portal, Tedder and Leigh-Mallory on 8th AF mission was no longer tolerable in HIS assigned mission (Marshall/Arnold) to destroy the LW. While the 8th did pound M/Y and infrastructure like the Loire river (9th AF destroyed Seine Rive bridges), the USSTAF attacks, granted by Eisenhower, on oil/chemical targets in mid and late May reduced delivery of aviation fuel from 180,000 tons in May to 50,000 tons in June.

Or Spaatz felt there was undue influence, rather than a flat there was. Interesting idea the effects of the USAAF May oil raids continued all through June. Following data is from the Speer reports to Hitler, reproduced in the Bomber Command Official History.

In April 1944 total production of German avgas was 175,000 tonnes for the month. Pre the first strikes May 1944 daily output 5,845 tonnes, down to 4,821 after 12 May, back up to 5,550 on 27 May down to 2,743 on 30 May after two days of 8th AF strikes. May avgas production 156,000 tonnes versus "essential production" of 180,000 tonnes. The figure hovers around 2,500 tons for the first week in June, down to 1,832 on the 7th then 3,718 on the 8th, then 3,052 on the 11th but 2,120 on the 12th.

After the RAF strike on the night of the 12th/13th it drops to 1,078 tonnes, climbs again to 1,587 on the 14th. Mosquito strikes on the 15/16th and 17/18th did slight damage. The 8th AF 20th June raid on Poelitz kept it shut down. On 20 June production 1,392 tonnes, 1,268 on the 21 June. On 21/22 June the RAF bombed Wesseling and Scholven/Buer, production on the 22nd was 632 tonnes, 868 on the 23rd, back up to 1,268 tonnes on the 24th as Leuna restarted production, the 15th AF hit Moosbierbaum on the 26th knocking it out. Production from the 24th to end of month hovered at a little over 1,200 tonnes per day.

While the 8th resumed oil strikes on the 15th it went after the natural oil refineries in Hamburg, which did not make avgas, it was a radar strike, using H2X, the 8th AF strikes on synthetic oil resumed on the 20th, they were a minority compared with the natural oil refineries and oil storage tanks for the rest of June.

June Luftwaffe avgas production 53,000 tonnes. So which of the three sources quoted indicates the June raids on synthetic oil plants had no effect on production and kept the ones hit in May suppressed to their end May production levels? Or was it another source? Or was it as usual a standard reply that was not worked on for days, edited and proof read, so omitted a key phrase? Or should everyone apply your standard to you "You presume that I (and others) would pore over deathless prose to seek clarification regarding clarification for what you may have intended?"

No matter how you re-phrase 'the heavies were only able to hit marshaling yards' it is a.) inadequate describe to the broad scope of 8th, 9th and 15th AF pre D-Day operations, but b.) also out of context.

Good to know that mentioning what the heavy bombers were good for, a type the 9th AF did not have, is inadequate, I should have put in all the 8th , 9th, 12th and 15th AF data and all types, not forgetting the carpetbaggers given the FFI sabotage operations, definite failure there to mention that use and context. Of course I said heavy bombers, and the claimed in context reply omits the RAF ones, along with the other RAF forces. Why that omission given such a need for context? Beyond put in lots of data it is boring, put in a subset it is inadequate.

Would it have been practical to attack the oil/gasoline industries earlier?? To my mind, from what I have read on this forum (for the most part), that is the only change that would have(may have?) made a significant difference.

The short answer is the oil campaign started about as soon as it could, defined as it would have a sustained effect. Choosing a specific set of targets makes you more predictable, making the job of the defences easier, they had to be worn down first. The raids also started about as soon as there was enough bomb lift to be able to sustain the attacks along with all the other targets. The USAAF says heavy bombers in the ETO dropped 47,452 tons of bombs in 1943 and 50,845 tons in the MTO. The oil campaign saw the ETO heavies drop 99,391 tons in 1944 and 26,562 in 1945, the MTO 52,622 and 15,250. (short tons). Bomber Command dropped 157,457 long tons of bombs in 1943, oil tonnage was 48,043 in 1944 and 47,510 long tons in 1945.

Allied economic intelligence was a weak point, trying to figure effects on output from photographs was a problem. However for the avgas attacks the Luftwaffe tended to provide evidence via its signals about the fuel situation. Even so the oil campaign had a lot of raids bombing plants a while from resuming production while allowing other plants to get back into production before they were bombed. And as the USSBS noted post war it would have taken a few weeks to restore production once the bombing stopped.

That is why the transport plan attack on Germany was so effective, instead of hitting all the factories it was hitting the key water and rail transport systems to cut the links between the factories and disrupted their continual need to ship stuff in and other stuff out, add the transport system's ability to break up bulk shipments from one source into the sizes needed by the individual customers The loss of canal and rail removed economic activity and strategic mobility, while the loss of oil removed tactical mobility

The data for the 8th and 15th AF January to May 1944, remember this is classified as boring, not context.

15th AF bomb tonnages by month by target. Breakdown by country available.
Target \ Jan-44 \ Feb-44 \ Mar-44 \ Apr-44 \ May-44 \ Total
A/F \ 3488 \ 497 \ 1733.9 \ 1028.8 \ 3715.6 \ 10463.3
A/I \ 324 \ 167.6 \ 0 \ 993.9 \ 83 \ 1568.5
A/I & M/Y \ 201 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 201
A/Iasy \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 643.8 \ 0 \ 643.8
A/Iasy He 219 \ 0 \ 0 \ 242 \ 356.2 \ 0 \ 598.2
A/Iasy Me 109 \ 0 \ 509.8 \ 0 \ 802.6 \ 902.6 \ 2215
A/Icomp \ 66 \ 0 \ 0 \ 481.5 \ 530.2 \ 1077.7
A/Icomp Me 109 \ 0 \ 342 \ 0 \ 0 \ 786.8 \ 1128.8
A/Icomp Me 410 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 738.9 \ 0 \ 738.9
A/Icomp Me109 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 123 \ 123
A/Ieng \ 0 \ 388 \ 0 \ 240 \ 0 \ 628
Bearings \ 156 \ 0 \ 0 \ 833.5 \ 0 \ 989.5
City \ 777.5 \ 131 \ 323.8 \ 291 \ 209.5 \ 1732.8
HY/Br \ 135 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 135
Hy/defile \ 65 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 65
I/A \ 0 \ 0 \ 296.7 \ 663.2 \ 277.7 \ 1237.6
Loco/Wrks \ 0 \ 62 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 62
M/T \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 177.5 \ 0 \ 177.5
M/Y \ 3314.9 \ 1207.4 \ 4851.1 \ 9392.8 \ 11091.6 \ 29857.8
M/Y & A/I \ 117 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 117
M/Y & City \ 81 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 81
O/PumpSt \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 361.8 \ 361.8
O/R \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 71 \ 1769.9 \ 1840.9
O/St \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 316.8 \ 316.8
P/A \ 546.5 \ 400.7 \ 99.3 \ 2318.1 \ 2692.1 \ 6056.7
Radar \ 0 \ 97.3 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 97.3
Radar (FC) \ 85.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 85.5
RR \ 0 \ 608.1 \ 120 \ 175.8 \ 181.9 \ 1085.8
RR/Br \ 269.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 100.5 \ 1569.4 \ 1939.4
RR/Shops \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 377.8 \ 377.8
RR/Via \ 0 \ 87 \ 0 \ 0 \ 98 \ 185
RR/Wareh \ 15 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 15
T/O \ 12 \ 33 \ 260.1 \ 95 \ 7.5 \ 407.6
T/T \ 0 \ 1589.2 \ 1061.9 \ 0 \ 2823.4 \ 5474.5
Torpedo/P \ 63 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 63
UB/Base \ 0 \ 201 \ 844.8 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1045.8
Total \ 9716.9 \ 6321.1 \ 9833.6 \ 19404.1 \ 27918.6 \ 73194.3

8th AF bomb tonnages by month by target. Breakdown by country available.
Target \ Jan-44 \ Feb-44 \ Mar-44 \ Apr-44 \ May-44 \ Total
A/F \ 463.5 \ 2734.2 \ 5439.4 \ 7001.6 \ 6722.8 \ 22361.5
A/I \ 0 \ 880.7 \ 133 \ 566.6 \ 452.8 \ 2033.1
A/I Pistons \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 31.5 \ 0 \ 31.5
A/Iasy Ju 88 \ 0 \ 85.1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 85.1
A/Iasy Fighter \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 97.5 \ 0 \ 97.5
A/Iasy FW 190 \ 288.1 \ 324.1 \ 300 \ 1731.2 \ 1341.5 \ 3984.9
A/Iasy He 177 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 702.3 \ 0 \ 702.3
A/Iasy Ju 88 \ 0 \ 109.9 \ 0 \ 268.5 \ 0 \ 378.4
A/Iasy Me 109 \ 0 \ 925.7 \ 0 \ 0 \ 348.8 \ 1274.5
A/Iasy Me 110 \ 1770.4 \ 1083.8 \ 371.9 \ 109.8 \ 0 \ 3335.9
A/Iasy Me 410 \ 0 \ 0 \ 300.5 \ 341.7 \ 0 \ 642.2
A/Icomp \ 92.1 \ 288.8 \ 0 \ 0 \ 114.9 \ 495.8
A/Icomp FW 190 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 319.6 \ 207 \ 526.6
A/Icomp He 177 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 391.6 \ 0 \ 391.6
A/Icomp Ju 88 \ 0 \ 77 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 77
A/Icomp Me 110 \ 0 \ 100 \ 1241.9 \ 1054.7 \ 0 \ 2396.6
A/Ieng \ 0 \ 49.5 \ 1084.3 \ 314.9 \ 644.2 \ 2092.9
A/Ieng Me 262 \ 0 \ 0 \ 101.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 101.5
A/Irepair \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 296.2 \ 169.4 \ 465.6
AAA \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 2.7 \ 2.7
AFV \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 24 \ 24
AFV eng \ 0 \ 0 \ 54 \ 0 \ 0 \ 54
Bearings \ 0 \ 690.1 \ 1191.7 \ 341.2 \ 0 \ 2223
Canal \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 2.1 \ 2.1
Canal/Lock \ 21.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 21.5
Cement/P \ 0 \ 0 \ 97.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 97.5
City \ 0 \ 0 \ 299.7 \ 422.1 \ 81.1 \ 802.9
Explosives \ 0 \ 0 \ 42.5 \ 47.5 \ 0 \ 90
Gear Whls \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 126.1 \ 0 \ 126.1
Hy \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 2.5 \ 0 \ 2.5
I/A \ 935.3 \ 2711.4 \ 2244.2 \ 1180.6 \ 3769.2 \ 10840.7
Loco/Wks \ 0 \ 0 \ 68.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 68.5
M/T \ 0 \ 0 \ 37.8 \ 0 \ 0 \ 37.8
M/Y \ 1865.6 \ 1811.9 \ 995.6 \ 2278.9 \ 10019.1 \ 16971.1
MCG/A \ 0 \ 0 \ 2982.3 \ 1423.5 \ 4277.4 \ 8683.2
NB/Cons \ 180 \ 247.2 \ 17.5 \ 215 \ 0 \ 659.7
NB/Labor Camp \ 0 \ 0 \ 51 \ 477 \ 250.8 \ 778.8
NB/Large Site Cons \ 216.7 \ 1546.5 \ 1826.5 \ 1778.8 \ 2457 \ 7825.5
NB/Ski Cons \ 2516.2 \ 1338.7 \ 515.4 \ 2164.5 \ 171.5 \ 6706.3
NB/Supply Site \ 0 \ 0 \ 27.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 27.5
NB/V-Site \ 0 \ 112.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 112.5
O/R \ 0 \ 0 \ 128.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 128.5
O/Sy \ 980.4 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 2872.9 \ 3853.3
Ord/D \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 240.2 \ 240.2
P & I/A \ 0 \ 878.8 \ 0 \ 449.9 \ 0 \ 1328.7
P/A \ 0 \ 0 \ 129.7 \ 23.1 \ 689.1 \ 841.9
Power Plant \ 143.1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 143.1
RR/Br \ 15 \ 0 \ 2.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 17.5
RR/Br & Emb \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 2.5 \ 2.5
RR/Junc \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 60 \ 60
RR/Siding \ 0 \ 24 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 24
RR/Sta \ 0 \ 0 \ 75.1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 75.1
T/O \ 610.8 \ 1004.7 \ 1286.6 \ 772.9 \ 780.4 \ 4455.4
T/T Coastal Installations \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 305.2 \ 305.2
UB/Yards \ 1580.5 \ 1278.8 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 2859.3
Warehouses \ 0 \ 36 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 36
Total \ 11679.2 \ 18339.4 \ 21046.6 \ 24931.3 \ 36006.6 \ 112003.1

 

[wuzak]

You know that the forum supports tables, so all those stats could be more readable?

 

[pbehn]

What I expected was common sense in the knowledge these messages are not written over days, then edited and proof read. I am now watching an exercise by some of the main voices pushing the local orthodoxy and marking their territory.

Very good, invent a bad idea, pass it to someone else, hoping the readership does not notice how smart they are thought to be in order to fall for the tactic.

BTW in the January to May 1944 period the 8th AF dropped 112,003.1 tons of bombs, the 15th 73,194.3. No 15th AF attacks on French marshalling yards in April, 15th AF Southern France M/Y strikes on 25, 26 and 27 May 1944, 4 targets on 25th, 6 in the 26th and 2 on the 27th, 3,249.1 tons of bombs out of the 11,019.6 tons of bombs dropped on Marshalling yards that month, to give the number. As to made more attacks on marshalling yards and airfields, half correct.
A/f \ 15th \ \ 8th
Month \ Apr \ May \ Apr \ May
A/F Tons \ 1028.8 \ 3715.6 \ 7001.6 \ 6722.8
A/F % \ 5.30% \ 13.3 \ 28.1 \ 18.7
M/Y Tons \ 9392.8 \ 11091.6 \ 2278.9 \ 10019.1
M/Y % \ 48.4 \ 39.7 \ 9.1 \ 27.8
1,599.5 tons of 15th AF marshalling yard bombs in April and 814.3 tons in May were on the Ploesti raids, where as we know the context was the USAAF was not supposed to be attacking oil targets but found a marshalling yards surrounded by refineries and bombed it, with at times deliberately dispersed bomb drops.

Or Spaatz felt there was undue influence, rather than a flat there was. Interesting idea the effects of the USAAF May oil raids continued all through June. Following data is from the Speer reports to Hitler, reproduced in the Bomber Command Official History.

In April 1944 total production of German avgas was 175,000 tonnes for the month. Pre the first strikes May 1944 daily output 5,845 tonnes, down to 4,821 after 12 May, back up to 5,550 on 27 May down to 2,743 on 30 May after two days of 8th AF strikes. May avgas production 156,000 tonnes versus "essential production" of 180,000 tonnes. The figure hovers around 2,500 tons for the first week in June, down to 1,832 on the 7th then 3,718 on the 8th, then 3,052 on the 11th but 2,120 on the 12th.

After the RAF strike on the night of the 12th/13th it drops to 1,078 tonnes, climbs again to 1,587 on the 14th. Mosquito strikes on the 15/16th and 17/18th did slight damage. The 8th AF 20th June raid on Poelitz kept it shut down. On 20 June production 1,392 tonnes, 1,268 on the 21 June. On 21/22 June the RAF bombed Wesseling and Scholven/Buer, production on the 22nd was 632 tonnes, 868 on the 23rd, back up to 1,268 tonnes on the 24th as Leuna restarted production, the 15th AF hit Moosbierbaum on the 26th knocking it out. Production from the 24th to end of month hovered at a little over 1,200 tonnes per day.

While the 8th resumed oil strikes on the 15th it went after the natural oil refineries in Hamburg, which did not make avgas, it was a radar strike, using H2X, the 8th AF strikes on synthetic oil resumed on the 20th, they were a minority compared with the natural oil refineries and oil storage tanks for the rest of June.

June Luftwaffe avgas production 53,000 tonnes. So which of the three sources quoted indicates the June raids on synthetic oil plants had no effect on production and kept the ones hit in May suppressed to their end May production levels? Or was it another source? Or was it as usual a standard reply that was not worked on for days, edited and proof read, so omitted a key phrase? Or should everyone apply your standard to you "You presume that I (and others) would pore over deathless prose to seek clarification regarding clarification for what you may have intended?"

Good to know that mentioning what the heavy bombers were good for, a type the 9th AF did not have, is inadequate, I should have put in all the 8th , 9th, 12th and 15th AF data and all types, not forgetting the carpetbaggers given the FFI sabotage operations, definite failure there to mention that use and context. Of course I said heavy bombers, and the claimed in context reply omits the RAF ones, along with the other RAF forces. Why that omission given such a need for context? Beyond put in lots of data it is boring, put in a subset it is inadequate.

The short answer is the oil campaign started about as soon as it could, defined as it would have a sustained effect. Choosing a specific set of targets makes you more predictable, making the job of the defences easier, they had to be worn down first. The raids also started about as soon as there was enough bomb lift to be able to sustain the attacks along with all the other targets. The USAAF says heavy bombers in the ETO dropped 47,452 tons of bombs in 1943 and 50,845 tons in the MTO. The oil campaign saw the ETO heavies drop 99,391 tons in 1944 and 26,562 in 1945, the MTO 52,622 and 15,250. (short tons). Bomber Command dropped 157,457 long tons of bombs in 1943, oil tonnage was 48,043 in 1944 and 47,510 long tons in 1945.

Allied economic intelligence was a weak point, trying to figure effects on output from photographs was a problem. However for the avgas attacks the Luftwaffe tended to provide evidence via its signals about the fuel situation. Even so the oil campaign had a lot of raids bombing plants a while from resuming production while allowing other plants to get back into production before they were bombed. And as the USSBS noted post war it would have taken a few weeks to restore production once the bombing stopped.

That is why the transport plan attack on Germany was so effective, instead of hitting all the factories it was hitting the key water and rail transport systems to cut the links between the factories and disrupted their continual need to ship stuff in and other stuff out, add the transport system's ability to break up bulk shipments from one source into the sizes needed by the individual customers The loss of canal and rail removed economic activity and strategic mobility, while the loss of oil removed tactical mobility

The data for the 8th and 15th AF January to May 1944, remember this is classified as boring, not context.

15th AF bomb tonnages by month by target. Breakdown by country available.
Target \ Jan-44 \ Feb-44 \ Mar-44 \ Apr-44 \ May-44 \ Total
A/F \ 3488 \ 497 \ 1733.9 \ 1028.8 \ 3715.6 \ 10463.3
A/I \ 324 \ 167.6 \ 0 \ 993.9 \ 83 \ 1568.5
A/I & M/Y \ 201 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 201
A/Iasy \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 643.8 \ 0 \ 643.8
A/Iasy He 219 \ 0 \ 0 \ 242 \ 356.2 \ 0 \ 598.2
A/Iasy Me 109 \ 0 \ 509.8 \ 0 \ 802.6 \ 902.6 \ 2215
A/Icomp \ 66 \ 0 \ 0 \ 481.5 \ 530.2 \ 1077.7
A/Icomp Me 109 \ 0 \ 342 \ 0 \ 0 \ 786.8 \ 1128.8
A/Icomp Me 410 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 738.9 \ 0 \ 738.9
A/Icomp Me109 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 123 \ 123
A/Ieng \ 0 \ 388 \ 0 \ 240 \ 0 \ 628
Bearings \ 156 \ 0 \ 0 \ 833.5 \ 0 \ 989.5
City \ 777.5 \ 131 \ 323.8 \ 291 \ 209.5 \ 1732.8
HY/Br \ 135 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 135
Hy/defile \ 65 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 65
I/A \ 0 \ 0 \ 296.7 \ 663.2 \ 277.7 \ 1237.6
Loco/Wrks \ 0 \ 62 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 62
M/T \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 177.5 \ 0 \ 177.5
M/Y \ 3314.9 \ 1207.4 \ 4851.1 \ 9392.8 \ 11091.6 \ 29857.8
M/Y & A/I \ 117 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 117
M/Y & City \ 81 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 81
O/PumpSt \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 361.8 \ 361.8
O/R \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 71 \ 1769.9 \ 1840.9
O/St \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 316.8 \ 316.8
P/A \ 546.5 \ 400.7 \ 99.3 \ 2318.1 \ 2692.1 \ 6056.7
Radar \ 0 \ 97.3 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 97.3
Radar (FC) \ 85.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 85.5
RR \ 0 \ 608.1 \ 120 \ 175.8 \ 181.9 \ 1085.8
RR/Br \ 269.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 100.5 \ 1569.4 \ 1939.4
RR/Shops \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 377.8 \ 377.8
RR/Via \ 0 \ 87 \ 0 \ 0 \ 98 \ 185
RR/Wareh \ 15 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 15
T/O \ 12 \ 33 \ 260.1 \ 95 \ 7.5 \ 407.6
T/T \ 0 \ 1589.2 \ 1061.9 \ 0 \ 2823.4 \ 5474.5
Torpedo/P \ 63 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 63
UB/Base \ 0 \ 201 \ 844.8 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1045.8
Total \ 9716.9 \ 6321.1 \ 9833.6 \ 19404.1 \ 27918.6 \ 73194.3

8th AF bomb tonnages by month by target. Breakdown by country available.
Target \ Jan-44 \ Feb-44 \ Mar-44 \ Apr-44 \ May-44 \ Total
A/F \ 463.5 \ 2734.2 \ 5439.4 \ 7001.6 \ 6722.8 \ 22361.5
A/I \ 0 \ 880.7 \ 133 \ 566.6 \ 452.8 \ 2033.1
A/I Pistons \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 31.5 \ 0 \ 31.5
A/Iasy Ju 88 \ 0 \ 85.1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 85.1
A/Iasy Fighter \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 97.5 \ 0 \ 97.5
A/Iasy FW 190 \ 288.1 \ 324.1 \ 300 \ 1731.2 \ 1341.5 \ 3984.9
A/Iasy He 177 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 702.3 \ 0 \ 702.3
A/Iasy Ju 88 \ 0 \ 109.9 \ 0 \ 268.5 \ 0 \ 378.4
A/Iasy Me 109 \ 0 \ 925.7 \ 0 \ 0 \ 348.8 \ 1274.5
A/Iasy Me 110 \ 1770.4 \ 1083.8 \ 371.9 \ 109.8 \ 0 \ 3335.9
A/Iasy Me 410 \ 0 \ 0 \ 300.5 \ 341.7 \ 0 \ 642.2
A/Icomp \ 92.1 \ 288.8 \ 0 \ 0 \ 114.9 \ 495.8
A/Icomp FW 190 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 319.6 \ 207 \ 526.6
A/Icomp He 177 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 391.6 \ 0 \ 391.6
A/Icomp Ju 88 \ 0 \ 77 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 77
A/Icomp Me 110 \ 0 \ 100 \ 1241.9 \ 1054.7 \ 0 \ 2396.6
A/Ieng \ 0 \ 49.5 \ 1084.3 \ 314.9 \ 644.2 \ 2092.9
A/Ieng Me 262 \ 0 \ 0 \ 101.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 101.5
A/Irepair \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 296.2 \ 169.4 \ 465.6
AAA \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 2.7 \ 2.7
AFV \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 24 \ 24
AFV eng \ 0 \ 0 \ 54 \ 0 \ 0 \ 54
Bearings \ 0 \ 690.1 \ 1191.7 \ 341.2 \ 0 \ 2223
Canal \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 2.1 \ 2.1
Canal/Lock \ 21.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 21.5
Cement/P \ 0 \ 0 \ 97.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 97.5
City \ 0 \ 0 \ 299.7 \ 422.1 \ 81.1 \ 802.9
Explosives \ 0 \ 0 \ 42.5 \ 47.5 \ 0 \ 90
Gear Whls \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 126.1 \ 0 \ 126.1
Hy \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 2.5 \ 0 \ 2.5
I/A \ 935.3 \ 2711.4 \ 2244.2 \ 1180.6 \ 3769.2 \ 10840.7
Loco/Wks \ 0 \ 0 \ 68.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 68.5
M/T \ 0 \ 0 \ 37.8 \ 0 \ 0 \ 37.8
M/Y \ 1865.6 \ 1811.9 \ 995.6 \ 2278.9 \ 10019.1 \ 16971.1
MCG/A \ 0 \ 0 \ 2982.3 \ 1423.5 \ 4277.4 \ 8683.2
NB/Cons \ 180 \ 247.2 \ 17.5 \ 215 \ 0 \ 659.7
NB/Labor Camp \ 0 \ 0 \ 51 \ 477 \ 250.8 \ 778.8
NB/Large Site Cons \ 216.7 \ 1546.5 \ 1826.5 \ 1778.8 \ 2457 \ 7825.5
NB/Ski Cons \ 2516.2 \ 1338.7 \ 515.4 \ 2164.5 \ 171.5 \ 6706.3
NB/Supply Site \ 0 \ 0 \ 27.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 27.5
NB/V-Site \ 0 \ 112.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 112.5
O/R \ 0 \ 0 \ 128.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 128.5
O/Sy \ 980.4 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 2872.9 \ 3853.3
Ord/D \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 240.2 \ 240.2
P & I/A \ 0 \ 878.8 \ 0 \ 449.9 \ 0 \ 1328.7
P/A \ 0 \ 0 \ 129.7 \ 23.1 \ 689.1 \ 841.9
Power Plant \ 143.1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 143.1
RR/Br \ 15 \ 0 \ 2.5 \ 0 \ 0 \ 17.5
RR/Br & Emb \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 2.5 \ 2.5
RR/Junc \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 60 \ 60
RR/Siding \ 0 \ 24 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 24
RR/Sta \ 0 \ 0 \ 75.1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 75.1
T/O \ 610.8 \ 1004.7 \ 1286.6 \ 772.9 \ 780.4 \ 4455.4
T/T Coastal Installations \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 305.2 \ 305.2
UB/Yards \ 1580.5 \ 1278.8 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 2859.3
Warehouses \ 0 \ 36 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 36
Total \ 11679.2 \ 18339.4 \ 21046.6 \ 24931.3 \ 36006.6 \ 112003.1

I would have thought any discussion of the oil plan would include Romania, that would be common sense in my book. Anyone reading this and only this would assume that neither RAF bomber command nor Soviet forces did anything at all. You are pushing an "America won the war on its own" orthodoxy, hardly unusual, in fact a little tiresome. Romanians were not paid for their oil and were less and less inclined to repair refineries that would be blown up before capture by the Soviets.

 

[drgondog]

I do not know enough about the bombing campaign to address specifics, but I have a question for any of you who do:

Would it have been practical to attack the oil/gasoline industries earlier??

To my mind, from what I have read on this forum (for the most part), that is the only change that would have(may have?) made a significant difference.

Simple answer Yes. Long Range escort was the critical success factor and Misburg and Leuna works for example, would have been better target than many Big Week targets and certainly more important than Berlin. Equally critical, the 8th AF had recovered from Summer/Fall 1943 losses.

Big Week for 8th AF would have been the 'practical period' to launch strikes against Lipzig/Ruhland/Hannover area Chemical/Oil/Gas targets. Ploesti would have been more costly until mid May because the P-38H/early J in 15th AF lacked the leading edge tanks and the 31st, 52nd and 325th were in process of conversion to P-51B. 332nd FG not a factor until very late July in their conversion. The 15th returned to Ploesti (and Bucharest area in early April 1944 but were unescortd at target area due to sretching just a little too far for the P-38s. Additionally, IMO the M/Y attacks for 15th were as much USSR influence w/Roosevelt (IIRC _ I don't have a source immediately at hand) than being part f the Transport Plan. Ploesti is a Loooooooooooong way from Normandy as far as troop/armor movements are concerned.

That said, 8th AF planning was focused on LW airframes, engines, assemby/repair and fighter pilots for pre-D-Day priority. In retrospect I don't think that they fully comprehended the effect of the 1943 decentralization efforts/accomplishments by Milch and Speer - and 'missed' the common denominator of diesel/avgas as a.) Critical (simlar to ball bearings) but b.) impossible to decentralize/move. IMO Harris missed the same point and many Fertilizer (food supply via farming) and same energy targets were vulnerable to RAF area bombing with larger bombs that RAF typically used (2000/4000 pound)

A/f \ 15th \ \ 8th
Month \ Apr \ May \ Apr \ May
A/F Tons \ 1028.8 \ 3715.6 \ 7001.6 \ 6722.8
A/F % \ 5.30% \ 13.3 \ 28.1 \ 18.7
M/Y Tons \ 9392.8 \ 11091.6 \ 2278.9 \ 10019.1
M/Y % \ 48.4 \ 39.7 \ 9.1 \ 27.8
1,599.5 tons of 15th AF marshalling yard bombs in April and 814.3 tons in May were on the Ploesti raids, where as we know the context was the USAAF was not supposed to be attacking oil targets but found a marshalling yards surrounded by refineries and bombed it, with at times deliberately dispersed bomb drops.

Would you agree that the Primary Aiming Points for Ploesti M/Y had not much to do with rail? What does 'not supposed to be attacking oil targets' mean to you. Was it a spanking offense for Eaker/Twinging?

Or Spaatz felt there was undue influence, rather than a flat there was. Interesting idea the effects of the USAAF May oil raids continued all through June. Following data is from the Speer reports to Hitler, reproduced in the Bomber Command Official History.

In April 1944 total production of German avgas was 175,000 tonnes for the month. Pre the first strikes May 1944 daily output 5,845 tonnes, down to 4,821 after 12 May, back up to 5,550 on 27 May down to 2,743 on 30 May after two days of 8th AF strikes. May avgas production 156,000 tonnes versus "essential production" of 180,000 tonnes. The figure hovers around 2,500 tons for the first week in June, down to 1,832 on the 7th then 3,718 on the 8th, then 3,052 on the 11th but 2,120 on the 12th.

After the RAF strike on the night of the 12th/13th it drops to 1,078 tonnes, climbs again to 1,587 on the 14th. Mosquito strikes on the 15/16th and 17/18th did slight damage. The 8th AF 20th June raid on Poelitz kept it shut down. On 20 June production 1,392 tonnes, 1,268 on the 21 June. On 21/22 June the RAF bombed Wesseling and Scholven/Buer, production on the 22nd was 632 tonnes, 868 on the 23rd, back up to 1,268 tonnes on the 24th as Leuna restarted production, the 15th AF hit Moosbierbaum on the 26th knocking it out. Production from the 24th to end of month hovered at a little over 1,200 tonnes per day.

Simply stated - in Speer's own words - "I shall never forget the date May 12, four days after" (returning from Berlin on May 8). On that day the Technologcal war ended". Please read for context from page 346 "Inside the Third Reich".

While the 8th resumed oil strikes on the 15th it went after the natural oil refineries in Hamburg, which did not make avgas, it was a radar strike, using H2X, the 8th AF strikes on synthetic oil resumed on the 20th, they were a minority compared with the natural oil refineries and oil storage tanks for the rest of June.

So, 'natural oil refineries' in Hamburg are not suitable targets in context of Oil Campaign? You do understand that synthetic plants augmented avgas production - not replace?

June Luftwaffe avgas production 53,000 tonnes. So which of the three sources quoted indicates the June raids on synthetic oil plants had no effect on production and kept the ones hit in May suppressed to their end May production levels? Or was it another source? Or was it as usual a standard reply that was not worked on for days, edited and proof read, so omitted a key phrase? Or should everyone apply your standard to you "You presume that I (and others) would pore over deathless prose to seek clarification regarding clarification for what you may have intended?"

Re-read Speer - that is, if you accept his opinion as credible?

Good to know that mentioning what the heavy bombers were good for, a type the 9th AF did not have, is inadequate, I should have put in all the 8th , 9th, 12th and 15th AF data and all types, not forgetting the carpetbaggers given the FFI sabotage operations, definite failure there to mention that use and context. Of course I said heavy bombers, and the claimed in context reply omits the RAF ones, along with the other RAF forces. Why that omission given such a need for context? Beyond put in lots of data it is boring, put in a subset it is inadequate.

It may have escaped your intention that B-26 bomb loads for M/Y, rail, barge, bridge interdiction in France at 4,000 pounds, was nearly same as B-17, bombed 10,000 feet lower and achieved asgood ot better accuracy. Please re-define 'heavy' perhaps in context of Transportation Campaign with respect to tonnage per aircraft on target?

The short answer is the oil campaign started about as soon as it could, defined as it would have a sustained effect. Choosing a specific set of targets makes you more predictable, making the job of the defences easier, they had to be worn down first. The raids also started about as soon as there was enough bomb lift to be able to sustain the attacks along with all the other targets. The USAAF says heavy bombers in the ETO dropped 47,452 tons of bombs in 1943 and 50,845 tons in the MTO. The oil campaign saw the ETO heavies drop 99,391 tons in 1944 and 26,562 in 1945, the MTO 52,622 and 15,250. (short tons). Bomber Command dropped 157,457 long tons of bombs in 1943, oil tonnage was 48,043 in 1944 and 47,510 long tons in 1945.

Reread the excerpts on #410 above from Stratgic Bombing Survey. The CAPABILITY existed as early as Big Week. Misburg, Merseberg, Leun, Ruhland, Brux were no more heavily defended than Berlin, Schweinfurt, Regensburg, Madgeburg, or Munich. Puleeze - it was a matter of priority. If left alone Spaatz would have begun in March but had no hope of getting Eisenhower to align against the Transportation Plan - given an either/or choice regarding capacity to do both - or fight the political war.

Allied economic intelligence was a weak point, trying to figure effects on output from photographs was a problem. However for the avgas attacks the Luftwaffe tended to provide evidence via its signals about the fuel situation. Even so the oil campaign had a lot of raids bombing plants a while from resuming production while allowing other plants to get back into production before they were bombed. And as the USSBS noted post war it would have taken a few weeks to restore production once the bombing stopped.

That is why the transport plan attack on Germany was so effective, instead of hitting all the factories it was hitting the key water and rail transport systems to cut the links between the factories and disrupted their continual need to ship stuff in and other stuff out, add the transport system's ability to break up bulk shipments from one source into the sizes needed by the individual customers The loss of canal and rail removed economic activity and strategic mobility, while the loss of oil removed tactical mobility

It Transport Plan was 'effective' but recall that 8th and 9th and RAF dedicated entire Fighter Command to CAS, interdiction, low level bombing of M/Y, bridges, rail, road and barge traffic - ditto 8th and 9th BC and RAF TAC and even RAF BC for at least 10 days before 'break' to attack Oil/Chemical in mid June, then back again on the tactical front.

 

[GrauGeist]

I do not know enough about the bombing campaign to address specifics, but I have a question for any of you who do:

Would it have been practical to attack the oil/gasoline industries earlier??

To my mind, from what I have read on this forum (for the most part), that is the only change that would have(may have?) made a significant difference.

The Soviets initially attacked Rumanian pipelines in 1941 but that was a limited campaign, as they were being pushed back out of range.
The USAAF launched a raid against Rumania in 1942 from Egypt with limited success.
In 1943, the well known raid (Operation Tidal Wave) took place conducted by the USAAF.

The main issue with the early raids into Rumania (excluding the Soviets), was an effective escort. In order to get to the Rumanian oil fields, the Allied bombers had to pass through Bulgaria, which was well defended.
The same case can be made in regards to German oil facilities in Germany.

 

[pbehn]

The Soviets initially attacked Rumanian pipelines in 1941 but that was a limited campaign, as they were being pushed back out of range.
The USAAF launched a raid against Rumania in 1942 from Egypt with limited success.
In 1943, the well known raid (Operation Tidal Wave) took place conducted by the USAAF.

The main issue with the early raids into Rumania (excluding the Soviets), was an effective escort. In order to get to the Rumanian oil fields, the Allied bombers had to pass through Bulgaria, which was well defended.
The same case can be made in regards to German oil facilities in Germany.

There were attacks against oil targets before there was an oil plan, another issue is it is extremely difficult to completely knock out oil plants and refineries, they have to be continually attacked. Oil campaign chronology of World War II - Wikipedia

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

There were attacks against oil targets before there was an oil plan, another issue is it is extremely difficult to completely knock out oil plants and refineries, they have to be continually attacked. Oil campaign chronology of World War II - Wikipedia

Did they think to use cluster-bombs against these targets? That would have played Hell with all the plumbing involved in a refinery.

 

[pbehn]

Did they think to use cluster-bombs against these targets? That would have played Hell with all the plumbing involved in a refinery.

Whatever you do to a pipe rack can be repaired in days, they didnt have to follow the ASME code. A joint on a small diameter pipe only takes an hour or so to weld. I worked on some reactor vessels in Qatar, they were 2 inch wall thickness, only a direct hit or very near miss will damage them, even if everything around it is blown to bits that is easily replaced too. Also there is an optical illusion with many refineries and many cities, there are huge spaces in them, just dropping bombs within the boundaries of the refinery means you have a statistically small chance of hitting anything important, so a lot of bombs are needed.