At the start of the war they were ahead in radar, but lost the lead due to the US and UK merging their programs, the Germans giving up on cavity magnetron research (which they had the lead in until 1940), and the Japanese not sharing their technology (they were at the same place with cavity magnetron research as the British in 1940 and arguably kept pace until the end of the war). They also had the best air defense system in the world until US production was able to take Britain to the next level somewhere in 1943-44.
Since the cavity magnetron has become a sort of magic device there are lots of claims about what qualified and who did it, in order USSR, Japan, Britain. The German field sets were more advanced than the British ones in 1940, but not the ones under development. The Germans then standardised in order to make the numbers required, while the allies made improvements. Given the results of 1940 air fighting, and the lack of Luftwaffe raids on Britain 1941 onwards deciding best air defence systems lacks evidence.
Cryptography saw the German achieve immense success, something the Allies covered up until the 2000s:
The Germans cracked things the allied merchant ship code and early war RN codes, for example See Hitler's Spies by David Kahn, copyright 1978. The cracking of various US codes also, like the Black code. Axis Allies also had successes but the Axis powers devoted plenty of effort to crack each other's systems. Nothing comparable to Ultra/Magic.
Much of the wartime issues was lack of resources, lack of manpower, lack of preparation for war (contrary to the claims there is no indication that the Germans were seriously preparing for war until 1938-39 when it was clear the Allies were preparing for war).
In the 1940 fiscal year Germany spent more on interest and loan repayments than the war. As of 1938 Nazi Germany was going to either explode militarily or implode financially in a few years. Do the spending figures in Germany include things like the off the books MEFO loans? Europe began preparing for war because of Nazi Germany, not the other way around.
The guaranteed local markets thanks to all that mostly military deficit spending meant there was less incentive to export and earn the foreign exchange to pay for imports. The synthetic oil program comes to mind as a war preparation along with pressuring companies to build up large stockpiles in Germany, not counted as defence spending.
Logistics was far more the reason behind decisions they made there. Also keep in mind the Germans advanced MUCH further over far worse infrastructure than the Allies did in 1944 France and had less issues with supply. Much of the claims about how bad the Germans were at logistics is post-war propaganda
Actually no, things like tank repair was in Germany but the tanks broke down in the east. The supply plan that assumed defeat of the Red Army close to the border. The Germans in the east used local food supplies, human and horse and still had supply problems. They were not too worried about civilian supplies. Same for PoW and enemy military hospitals. Soviet tactical problems kept German losses down.
On 15th August Anvil/Dragoon landings start, amongst the units landed in the first two days are 25 truck companies and 2 gasoline supply companies. The supplies include 300,000 blankets and 350,000 sets of Red Cross relief clothing for the civilian population, due to the known shortages.
In France in 1944 During September 5,000 Italians arrive from the Mediterranean to be used as part of the US logistics system. As the US starts to hire French citizens it finds "Labour was plentiful, though rendered inefficient by malnutrition."
Allied relief supplies to The European Theatre of Operations, long tons, by quarter, excluding liquid fuels,
Q2/44 727 (In other words 6 to 30 June 1944)
Q3/44 157,639
Q4/44 588,968
The Germans concentrated more on removing supplies from the civil populations.
Back in the east in 1941 in the north the European gauge rail was largely captured intact, it was the Russian gauge parts that were heavily damaged. Army Group Centre stopped at Smolensk. Meantime the German rail troops had low priorities for equipment and supplies. As most of the Baltic ports were captured intact Army Group North could use ships.
Army Group Centre stopped for supply reasons, it could free a panzer army to strike south, where the resistance had been solid, and send troops north to be supplied by Army Group North. Then came the logistically risky attack on Moscow. The Soviet recapture of the Mosbas coal fields in 1941/42 was important
After all they mostly ignored the ports and then were shocked when they ran out of supplies at the German border. Like how could the vaunted Allies miss how important Antwerp was? Then even after they captured it they didn't allocate enough labor to even fully utilize it.
At the start of the Octagon conference the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree with General Eisenhower's intention to continue to strike towards Germany as a higher priority than opening the ports. The CCS do note the ports will be needed before bad weather sets in. Both 1st and 3rd Armies report they have the fuel and ammunition needed to advance to the Rhine. Centuries of warfare meant plenty of European borders were good defence lines, putting a hole in the German western defences was considered worth trying for. Clearing the approaches to Antwerp first would give the other German defences time to solidify.
Neither the Germans nor the allies missed the significance of ports in France, after all the Germans kept hold of some to the end and wrecked others. The turn into Brittany instead of to Falaise during the break out and the subsequent capture of Brest was all about ports. The US Army port units were inexperienced, the ports small and/or damaged with only a few weeks to make them work if the 1944 advance was to continue. The result was even if the rail systems were working perfectly the allies were not landing enough supplies to keep advancing in September 1944 but the lack of trucks and non working rail made the port performance irrelevant. While a working French rail system in June 1944 was a direct threat to the beach head, start with German units turning up as units, not partial arrivals that became battle groups only later reassembled as the full unit.
The basic rule for the US Army was it took about 3 weeks to load then completely unload a merchant ship in a well equipped port using experienced workers. That put a major delay in supply times. Dry cargo ships to the UK were taking an average of 59.8 days for a return voyage in 1943. Army dry cargo ships were taking 76.9 days on average to complete a round trip voyage to England in the period January to June 1944, including 15.4 days in English ports and 27.4 days in US ports. War Shipping Administration figures for 1,412 ships completing round voyages to England January 1943 to March 1944 gives the average round trip time as 69.4 days including 18.4 days "in overseas area" but with 5 less days at sea and 5 less days in US ports than the army cargo ships. The explanation appears to be a combination of more ready to ship cargo in the US and lower priority unloading in England. Times would blow out in 1944. On 17th August to give an idea of the shipping situation a ship, presumably loaded with medical supplies arrives in Europe on this day, it finally begins unloading on 10th December.
Supply depot in Germany to rail head was days, assuming the rail lines were open. US was rail to port depot, load ship, ship across ocean, unload ship to port depot, rail to supply depot and unloaded.
When it comes to the ports the allies tried various options, so on 2nd October Le Havre opens as a US port, in the first 3 months of 1945 35.2% of cargo handled will be unloaded via DUKWs. On 15th October the very small port of St Brieue is closed, it was opened on 16th September, unloading 9,521 tons at an average of 317 tons/day.
Antwerp was under continual V-1 and V-2 attack, so not all of its 242 berths were put back into action while the decision was taken to only unload ammunition there for the AA guns defending it, other ports handle the army ammunition, except for special cases. To help clear the cargo the Albert canal is to be brought into operation, hopefully by mid December. Antwerp actually makes the rail congestion problem worse since it shortens travel time, leaving the depots that much less time to unload trains. Personnel are landed at Le Havre or southern France.
In January 1945 the workers at Antwerp will go on strike due to a lack of food, clothing and coal, where possible the allies were using civil workers in the ports and rail systems. However for example as of 24th November 1944 to run the US part of Le Havre the US Army is using 8,919 men.
Providing spare parts for the port cranes etc. was a problem.
And they ran out of infantry replacements so were using untrained clerks as meatshields by late 1944. During the Bulge the US even had to beg the Brits for 400 Sherman tanks even as thousands of Shermans were waiting in depots in the US to go to Europe.
US army supply and loss rates were set based on North African experience, in particular the large amount of ammunition sent but not used, it took a long time to ship it back out. Changing the rates required evidence, June/July 1944, transmission of that to Washington followed by action in the US, followed by shipment and unloading. The failure to open enough ports early resulted in units being sent to the south of France and to Britain. There had been little maintenance done to French roads in 4 years.
The US Army had hit its manpower ceiling in 1944, the first warnings of what this would mean had been in September 1943. In April 1944 a meeting Washington with the European and Mediterranean Theatre of Operations representatives was told that from now on only replacements for existing units would be forthcoming, requests for additional men would have to be found by using existing resources more efficiently or reallocation of existing manpower. The days of expansion were over. The European Theatre of Operations command noted the report but did not make any changes.
On 1st September there were 42,000 infantry replacements versus requirement of 55,000 only 15,000 of these had the MOS 745 classification, a rifleman. The theatre will retrain 14,400 men as riflemen in September and October. Mainly from replacements originally meant for other ground service arms. A retraining system was set up for the rest of the war. The 400 Sherman transfer was the direct result of the assumed low casualty rates.
I was talking about Russia, but in 1940 the Germans went further faster than the Wallies in 1944 as they didn't go out of their way to wreck infrastructure for months.
They did wreck things it was going to be or was in enemy hands, by the way the Red Army recovered Soviet territory in 1943/44 at about the same rate the Germans took it in 1941/42
First of all they weren't trying to conquer the world, that was a British fabrication: Second I don't disagree that serious mistakes were made by Germany though they lacked options to do much else given how anti-negotiation the Allies were,
Hitler's war aims were somewhat opportunistic and shifting , in the 1930's he wanted revenge on France and conquering the east. Ruling the world was held off while ruling Europe was achieved. How about outlining the terms the Germans were prepared to offer the allies? Or the ones they would accept instead of allies would not negotiate. And what happens when the extermination system is discovered.
but the US had the war on easy mode and still managed to fuck up.
The Germans were really good even superior but the US had it easy?
In fact had Hitler not been so obsessed with Antwerp in 1944 and adopted Rundstedt's plan the 90 division gamble could have seen the US army effectively collapse in NW Europe via the Ardennes offensive.
Except the majority of US forces were south, it was the Commonwealth forces that stood to be pocketed, also as the Ardennes showed, the entire attack had to be in close to unflyable weather.
Also it wasn't logistics that stopped the Germans in 1941 or 1942, it was Hitler's poor choices to try and clear the flanks before going for Moscow and the obsession with trying to bag prisoners instead sticking to plan Blau.
No, Army Group Centre was staying where it was until the rail head was brought forward, the lack of winter clothing shows even months later how bad the supply situation was. In 1942 it became supplies and lack of troops, 60 mile wide divisional fronts for example. The Luftwaffe largely becoming battlefield support to compensate.
Otherwise the USSR was on the verge of implosion by late 1942 economically due to the loss of territory, population, farmland, resources, etc.
As of around May 1942 the Germans needed to keep about half the front quiet and used multiple axis allied armies elsewhere to be able to attack, mostly taking open terrain, meantime the USSR was down to around 2/3 its pre war population. The death toll in Leningrad gives an indication of how tough it was to crack the Soviet system.
The Mediterranean supply book: the MTO had been in combat since November 1942 and only some select combat units and personnel were sent to Britain for Normandy. So the ETO supply system was green. The French forces coming from the MTO had few support units and concentrated on creating more combat units. As for the selective unloading,
On 6th June landings begin, by the end of the day 19 US wounded have made it back to England, Portland Harbour.
On 7th June at 18:00 hours shellfire forces the ships offshore from Omaha beach to withdraw. Even without this interference the build up of ships waiting to unload is growing beyond what was planned.
On 8 June the first LSTs were dried out as the supply organisation tried to be selective in unloading ships, but the attempts were heavily compromised by a lack of manifests and even ship names. The same sort of problems as the trans Atlantic shipping had in 1942. Hence the tours of the anchorage in a landing craft and using loud hailers to discover what was out there.
On 10th June LCTs and LSTs began to be unloaded in arrival order, on 11th June this was extended to all ships. On 12th June blackout restrictions were eased and by 15th June the shipping backlog had been cleared.
On 12th June the confusion on the English side of the channel, caused by the slow return of ships reached its height. The situation is not helped by units failing to strip out items to be sent as cargo, instead taking all the equipment into the marshalling areas. Units are shipped in whatever shipping is available and not in the planned order.
15 September 1944 SHAEF gains control of 6th Army Group, on 20 November COMZ the US ETO supply system gains control of SOLOC the supply system for 6h AG.
Mid September the rail lines from the Mediterranean coast are to Bourg, 220 miles inland, 1,500 tons/day since the locomotives could not cross some of the repaired bridges. To handle the supplies the army opens up the never used WWI US Army depot at Mirimas, 20 miles from Marseilles.
On 25th September rail from the South has reached Lyon, offering 3,000 tons/day. In late September 12th Army Group calculated its 22 divisions plus air force plus local supply units needed around 19,000 tons per day to resume the offensive.
On 4th October the southern rail capacity is nearing 8,350 tons/day enabling trucks to go back to short haul services, as a result the "Flaming Bomb Express" truck service is terminated 4 days later
By mid October rail capacity from the Mediterranean ports is at 12,000 tons/day
At the end of October the plans for mid November have 21st Army Group with 18 1/3 divisions, 12th Army Group with 30 divisions and 6th Army Group with 16 divisions. Despite the supply problems the armies have adapted, reducing their consumption, 12th Army group now has 155,000 tons of reserve supplies, 1st army has 7 days of fuel, 3rd less than 2 days. In Marseilles there has been congestion caused by a backlog in clearing cargo from the port area even though the railway running north can now handle 12,000 tons/day it will remain the supply bottleneck in the south for the remainder of the war, it does not have the capacity to clear the cargo from a fully working Marseilles, so once Antwerp opens ships will be unloaded in the north where possible.
US Army Cargo landed 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945 excluding bulk POL and vehicles in Long Tons / personnel landed
South France 4,123,794 / 905,512
Cherbourg 2,697,341 / 95,923 (67,022 personnel in September 1944)
Antwerp 2,658,000 / 333 ("little momentum" before mid December 1944)
Omaha 1,264,990 / 801,000
Le Havre 1,168,171 / 1,014,036
Rouen 1,164,511 / 82,199 (Mainly a POL port)
Utah 726,014 / 801,005
Ghent 614,861 / 6
Minor Ports in Normandy 600,884 / 788
Brittany Ports 253,837 / 1378
Total 15,272,412 long tons, 3,702,180 personnel. Utah and Omaha also handled 287,500 vehicles.