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This is a case of comparing apples and oranges. the forces on midway are not comparable to the forces that were attached to CarDiv 1 and 2. The reason is because of where they were, and their total lack of expereince working with the fleet to provide them with coherent tactical intell. You cannot also include all the Japanese BBs for the same reason. If Recon elements have not worked with carriers, they are worse than useless in providing good intell. The USN carriers had no supplementary sources of intelligence gathering of a tactical nature that they could rely on. They might get lucky here and there and get a submarine report, or an occasional sighting report fom land based air, but not coherent or consistent support
there were also the planes on Midway for the US.....
others plane avaialble for Japanese
8 Type 96 torpedo bomber (Hosho)
12 Type 96 fighter and 12 Type 97 torpedo bomber (Zuiho)
35 Seaplanes in the Chitose and Kamikawa Maru
a max 31 seaplanes was possible carried from the BB and an other 39 from the CC i've many doubt that actually they loaded the max number of seaplanes
others planes available for US
31 PBY-5 on Midway
6 TBF on Midway
21 F2A on midway
7 F4F on Midway
40 SBD on Midway
16 B-17 on Midway
4 B-26 on Midway
plus the seaplanes in the fleet (max 20)
Not sure I understand what you are saying here Pars? As you said before and on other occasions, IJN search was very high quality and in general of a higher performance quality than the USN's in terms of range/area of coverage and accuracy of position reports.
But the USN PBY's were by training the "eyes of the fleet." and the USN CVs, as I am sure you are aware, did typically launch organic searches (by SBDs at Midway, twice as a measure of insurance).
The first search departed in the early morning (~0420) in response to intelligence-based report of two separated groups of IJN CVs and against the possibility that one of the pairs might lie somewhere further North than where they were expected:
the location of the two that were subsequently discovered by the PBY before 0600. While the accuracy of some of PBY and later SBD position reports left something to be desired,
they got the job done in the sense that, based on their admittedly inaccurate information, enough CV based TACAIR assets found the enemy and got the job done. Had there been more mystery regarding IJN Intentions,
.that CV launched search would have been more comprehensive probably involving at least 16 SBDs sent out to nearly 250-300 miles, depending on armament, if any. As you say, the IJN had the longer legged scouts, and could have had an earlier detection
True and Fletcher noticed the capability and equipment and advised the USN to make appropriate adjustments based on his experience at Coral Sea. Typically, he was ignored.Doesnt tke into account the very capable floatplane division more or less permanently attached to Car Div 1 and carDiv 2, The USN was forced to use a portion of its CAG as searchplanes. The IJN had 12 floatplanes attached to Tone and Chikuma which had been attached to the carriers since the outbreak of the war. They also had the two fast BBs which had a further 8 floatplanes, all of which had worked closley with the carriers for extended periods and could provide very effective support and co-operation whilst underway. the USN had nothing to compare to that.
The land based PBYs were inexperienced and there were severe difficulties in getting them to co-operate effectively with the forces afloat, because they simply lacked the experience to do so, and in any event the land based forces were badly placed to provide that support.
The result of all this is that the in the opening attacks, the USN should have roughly 50-60% less aircraft available for strike than the Japanese. Thats a critical imbalance.
Why didnt it pan out that way. The USN knew from its codebreaking where and when the IJN would be, and did not need to expend too many resources finding the Japanese. The Japanese got unlucky and sloppy in their searches, and it cost them the battle. If the IJN had changed their codes, and called on11 carriers in July instead of 4 in June (the 11 carriers being Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Zuikaku, Shokaku, Zuiho, Hiyo, Junyo, Ryujo and Hosho), the result would not have been in much doubt. What the Japanese had to do, however was get over themselves and the victories they had won to that point.
Vin, I don't often see a chance to correct one of your posts so I'l take the small opportunity you've provided here to do so: The above list should be 16 operational SBD-2s and 12 operational SB2U-3 Vindicators.
.The intelligence on the IJN carrier force location is a common misconception only recently corrected. The USN had at least one critcal mistaken notion about the composition and location of Kido Butai. That was the issue of the separated Pair of CVs lurking behind the two that were expected to stage the assault on Midway
In other words, the searches undertaken by the Black Cats was a sham, based on the SIGINT they had already received. Launching at 0420 from Midway places the US Searches about 3 hours behind those of the IJN
. A couple of things to respond to here. The PBYs that were launched to "find" the Striking Force were not required to obtain a visual sighting, and neither did they (at least initially). They relied simply on their ASV Radar to confirm the position of the Striking Fordce. Because SIGINT had already predicted the time and location of its arrival, all the PBYs had to do was confirm what the MAGIC guys already had predicted. That explains nicely, incidentally why the PBY reports were so innaccurate. They were relying on distant tracking of "something". it was not until daylight that visual sighting could confirm what was already known. I confess I dont actually know when that visual confirmation occurred.
The second point is that Fletcher was unnaturally worried about an outflanking manouvre from the North, and this caused him to expend 10 SBDs on an armed recon in that direction. There was no basis to support this, just Fletcher not trusting completely the intell being provided to him, and the sneaking or nagging suspiciion that the Japanese were up to "something".....
.This is the first I have heard of ASV sets on the day searching PBYs. The black Cats were brought in from PH because they could do such an attack with their ASV sets. AFAIK, the PBYs based at and operating from Midway did not have such equipment. Please provide a source for that information
.
Source: David Brown - Carrier Operations In World war II - VolII The Pacific December 1941 to feb 1943 ; London 1984
Although the following is not a direct reference to the search in question, it is the same aircraft on during the same operation.
At Page 166 Brown makes his observationsd with regard to the PBY searches....this account relates to those searches that found the main body, but i firmly believe the methods and equipment described for this part of the operation can be reasonably exytrapolated for the searches undertaken within 24hours for the Striking Force
Browns account relevantly says "At 2115 (june 3rd) as the b-17s returned from their long mission, four PBY-5As of VP-44 took off from Midwayeach armed with a single 21 in torpedo. All had been flown in by the same crews on the same afternoon - a ten hour flight from Oahu. Four hours and 575 miles out from Midway, three of the aircraft detected the enemy transports at distant range of about 100 miles on their ASV radars, and then vectored to the detected enemy force, making down moon glide attacks, as well as strafing the decks of the transports. One torpedo hit, daamging the fleet oiler Akebono Maru, which lost 24 mwen, but remained with the convoy....."
He makes the same references to those aircraft used to locate the Striking Force.
As for both Lundstrom and Fletcher, no I dont think much of either. And I reject the revisionist accounts that have recently tried to paint him in a more sympathetic light.
Neither do I think much of Nagumo incidentally
My chart from Battle Stations (Wise Co., N.Y., 1946) shows them sighted at around 450 out and bombed at around 350 out....not as sure about the Japanese, but still over 300 miles
That's pretty much how it was, although the Chief Petty Officers also ran the craps games. How were those bankrolled? I shan't say, except that I doubt you'll find that in one of your books.According to one source, one of those "my uncle served in such and such a unit" acconts....This account is describing operations that commenced from May 1942, and goes a follows:..Uncle John was the leading Chief Petty Officer of the unit he was responsible for ensuring that the aircraft were up and ready for action. He made out the sailors work assignments and supervised the repairs on each of the aircraft making sure the planes were fixed and fixed properly. FAW-4 consisted of many VP or patrol squadrons. These Aircraft Squadron's would deploy to the Aleutians from the U.S., and would be stationed along with the HEDRONs on each island. Each a squadron was usually comprised of seven PBY-5a's, later the aircraft were changed over to PV-1 Venturas and then to the more updated PV-2 Harpoon patrol planes.