parsifal
Colonel
I dont think Fletcher can be given the credit for the loss of anything like 6 IJN carriers. And his bio whilst not great, still illustrates the point.
Coral Sea was a pyrrhic victory at the time. Only susbequent events delivered or transformed it into a "strategic victory". Moreover, i agree that at the end the USN possessed greater strength than the IJN. generally accepted losses during the battle were
The US fleet suffered greater losses in the battle. US losses:
One carrier destroyed, one damaged, one oiler and one destroyer sunk, 66 aircraft lost, and 543 men killed or wounded.
Japanese losses:
One small carrier destroyed, one carrier severely damaged, one destroyer and three small naval ships sunk, 77 carrier aircraft lost, and 1074 men killed or wounded.
(Mitsuo Fuchido and Masataku Okumiya, Midway. The Battle That Doomed Japan, Hutchinson, 1957 pp 116-7.)
The earlier figures are not necessarily wrong, as these losses for both sides include aircraft lost with ships sunkand from all causes, whilst the earlier figures seem to represent a/c lost in actual combat. losses to all causes, including the out of control fires that engulfed the Shokaku after the battle and very nearly sank her seems a bit of a stretch to be attributable to Fletcher. more pertinntly the Japanese losses were more the reult of poor damage control and poor tactical handling rather than any brilliance displayed by Fletcher. .
A large part of the outcome was due to Japanese complacency and failure of naval intelligence – they underestimated the strength of the forces available to the US, believing that it could only provide one carrier instead of two. Thus, they did not assign to the invasion the full strength that was available to them.
The Japanese also made tactical mistakes – they wasted valuable searching hours while attacking a relatively unimportant target, the tanker. They also lost the gamble involved in searching for their targets during the late afternoon, resulting in the loss of irreplaceable combat-experienced air crew.
The Americans had the advantages of knowing what the enemy were planning, due to being able to intercept and decode their secret signals. The Americans had radar that could identify incoming enemy aircraft in time for them to scramble their own fighters into the air to attack them.
The Americans also had luck during their attack – the two Japanese carriers were about twelve kilometres apart and one was covered in cloud, so the US pilots could concentrate on one, free from the protective guns of the other. They destroyed the Shokaku. This meant also that the Shokaku's planes, when they returned from attacking the US carriers, had to land on the Zuikaku; but that ship was unable to handle the number of planes arriving, and crew had to push landed planes overboard to allow more incoming ones to land. The Japanese lost 45 of the 72 aircraft operational at the outset of battle on 7 May.
The Allies sometimes needed that luck – as some of their weapons were decidedly inferior. The Devastator Torpedo Bomber, for example, had to fly low and slowly for a long period when coming in to release its torpedoes against the enemy, and in doing so became 'sitting ducks' for the gunners aboard the target ship. Then, even if the Devastators were able to release their torpedoes, they were likely not to stay on course, or if they did hit, not to explode!
However attributing the victory to Fletchers brilliance as a commander is a stretch supported by nothing other than misplaced loyalty to the man. I would describe his performance as solid, cautious, and uninspired.
At Midway, Fletchers command was part of a fleet that sank a further 4 Japanese carriers, and irreparably damaged the Japanese offensive capabilities. that needs to be acknowledged. but how much of the tactical handling for that amazing victory can we give to Fletcher. As a senior commander on the sceneone is tempted to say "a lot" , but in fact I think the battle was won in spite of his performance, rather than because of it. And that is despite his greater level of experience in handling the carriers. His staff, particulalry his chielf of operations (whose name I forget) was the main driving force for the crucial decisions that won the battle . He (fletcher) halved the strike capability of one carrier, sending aircraft off on fruitless searches in the wrong direction. I am sure his apologists will argue that was because he was worred about a flanking attack, however on the day of the battle, this was an action that led to very strong disagreements in Fletchers command. Fletcher showed his real absence of talent when, having located the IJN carriers, he resisted (initially) the recommendation to launch immediately. tis despite having the experience to know that he who strikes first usually wins in carrier warfare. Eventually he was persuaded away from waiting (for the return of the recon elements). The foresight of Fletchers staff and not Fletcher was the reason for the excellent tactical handling of the resources and the reason the American achieved first strike during the battle.
We can look at the other battles, but the point is, battles were fought and won, in spite of Fletcher, not because of him.
Coral Sea was a pyrrhic victory at the time. Only susbequent events delivered or transformed it into a "strategic victory". Moreover, i agree that at the end the USN possessed greater strength than the IJN. generally accepted losses during the battle were
The US fleet suffered greater losses in the battle. US losses:
One carrier destroyed, one damaged, one oiler and one destroyer sunk, 66 aircraft lost, and 543 men killed or wounded.
Japanese losses:
One small carrier destroyed, one carrier severely damaged, one destroyer and three small naval ships sunk, 77 carrier aircraft lost, and 1074 men killed or wounded.
(Mitsuo Fuchido and Masataku Okumiya, Midway. The Battle That Doomed Japan, Hutchinson, 1957 pp 116-7.)
The earlier figures are not necessarily wrong, as these losses for both sides include aircraft lost with ships sunkand from all causes, whilst the earlier figures seem to represent a/c lost in actual combat. losses to all causes, including the out of control fires that engulfed the Shokaku after the battle and very nearly sank her seems a bit of a stretch to be attributable to Fletcher. more pertinntly the Japanese losses were more the reult of poor damage control and poor tactical handling rather than any brilliance displayed by Fletcher. .
A large part of the outcome was due to Japanese complacency and failure of naval intelligence – they underestimated the strength of the forces available to the US, believing that it could only provide one carrier instead of two. Thus, they did not assign to the invasion the full strength that was available to them.
The Japanese also made tactical mistakes – they wasted valuable searching hours while attacking a relatively unimportant target, the tanker. They also lost the gamble involved in searching for their targets during the late afternoon, resulting in the loss of irreplaceable combat-experienced air crew.
The Americans had the advantages of knowing what the enemy were planning, due to being able to intercept and decode their secret signals. The Americans had radar that could identify incoming enemy aircraft in time for them to scramble their own fighters into the air to attack them.
The Americans also had luck during their attack – the two Japanese carriers were about twelve kilometres apart and one was covered in cloud, so the US pilots could concentrate on one, free from the protective guns of the other. They destroyed the Shokaku. This meant also that the Shokaku's planes, when they returned from attacking the US carriers, had to land on the Zuikaku; but that ship was unable to handle the number of planes arriving, and crew had to push landed planes overboard to allow more incoming ones to land. The Japanese lost 45 of the 72 aircraft operational at the outset of battle on 7 May.
The Allies sometimes needed that luck – as some of their weapons were decidedly inferior. The Devastator Torpedo Bomber, for example, had to fly low and slowly for a long period when coming in to release its torpedoes against the enemy, and in doing so became 'sitting ducks' for the gunners aboard the target ship. Then, even if the Devastators were able to release their torpedoes, they were likely not to stay on course, or if they did hit, not to explode!
However attributing the victory to Fletchers brilliance as a commander is a stretch supported by nothing other than misplaced loyalty to the man. I would describe his performance as solid, cautious, and uninspired.
At Midway, Fletchers command was part of a fleet that sank a further 4 Japanese carriers, and irreparably damaged the Japanese offensive capabilities. that needs to be acknowledged. but how much of the tactical handling for that amazing victory can we give to Fletcher. As a senior commander on the sceneone is tempted to say "a lot" , but in fact I think the battle was won in spite of his performance, rather than because of it. And that is despite his greater level of experience in handling the carriers. His staff, particulalry his chielf of operations (whose name I forget) was the main driving force for the crucial decisions that won the battle . He (fletcher) halved the strike capability of one carrier, sending aircraft off on fruitless searches in the wrong direction. I am sure his apologists will argue that was because he was worred about a flanking attack, however on the day of the battle, this was an action that led to very strong disagreements in Fletchers command. Fletcher showed his real absence of talent when, having located the IJN carriers, he resisted (initially) the recommendation to launch immediately. tis despite having the experience to know that he who strikes first usually wins in carrier warfare. Eventually he was persuaded away from waiting (for the return of the recon elements). The foresight of Fletchers staff and not Fletcher was the reason for the excellent tactical handling of the resources and the reason the American achieved first strike during the battle.
We can look at the other battles, but the point is, battles were fought and won, in spite of Fletcher, not because of him.
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is there an smiley face icon for intellectually exhausted? I think we just refought the first year of WW2. Wore me out. 
