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The fuze was later found to be able to detonate artillery shells in air bursts, greatly increasing their anti-personnel effects.[18]One of the most original and effective military developments in World War II was the proximity, or 'VT', fuze. It found use in both the Army and the Navy, and was employed in the defense of London. While no one invention won the war, the proximity fuze must be listed among the very small group of developments, such as radar, upon which victory very largely depended.[17]
Estimates from the US were that it would increase Allied losses by 300%....if there was no jamming of the fuses and radar. For this to work they'd need to figure out a way to avoid jamming, which the Allies figured out before they deployed their own in case any of there was captured and reverse-engineered, and have a functional cavity magnetron to avoid radar jamming. If they had that...well look at how well Allied FLAK dealt with the V-1s once all their systems came online in 1944. I'd imagine the combo would make 400% higher Allied air losses. Unsustainable territory very quickly. The best the Germans managed was a shoot down for every 2000 shells in 1942, 400% better means 500 shells per kill in 1943.Let's have the Germans deploy functional proximity fuses for their flak guns in time for the RAF and USAAF strategic bombing offensives.
The proximity fuze was one of the most important technological innovations of World War II. It was so important that it was a secret guarded to a similar level as the atom bomb project or D-Day invasion.[14][15][16] Admiral Lewis Strauss wrote that,
The fuze was later found to be able to detonate artillery shells in air bursts, greatly increasing their anti-personnel effects.[18]
In Germany, more than 30 (perhaps as many as 50)[19] different proximity fuze designs were developed, or researched, for anti-aircraft use, but none saw service.[10] These included acoustic fuzes triggered by engine sound, one developed by Rheinmetall-Borsig based on electrostatic fields, and radio fuzes. In mid-November 1939, a German neon lamp tube and a design of a prototype proximity fuze based on capacitive effects was received by British Intelligence as part of the Oslo Report.
That's my thinking too. Putting efforts toward advanced AA tech rather than ballistic missiles and Goering's Napkinwaffe seems the better approach.American daylight strategic bombing stops for sure and UK night bombing probably stops. Both types of operations would be unsustainable due to the loss rates incurred.
Ideas were not the problem. Turning the ideas into stuff that actually worked was the problem. Worked in a real live fire test, not experiments to see if the idea itself worked.In Germany, more than 30 (perhaps as many as 50)[19] different proximity fuze designs were developed, or researched, for anti-aircraft use, but none saw service.[10] These included acoustic fuzes triggered by engine sound, one developed by Rheinmetall-Borsig based on electrostatic fields, and radio fuzes. In mid-November 1939, a German neon lamp tube and a design of a prototype proximity fuze based on capacitive effects was received by British Intelligence as part of the Oslo Report.
It was actually much easier to design and build a proximity fuse for a rocket or missile than a proximity fuse for an AA gun.Putting efforts toward advanced AA tech rather than ballistic missiles
Was there any reasonable feasible route for the Germans to mass produce and deploy wireless guided SAMs with proximity fuses?It was actually much easier to design and build a proximity fuse for a rocket or missile than a proximity fuse for an AA gun.
You have more space to work with.
And how do you direct radar and guide a missile onto a single aircraft when there's a wall of hundreds coming at you? I guess that was thinking behind the AIR-2A Genie, each missile takes out many bombers.A successful Proximity fuse would have gone a long way into making a successful SAM.
You still need successful propulsion and successful guidance.
Tracking the missile with a 2nd radar and using that to either detonate the warhead or to command the operator to do it (very fast reflexes ?) is also a little wasteful?
How many radar beams using close to identical frequencies in the air at one time?
Size of the rocket was somewhat dependent on the size of the warhead. Using a 306 kg warhead (an area weapon) rather than a 100kg warhead obviously means a much larger missile.
Some info here. Proximity fuze - WikipediaAre there examples of german proximity fuses that were the most feasible/got closest to production?
AFAIK the only proven ones that were functional were the ones for rockets and missiles since they were easier to make as they didn't deal with the small size of a cannon fired shell or the g-force acceleration. There have been allegations about electro-static FLAK fuses, but that they weren't operational by the end of the war.Very interesting thread. A FOUR time increase in losses to heavy flak sound devastating. Are there examples of german proximity fuses that were the most feasible/got closest to production? One can theorize that even if the german fuses were not as good as the allied ones and only increase losses by say 3 times, that is still a massive improvement in efficiency.
Also, one can onsider other effects such as german proximity fuses being handed over to the japanese. Presumably the bigger the shell the easier is to fit proximity fuses, so the japanese could fit such fuses to their big gun San-shiki-dan shells on their cruisers, battleships etc. as well as land based mounts.
Given their postwar lead in innovation, it's noteworthy just how behind the Germans were in some many essential military capabilities. Air warning/intercept radar and overall air defence, naval fire control radar, cryptography, logistics and supply chain, production/weapons/kit prioritization, and so much more.
A great example is when the Germans take the Russian oil fields but brought no expertise or ability to reverse the Soviet's entirely-predictable sabotage. Barbarossa was all about seizing the USSR's resources, and now you've done it, but you didn't being the kit to use it. D'oh.
As noted earlier Crosley built about 25% of the Proximity fuses built in the US using a work force of 10,000 workers.I took thousands of at least semi skilled, if not skilled workers to make these fuses.
Where's the Germans going to get these people, from their usual pool of slave labor ?
Working under the threat of death.
They really seemed to think that insured quality, but then they were Nazis.
Unfortunately you have several misconceptions. At the start of the war they were ahead in radar, but lost the lead due to the US and UK merging their programs, the Germans giving up on cavity magnetron research (which they had the lead in until 1940), and the Japanese not sharing their technology (they were at the same place with cavity magnetron research as the British in 1940 and arguably kept pace until the end of the war). They also had the best air defense system in the world until US production was able to take Britain to the next level somewhere in 1943-44. Cryptography saw the German achieve immense success, something the Allies covered up until the 2000s:Given their postwar lead in innovation, it's noteworthy just how behind the Germans were in some many essential military capabilities. Air warning/intercept radar and overall air defence, naval fire control radar, cryptography, logistics and supply chain, production/weapons/kit prioritization, and so much more.
A great example is when the Germans take the Russian oil fields but brought no expertise or ability to reverse the Soviet's entirely-predictable sabotage. Barbarossa was all about seizing the USSR's resources, and now you've done it, but you didn't bring the kit to use it. D'oh.