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Conslaw
Senior Airman
If you don't want to argue "what if" scenarios, then don't. This topic is for folks who are in to such things.
What if? - Battle of Midway in July 1942 rather than June
- Thread starter Conslaw
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If you don't want to argue "what if" scenarios, then don't. This topic is for folks who are in to such things.
- Thread starter
- #163
Conslaw
Senior Airman
I was reflecting on Vinnye's post arguing that the Japanese would have won the Battle of Midway if they would have changed their codes and not allowed the US to stage an ambush. If the Japanese would have had the surprise factor at Midway, it is likely that they would have been able to take the atoll with their troops. They also would have had better odds in taking on any American carriers that then came to battle, at least compared to what actually happened.
AFAIK, the scenario that the Japanese wargamers didn't model was the possibility that the Americans would refuse the offer of battle at Midway. The Japanese fleet couldn't stick around at Midway. Once the Kido Butai left, it would have been relatively easy for the Americans to retake Midway Atoll.
I don't think the Americans would have rushed to battle with their only three operational Pacific carriers if they didn't have surprise and a fortified Midway island in their favor. I'm interested in the opinions of our best and brightest on whether the American Navy would have rushed to fight the Japanese at Midway after they had already taken the island group.
AFAIK, the scenario that the Japanese wargamers didn't model was the possibility that the Americans would refuse the offer of battle at Midway. The Japanese fleet couldn't stick around at Midway. Once the Kido Butai left, it would have been relatively easy for the Americans to retake Midway Atoll.
I don't think the Americans would have rushed to battle with their only three operational Pacific carriers if they didn't have surprise and a fortified Midway island in their favor. I'm interested in the opinions of our best and brightest on whether the American Navy would have rushed to fight the Japanese at Midway after they had already taken the island group.
How Fletcher came into command of the CV's, I suggest, amounted to no more than which commander was available to make a rush supply and reinforcement trip to Wake. That trip was a bust but it wasn't Fletcher's fault, the enemy struck and Fletcher was recalled. Once in the command slot he stayed there and became one of the greatest (uncelebrated) heros in the military history of the United States.
It was believed that the advent of naval aviation required officers in mid career to be positioned so that they would be able to command air units in the near future. The thinking was that any officer in command of air units must be a pilot in order to understand the needs of aviation. The men who enrolled in this program were taking big chances with their naval careers. Anyway, these officers were known as Johnny come lately's or JCL's. Fletcher himself applied but was turned down due to eyesight. So, it is apparent that many navy men appreciated the importance that naval aviation was about to present in the coming war.
So, now imagine all these ladies in waiting and a black shoe in command. It wouldn't matter how good Fletcher was at his job, they would not be happy. I'm surprised Fletcher stayed at sea as long as he did. So, yeah, with his glowing war record he needed to be "banished" so that the fly boys could have their day. Both the JLC's and the backers of the JLC program had to oppose Fletcher.
Fletcher was a sea dog but with his exulted rank he wasn't going to be able to go back to his cruisers. It was up and out. I wish he could have been posted to cruiser flotilla command at Guadalcanal. That would have been interesting.
It was believed that the advent of naval aviation required officers in mid career to be positioned so that they would be able to command air units in the near future. The thinking was that any officer in command of air units must be a pilot in order to understand the needs of aviation. The men who enrolled in this program were taking big chances with their naval careers. Anyway, these officers were known as Johnny come lately's or JCL's. Fletcher himself applied but was turned down due to eyesight. So, it is apparent that many navy men appreciated the importance that naval aviation was about to present in the coming war.
So, now imagine all these ladies in waiting and a black shoe in command. It wouldn't matter how good Fletcher was at his job, they would not be happy. I'm surprised Fletcher stayed at sea as long as he did. So, yeah, with his glowing war record he needed to be "banished" so that the fly boys could have their day. Both the JLC's and the backers of the JLC program had to oppose Fletcher.
Fletcher was a sea dog but with his exulted rank he wasn't going to be able to go back to his cruisers. It was up and out. I wish he could have been posted to cruiser flotilla command at Guadalcanal. That would have been interesting.
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I'd say, look at the broader picture. That will tell you. Why were they there in June? They were there in June because just a month before they for the first time felt the destructive presence of our carriers. Yamamoto was right, there, wasn't he? Coral Sea got that across to them, didn't it?
So, OK, our carriers never show up. There are a lot of ways they could go from there, with a taken Midway. Their carrier fleet is intact. Another launch on Pearl. While that possibility looms, we're going to be in Southeast Asia with our carriers? I don't know about that. That carrier fleet is going to meet our carriers at Midway. Yamamoto gets his showdown. I don't think there's any other way it figures.
Balljoint
Senior Airman
As an aside, wouldn't this delight Hitler if it had occurred?
oldcrowcv63
Tech Sergeant
With respect to the aggressiveness of the US fleet/command and their willingness to do battle in various scenarios I believe psychology of the USN commanders comes in to play. While both Nimitz and King were aggressive commanders, only Nimitz seemed to appreciate the importance of husbanding his fleet assets and committing them under favorable circumstances. In other words, Nimitz seemed to appreciate the concept of a fleet in being better than King. I also have the impression King took the IJN assault on PH as a personal affront to his apparent racist perspective (a counterpoint to the IJN's Victory disease that lead, directly or indirectly, to a number of USN debacles). With some of these alternate scenarios I think the real danger to the USN fortunes derives from its leadership. Nimitz like virtually everyone else in the USN was subject to bullying by King, until he establishes his own record of successes and (I assume) a political power base (by about mid to late 1942). One gets the impression (reading Lundstrom's Black Shoe Admiral), Nimitz was playing sleight of hand games with King in their correspondence to make King believe he was doing what King wanted when in actuality he was doing something else entirely (e.g. CINCPAC's employment of the Battle ships of Task force 1 thru Midway). King's contempt for the IJN's capability in any area seems to me to be the greatest source of real danger to the survival of the US Pacific fleet until late 1943.
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davparlr
Senior Master Sergeant
Interesting comments. I don't know a lot about Admiral King but I understand he also had a disdain for the Brits such that he ignored their advice on anti-sub tactics which led to the loss of many US ships on the Eastern seaboard.
I think you meant, with a change of parenthesis, "I also have the impression King took the IJN assault on PH as a personal affront to his apparent racist perspective (a counterpoint to the IJN's Victory disease) that lead, directly or indirectly, to a number of USN debacles.
I think you meant, with a change of parenthesis, "I also have the impression King took the IJN assault on PH as a personal affront to his apparent racist perspective (a counterpoint to the IJN's Victory disease) that lead, directly or indirectly, to a number of USN debacles.
oldcrowcv63
Tech Sergeant
Thanks Dav. Yep that's what I meant. I can't substantiate the ASW story but it wouldn't surprise me to find it true. I have heard/read from a variety of sources regarding his anglophobia, but usually in the context of his fear that "his war" would suffer due to Roosevelt's 'misplaced priorities' on European victory (His view, not mine). I suspect he probably possessed a broader arrogance that distrusted anything he couldn't directly control, especially the British or other allies with whom he was literally forced to play. He also is reputed to have believed that no one was as smart as he, individually or collectively. It might even be fair to say his contempt for the British was only exceeded by his contempt for the Japanese. I believe he suffers in comparison to either Marshall or Arnold among the US senior military leadership.
vinnye
Senior Airman
Regarding Admiral King, from Wiki :
At the start of US involvement in World War II, blackouts on the U.S. eastern seaboard were not in effect, and commercial ships were not travelling under convoy. King's critics attribute the delay to implement these measures to his Anglophobia, as the convoys and seaboard blackouts were British proposals, and King was supposedly loath to have his much-beloved U.S. Navy adopt any ideas from the Royal Navy. He also refused, until March 1942, the loan of British convoy escorts when the Americans had only a handful of suitable vessels. He was, however, aggressive in driving his destroyer captains to attack U-boats in defense of convoys and in planning counter-measures against German surface raiders, even before the formal declaration of war in December 1941.[35]
Instead of convoys, King had the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard perform regular anti-submarine patrols, but these patrols followed a regular schedule. U-boat commanders learned the schedule, and coordinated their attacks to these schedules. Leaving the lights on in coastal towns back-lit merchant ships to the U-Boats. As a result, there were disastrous shipping losses — two million tons lost in January and February 1942 alone, and urgent pressure applied from both sides of the Atlantic. However, King resisted the use of convoys because he was convinced the Navy lacked sufficient escort vessels to make them effective. The formation of convoys with inadequate escort would also result in increased port-to-port time, giving the enemy concentrated groups of targets rather than single ships proceeding independently. Furthermore, blackouts were a politically sensitive issue – coastal cities resisted, citing the loss of tourism revenue.
Ialso recall reading that when the RN began to operate a Task Force in the Far East - King gave orders for the USN to refuse to help them. Apparently, a lot of USN officers would supply anything they could that the RN wanted - as long as King did not find out!
At the start of US involvement in World War II, blackouts on the U.S. eastern seaboard were not in effect, and commercial ships were not travelling under convoy. King's critics attribute the delay to implement these measures to his Anglophobia, as the convoys and seaboard blackouts were British proposals, and King was supposedly loath to have his much-beloved U.S. Navy adopt any ideas from the Royal Navy. He also refused, until March 1942, the loan of British convoy escorts when the Americans had only a handful of suitable vessels. He was, however, aggressive in driving his destroyer captains to attack U-boats in defense of convoys and in planning counter-measures against German surface raiders, even before the formal declaration of war in December 1941.[35]
Instead of convoys, King had the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard perform regular anti-submarine patrols, but these patrols followed a regular schedule. U-boat commanders learned the schedule, and coordinated their attacks to these schedules. Leaving the lights on in coastal towns back-lit merchant ships to the U-Boats. As a result, there were disastrous shipping losses — two million tons lost in January and February 1942 alone, and urgent pressure applied from both sides of the Atlantic. However, King resisted the use of convoys because he was convinced the Navy lacked sufficient escort vessels to make them effective. The formation of convoys with inadequate escort would also result in increased port-to-port time, giving the enemy concentrated groups of targets rather than single ships proceeding independently. Furthermore, blackouts were a politically sensitive issue – coastal cities resisted, citing the loss of tourism revenue.
Ialso recall reading that when the RN began to operate a Task Force in the Far East - King gave orders for the USN to refuse to help them. Apparently, a lot of USN officers would supply anything they could that the RN wanted - as long as King did not find out!
oldcrowcv63
Tech Sergeant
http://vpnavy.com/vp44_1940.htmlnear the bottom of the page:
Probably a reasonably reliable source: although clearly the PATWING managed to find 4 aircraft that possessed ASV radar and could attempt a night strike on the evening of June 3-4:
22 May–Jun 1942: VP-44 transferred to Midway Island to provide combat patrols, joining Catalinas from VPs 14, 23, 24, 51, 72, 91 and 44. There were 32 PBY-5 and 5A aircraft at Midway awaiting the arrival of the Japanese due to decoded intercepts detailing their plans to attack Midway Island. The aircraft were split into two groups—one operating with 22 aircraft from Sand Island, the other with 10 aircraft operating from Eastern Island. Sector searches were flown out to 700 miles from Midway commencing at 0415 each morning. The squadrons were handicapped at this stage of the war by the lack of radar on the aircraft. All sightings had to be done by the "Mark I eyeball." On 3 June, Ensign Jewell H. Reid and his crew were the first to spot the Japanese task force approaching Midway.
Probably a reasonably reliable source: although clearly the PATWING managed to find 4 aircraft that possessed ASV radar and could attempt a night strike on the evening of June 3-4:
22 May–Jun 1942: VP-44 transferred to Midway Island to provide combat patrols, joining Catalinas from VPs 14, 23, 24, 51, 72, 91 and 44. There were 32 PBY-5 and 5A aircraft at Midway awaiting the arrival of the Japanese due to decoded intercepts detailing their plans to attack Midway Island. The aircraft were split into two groups—one operating with 22 aircraft from Sand Island, the other with 10 aircraft operating from Eastern Island. Sector searches were flown out to 700 miles from Midway commencing at 0415 each morning. The squadrons were handicapped at this stage of the war by the lack of radar on the aircraft. All sightings had to be done by the "Mark I eyeball." On 3 June, Ensign Jewell H. Reid and his crew were the first to spot the Japanese task force approaching Midway.
