Thumpalumpacus
Major
Meh, it's only war, what's two or three weeks?
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Conclusion
Ultimately, like Geoffrey, I have concluded that if the effort had been put into clearing the Scheldt then maybe Antwerp could have been reopened 2 or at most 3 weeks sooner than historical.
When weighed against the possibility that the war in Europe could be over by Christmas 1944?Meh, it's only war, what's two or three weeks?
When weighed against the possibility that the war in Europe could be over by Christmas 1944?
You do realize that the Ju87 was used exactly for that, right? And infrastructure includes much more than just bridges. Things like rail hubs, trains in motion, road networks, etc. were all targeted. And yes that is exactly what the Germans did. You might find this very useful:Really? Given the difficulties of dropping a bridge with unguided weapons, multiple missions will be needed, upon multiple bridges. And are you going to divert fighter-bombers from attacking Panzers and other divisions on the move to attacking locomotives and rolling stock?
My point was they over did the bombing of infrastructure throughout France and then advanced further than logistics could sustain and even then bypassed a major port near the front that could have solved the supply issue, since all the other ports were fortified and held by German garrisons. Also much effort was wasted on ports away from the front in Britany when the rail lines were too bombed to even make them useful if they were captured intact. Cherbourg was a special situation.That shit requires lead time. The Allies were good, but they weren't snap-your-fingers-and-it's-done good.
Sure, I was referring to them hitting everything repeatedly and then being flabbergasted that they couldn't move supplies up to chase the Germans to the border. Again the Germans were able to do it in 1940 without an issue, the US in particular seemed to love going overboard with bombing even when counterproductive.And aside from all that, no matter when the bridges, rail cars/locomotives, and marshaling yards are destroyed, they will still need to be repaired before use, meaning just-in-time bombing doesn't solve the issue.
Ok, then we agree. When I said not capturing Antwerp I meant all the terrain necessary to get it functional.The capture of intact facilities was lucky, the skipping its exploitation was the blunder, was my point.
Sure. There is a difference between the necessary bombing to get the invasion to succeed and wrecking all the infrastructure they'd need to advance upon breakout. Of course they assumed the conquest of France would be a process of 12 months for some reason, so they made some poor choices, but as the review I had posted of a book on Allied logistics pointed out the NWE logisticians were quite inexperienced with combat operations and made some mistakes that could have been remedied had they consulted with the Mediterranean crew. Still, even there those guys were mainly focused on shipping rather than inland operations, though the North Africa experience would have been helpful to planning the invasion and breakout in France.Both sides had successes and failures in logistics. Criticizing the Allies for destroying transport resources ignores the likelihood that leaving those resources intact until the invasion might well have caused the invasion to fail. That was a risk the Allies would not run -- rightfully so, in my opinion.
How so? Also remember in 1939 the Brits had captured German naval radar from the Graf Spee.The KM had an early lead, but by the end of 1940 they had lost the lead to the UK/RN, and this was before the USA made any note worthy contributions.
Sure, but keep in mind the Germans were focused on aerial and land warfare, the Brits on naval. After all the KM had about 20% of German military spending and kept their radar program separate from the Luftwaffe's. IIRC the Brits spent about 50% of their war spending on the navy.By mid 1941 the RN had introduced short range shipborne FC radar (Type 282), Long range AW/FC radar (Type 279/281) medium and main calibre FC radar (Type 285/284) and microwave/cavity magnetron surface search radar (Type 271/273).
Again thanks to US help with development and production of the lab toy that the Brits had invented in early 1940. The Germans certainly messed up by not pursuing the cavity magnetron until late in the war.By June 1941, HMS Prince of Wales, for example, had Type 271, 281. 6 x type 282, 4 x type 285 and Type 284. Plus the UK/RN began deploying airborne ASVII radar on a wide scale, and this was instrumental in the sinking of the Bismarck.
The Japanese never came close to developing their cavity magnetrons to the same level as the UK.
A special laboratory was set up near Shimada, in the Shizuoka Prefecture, for developing a high-power magnetron that, if not as powerful as Tesla had boasted, might at least incapacitate an aircraft. A number of Japan's leading physicists were involved. A 20 cm magnetron producing 100 kW was achieved, and by the end of the war a 1000 kW (1 MW) unit was undergoing preliminary testing.[7]
You do realize that the Ju87 was used exactly for that, right? And infrastructure includes much more than just bridges. Things like rail hubs, trains in motion, road networks, etc. were all targeted. And yes that is exactly what the Germans did. You might find this very useful:
My point was they over did the bombing of infrastructure throughout France and then advanced further than logistics could sustain and even then bypassed a major port near the front that could have solved the supply issue, since all the other ports were fortified and held by German garrisons. Also much effort was wasted on ports away from the front in Britany when the rail lines were too bombed to even make them useful if they were captured intact. Cherbourg was a special situation.
Sure, I was referring to them hitting everything repeatedly and then being flabbergasted that they couldn't move supplies up to chase the Germans to the border. Again the Germans were able to do it in 1940 without an issue, the US in particular seemed to love going overboard with bombing even when counterproductive.
Ok, then we agree. When I said not capturing Antwerp I meant all the terrain necessary to get it functional.
Sure. There is a difference between the necessary bombing to get the invasion to succeed and wrecking all the infrastructure they'd need to advance upon breakout. Of course they assumed the conquest of France would be a process of 12 months for some reason, so they made some poor choices, but as the review I had posted of a book on Allied logistics pointed out the NWE logisticians were quite inexperienced with combat operations and made some mistakes that could have been remedied had they consulted with the Mediterranean crew. Still, even there those guys were mainly focused on shipping rather than inland operations, though the North Africa experience would have been helpful to planning the invasion and breakout in France.
You do realize that the Ju87 was used exactly for that, right?
Monty expected the Allied Armies to cross the Seine and threaten Paris about 3 months after D-day but this was based upon the expectation that the German Army would conduct a fighting retreat to preserve it's strength and maintain a continuous front, hence the expected year long fight to take all of France. In the event Hitler ordered a suicidal no-retreat stand in front of Caen and Hedgerow country to the south. Hitler's order made the front static for about 2 months before the inevitable German collapse after which began a rapid advance for which the Allies were unprepared and, realistically, they couldn't have foreseen.Sure. There is a difference between the necessary bombing to get the invasion to succeed and wrecking all the infrastructure they'd need to advance upon breakout. Of course they assumed the conquest of France would be a process of 12 months for some reason, so they made some poor choices, but as the review I had posted of a book on Allied logistics pointed out the NWE logisticians were quite inexperienced with combat operations and made some mistakes that could have been remedied had they consulted with the Mediterranean crew. Still, even there those guys were mainly focused on shipping rather than inland operations, though the North Africa experience would have been helpful to planning the invasion and breakout in France.
There is not a study that I'm aware of that has specific numbers, just some references in the book I linked and ER Hooton's Phoenix Triumphant. The Stuka had tactical and operational level bombing missions, but it was not a CAS bomber. It was designed as a precision operational bomber, per the James Corum book I linked.Yes, I'm aware of other bits of infrastructure, and have indeed referred to railyards and so on. I don't have the numbers to hand; how many bridges in France did Stukas drop? Trains, rolling stock, and so on? What I've read indicates the Stuka was used more in a direct-support role, while the twins worked over troop concentrations, dumps, and other tactical targets mostly. Not to say they didn't strike marshalling yards, bridges, rolling stock, but that combat support of the Heer was the primary mission of LW bombers.
I apologize, I'm frustrated with the actions of several people on this forum and I took it out on you. I'll be more respectful in my responses since you haven't done anything to me.I don't really care for your condescension. Might we dial that back a little?
Likely, but a badly misguided perspective given how Cherbourg turned out.Sure. I think SHAEF and others thought the French ports would all much quicker than actually happened.
I mean they considered logistics of course, but did a demonstrably bad job of it compared to their Mediterranean compatriots, even when things were restricted to near the beaches.Even so, their concern over logistics shows in the emplacement of the Mulberries.
Sure and I'm not saying they should have, just not overdone the bombing, as that hampered their ability to advance later on. Granted they also planned on things taking a lot longer and the German reserves holding out longer.Again, they didn't want to stake the whole invasion to such a risky, last-minute campaign. They knew that the defeat of Overlord would set back the war two or more years, and so allowed for safer margins than you appear to think necessary.
Of course, I think we've just gotten away from the reason I was criticizing Allied performance in logistics in NWE: they usually hold that up as a sterling example of how they were so much better than the Germans, especially in comparison to Barbarossa, when the reality is much different than that propaganda. I'm a truth-autist on this stuff and so much propaganda has seeped into the narratives that most people have a cartoonish view of what the war actually was.Sure. It's war. Mistakes are made, in logistics as well as other fields.
Indeed, but they apparently didn't accurately take into account German reserves despite their vaunted intelligence apparatus (which fell down several times).I think they figured 12 months for France because the Germans had put up great fights in other theaters.
Right, they were overly cautious when they shouldn't have been and were overconfident when they shouldn't have been and had Hitler not made poor choices it could have badly backfired on the Allies. That it didn't is their luck.I'd rather overestimate than underestimate my enemy, too. Seeing the invasion force safely ashore and able to operate starts with seeing them safely ashore. Without that, those intact bridges are nugatory -- or worse, used against you to push those troops into the sea.
And? That really doesn't have anything to do with my point.And the Battle of Britain showed that operating the Ju 87 without ample fighter escort resulted in a lot of Ju 87s being shot down. Dive bombers were quite vulnerable to enemy fighters. Hence the shift in the USAAF later in the war to fighter-bombers as those could defend themselves after dropping the bombs.
All things considered that stand was the right way to go. James Holland's Normandy campaign book agrees. Where Hitler messed up was trying to counterattack once the Allies broke through and not retreating in good order at that point, which led to Falaise and a ton of unnecessary equipment and manpower losses. After all per Zetterling's study on Normandy the Germans inflicted ~2.5:1 losses in Normandy before Falaise (the Allies wildly lied about German casualties, more than doubling the actual number lost in Normandy and Falaise) and even then losses would have been substantially less severe had Hitler allowed an orderly retreat instead of Operation Luettich in August. Though that gets into what if-ery, the Allies would have been in an even worse situation overall had that happened, but logistically wouldn't have gotten overextended due to the intact German line.Monty expected the Allied Armies to cross the Seine and threaten Paris about 3 months after D-day but this was based upon the expectation that the German Army would conduct a fighting retreat to preserve it's strength and maintain a continuous front, hence the expected year long fight to take all of France. In the event Hitler ordered a suicidal no-retreat stand in front of Caen and Hedgerow country to the south. Hitler's order made the front static for about 2 months before the inevitable German collapse after which began a rapid advance for which the Allies were unprepared and, realistically, they couldn't have foreseen.
Given the ETO armies did not have to do much retreating in September/October 1944 and did several attacks they did not advance beyond supply capacity, they did advance beyond supply capacity to continue a pursuit or easily break the new German defensive lines, while thinning out over a larger front. And bypassing is defined as waiting under 3 weeks while there was one further major attack. Start of minesweeping operations to US army supply system is working well was about 2 months, except it was not thanks to the disruption caused by the Ardennes attack.My point was they over did the bombing of infrastructure throughout France and then advanced further than logistics could sustain and even then bypassed a major port near the front that could have solved the supply issue,
The allies were not flabbergasted about moving the supplies, they paid the price for stopping easy German reinforcement of the front line, and places like Southern France were not heavily bombed, that was German sabotage. The Germans in 1940 had supply issues, one reason for the pauses, they did not need to disrupt the rail network for military operations, the allies were not making much use of it, nor did the Germans have to move supplies from ships.Sure, I was referring to them hitting everything repeatedly and then being flabbergasted that they couldn't move supplies up to chase the Germans to the border. Again the Germans were able to do it in 1940 without an issue, the US in particular seemed to love going overboard with bombing even when counterproductive.
The Mediterranean gave a lot of combat lessons but fewer supply lessons, the two big ones, both from Sicily, were if an army comes ashore and operates away from the beaches an army supply system has to come ashore, if you expect to lose lots of landing craft you build them as one shot items, if the losses are low they need to be built more robustly as they can be very useful landing supplies long after the invasion, as long as there is a repair system. The Mediterranean did not have to cope with a steady stream of supply ships needing major ports repaired and working almost as soon as the invasion began, in order to fight German Army Group level formations, there were no major ports in Sicily for example, but plenty working in North Africa, the initial US army operations in North Africa were limited and had intact ports from the start. The US Army in the Mediterranean peaked at 9 divisions, initially using 6 in Sicily, the US Army in Normandy was 13 divisions by end June 1944 and 18 end July, after the 2 airborne divisions had been withdrawn.I had posted of a book on Allied logistics pointed out the NWE logisticians were quite inexperienced with combat operations and made some mistakes that could have been remedied had they consulted with the Mediterranean crew.
Why does so much allied stuff come with this sort of adjective? Were the Soviet and Japanese versions also lab toys, when did German radar graduate from lab toy status? And the US help claim ignores the British designs. Pre war the British came up with radar designs assuming something like the cavity magnetron would appear.Again thanks to US help with development and production of the lab toy that the Brits had invented in early 1940.
The MTO never had to do pursuit operations and did a lot wrong at Sicily, with the supply plan contributing to the problems, lots of MTO lessons were sent on but not really absorbed.I mean they considered logistics of course, but did a demonstrably bad job of it compared to their Mediterranean compatriots, even when things were restricted to near the beaches.
At a tactical level the Germans in Barbarossa had the 1939 to May 1941 campaigns to learn from with almost the whole army having some combat/campaign experience. On a strategic level the German plan assumed the Red Army would fight where the Germans could supply, not repeat the Napoleon experience. The Germans lost the war by under estimating the task at hand, the allies in 1944 missed pursuit opportunities by over estimating the opponent.the reason I was criticizing Allied performance in logistics in NWE: they usually hold that up as a sterling example of how they were so much better than the Germans, especially in comparison to Barbarossa
There is that adjective again, and along with hey it was not perfect. What are the reserves being talked about?Indeed, but they apparently didn't accurately take into account German reserves despite their vaunted intelligence apparatus (which fell down several times).
The critical event for the British pursuit was the destruction of the Mons pocket, primarily by the US VII Corps, which ended German resistance in north eastern France, it essentially unhinged the resistance of 5 Panzerarmee and II SS-Panzer Corps, which had been outside the Falaise pocket, forcing them to retreat to Holland and Germany.Where Hitler messed up was trying to counterattack once the Allies broke through and not retreating in good order at that point, which led to Falaise and a ton of unnecessary equipment and manpower losses.
Does the 2.5 to 1 losses include the large number of paratroops lost not to German action? And prisoners? Also what is surprising about an average more experienced army usually on the defensive in good defensive terrain inflicting the larger proportion of casualties?After all per Zetterling's study on Normandy the Germans inflicted ~2.5:1 losses in Normandy before Falaise
Adjective again, so when and where were these allied figures published?(the Allies wildly lied about German casualties, more than doubling the actual number lost in Normandy and Falaise)
You're just forgetting one thing:Estimates from the US were that it would increase Allied losses by 300%....if there was no jamming of the fuses and radar. For this to work they'd need to figure out a way to avoid jamming, which the Allies figured out before they deployed their own in case any of there was captured and reverse-engineered, and have a functional cavity magnetron to avoid radar jamming. If they had that...well look at how well Allied FLAK dealt with the V-1s once all their systems came online in 1944. I'd imagine the combo would make 400% higher Allied air losses. Unsustainable territory very quickly. The best the Germans managed was a shoot down for every 2000 shells in 1942, 400% better means 500 shells per kill in 1943.
View attachment 762016
Increase write-offs by a factor of 4 every month.
Maybe yes and maybe no.
the proximity fuse was a really simple idea.
Does it? I thought it had more to do with the ability to make porcelain microtubes that could fit in an AAA shell and be hard enough to withstand acceleration. Based on a 1947 report from a US army engineer about the German research establishment proliferation of projects instead of the concentration of resources badly hampered technological development. Also Germany just had a smaller electronics industry than the US alone, but with the UK+US it was a blowout in terms of resources and labor.You're just forgetting one thing:
Radar-proximity fused shells implies a much greater advancement in radar technology - with much much broader - and widely more military advantageous situations than just shooting down bombers.
Think surface ships , u-boats, night fighters, intruders even bomber aircraft.
Just my 2 cents
It isn't mini-radar, it's mini-tubes. Radar itself is actually pretty simple, it was invented in 1905: Christian Hülsmeyer - WikipediaI think his point was that if you've gotten to miniaturize radar to that extent, you've probably advanced your radar tech in other fields as well, with the knock-on effects that implies.
It isn't mini-radar, it's mini-tubes. Radar itself is actually pretty simple, it was invented in 1905: Christian Hülsmeyer - Wikipedia