What if: No Allied invasions of Sicily Italy

[parsifal]

The planning for a russian collapse began from early 1942, but didnt end with Stalingrad. The risk of a Russian collapse remained real enough until after Kursk, so Allied plans for an emergency landing remained relevant until well into 1943.

Interstingly the allies even toyed with the idea of sending formations to Russia itself. This was a concept advocated or at least supported by Stalin. He wanted something like 30 Brit Divs sent to fight on the eastern front at one stage. Stalin was even less comprehending of the logistic difficulties of such a scheme, and the fact that Britain could not have sustained such a large army with the manpower at her disposal in the last half of the war.

 

[barney]

Before the war the accepted theory was that you bombed a city, everyone panics, and surrender immediately follows. After the BoB, if there was a people on earth who should have known this wasn't true, it was the British. Nevertheless, this is the policy that Britain adhered to, to the end of of the war by way of the Bomber C in C, Harris.

So, what does this have to do with invading Italy? Well, for bombers to work the sky needs to be cleared of enemy fighters. That takes time. But, more sadly, even the Americans didn't have a clear idea of what to bomb. Should it have been armament plants, rail centers, cities, canals or submarine pens? It wasn't until late in the war that it started to become apparent that oil was key. And oil didn't become a factor until Russian Armies had overrun important oil fields. Now, when synthetic oil plants were bombed, the ability of Germany to make war was greatly affected.

In the meantime, some pretense of creating a second front was needed to satisfy Stalin.

 

[parsifal]

The bomber campaign was just an extension of the "broad front strategy", and it is a failure only when measured against the bombastic and urealistic claims that go all the way back to trenchards day. But to say that bombing of civilian was always inneffective, is to be wise after the event. Beginning with Guernica, progressing through to Warsaw, the battles in the low countries and france, and dare i say it, even Britain itself, there were many well documented instances of civilian panic and breakdowns in infrastructure. This process continued over Germany, though up to April 1942 the bombing effort was more about lifting British morale and learning the trade rather than affecting the Germans. But from April 1942 onward, with increasing ferocity and effectiveness, the Bomber offensive took an increasing toll on German morale, production, transport and manpower, sapped the confidence of much of the leadership, and most important of all diverted an ever increasing amount of German manpower (over a million men in the flak artillerie alone) and aerial resources, as the war progressed. The British bomber offensive reached its zenith in July 1943, with the Hamburg raids, which according to Speer, nearly brought Germany to its knees.

So, its a very one eyed and incorrect view to claim the bomber offensive was a failure. It was a failure if one says it didnt win the war, but the same criticism could be laid at the feet of the Battle Of the Atlantic, or the efforts in North Africa, of the Battle Of Moscow, or a score of other crucial battles for the allies. The facts are that the Allies won by applying overwhelming pressure on the Germans across a wide number of fronts, in the air, on the ground, and in a wide variety of geographical locations. Saying this theatre or that offensive was useless is to completely misunderstand why and how the allies won.....

 

[barney]

No, the bombing effort was not a failure. But the greatest payoff of the effort had its beginnings with the invasion planners redirecting of the efforts of the 8th and 15th Air Forces to targets they thought would make the Normandy landing easier. Once the thinking of the air bosses got channeled in that direction, by late summer 1944, the importance of attacking oil began to have the priority it deserved.

So, this is a series of stepping stones. First, you need enough control of the skies to make bombing something other than suicidal. Second, the Soviet front in the East has to envelope the Balkan oil fields. Third, somebody had to arrive at the idea that the German Army might be pressed for fuel if the refineries and synthetic plants were bombed. Now, finally, you have arrived at the most important target for the bombers.

And yes, the British participated in this effort to, if begrudgingly. Sir Arthur Harris said, "I still do not think that it was reasonable, at that time, to expect that the [oil] campaign would succeed; what the Allied strategists did was to bet on an outsider, and it happened to win the race." This is probably true but what matters is that it worked.

In getting back to the subject of this thread, yes Italy should have been invaded simply because the pieces were not yet in place to mount an invasion in the North.

 

[pbfoot]

No, the bombing effort was not a failure. But the greatest payoff of the effort had its beginnings with the invasion planners redirecting of the efforts of the 8th and 15th Air Forces to targets they thought would make the Normandy landing easier. Once the thinking of the air bosses got channeled in that direction, by late summer 1944, the importance of attacking oil began to have the priority it deserved.

So, this is a series of stepping stones. First, you need enough control of the skies to make bombing something other than suicidal. Second, the Soviet front in the East has to envelope the Balkan oil fields. Third, somebody had to arrive at the idea that the German Army might be pressed for fuel if the refineries and synthetic plants were bombed. Now, finally, you have arrived at the most important target for the bombers.

And yes, the British participated in this effort to, if begrudgingly. Sir Arthur Harris said, "I still do not think that it was reasonable, at that time, to expect that the [oil] campaign would succeed; what the Allied strategists did was to bet on an outsider, and it happened to win the race." This is probably true but what matters is that it worked.

In getting back to the subject of this thread, yes Italy should have been invaded simply because the pieces were not yet in place to mount an invasion in the North.

The reason they switched from oil to area was they couldn't hit the oil facilities with any accuracy

 

[tomo pauk]

RAF swithched from attacking point targets (factories) to 'dehousing' way before the POL targets were singled out as priorities.

 

[syscom3]

In the book "An Army At Dawn", the author talked in length about the Casablanca conference in which allied strategy was discussed for 1943.

Churchill pressed upon the US commanders the importance of opening up the Med to British convoys. That would free up the equivalent of 275 cargo ships due to a vastly shorter supply line. As such, the invasions of Sicily and Italy were agreed upon (at least this was one of the reasons). With the bonus invasions of Sardinia and Corsica, the allies would dominate the Med and make things easier to begin the buildup and support of the projected invasion of France.

There were other factors in play here, as mentioned by some of you:

1) The knocking out of Italy from the war.
2) The political need to do something to appease Stalin.
3) The need for bomber fields for the 15th AF and BC.
4) The lack of divisions and supply to follow on the invasion of France (You can land and hold, but not advance)
5) The lack of air superiority any where in France meant an invasion was guaranteed to be "exciting", if not disastrous.
6) The German Army was still way better than the Allies, and untill the brutal lessons of Italy were learned, there is every chance that they could handle and defeat an allied invasion anywhere in France.

 

[vinnye]

A very interesting discussion!
I believe that an allied invasion in 1943 would have had only an even chance of success.
As mentioned by Syscom3 - a lack of air superiority would have made things intersting to say the least.

The Sicily campaign was used in my opinion to keep Stalin happy, keep the good news rolling in - and to give experience to more US troops and keep the 6th Army units active rather than chomping at the bit back in blighty!
It also meant that some German Army units had to be re-located to bolster the defence of Italy.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... Britain was just stalling while the Soviet Union chewed up more of the Wehrmacht...."

As the architect of Gallipoli Churchill certainly was familiar with how a landing could go wrong - if he was cautious - good.

As for letting the Soviets "chew up" Germany - nothing wrong with that at all - the Soviets were fighting on home turf. Their turf. Italy certainly wasn't British turf - why fight any sooner than when you have to? or are ready?


MM

 

[Njaco]

In my mind, the Allies needed to attack Italy and Sicily for the following reasons:

1. Tied up German resources that would be needed on a Western Front;
2. Knock Italy out of the war and possibly create havoc with other Med occupied countries such as Greece. That also tied up resources.
3. Secure airfields closer to Germany and also can be used to assist the Russians.

Oh and Tiger tanks were around since late 42 - first one captured by the Allies was in North Africa.

 

[GrauGeist]

...And oil didn't become a factor until Russian Armies had overrun important oil fields. Now, when synthetic oil plants were bombed, the ability of Germany to make war was greatly affected.

The Axis oil supply was definately a consideration from the onset.

The first attacks on Axis oil targets occurred in 1940, in the Ruhr area by RAF bombers, the first raid on Ploesti was executed on 12 June 1942 by USAAF B-24 bombers, and the attacks continued right up to the end of the war with a raid on the refineries in Norway in April 1945.

It may have had a lower priority than other operations, but it was a steady drain on the Axis war effort.

 

[renrich]

Many American commanders wanted an invasion of France in 1943. The British, I believe correctly, felt that a 1943 invasion in France was premature. Many good reasons supporting the argument that the invasions of Sicily and Italy were the proper strategy have been advanced here. The probability is that an Overlord in 1943 would have been a failure. Poorly trained troops, lack of landing craft, not enough manpower, insufficient supplies and don't forget that the bombing in 1943 and the first half of 1944 severely weakened Germany and the LW. The Allies had complete air superiority over Normandy in 1944.