What if? - Battle of Midway in July 1942 rather than June

[parsifal]

I dont think Fletcher can be given the credit for the loss of anything like 6 IJN carriers. And his bio whilst not great, still illustrates the point.

Coral Sea was a pyrrhic victory at the time. Only susbequent events delivered or transformed it into a "strategic victory". Moreover, i agree that at the end the USN possessed greater strength than the IJN. generally accepted losses during the battle were

The US fleet suffered greater losses in the battle. US losses:

One carrier destroyed, one damaged, one oiler and one destroyer sunk, 66 aircraft lost, and 543 men killed or wounded.

Japanese losses:

One small carrier destroyed, one carrier severely damaged, one destroyer and three small naval ships sunk, 77 carrier aircraft lost, and 1074 men killed or wounded.

(Mitsuo Fuchido and Masataku Okumiya, Midway. The Battle That Doomed Japan, Hutchinson, 1957 pp 116-7.)

The earlier figures are not necessarily wrong, as these losses for both sides include aircraft lost with ships sunkand from all causes, whilst the earlier figures seem to represent a/c lost in actual combat. losses to all causes, including the out of control fires that engulfed the Shokaku after the battle and very nearly sank her seems a bit of a stretch to be attributable to Fletcher. more pertinntly the Japanese losses were more the reult of poor damage control and poor tactical handling rather than any brilliance displayed by Fletcher. .

A large part of the outcome was due to Japanese complacency and failure of naval intelligence – they underestimated the strength of the forces available to the US, believing that it could only provide one carrier instead of two. Thus, they did not assign to the invasion the full strength that was available to them.

The Japanese also made tactical mistakes – they wasted valuable searching hours while attacking a relatively unimportant target, the tanker. They also lost the gamble involved in searching for their targets during the late afternoon, resulting in the loss of irreplaceable combat-experienced air crew.

The Americans had the advantages of knowing what the enemy were planning, due to being able to intercept and decode their secret signals. The Americans had radar that could identify incoming enemy aircraft in time for them to scramble their own fighters into the air to attack them.

The Americans also had luck during their attack – the two Japanese carriers were about twelve kilometres apart and one was covered in cloud, so the US pilots could concentrate on one, free from the protective guns of the other. They destroyed the Shokaku. This meant also that the Shokaku's planes, when they returned from attacking the US carriers, had to land on the Zuikaku; but that ship was unable to handle the number of planes arriving, and crew had to push landed planes overboard to allow more incoming ones to land. The Japanese lost 45 of the 72 aircraft operational at the outset of battle on 7 May.

The Allies sometimes needed that luck – as some of their weapons were decidedly inferior. The Devastator Torpedo Bomber, for example, had to fly low and slowly for a long period when coming in to release its torpedoes against the enemy, and in doing so became 'sitting ducks' for the gunners aboard the target ship. Then, even if the Devastators were able to release their torpedoes, they were likely not to stay on course, or if they did hit, not to explode!

However attributing the victory to Fletchers brilliance as a commander is a stretch supported by nothing other than misplaced loyalty to the man. I would describe his performance as solid, cautious, and uninspired.


At Midway, Fletchers command was part of a fleet that sank a further 4 Japanese carriers, and irreparably damaged the Japanese offensive capabilities. that needs to be acknowledged. but how much of the tactical handling for that amazing victory can we give to Fletcher. As a senior commander on the sceneone is tempted to say "a lot" , but in fact I think the battle was won in spite of his performance, rather than because of it. And that is despite his greater level of experience in handling the carriers. His staff, particulalry his chielf of operations (whose name I forget) was the main driving force for the crucial decisions that won the battle . He (fletcher) halved the strike capability of one carrier, sending aircraft off on fruitless searches in the wrong direction. I am sure his apologists will argue that was because he was worred about a flanking attack, however on the day of the battle, this was an action that led to very strong disagreements in Fletchers command. Fletcher showed his real absence of talent when, having located the IJN carriers, he resisted (initially) the recommendation to launch immediately. tis despite having the experience to know that he who strikes first usually wins in carrier warfare. Eventually he was persuaded away from waiting (for the return of the recon elements). The foresight of Fletchers staff and not Fletcher was the reason for the excellent tactical handling of the resources and the reason the American achieved first strike during the battle.

We can look at the other battles, but the point is, battles were fought and won, in spite of Fletcher, not because of him.

 

[tomo pauk]

Fletcher was pitted repeatedly against the most capable carrier airforce in the world, managing to extract the toll that was eventually unbereable for the IJN. He was solid, he had to be cautious; getting 'inspired' almost cost Bull Hasley his career, and US forces many servicemen lives.
No admiral/marshall/general of ww2 was performing flawlessly every time. Expecting Fletcher to make perfect victories in 1942 is unfair to the man.

 

[parsifal]

great points and well said tomo. I agree, in case there is any doubt. that is not what is being claimed here. The claim is that he was brilliant, and responsible for the loss of no less than 6 japanese flat tops. Baloney.....

 

[syscom3]

... The foresight of Fletchers staff and not Fletcher was the reason for the excellent tactical handling of the resources and the reason the American achieved first strike during the battle.

The mark of a great leader in any endeavor is in their choice of subordinates and his willingness to listen to them.

 

[pinsog]

I wonder how many carriers Fletcher would have lost if his CAP was made up of Hellcat fighters instead of Wildcats? How many Japanese carriers could her have sunk if he had Avenger torpedo bombers with reliable torpedoes escorted by Hellcats instead of Wildcats? He might have have been the greatest fighting admiral in American history. By the time Halsey was fighting later in the war, the experienced Japanese aviators were mostly dead and they were facing Hellcats and Corsairs instead of Wildcats. BIG difference.

 

[tomo pauk]

USN of 1944 vs. IJN of 1942?

 

[Shortround6]

Fletcher may have been like Jellicoe in WW I. He may not have been able to win the war but he could lose it in a matter of hours.

Granted the American's have a better potential to stage a come back, but losing one or two MORE carriers BEFORE Midway would have left the Americans in a very vulnerable position.

I am not saying he was brilliant but husbanding resources at that stage of game may have been a better strategy than taking big gambles.

 

[pinsog]

USN of 1944 vs. IJN of 1942?

Just fast forward the Hellcat and the Avenger, and make sure our torpedoes work(the torpedoes could have been an easy fix, no excuse for unreliable torpedoes) I know it couldnt be done, I'm just pointing out how easy it should be to win when you have superior equipment.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

However attributing the victory to Fletchers brilliance as a commander is a stretch supported by nothing other than misplaced loyalty to the man. I would describe his performance as solid, cautious, and uninspired.

I can certainly accept that, with the caveat that the circumstances at the time called for some caution.

"The Japanese lost 45 of the 72 aircraft operational at the outset of battle on 7 May."

Your loss accounting here does not match my sources which state that the IJN lost 12 aircraft (10 VT 2 VB) during the 7th's twilight air battle and 24 (12 VF 6 VT) with the sinking of the Shoho. That's a total of 36 aircraft lost on the 7th.

Then you cite 72 operational aircraft at the battle outset on the 7th? IJN started the battle with A/C totals on the evening of the 6th as follows: 56 of 58 operational A/C on Shokaku (18 VF, 18 VB 20 VT) while Zuikaku air group had 53 operational of 63 A/C (19 VF, 17 VB 17 VT) for a combined total of 127 A/C operational on the morning of the 7th.

Late edit: I think something got deleted in the following in a cut and paste that went awry. not sure what all i wanted to say????

In a classic anvil attack timed with the VB assault, USN TBDs claimed scoring 5 torpedo hits that contributed to sinking the Shoho, perhaps because they were using up the last of the original stock of prewar Mk 13 mod 0's which were reported to be more reliable than the newer issues. That, or perhaps more believable is that this was just a report by overoptimistic USN VT pilots.

At Midway, Fletchers command was part of a fleet that sank a further 4 Japanese carriers, and irreparably damaged the Japanese offensive capabilities. that needs to be acknowledged. but how much of the tactical handling for that amazing victory can we give to Fletcher. As a senior commander on the sceneone is tempted to say "a lot" , but in fact I think the battle was won in spite of his performance, rather than because of it. He halved the strike capability of one carrier, sending aircraft off on fruitless searches in the wrong direction. I am sure his apologists will argue that was because he was worred about a flanking attack, however on the day of the battle, this was an action strongly disagreed with by Admiral Brown, the real architect of the victory. it was Brown, thankfully that insisted on sending the remaining strike aircraft off immediately after the Striking Force had been located, and not wait for the recovery of those very same aircraft that Fletcher had sent off on a wild goos chase. Browns foresight was opposed by guess who. Luckily his more competent shief of staff won that argument....and the rest is history. We can look at the other battles, but the point is, battles were fought and won, in spite of Fletcher, not because of him.

Doesn't the fact that TF-16 and -17 aircraft arrived at over Kido Butai within minutes of each other suggest to you something may be amiss in the description you gave above?

First, whether you realize it or not, you are parroting Bates deeply flawed War College analysis. Bates had an insufficient understand of WW2 carrier ops to render an objective judgements of Fletcher's actions. Who was the war college president when Bates made his report? Spruance. Not that Spruance was overly vain, but I can imagine he would be flattered by a report that cast him in a favorable light especially when there was a strong lobby of officers who had a vested interest in denigrating Fletcher's reputation led by Turner and Towers for two of the most influential.

Why do I say this? check his bio: Admiral Richard Bates Papers

Spruance proceeded with launch preparations based on Fletcher's command given at 0607: "Proceed southwesterly and attack enemy carriers as soon as definitely located", not on the advice of Browning who did fortunately advise Spruance to wait an hour to launch to shorten the distance to Kido Butai which Fletcher left to Spruance's discretion (Fletcher wasn't a micro-manager). Spruance launched under Browning's untutored (far from brilliant) direction to begin at 0700 as a deferred departure, which entailed a rendezvous over TF-16 of two deck loads of aircraft, the consequences of which were a delay in departure that ultimately fragmented the strike which was released to proceed at 0745 leaving the tardily launched VT-6 TBDs to fend for themselves departing independently at 0806. Fletcher had completed the recovery of his search and 1st CAP by 0645. So just how much time did Fletcher waste waiting for confirmation of phantom CVs which never came? Well, he started turned into the wind at ~0838 to launch of his 17 SBDs and 12 TBDs with 12 escort CAP VF. Launch was completed by 0914. While TF-17 launch may have only been a few minutes faster than TF-16, the biggest difference was in the strike cohesion. TF-17 arrived over the enemy at essentially at the same time. Obviously, waiting to recover the morning search did not delay the launch by 1 minute. Waiting for confirmation of the remaining two carriers was the specific reason for the delay and it cost the US nothing. It did provide the USN forces with a secondary search capability of 10 SBDs that proved critical in finding the last IJN CV. Of course critics of Fletcher recite the litany that he should not have withheld his 17 VS-5 SBDs from the AM strike. They maintain these would certainly have taken out the Hiryu before it hit the Yorktown. Maybe. Many pilots didn't even see the 4th carrier and those in VS-5 might have also piled on Soryu before realizing another IJN CV was lurking on the horizon. That's just what happened to VB VS-6 when McClusky dove on the Kaga, and every SBD in BOTH squadrons piled on. Only Dick Best and two wingmen dove on Akagi, but fortunately for the USN, their aim was impeccable. The reserve SBDs did find the Hiryu and the rest is history. As it was, Yorktown SBDs certainly put down one IJN CV and at worst shared in another.

I think you may be confusing Captain Miles Browning with Adm. Wilson Brown who I believe was occupying a desk in DC at the time of Midway. Browning's eratic performance at Midway almost devastated the Enterprise air wing on the 5th when he came into conflict with the air group commander, the very capable Wade McClusky. Spruance took McClusky's side and all proceeded without incident. Brown, did eventually become an Admiral on his retirement (with Halsey's mentoring which should tell you something) Browning actually WAS indeed removed from command for reason in May 1944 and banished to the command and staff college at Leavenworth, Kansas. At least one former shipmate opined "I always knew he'd end up in Leavenworth," meaning the prison and not the college.

According to Buell, Spruance Biographer, said of Browning, "Browning bungled every aspect of the planning and execution of the second launch (to attack the Hiryu) on the 4th"." He also botched strike planning on the 5th as related above.

Fletcher commanded the entire US fleet at Midway, not just TF-17. Spruance looked to him for orders until the loss of the Yorktown when he deferred to Spruance. From that point on, Spruance commanded. Yorktown's overall performance was superb and exceeded that of the other two US carriers by a comfortable margin, which may be just the result of a more experienced air group and staff or the combination of a sage commander and well run shop and air group.

To me, to say the battle was won in spite of Fletcher is just plain silly and not supportable by the facts. I believe the victory belonged equally to both admirals who did well, if not perfectly. But once again, here we may just have to agree to disagree.

Finally FYI: According to Parshall and Tully, Fuchida's book is reported to be considered less than authentic account by the Japanese themselves. domestically 'debunked' is the word they use. from what I understand the debunking was done by veterans of the battle as well as historians. I'd take the time to read Shattered Sword, or Black Shoe before suggesting they are simply apologists revising history.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

great points and well said tomo. I agree, in case there is any doubt. that is not what is being claimed here. The claim is that he was brilliant, and responsible for the loss of no less than 6 japanese flat tops. Baloney.....

Well I certainly didn't mean to claim that Fletcher was brilliant. Or that he was uniquely responsible for the destruction of 6 IJN flattops. If you had asked me whether I meant that I would have said, no. He was however in at least intial command during events that had that result and so, can justifiably claim a share of the credit.

 

[parsifal]

We are not that far from each other in terms of position, I can see. Fletcher certainly got a raw deal in the post war wash up. I dont know if I was quoting Bates, Ive heard of him, but never read him. Saying however that he was "promoted" with his North Pacific assignment, is a real stretch Old Crow. Whether justified or not, whether promised a fleet of CVEs or not, a transfer to the North Pacific after having commanded the only and premier offensive element of the USN for most of 1942, must have left him a bitterly disappointed man. His post war attitudes certainly bear that out.

The USN has been criticised in both the Coral Sea and Midway wash ups as having not pursued the Japanese more aggressively. On both occasions the Japanese were left reeling after the battles, yet managed to escape with most of their forces, to fight another day. i dont know how well founded those criticisms are...in fact I have strong doubts about them, but I also think there was room for the Americans to achieve some greater victory than they did, but that needed an aggressive commander and aggressive tactics....it is significant I think that 2 years later when faced with a similar situation Halsey did not hesitate, ironic that he blew it off Cape Engano. But I think he was reacting to what had happened to Fletcher....castigated by his own peers for timidity, that was a cardinal unforgiveable sin in a service like the USN that marked as its hallmark extreme aggression in its tactical behaviour.

Some of your reply relates to comments i went back and edited....Not sure if it makes a difference to what you want to say, but I thought you might want to know.

Great discussion incidentally

 

[oldcrowcv63]

We are not that far from each other in terms of position, I can see. Fletcher certainly got a raw deal in the post war wash up. I dont know if I was quoting Bates, Ive heard of him, but never read him.

I agree. I have a copy of Bates, and in looking it over and found a lot of the same points others have subsequently cited. If I get a chance, I'll digitize and post it. It's about 150 pages. ummm, don't know when I'll have a chance to do that.

Wait found it on line:

http://midway1942.org/docs/usn_doc_25.shtml

Saying however that he was "promoted" with his North Pacific assignment, is a real stretch Old Crow. Whether justified or not, whether promised a fleet of CVEs or not, a transfer to the North Pacific after having commanded the only and premier offensive element of the USN for most of 1942, must have left him a bitterly disappointed man. His post war attitudes certainly bear that out.

I agree with the foregoing. It must indeed have been a disappointment, but he apparently felt somewhat redeemed when, despite Kings effort to oust him, he had enough high level support to hold on to the assignment and be at the center of the planning for KeelBlock in 1944. I also think there is evidence he was truly exhausted by the end of September and appreciated the chance to be off the hot seat for a change. He couldn't then foresee the long term effect of the critical campaign waged mainly by a certain very influential leader who was attempting (in my view) to obscure his own culpability in tragic events (Turner). His campaign, was aided by some jealous pioneer aviators who believed if only they had been in command of the carriers the war would have been over in 6 months. This campaign was largely successful until the early 60's when Fletcher's screen commander, Adm. Poco Smith published his own account with a more balanced (but not uncritical) view of Fletcher's performance. After the war, Fletcher initially attempted to help Bates and Morrison but realized from early drafts what Bates was doing and how Morrison's history was treating him. Rather than fight another personal war for his reputation (without the aid of his papers lost on the Yorktown), he retired peacefully. With the passing of his generation, and the discovery of new informative documents, it may be possible to have an objective view of those events without the emotional drama that attended the survivors who were so heavily involved. Of course that should always be done with caution as your skeptical concerns about revisionist history are certainly justified.

The USN has been criticised in both the Coral Sea and Midway wash ups as having not pursued the Japanese more aggressively. On both occasions the Japanese were left reeling after the battles, yet managed to escape with most of their forces, to fight another day. i dont know how well founded those criticisms are...in fact I have strong doubts about them, but I also think there was room for the Americans to achieve some greater victory than they did, but that needed an aggressive commander and aggressive tactics....it is significant I think that 2 years later when faced with a similar situation Halsey did not hesitate, ironic that he blew it off Cape Engano. But I think he was reacting to what had happened to Fletcher....castigated by his own peers for timidity, that was a cardinal unforgiveable sin in a service like the USN that marked as its hallmark extreme aggression in its tactical behaviour.

These are really good points. The story that I've heard tell is that Spruance was heavily criticized after Midway for his failure to pursue. other say, that's exactly what Yamamoto wanted: a night time surface engagement where his big guns could be brought to bear. Beyond that, heading west would have brought the USN units into the range of Wake aerial coverage. I have also heard that at that time in the war the USN did not have an effective armor penetrating bomb and so its HE explosives were unlikely to have much effect on the IJN heavies. The two surviving CVs certainly retained an effective punch but I think the pilots were wearing out. I think Spruance preserved the victory by remaining cautious. I also agree that Halsey was prompted to his actions at Engano by the over-aggressive entreaties of the naval aviation community as well as his own inclinations. In general, I believe it was God's grace that Fletcher, Fitch and Spruance were in command of the USN CV forces during the first 8 months of the war. If Halsey had been in command, I suspect the result might have been very different and not necessarily better. Despite the Pearl Harbor attack, I don't believe the USN really understood how good the IJN was until after Coral Sea, Midway and the events around Guadalcanal. It was a very dangerous proposition to be recklessly aggressive around the IJN. The thing is, the US didn't need to be recklessly aggressive while the IJN had to be to some extent. The USN just needed to survive long enough for the country's industrial capacity to more than make up losses.

Some of your reply relates to comments i went back and edited....Not sure if it makes a difference to what you want to say, but I thought you might want to know.

Great discussion incidentally

is there an smiley face icon for intellectually exhausted? I think we just refought the first year of WW2. Wore me out.

 

[Francis marliere]

Parsifal,

I respect your point of view but don't share it. Your sentence "We can look at the other battles, but the point is, battles were fought and won, in spite of Fletcher, not because of him." is exactly what Fletcher answered when he was asked if he was in command at Midway (something like : I don't know who was in command but I know who would if we had lost). I guess that we can can write that for every commander of every battle (Scott at Cape Esperance, Montgomery at El Alamein, Wellington at Waterloo, ... choose the commander you want to shoot).
I am sorry but have no time to answer in lenght. I just suggest that you read Lundstrom and make up your own mind.

Best regards,

Francis Marliere

 

[oldcrowcv63]

It seems to me many military leaders from that period were forced into a rigorous curriculum of learn to fight or die. Even those touted as the best made ghastly (more or less) mistakes for which they might have been pilloried. Nagumo at PH and MacArthur in the PI in 41, Yamamoto at Midway and Turner at Savo Island in 42, Halsey at Engano in 44. Clark during the entire Italian campaign in 43. Ike in North Africa in 42. (I am not sure of the details of some of these so don't call me to account for disrespecting your favorite leader) The thing is, they all made significant contributions to their cause as well as mistakes in pursuing them. Some were the subject of hagiographies others were cast as goats. What was the real difference? Was it just good PR in the case of the former? or did some leaders so outshine others that we elevate them to the cloud heights. I think there was a broad spectrum of performance from incompetent to brilliant. In the case of Fletcher, I believe he was unjustly labeled as incompetent. I think Pars' word 'solid' is a fair description. he didn't lose the farm during a difficult period. Nuff said. On to a new and captivating thread I hope. But not quite so much. I have to get some work done and you guys are just too much fun to hang out with. Can you imagine if we were all in a room with a couple of cases of beer. Kirin Ichiban for me. Although some say its Fosters for Australian beer, Mate... Pars, If I get to Oz, I'll buy a round for us.

Don't know if Rommel ever made a mistake.(attacking Patton? ) I've read books but so long ago I can't remember.

 

[VBF-13]

Not so fast. We hadn't yet considered the big question, namely, what shape would we be in had they got our carriers? One would think, in other words, before one goes calling an admiral yellow, in effect, for erring on the side of protecting his carriers, one would have some kind of grasp on the import of his rationale. Have any of these critics ever seriously considered that question? Maybe, had they, they'd have been forced to have softened up some. Leave that question dark, though, and criticize away, what the hell? The Japanese had tried twice to get our carriers, both in rather elaborate surprise attacks. They evidently had a grasp on the import of the rationale. I'm not hearing any of these critics ever having so much as even considered that question. Convenient for them, sure. Nonetheless, hmmm...

 

[oldcrowcv63]

VB, I think there was an abiding belief (somewhat alluded to by Pars) that the brown shoe navy could handle anything the IJN threw at them and come out as winners simply by being the more aggressive. I'll stick my neck out here and say, Santa Cruz was the result of that perspective. Even though Kincaid, a black shoe admiral, was in local command, his decisions were motivated by Halsey. Kincaid carried out Halsey's prime directive expressed in his terse pre-battle command: Attack! repeat Attack! I can't help but wonder if the US had used Henderson's few planes (12 VF, 11 VB and 6 P-39/P-400) more smartly or perhaps staged CV air groups out of the unsinkable landbase which was the prime objective of the battle whether the CV battle might have gone a bit differently. The USN was up against 4 flight decks and Henderson might have mitigated the odds somewhat. The US abundance of PBYs seemed to give it a recon edge which turned out ot be ineffective on the 26th AFAIK.

To me, the real problem at Santa Cruz was more the abysmal way the USN radar directed Enterprise CAP battle played out. It was as though the USN had learned nothing from the previous three battles and the continuous swapping of escorts ships exacted a heavy coordination penalty. However the bottom line was the IJN's first team was still superb and, given half a chance, was going to draw blood.

 

[VBF-13]

The Battle of Santa Cruz Island is good support for that theory, Crow, that much I believe. At McDonald's, and have to get back to work. I shall return, though.

 

[parsifal]

Just a bit of changed perspective. As a warame playtester, designer and player (these are not arcade shoot em ups....they usually take 6-8 people at least 200 hours playing time each to complete) I have played a number of simulations of the Pacific War, as both the Japanese and the Allies. There was one game, SPIs grand daddy of em all, "War In The Pacific" (WITP). Its very much the old style of simulation, eight map sections, 500 small scale atoll battle maps, about 5000 counters, scales are each counter represents an individual ship down to destroyer escort (and below that you have multiple ships per counter). Merchant Shipping is represented at 1 counter per 20000 tons. Battalion level ground units. Aircraft are represented at ba scale of 5 aircraft per "unit" (actually pointsd). Each unit of time is a week, consiting of three impulses (about 2 days per impulse) but for carrier battles (and surface battles) the game system uses "telescoping" such that each unit of time can be as short as 5 minuts of battle. This is to maximise the detailing and accuracy as much as possible. There is not too much abstraction...you even get to drive PTs and lay mines

Calling these things "games" is a misnomer. They are really "simulations", and are sometimes used at military colleges to demonstrate military operations. Sandhurst, for example uses a sim by the famous Richard Berg called "Campaign For North Africa" which is even more detailed (to the point really that as a"game" it is really unplayable).

There have been many games of WITP. Mostly for fun, occasionaly to examine operations as part of a course. A game will usually run for 6 months to a year, and is a great way to learn some basic operations techniques.


Ive participated in many of these events, both as a "friendly" event, and in competition. Yes there are other weirdos just like me. For WITP, the USN cannot lose (in a historical sense), even if it loses every carrier in its pre-war inventory. However the way the game victory system works, if the USN or IJN does lose too much material, the players win or lose "on points so to speak".

As the USN I found it verydifficult at the start, ironically because pilots were in short supply, and shipping too scarce to put the forces forward that were needed to effectively defend the forward positions. However, barring a one sided defeat of the USN it was usually possible to start inching back the front lines by the latter part of 1942. The IJN usually did better than it does historically. Few times are there any "Midway" style defeats. Even without a defeat like this, however, the very things that bedevil the US at the beginning start to hurt the IJN for the same reasons. They simply cannot produce the pilots they need, and they dont have the shipping to build an effective forward defence network. A "Midway" style of victory for the Americans is rare in the game, but even when it happens, its doesnt make much difference to the timing or outcome of the US counteroffensive. Perhaps an artifical elemen t of the game, but losing badly and being forced back early does allow the Japanese to initiate Kamikazes, and unless the US defences are very tight, these attacks can be devastating....


However, if the Japanese come out or achieve a one sided victory or victories in 1942, this does slow down, but does not stop, the US counteroffensive, usually by up to a year. In Game terms that usually means the Japanesde will win (the assumption I guess being that they get their negotiated peace).

If the US players use their carriers carefully, they can usually avoid these sorts of one sided defeats, but its anything but easy. For the Japanese, the cardinal rule is "keep your carriers together, or in support of each other"

 

[parsifal]

Don't know if Rommel ever made a mistake.(attacking Patton? ) I've read books but so long ago I can't remember.

Rommel made some monumental stuff ups, most significantly his failure to return air assets to Kesselring after tobruk. Yet he is rightly seen as perhaps thje best land commander of the war for either side.

Determining whether a commander was "inspired" or "outstanding" as opposed to "solid" or "competent", or "poo" or ""incompetent" can be a subjective excercise. Fletcher is no diferent. I dont see Fletcher in the nsame calibre as Mitscher or Ozawa, Nelson or Cunningham. I see him as having similarities to Jellicoe. I see him as better than Nagumo but not to the extent that he could be seen as "brilliant". I think it was possible for him to have done more, but as you rightly point out, that could be seen as wisdom after the fact. Fletcher fought in those battles and didnt lose the farm, he also bloodied the nose of his opponents. Perhaps we should keep that in mind I guess.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I've been interested in AI type simulations for some time. Tried a number of 'games' to see how well they duplicated carrier operations. SSG Carriers at War I II had too many unrealistic flaws but some interesting features but was totally unrealistic. I wasn't terribly impressed by the graphics or user interface. I tried another, whose name I can't remember, although graphics and UI were a bit better it ran very slowly and frequently crashed. Most recently I obtained a copy of HPS Naval Campaigns: Midway and Guadalcanal. These were altogether better but once I got used to the operation, and figured out the game 'features,' by which I mean those quirks in the game that once revealed make it difficult to lose it wasn't as interesting. Also, there was only a bit of randomization of the initial conditions and variables and subsequent movement by the AI. A human running the opposition would have made it far more interesting. Some of the parameter settings like radar ranges were wrong and that was just irritating. It was pretty good as I recall for simulating the launch, arming and recovery cycle. I do believe some of these hypothetical scenarios will be able to be explored with advanced AIs some day.