What if? - Battle of Midway in July 1942 rather than June

[parsifal]

This is a case of comparing apples and oranges. the forces on midway are not comparable to the forces that were attached to CarDiv 1 and 2. The reason is because of where they were, and their total lack of expereince working with the fleet to provide them with coherent tactical intell. You cannot also include all the Japanese BBs for the same reason. If Recon elements have not worked with carriers, they are worse than useless in providing good intell. The USN carriers had no supplementary sources of intelligence gathering of a tactical nature that they could rely on. They might get lucky here and there and get a submarine report, or an occasional sighting report fom land based air, but not coherent or consistent support

 

[oldcrowcv63]

This is a case of comparing apples and oranges. the forces on midway are not comparable to the forces that were attached to CarDiv 1 and 2. The reason is because of where they were, and their total lack of expereince working with the fleet to provide them with coherent tactical intell. You cannot also include all the Japanese BBs for the same reason. If Recon elements have not worked with carriers, they are worse than useless in providing good intell. The USN carriers had no supplementary sources of intelligence gathering of a tactical nature that they could rely on. They might get lucky here and there and get a submarine report, or an occasional sighting report fom land based air, but not coherent or consistent support

Not sure I understand what you are saying here Pars? As you said before and on other occasions, IJN search was very high quality and in general of a higher performance quality than the USN's in terms of range/area of coverage and accuracy of position reports. But the USN PBY's were by training the "eyes of the fleet." and the USN CVs, as I am sure you are aware, did typically launch organic searches (by SBDs at Midway, twice as a measure of insurance). The first search departed in the early morning (~0420) in response to intelligence-based report of two separated groups of IJN CVs and against the possibility that one of the pairs might lie somewhere further North than where they were expected: the location of the two that were subsequently discovered by the PBY before 0600. While the accuracy of some of PBY and later SBD position reports left something to be desired, they got the job done in the sense that, based on their admittedly inaccurate information, enough CV based TACAIR assets found the enemy and got the job done. Had there been more mystery regarding IJN Intentions, that CV launched search would have been more comprehensive probably involving at least 16 SBDs sent out to nearly 250-300 miles, depending on armament, if any. As you say, the IJN had the longer legged scouts, and could have had an earlier detection.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

there were also the planes on Midway for the US.....
others plane avaialble for Japanese
8 Type 96 torpedo bomber (Hosho)
12 Type 96 fighter and 12 Type 97 torpedo bomber (Zuiho)
35 Seaplanes in the Chitose and Kamikawa Maru
a max 31 seaplanes was possible carried from the BB and an other 39 from the CC i've many doubt that actually they loaded the max number of seaplanes

others planes available for US
31 PBY-5 on Midway
6 TBF on Midway
21 F2A on midway
7 F4F on Midway
40 SBD on Midway
16 B-17 on Midway
4 B-26 on Midway

plus the seaplanes in the fleet (max 20)

Vin, I don't often see a chance to correct one of your posts so I'l take the small opportunity you've provided here to do so : The above list should be 16 operational SBD-2s and 12 operational SB2U-3 Vindicators.

 

[parsifal]

Not sure I understand what you are saying here Pars? As you said before and on other occasions, IJN search was very high quality and in general of a higher performance quality than the USN's in terms of range/area of coverage and accuracy of position reports.

Yes

But the USN PBY's were by training the "eyes of the fleet." and the USN CVs, as I am sure you are aware, did typically launch organic searches (by SBDs at Midway, twice as a measure of insurance).

Thgey were not trained to coperate with their carriers to near the standard demanded by the carriers and were in any case land based which invariably meant their search reports were later than they should. What saved the Americans was that they already had strategic intell that gave them the position, the target and the strength of the Japanese on the day of battle. This GREATKy reduced the complexity for them.

Extrapolate if you will what might have happened if the Japanese had not been so sloppy in their preparations on the day of battle and had changed their codes as they had intended.

What this would have done was a couple of things. The IJN would not have made the assumptions they did which in turn made their search arrangements so poor on the day. They (the Japanese) would or should have launched a far more comprehensive search pattern than they did, and received contact details far more timely than they did.

The USN would, without the benefit of SIGINT have been forced to make far less targetted searches and being land based would have been several hours behind the Japanese, as was shown in the historical results. The Japanese launched their searches far earlier than the Americans....the one thig that saved the US was the late launching of just one search a/c due to mechanical difficulties.

The first search departed in the early morning (~0420) in response to intelligence-based report of two separated groups of IJN CVs and against the possibility that one of the pairs might lie somewhere further North than where they were expected:

In other words, the searches undertaken by the Black Cats was a sham, based on the SIGINT they had already received. Launching at 0420 from Midway places the US Searches about 3 hours behind those of the IJN

the location of the two that were subsequently discovered by the PBY before 0600. While the accuracy of some of PBY and later SBD position reports left something to be desired,

you can say that again.....

they got the job done in the sense that, based on their admittedly inaccurate information, enough CV based TACAIR assets found the enemy and got the job done. Had there been more mystery regarding IJN Intentions,

it was the same situation as over Malta....enigma gave the Italian convoy positions away....just to protect the intell, a search a/c was sent anyway (Marylands usually) .

Take away the intell advantage and then re-analyse what the likley outcome would be.....a debacle for the USN because its (landbased) search elements will be late, poor quality and diluted because they wont know exactly where to search for the Japanese

that CV launched search would have been more comprehensive probably involving at least 16 SBDs sent out to nearly 250-300 miles, depending on armament, if any. As you say, the IJN had the longer legged scouts, and could have had an earlier detection

.


Yes, agree

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Doesnt tke into account the very capable floatplane division more or less permanently attached to Car Div 1 and carDiv 2, The USN was forced to use a portion of its CAG as searchplanes. The IJN had 12 floatplanes attached to Tone and Chikuma which had been attached to the carriers since the outbreak of the war. They also had the two fast BBs which had a further 8 floatplanes, all of which had worked closley with the carriers for extended periods and could provide very effective support and co-operation whilst underway. the USN had nothing to compare to that.

True and Fletcher noticed the capability and equipment and advised the USN to make appropriate adjustments based on his experience at Coral Sea. Typically, he was ignored.

The land based PBYs were inexperienced and there were severe difficulties in getting them to co-operate effectively with the forces afloat, because they simply lacked the experience to do so, and in any event the land based forces were badly placed to provide that support.

yes, inexperienced but not totally useless. Despite the shortcomings and difficulties they got the basic job done. They got better as the war progressed. Also, the IJN for all their skill and capability had their own problems which hindered their attempts to strike back, including position errors and faulty radios.

The result of all this is that the in the opening attacks, the USN should have roughly 50-60% less aircraft available for strike than the Japanese. Thats a critical imbalance.

50-60% less aircraft? I don't understand that number. Searches from the duty carrier may involve up to 18 SBDs Rarely more. That's one squadron. half the dive bombing capability of one carrier: one third the striking power, not 50-60 % of aircraft available for a strike. The more carriers present, the smaller the percentage taken from strike capability. Two carriers, one searching squadron out of a total of 6 striking squadrons. Three CVs one of 12. Also, while the IJN favored the Use of LR Float planes it also supplemented them with liberal use of unarmed Kates. AFAIK, searches by ONLY float planes was I believe unique to Midway. The actual number of aircraft available for strike was fairly equal USN CV to IJN CV.

Are you speaking of during the historic Midway battle or a hypothetical battle in lieu of Midway? At Midway the Yorktown sent out only 10 SBDs, the same group twice, the second time to find and fix the 4th CV reported by Thach on his return to the Yorktown.

Why didnt it pan out that way. The USN knew from its codebreaking where and when the IJN would be, and did not need to expend too many resources finding the Japanese. The Japanese got unlucky and sloppy in their searches, and it cost them the battle. If the IJN had changed their codes, and called on11 carriers in July instead of 4 in June (the 11 carriers being Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Zuikaku, Shokaku, Zuiho, Hiyo, Junyo, Ryujo and Hosho), the result would not have been in much doubt. What the Japanese had to do, however was get over themselves and the victories they had won to that point.

The intelligence on the IJN carrier force location is a common misconception only recently corrected. The USN had at least one critcal mistaken notion about the composition and location of Kido Butai. That was the issue of the separated Pair of CVs lurking behind the two that were expected to stage the assault on Midway. Can't argue about the IJN's bad luck or sloppiness of their search. That's stated by Fuchida himself. They (USN) expended enough search assets to make certain of the intelligence.


I believe Hiyo was commissioned on 31 July 1942, so it probably wouldn't have been available to fight in July. As stated before, Sho doesn't return to service until August. Junyo (21 VF, 18VB 9 VT) would have provided a significant strike capability and the combined assets of the three light carriers could be useful in strike if their air groups could coordinate, which I would expect to be fairly difficult. Starting at Eastern Solomons, Zuiho (air group formerly consisting of 12 VF 6 VT was increased to 21 VF 6 VT at Santa Cruz and contributed mainly to the CAP. Ryujo (air group: 24 VF and 9 VT at Eastern Solomons. I suspect the Hosho with its 8 VB would have been good as a relief flight deck and source of spare VBs. I doubt it would have been found in anything but a reserve status or aerial ASW component for the heavies. Yet even so, 8 CVs with ~425 A/C whether light, medium or heavy, collectively pack a mighty punch. But so do 4 or 5 USN CVs with from ~300 to ~375 A/C plus whatever is based on Midway if that's the July objective.

 

[Vincenzo]

Vin, I don't often see a chance to correct one of your posts so I'l take the small opportunity you've provided here to do so : The above list should be 16 operational SBD-2s and 12 operational SB2U-3 Vindicators.

yes i wrong they were not all SBD, there were 19 SBD and 21 SB2U, 18 and 14 operational for navweaps page but only 12 crew for the SB2U

 

[parsifal]

On June 3, the critical day really Striking Force began launching at 0415 hours, elying on the floatplanes of Tone and Chikuma, and the two BBs. At that stage the two opposing fleets were less than 250 miles distant from each other. Midway was over 300 miles (the USN carriers were 345 miles from Midway....not as sure about the Jpanese, but still over 300 miles) to the south. Unfortunately for the Japanese two of the floatplanes experienced engine difficulties, which delayed their takeoffs until well after 5am. These were the very aircraft tasked to cover the sector containing the US Carriers.

Historically, whilst the PBYs had located the IJN Striking Force shortly before 0600, this information did not reach Fletcher until 0605. Moreover, the report was innaccurate by about 100 miles from the actual position. By 0605 the IJN search aircraft that had taken off on time were about 250 miles into their search arcs. The USN did not commence launch of its strike wings until an hour later, 0702.

The first reports of the US fleets position were transmitted 0720, with amplification reports received over the next hour. There was a problem in the IJN reports....no mention of carriers until 0810. This sloppiness woulod not have occurred if the Japanese had committed more aircraft to the search as they knew they should have

However, if the Japanese had been less sloppy in their staff work (which would have at least doubled the search density), changed their codes as they should have, the USN would have likley have been found from 0630. Since the Japanese already had 95 strike aircraft readied for attack and the USN was still arming, they had at leasty an hour in which to hit the US Carriers before the US would be in position to respond. if the Codes had been changed, the US search arcs would have been far broader, and as a result there is a strong possibility that their time of detection of the IJN would have been much later

 

[parsifal]

The intelligence on the IJN carrier force location is a common misconception only recently corrected. The USN had at least one critcal mistaken notion about the composition and location of Kido Butai. That was the issue of the separated Pair of CVs lurking behind the two that were expected to stage the assault on Midway

.

A couple of things to respond to here. The PBYs that were launched to "find" the Striking Force were not required to obtain a visual sighting, and neither did they (at least initially). They relied simply on their ASV Radar to confirm the position of the Striking Fordce. Because SIGINT had already predicted the time and location of its arrival, all the PBYs had to do was confirm what the MAGIC guys already had predicted. That explains nicely, incidentally why the PBY reports were so innaccurate. They were relying on distant tracking of "something". it was not until daylight that visual sighting could confirm what was already known. I confess I dont actually know when that visual confirmation occurred.

The second point is that Fletcher was unnaturally worried about an outflanking manouvre from the North, and this caused him to expend 10 SBDs on an armed recon in that direction. There was no basis to support this, just Fletcher not trusting completely the intell being provided to him, and the sneaking or nagging suspiciion that the Japanese were up to "something".....

 

[oldcrowcv63]

In other words, the searches undertaken by the Black Cats was a sham, based on the SIGINT they had already received. Launching at 0420 from Midway places the US Searches about 3 hours behind those of the IJN

Correction, even at Midway, Type 97 Kates were evidently used in recon role.

You lost me again... Yorktown launches its morning search at 0440 on the 4th, to cover the north out to a mere 100 miles as insurance... IIRC, That was about the same time as the Type 97 Kates from Kaga and Akagi and float planes on search.

I don't believe the Cat night raiders were launched on sigint although that may have helped them track their quarry.

The time line for the Black Cat ops:

Morning of June 3rd, day searching PBY detects Occupation Force and misidentifies it as main body. (9 B-17s attack that afternoon based on day sighting)
The Black Cats leave much earlier than the Yorktown's SBDs to attack the Midway occupation force (not Kido Butai). According to Knott, the 4 PBYs depart Midway at 2115 on June 3rd after they had flown in from pearl harbor that afternoon. I don't believe the Black Cats did any searches as they returned to Midway from their attack after the IJN air raid was over.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

. A couple of things to respond to here. The PBYs that were launched to "find" the Striking Force were not required to obtain a visual sighting, and neither did they (at least initially). They relied simply on their ASV Radar to confirm the position of the Striking Fordce. Because SIGINT had already predicted the time and location of its arrival, all the PBYs had to do was confirm what the MAGIC guys already had predicted. That explains nicely, incidentally why the PBY reports were so innaccurate. They were relying on distant tracking of "something". it was not until daylight that visual sighting could confirm what was already known. I confess I dont actually know when that visual confirmation occurred.

The second point is that Fletcher was unnaturally worried about an outflanking manouvre from the North, and this caused him to expend 10 SBDs on an armed recon in that direction. There was no basis to support this, just Fletcher not trusting completely the intell being provided to him, and the sneaking or nagging suspiciion that the Japanese were up to "something".....

This is the first I have heard of ASV sets on the day searching PBYs. The black Cats were brought in from PH because they could do such an attack with their ASV sets. AFAIK, the PBYs based at and operating from Midway did not have such equipment. Please provide a source for that information. WRT to Fltecher, you've evidently read too many of the histories that discredit Fletcher. Unless you just disagree with the evidence cited by Lundstom, In which case the best we can do is agree to disagree.

The messages sent from Spruance at the return of his strike suggest a more complex situation wrt to the purported pair of stalking CVs

I can probably help with some of the PBY time line. Which as you have pointed out was abysmally incomplete in some cases and very helpful in others. The performance was not systematically good but individuals outdid themselves in some cases.

First contact:
Addy's PBY at 0534 reports "enemy carriers" with his call sign which presumably should give listeners some idea of where they are. Later at 0552, Chase's PBY is reported by Parshall and Tully in Shattered Sword (page 134) as 'sighting' "Two carriers and BBs, bearing 320, distance 180 mi, course 135, speed 25."

it wasn't all that accurate but it was complete.

It's restated there that almost no pilots reported seeing more than two carriers. My understanding from both books is that intelligence stated that Kido Butai would be split in two elements one supporting the other. Intelligence does not seem to have provided any information as to how close they might be operating.

This separated force is one reason given for Hornet CAG (C-HAG) Ring's Sojourn to the North of the reported KB position.

 

[parsifal]

This is the first I have heard of ASV sets on the day searching PBYs. The black Cats were brought in from PH because they could do such an attack with their ASV sets. AFAIK, the PBYs based at and operating from Midway did not have such equipment. Please provide a source for that information

.

Source: David Brown - Carrier Operations In World war II - VolII The Pacific December 1941 to feb 1943 ; London 1984

Although the following is not a direct reference to the search in question, it is the same aircraft on during the same operation.

At Page 166 Brown makes his observationsd with regard to the PBY searches....this account relates to those searches that found the main body, but i firmly believe the methods and equipment described for this part of the operation can be reasonably exytrapolated for the searches undertaken within 24hours for the Striking Force


Browns account relevantly says "At 2115 (june 3rd) as the b-17s returned from their long mission, four PBY-5As of VP-44 took off from Midwayeach armed with a single 21 in torpedo. All had been flown in by the same crews on the same afternoon - a ten hour flight from Oahu. Four hours and 575 miles out from Midway, three of the aircraft detected the enemy transports at distant range of about 100 miles on their ASV radars, and then vectored to the detected enemy force, making down moon glide attacks, as well as strafing the decks of the transports. One torpedo hit, daamging the fleet oiler Akebono Maru, which lost 24 mwen, but remained with the convoy....."

He makes the same references to those aircraft used to locate the Striking Force.

As for both Lundstrom and Fletcher, no I dont think much of either. And I reject the revisionist accounts that have recently tried to paint him in a more sympathetic light.

Neither do I think much of Nagumo incidentally

 

[oldcrowcv63]

.

Source: David Brown - Carrier Operations In World war II - VolII The Pacific December 1941 to feb 1943 ; London 1984

Although the following is not a direct reference to the search in question, it is the same aircraft on during the same operation.

At Page 166 Brown makes his observationsd with regard to the PBY searches....this account relates to those searches that found the main body, but i firmly believe the methods and equipment described for this part of the operation can be reasonably exytrapolated for the searches undertaken within 24hours for the Striking Force


Browns account relevantly says "At 2115 (june 3rd) as the b-17s returned from their long mission, four PBY-5As of VP-44 took off from Midwayeach armed with a single 21 in torpedo. All had been flown in by the same crews on the same afternoon - a ten hour flight from Oahu. Four hours and 575 miles out from Midway, three of the aircraft detected the enemy transports at distant range of about 100 miles on their ASV radars, and then vectored to the detected enemy force, making down moon glide attacks, as well as strafing the decks of the transports. One torpedo hit, daamging the fleet oiler Akebono Maru, which lost 24 mwen, but remained with the convoy....."

He makes the same references to those aircraft used to locate the Striking Force.

As for both Lundstrom and Fletcher, no I dont think much of either. And I reject the revisionist accounts that have recently tried to paint him in a more sympathetic light.

Neither do I think much of Nagumo incidentally

The reference you cite I've already acknowledged. I want to see those that claim the PBYs searching for the IJN on the 3rd and 4th were equipped with ASV type radar (USN: ASB or less likely ASA) I have searched high and low for any reference to PBYs being typically equipped with ASV in June. My understanding based on a long list of books on the subject and web references, is that ASV production began in the spring and only the 4 PBY-5A aircraft brought to Midway from PH specifically for that night action possessed RADAR. All others did not. The only black cat ops referred to in Knott aside from the 4 participating in the Midway night op are those in the Solomons after August and in the SW Pacific.

I must admit to being simply astonished at your off-handed rejection/dismissal of Lundstrom. It has been clear to me for over 40 years that there are many mysteries unaddressed by half-knowledgable authors and some much-lauded historians in this field. Only recently have these mysteries come to resolution largely through the efforts of historians doing careful research of previously unexamined contemporary documents from both sides as well as participant interviews. Shattered Sword is another good reference.

 

[VBF-13]

...not as sure about the Japanese, but still over 300 miles

My chart from Battle Stations (Wise Co., N.Y., 1946) shows them sighted at around 450 out and bombed at around 350 out.

EDIT: Replacing chart; hopefully, this size is readable...

 

[parsifal]

with regard to the radar fitment, Im not saying that i am admantly sure. However it seems very unlikley to me that just four aircraft were radar fitted in June Certainly that runs counter to a number of sources. This is material that I do have...

"In mid 1941, a PBY-2 aircraft 54-P-10, BuNo 0456 belonging to VP-54, was equipped with the first operational radar aboard a US Navy aircraft. The ASV radar equipment used long separate transmitting and receiving antennas mounted on insulated stub supports along the forward hull of the PBY. The British had already put ASV Mark II on their Consolidated Catalina flying boat patrol aircraft, so it was straightforward to mount it on US Navy Catalina's. The installation was completed at NAS Anacostia, Washington, D.C. NAS Anacostia was the site of the Fleet Air Tactical Unit. They conducted experiments with new aircraft and equipment in order to determine their practical application and tactical employment. NAS Anacostia was a primary training base for naval aviation and the home of all Navy flight test operations until overcrowding caused that mission to be moved in 1943 to Patuxent River. At the time of the radar installation, VP-54 was assigned to Patrol Wing Five, stationed at NAS Norfolk. The VP-54 aircraft was most likely selected because the squadron had aircraft available in the area and was also experienced with working with the British RAF. VP-54 had conducted neutrality patrols in the Atlantic daily, weather permitting, from Newport to Nova Scotia in June 1939 to February 1941, and also from Bermuda, B.W.I. in September 1940 to January 1941.


Commander J. V. Carney, Senior Support Force Staff Officer, reported on 18 July 1941 that British type ASV radar has been installed in one PBY-5 Catalina each of VP-71, VP-72, and VP-73 and two PBM-1's of VP-74. Initial installation of identification equipment (IFF) was made about the same time. In mid-September, radar was issued for five additional PBM-1's of VP-74 and one PBY-5 of VP-71, and shortly thereafter for other aircraft in Patrol Wing 7 squadrons. Thereby Patrol Wing 7 became the first operational Wing of the U.S. Navy to be supplied with radar-equipped aircraft. Its squadrons operated from Norfolk, Quonset Point and advanced bases on Greenland, Newfoundland and Iceland during the last months of the neutrality patrol. Radar introduced both aircrew and ground personnel to a whole new capability for Navy airborne operations. The early installations were awkward due to their long separate transmitting and receiving antennas mounted on insulated stub supports along the forward hull of the PBYs.

No PBY Catalina aircraft in the Pacific was equipped with radar at the time of the 7 December.

However after that re-equipment with SCR521 radar was fairly rapid, and certainly occurred prior to August 1942".

According to one source, one of those "my uncle served in such and such a unit" acconts....This account is describing operations that commenced from May 1942, and goes a follows:..Uncle John was the leading Chief Petty Officer of the unit he was responsible for ensuring that the aircraft were up and ready for action. He made out the sailors work assignments and supervised the repairs on each of the aircraft making sure the planes were fixed and fixed properly. FAW-4 consisted of many VP or patrol squadrons. These Aircraft Squadron's would deploy to the Aleutians from the U.S., and would be stationed along with the HEDRONs on each island. Each a squadron was usually comprised of seven PBY-5a's, later the aircraft were changed over to PV-1 Venturas and then to the more updated PV-2 Harpoon patrol planes.

Jim Decker a Radioman stationed with my Uncle John described to me the conditions of the patrols. The PBY-5a's would fly out on a patrol "Leg "from eight to anywhere up to thirteen hours, depending on the patrol. The "leg" consisted of a triangular shaped route that extended for several hundred miles. Each plane had a forward-looking SCR-521 ASV radar that consisted of the radar set connected to a "Yagi" antennae located on the wing. Later (from August) a side looking radar was installed in each aircraft, which vastly extended the radar capability of the aircraft. Each radar unit had an operator station located behind the co-pilot. This station consisted of a radar screen with a rubber boot over it. The crew would take turns looking into the screen after an hour or so otherwise the men would get "buggy" from looking at the screen too long".

This account is entirely consistent with many other sources. Another one of those "discredited" sources that you don't like, Norman Polmar who co-wrote his book back in the 60s with Minoru Genda., says that ASV radar became operational from April in the North and was used extensively during the battle. Given that the US produced over 3500 SCr 521 sets in 1942 alone, I find it inconcevable that just four aircraft in the whole of the Pacific were fitted with ASV in June.

Sorry if my disdain of Lundstrom surprises you. I get that a lot. but I find him to be annoyingly a headline grabber, a sensationalist that really wants to rewrite history. A lot of his work IS good, I admit, but becaue he has an agenda in his writing, I seldom use him. Shocking I know, probably bad karma as a serious history student, but there it is I guess.

 

[VBF-13]

According to one source, one of those "my uncle served in such and such a unit" acconts....This account is describing operations that commenced from May 1942, and goes a follows:..Uncle John was the leading Chief Petty Officer of the unit he was responsible for ensuring that the aircraft were up and ready for action. He made out the sailors work assignments and supervised the repairs on each of the aircraft making sure the planes were fixed and fixed properly. FAW-4 consisted of many VP or patrol squadrons. These Aircraft Squadron's would deploy to the Aleutians from the U.S., and would be stationed along with the HEDRONs on each island. Each a squadron was usually comprised of seven PBY-5a's, later the aircraft were changed over to PV-1 Venturas and then to the more updated PV-2 Harpoon patrol planes.

That's pretty much how it was, although the Chief Petty Officers also ran the craps games. How were those bankrolled? I shan't say, except that I doubt you'll find that in one of your books.

 

[parsifal]

VB thanks for the map. Its hard to read. But it looks like the Striking Force was down to about 250 miles at the time of the Mcclusky's attack, which means at the time of detection it would be over 300 miles from Midway. Not that that made too much difference in the actual battle....the USN knew where to look, when to loook, and what they were looking for

 

[VBF-13]

Pars, just replaced the chart, go back a page and see it. This time one can actually read the darn thing. It's a good visual of the "battle tracks." Primarily just wanted to show you were right, though, that Occupation Force was over 300 out from Midway.

 

[parsifal]

Thanks VBF much appreciated. Gotta respect Old Crows knowledge on this subject. he really is encyclopedic on this issue. Doesnt mean we have to agree with everything, and i dont, but I still have great respect for the man and the knowledge he has.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Happy post-Thanksgiving to all who observe the occasion and to those who may not.

Am On travel and having to do this on someone else's computer so I've got to make it brief.

Pars, my info on introduction of ASV in mid 41 corresponds to yours. From what i can gather, the main focus/priority was the atlantic theater, so those squadrons got it first. One would expect with all the much touted industrial capacity and technical savvy of the USA we would have been on top of the problem and been able to get ASV/B equipment installed ASAP. That appears to have not been the case. I've found a number of web sources that state the PBY installed ASV sets didn't appear in the PTO except in a few cases (such as the Midway op) until mid-summer, ultimately resulting in the black cat ops that began during the Solomons campaign.

SSP - In Action 062 - PBY Catalina

Page 44 is about as definitive a source as I can find.

This may appear to be surprising, but compare the USN and RN adoption of the new technology. Sommerville's carrier fleet in the IO in April 1942 had Swordfish and Albacore's embarked, many or all of which were equipped with ASV. The first embarked USN CV aircraft that was equipped and hoped to utilize ASV in an operation was during the Santa Cruz battle in October 1942. One Enterprise TBF-1 flown by VT-10 CO Jack Collette was the only ASB equipped aircraft in the small CV-6 strike group and it was also the first one shot down by a Zuiho-based escort Zero that abandoned its primary mission to attack the Enterprise group on a reciprocal heading. Thus the opportunity to use ASB to provide a critical advantage to the USN at Santa Cruz was stillborn. ONe TBF-1 some 6 months after ASV was common equipment on RN TSR a/c. Where did I learn this interesting story? Lundstrom. (???of course??)

If you haven't yet read First team, I am envious of the enjoyment you will experience. It is a veritable feast of information for any student of WW2 history. Forget what you get second hand on the forum. That tends to be Lundstrom through a glass darkly. When you say revisionist history, I can only say it can't be revisionist if it's history that for all practical purposes has never before been written except in the most fragmentary and incomplete fashion. Can it be improved upon? I am sure it can, he is not so technical that he get's it all right, but he tackles more technical details than most historians have previously attempted. I suspect much of the hype or media attention surrounding his work is because it is so ground breaking and so influential. Shattered Sword is heavily dependent on Lundstrom and Frank and Hornfischer pay him homage in their work. That praise for Lundstrom is not universal should not be surprising when you consider the vast body of work and professional bias that became the orthodox history of events. The marines revile Fletcher while some historians refused to even mention his name. Only Spruance is recognized to have fought and won the Battle of Midway. Fetcher was not a self promoter. His only response to the bias that pounded his reputation was, when asked who won the battle of Midway was to say, "I won't say who won the battle, but I know who they would have said lost it had it been lost."

As a USN brown shoe I can tell you from experience that Miles Browning was not such an anomaly. Aviation egos are second to none and are behind a long campaign to discredit any non-aviation naval leader who has the temerity to assume command of a carrier group. Mitscher's performance at Midway should have cost him a star but he was an aviator and had friends in the right places. Fortunately for future ops it didn't but that's the crazy culture that is Naval aviation. You never hear about Fletcher's post-Midway Career but there was one and it was essentially successful and as a fighting admiral, he contributed in his own small way to the ultimate allied victory.

This is me being brief?

 

[VBF-13]

Crow, why is it Admiral Fletcher is so discredited around these parts? I never knew that until I mentioned him, here. I'm sorry for the digression, but I didn't think I should start a separate thread on this. I'd just like to know what you boys think, especially what you think. Are his accounts at Midway just that plum wrong? What is it you boys evidently know that I don't know? Thanks.