What if? - Battle of Midway in July 1942 rather than June

[VBF-13]

With respect to the 18 SBD-2's of VMSB-241, I have to agree. These aircraft had only just arrived on May 29th and the pilots were new to the aircraft. CO Maj. Henderson, took command of that component as a virtual separate squadron while XO Maj. Noris took command of the 12 SB2U-3 Vindicators (aka "Wind Indicators" to the pilots). These pilots had been flying this aircraft since before December 1941 when they made the longest single engine formation flight in history from Ewa to Midway and so were probably reasonable competent in that type by June 4, albeit reinforced by green replacements as the SBDs arrived. Whether the newly arrived SBD-2s (USN castoffs when replaced by fully armored SBD-3s) or the older SB2Us had SS tanks or armor is unknown to me. AFAIK, no Midway based aircraft scored better than a near miss on IJN ships in Nagumo's Kido Butai and that by an SBD during a glide bombing attack on the Hiyru. The SB2Us under Norris attacked the Haruna without scoring a hit. Info from "A Glorious Page in Our History"

Crow, FWIW, here's the narrative I'm drawing from, as regards those direct hits...

At 0755 VMSB-241 began its attack. This squadron was divided into two attack groups: one commanded by Maj. Lofton R. Henderson, with 18 SBD-2 planes, and a second under Maj. Benjamin W. Norris with 12 SB2U-3's. Ten of the pilots had joined the squadron only a week before and there had been very little opportunity for training flights.

Only 3 of the pilots had had experience in SBD-type planes. Because of the inexperience of his pilots, Major Henderson had decided to make a glide-bombing attack, rather than attempt to dive-bomb without training.

Between 0610 and 0620 these units took off, minus 2 SBD's which developed engine trouble and an SB2U-3 which was forced to return when a cowling came loose. The 16 SBD's climbed to 9,000 feet en route to their target. At 0755 the enemy was sighted and our planes made a wide circle at high speed to lose altitude. At once a number of Nakajima 97 and Zero fighters attacked and heavy antiaircraft fire was opened from below. Rear seat gunners in our planes sent down 4 Japanese fighters in flames and possibly 2 more. As our planes came in for their glide, Major Henderson's ship was hit and it was obvious that he was badly wounded, so Capt. Elmer G. Glidden, Jr., took the lead. The squadron dove through a cloud, emerging to encounter heavy anti-aircraft fire from a large Kaga19 class carrier which was maneuvering violently below. Bombs were released at 500 feet or less. Three direct hits were seen and several near hits. As our planes returned low over the water they could see her smoking badly. Of the 16 SBD's which engaged in this attack, 8 returned to the base, and of these only 6 remained fit for service. Two were seen to go down in flames, and 1 went out of control before reaching Midway. The pilot jumped and was picked up by a PT boat. Another was forced down 100 miles west of Midway, but both pilot and gunner were rescued 2 days later.

The Battle of Midway June 3-6, 1942.

This may be indicative of the level of skill and experience required to be an effective dive bomber. Time in the cockpit was no substitute for practice on moving maritime targets. How much of such practice the SB2U pilots actually got of that sort during their 5+ month sojourn on Midway Island is unknown but I expect not much. In contrast, both Yorktown and Enterprise SBD pilots were by the time of Midway well experienced and quite effective as their collective performance shows.

Yeah. That's basically right. Neither would I suggest the training was all that difficult. There were just a number of things the pilots had to become accustomed to in dive-bombing that you didn't want them having had to experience for the first time in a combat-situation.

 

[davebender]

Only if the U.S. allows it, which I doubt.

B24 bombers based in Hawaii would bomb Japanese occupied Midway 7 days a week, preventing establishment of seaplane and submarine bases. Midway would become just one more IJA regiment stationed on a Pacific island that must be kept supplied while contributing nothing to the Japanese war effort.

 

[tyrodtom]

You're kind of pushing things seeing as how the first US combat use of the B24 was on June 6, 1942, 4 ( four) B24s were staged thru Midway from Hawaiia to bomb Wake Island, but they couldn't find it.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

The Battle of Midway June 3-6, 1942.

Cool, I never saw this combat narrative before but it contains a lot of information I've seen in histories written after the war but before the full japanese story was revealed. Imagine you are in an SBD retiring from the scene where you dropped your egg and saw too many of your buddies enter Davy Jones Locker. You look back and see all kinds of fire and smoke erupting from the ship you just attacked. I would guess its understandable to believe you must have scored a certain hit in its vitals, but most likely, with the benefit of hindsight, you ware watching the flashes and smoke from medium caliber AAA attempting to tag you as you flew by. IIUC, this was a common misinterpretation of both sides who wanted to believe their life risking heroics and sacrifice of their mates was not in vain. To get a very balanced view from both sides of the fence, I suggest Shattered Sword. It's one of the most interesting and comprehensive accounts of the battle I've come across. the damage done to the IJN ships is carefully accounted.

 

[parsifal]

Only if the U.S. allows it, which I doubt.

B24 bombers based in Hawaii would bomb Japanese occupied Midway 7 days a week, preventing establishment of seaplane and submarine bases. Midway would become just one more IJA regiment stationed on a Pacific island that must be kept supplied while contributing nothing to the Japanese war effort.

Why didnt that happen in the SWPA where B-17s were deployed and the japanese had about 30 fighters to protect their bases. you overestimate the effects of American heavy bombers operating at those sorts of ranges. They were not decisive until much later in the war, and at ranges much less than would have been the case in this scenario. Bombing Midway from Hawaii would stretch even modern age aircraft because of the ranges involved.

The US would have been unable to control this situation to near the extent that you are suggesting. Even in 1944, when they really did hold decisive air superiority throughout the central pacific, the Japanese operated exceptionally efficient and valuable reconnaisance elements in the face of devastated airfields and massive USN attacks. Have a close look at the long range recon that wa achieved prior to Phillipines Sea in June 1944.

 

[Balljoint]

Two important factors wouldn't change in a month. The code breaking effort that was so important both in the Pacific and in Europe was in fact decisive. Of course a new code could be a problem, but early chatter by the IJN pretty much gave the game away.

And ironically, in view of Japan's post war accomplishment, the crappy radios in their planes. Interviews with Japanese pilots almost universally confirm that they used hand signals to communicate because of unworkable radios. Scout planes aren't of much use if they can't report what they see.

Given the chancy nature of the actual battle, the most significant effect of a months delay would be picking the dice up for a fresh roll.

 

[parsifal]

Two important factors wouldn't change in a month. The code breaking effort that was so important both in the Pacific and in Europe was in fact decisive. Of course a new code could be a problem, but early chatter by the IJN pretty much gave the game away.

Everybody had this problem, Japan was no worse or better than any of the combatants. Advantages derived from radio chatter were helpful, but in no way a substitute for detailed intelligence derived from reading the signal traffic. A few hours or minutes warning of the approaching Japanese tells the commanders virtually nothing and does not give them time to position for a first strike effectively

Scout planes aren't of much use if they can't report what they see.

Which kinda disproves the basic supposition. The IJN easily had the most efficient aerial recon elements (land based or afloat) of any of the combatants....an advantage they held until the very end. It was sheert bad luck that the US Carriers were not spotted earlier during the actual battle

Given the chancy nature of the actual battle, the most significant effect of a months delay would be picking the dice up for a fresh roll

.

Agreed

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Given the chancy nature of the actual battle, the most significant effect of a months delay would be picking the dice up for a fresh roll.

I certainly wouldn't argue that the battle that transpired on June 4, 1942 was the result of a compilation of fortuitous events which favored the USN in some critical respects. But chance is always a factor in victory and defeat. I think the real flaw in the IJN scheme that sealed their defeat, and what set the USN's teeth grinding at night two months later at Guadalcanal, was the split objective: Island capture and Fleet engagement. US forces had one clear objective, Kido Butai and focused all its forces on destroying that primary strike force. Because of the Island capture objective, the IJN focused half its aerial striking power on the least capable component of the USN/USAAF force arrayed against it.

Had the IJN not been focused on taking Midway and had it not ignored signs it was steaming into a trap (based on the early PBY attacks on the invasion force and effective submarine recon), it might have found a way to engage the USN carriers under more favorable circumstances. Only two US carriers were likely to be effective in such a confrontation and one of those (the Enterprise) was beset with leadership problems that very nearly neutralized its squadron effectiveness. I believe the Sara had a more experienced air group than Hornet so perhaps it would have provided a less problematic performance in a July battle.

I have to admit this is a perspective I adopted after reading Lundstrom's Black Shoe Carrier Admiral. Attacking even a marginally well defended island posed a serious problem for any carriers employed in invasion support. I believe, assuming intelligence-derived motivation for an additional month's preparation, this strategic flaw would have become even more problematic.

 

[VBF-13]

Cool, I never saw this combat narrative before but it contains a lot of information I've seen in histories written after the war but before the full japanese story was revealed. Imagine you are in an SBD retiring from the scene where you dropped your egg and saw too many of your buddies enter Davy Jones Locker. You look back and see all kinds of fire and smoke erupting from the ship you just attacked. I would guess its understandable to believe you must have scored a certain hit in its vitals, but most likely, with the benefit of hindsight, you ware watching the flashes and smoke from medium caliber AAA attempting to tag you as you flew by. IIUC, this was a common misinterpretation of both sides who wanted to believe their life risking heroics and sacrifice of their mates was not in vain. To get a very balanced view from both sides of the fence, I suggest Shattered Sword. It's one of the most interesting and comprehensive accounts of the battle I've come across. the damage done to the IJN ships is carefully accounted.

Quite honestly, Crow, had they not hit a thing, that'd hardly surprise me. While they weren't as vulnerable as the torpedo-bombers, they were pretty darn close. However, this the thing. That narrative actually referenced, not one, but two observations. Only one of those was the smoke, as they were drawing away. The other one was, they got off three direct hits.

Now, that's pretty exacting testimony. That's not to say it can't be refuted. But, if so, let's see the evidence, what the hell? Bias? Well, yeah, I suppose. If one can't refute the testimony, discredit the source of the testimony. But, I'd think I'd want to see better than that. And, that's all I'm saying, there.

On Shattered Sword, you're not the only one who has recommended that book to me. I just hadn't got around to it, yet. But, I aim to.

EDIT: BTW, you do know, the Japanese, besides just being short, are nearsighted? So, what the hell could they see?

PS: Just kidding!

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Considering their chances for success using a glide bomb delivery while facing the full strength of the numerically formidable IJN CAP, a hit would indeed be astonishing. It seems to me, aside from the reports of the Midway pilots and the testimony of the IJN defenders, the most compelling argument for the marine's lack of success appears to come from the surviving USN SBD pilots and crew later that morning. I believe they all reported that the flight decks they individually attacked were undamaged. The Hiryu itself, if it was indeed the target of the marines attack was able to launch an escorted counterstrike almost immediately and with the full weight of its VB component which argues that it suffered little if any damage. Hiryu was in the same vulnerable state as the other three carriers. Three hits should have done her in. Let's assume the Haruna was the target. That's a vessel could indeed have absorbed three hits from the 500 pound bombs carrier by the SB2U-3s and shrugged them off if there weren't in some way well targeted. If the detailed account is correct, it looks like both the Haruna and Kirishima were attacked by Vindicators unsuccessfully and by subsequent USN SBDs as well also without success. Yet even IJN observers on neighboring ships apparently reported her as hit repeatedly.

Imperial Battleships

After watching my son's 10 year old nephew play baseball near Nara, I can absolutely affirm the prewar reports of asian nearsightedness were just a trifle exaggerated. I wish I could have fielded as well as he during my brief career in US Little League.

Not since the civil war has the country paid such a high price for its institutionalized racial prejudices. What we are able to say in jest today was a tragically experienced reset of reality to the USA and its allies. To steal a Myth Buster phrase: Rejecting reality and substituting one's own can have grave consequences.

 

[VBF-13]

Crow, did you notice in your link, during the Midway attack, it's reported the Kaga was afire? That's pretty much the account in my link. I agree, though, we have to be discriminating, and have to try, where we can, to see both sides. That's a good website for those ships, and I have it bookmarked.

On the stereotyping, that just came with the times, I think. We were taking Japanese-American citizens out of their homes, then. Throw out the book. This was war.

PS: Cherish that little nephew. Mine is 16, already. They grow up too quick!

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I saw that:

"When KAGA is set afire, HARUNA briefly closes to assist." but figured they referred to later that morning when it was hit, most probably by fighter pilot and air group commander McClusky's leading VB-and VS-6 SBDs from Enterprise. The Kaga page seems to indicate that as well: Kaga Tabular Record of Movement | Imperial Flattops | Nihon Kaigun

wrt nephew... He's my son's wife's nephew, so by extension his as well. He's a cute kid and loves Baseball. My own nephews and nieces are all grown, many with their own kids. Spoiling my grandkids is my current favorite hobby. It's also my revenge.

 

[Conslaw]

Let's add a sub-scenario: It is August 1942. Let's say that all six Japanese fleet carriers are sunk in a grand battle at Midway, and the Americans lose two. The Americans have three serviceable fleet carriers in the Pacific, and the Japanese have none. Under this scenario, tell me how the next 18 months play out. Is it game, set, match, USA?

 

[parsifal]

A one sided defeat of the IJN ensures the outcome of the war strategically, but Midway was strategically more important because it avoided defeat for the Us and put a stop to Japanaese expasion on a strategic scale. The US carriers did not wrest the initiaitive from the japanese. the solomons campaign did that, and the large carrier battles notwithstanding, these were less important to the outcome over the vicious battles of attrition that developed over the Solomons. the Japanese lost over 1000 aircrew over Guadacanal, and a large number of ships. it was these losses, particualalry the destroyer losses that forced them on the defensive.

Also the loss of 6 carriers is not the end of the IJN carrier force, though it is a critical blow. They beagan the war with ten carriers. they lost one at Coral Sea. And four at Midway. They also lost a further one in the Solomons campaign. They added three more carriers from Midway through to December, and took in hand four more ships for conversion. One was sunk before work began (the Mizuho). What you are saying is, "if things went from terrible to catastrophic, would ther be an effect? Ah yes. You are also saying is, "if 6 carriers are lost instead of four, does that decide the outcome to December 1943. no, because from June 1942 until December 1943 Carriers were not strong enough on either side to make a difference.

 

[VBF-13]

Let's add a sub-scenario: It is August 1942. Let's say that all six Japanese fleet carriers are sunk in a grand battle at Midway, and the Americans lose two. The Americans have three serviceable fleet carriers in the Pacific, and the Japanese have none. Under this scenario, tell me how the next 18 months play out. Is it game, set, match, USA?

The Japanese were too dug in. Before Midway their Navy was basically serving their Army's objectives in the Southwest Pacific, and they were very strong, there. They'd have kept on fighting with everything they had while we were still trying to take those islands back. This was no tennis game to them.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Let's add a sub-scenario: It is August 1942. Let's say that all six Japanese fleet carriers are sunk in a grand battle at Midway, and the Americans lose two. The Americans have three serviceable fleet carriers in the Pacific, and the Japanese have none. Under this scenario, tell me how the next 18 months play out. Is it game, set, match, USA?

One major change in the solomons campaign is that Fletcher could relax about the impending IJN CV-centered counterstrike that was certain to come sometime in August, and for which he husbanded his fighter assets. His main concern would have been land based air and submarines, the latter of which proved to be more than a threat by the end of August. Thus the USN carriers are likely to have been able to provide more proactive air cover for the lodgement at Henderson field, at least until it became active on August 19. Fletcher would also have been in a position to inflict a heavy toll on the retreating IJN cruiser force that had savaged the USN cruiser screen at Savo Island on August 9. King would have been happier with him and so would Turner. The marines would have lost their shoulder-chip and would have no reason to whine for the next half century about how the navy abandoned them. Other than that, Pars has pretty well summed up the likely aftermath.

I would expect the IJN would accelerate their CV conversions and building programs to make up losses. I am also assuming that, like the actual battle, most IJN pilots were saved at Midway and the mechs and deck crews were the greatest loss, aside from the CVs. Junyo, Hiyo (assuming it stays healthy) and Zuiho become the core of the IJN CV rebuild program (Hosho probably becomes more a training vessel) which would probably take the IJN about a year or two to recover to a point where it can attempt serious opposition, however, by then The USN has the Essex class on line and the situation is on track to replay a Philippine Sea scenario. At the end of the Guadalcanal, the USN has two surviving fleet carriers (say Enterprise and Sara) and the IJN is rebuilding. That's not a terribly different outcome than what actually happened. Only the accounting is a bit different. While they did have the two big decks, (Sho and Zui) one was heavily damaged and all the air groups were pretty much shattered. So a major rebuild was actually played out.

The Solomons campaign may go a bit faster without the two major carrier battles and the ever present threat of their interference. Perhaps the USN does a bit better in the surface battles by assigning some of its BB, CA CL cruiser assets to gun duty instead of CV Protection which should have been the job of the CL(AA)s like Juneau, Atlanta, San Juan and San Diego. That might have helped make some of the night-battle outcomes slightly more favorable for the USN (They could hardly have done much worse, except for Cape Esperance and the 2nd Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on November 14-15). Their presence might have provided some measure of protection to the Marines ashore although the surface losses would probably have been higher. Once again, less complaint from the shore component about the legitimate perception of an absent US navy.

However, delay in the Solomon campaign by two months probably means IJ has an operational air field on Guadalcanal. That could pose a problem slowing the initial campaign and making it more like the Midway scenario. Even with its weak carriers in support, that could pose a problem for the US invasion. That probably plays out in a very different set of events but probably doesn't change the end result. Let's see for grins. Junyo, Hiyo and Zuiho bring ~110-120 A/C to support the ~60 A/C on Guadalcanal against the three USN CVs each carrying about 75 A/C for a US total of 225 A/C vs about 180 IJN A/C plus whatever can be sent from Rabaul although by then, there may be intermediate fields in operation. That's kind of interesting.

 

[bob44]

Let's add a sub-scenario: It is August 1942. Let's say that all six Japanese fleet carriers are sunk in a grand battle at Midway, and the Americans lose two. The Americans have three serviceable fleet carriers in the Pacific, and the Japanese have none. Under this scenario, tell me how the next 18 months play out. Is it game, set, match, USA?

In this scenario, the Japanese would probably go on the defence. There would be not be the hard, 6 months, fighting for Guadalcanal. The Allies are still very weak and are building up. The Allies would start an offensive in the South Pacific, pushing into NG. The Japanese are going to fight for every inch. Probably will not commit their BB yet. Both sides continue to build up their forces.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

In this scenario, the Japanese would probably go on the defence. There would be not be the hard, 6 months, fighting for Guadalcanal. The Allies are still very weak and are building up. The Allies would start an offensive in the South Pacific, pushing into NG. The Japanese are going to fight for every inch. Probably will not commit their BB yet. Both sides continue to build up their forces.

IJ would have been extremely reluctant to give up their foothold on Guadalcanal. Their overall strategy, as I understand it, wasn't just to create a ribbon defense made up of fortified island bases as a buffer to attacks on the home islands. They recognized the key to winning the war or a separate peace by concession was isolating and severing the USA and Australian logistical lifeline, that was becoming such a headache in their attempt to solidify their hold on New Guinea. An IJN airfield on Guadalcanal was vital to that role. Draw a 600 mile circle around Henderson field and you'll get the idea. It doesn't create an insurmountable barrier but it increases the time and cost of reinforcement and resupply by forcing the allies to use longer routes. Look how hard IJ forces fought to keep it and how reluctantly they gave it up.

 

[Conslaw]

In the subscenario, where the Japanese have no heavy carriers and the US has 3 (if you include WASP as a heavy carrier), I think Guadalcanal would still be the next US offensive. If I made the decision, I would first conduct another carrier raid on Japan proper for the purpose of keeping assets bundled up in the home islands. Without its carriers, Japan would have a hard time holding onto any objective in the Solomons. Rabaul would be an isolated outpost by Mid 1943, maybe earlier.

As an offensive force, the Japanese medium carriers had limitations. The Junyo and Hiyo were rather slow at 25.5 knots. The Junyo and the Hiyo each carried 42 active aircraft. The Zuiho carried 30. To match up against an American carrier force with these medium-sized ships, Japan would look for an opportunity to go against a single US carrier.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

In the subscenario, where the Japanese have no heavy carriers and the US has 3 (if you include WASP as a heavy carrier), I think Guadalcanal would still be the next US offensive. If I made the decision, I would first conduct another carrier raid on Japan proper for the purpose of keeping assets bundled up in the home islands. Without its carriers, Japan would have a hard time holding onto any objective in the Solomons. Rabaul would be an isolated outpost by Mid 1943, maybe earlier.

As an offensive force, the Japanese medium carriers had limitations. The Junyo and Hiyo were rather slow at 25.5 knots. The Junyo and the Hiyo each carried 42 active aircraft. The Zuiho carried 30. To match up against an American carrier force with these medium-sized ships, Japan would look for an opportunity to go against a single US carrier.

I agree that capture of Guadalcanal would be a prime objective for the US. Assuming the US historical loss of Wasp occurs sometime during the effort to take Guadalcanal, which I would expect to be a much more difficult nut to crack two months later than the actual early August date. I'd expect loss of their fleet carriers would have motivated the IJ forces to accelerate the build-up of their airfield and its defense. As it was, Guadalcanal was a close thing for the US with the forces at hand and the IJN's fleet carriers didn't play that significant a practical role in its numerous attempts to recapture the island, either because they were too valuable to risk or were forced into a mutual retreat due to air group losses. I wouldn't expect a classic CV vs CV confrontation in the scenario. In 1943, the IJN employed a useful tactic in an effort to stem the allied advance up the Solomon Islands, and another in June '44 during the Battle of the Philippine Sea (BPS). They stripped their carriers in '43 to reinforce Rabaul and then used Guam to stage shuttle bombing during the BPS. If the IJN shuttles its air assets as they planned to do during the BPS or staged their air groups out of Guadalcanal with the US down to 2 or even 3 fleet carriers, then, in the absence of phalanxes of F6Fs or F4Us to defend the carriers, the US effort to take Guadalcanal becomes IMHO a very risky proposition.