What if the LW had adopted a different doctrine/strategy?

bobbysocks said:

What if the Luftwaffe had adopted a completely different doctrine when they began structuring.

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Such a radical change is unlikely bereft of hindsight and Germany's geographical and military situation. The cult of Strategic Bombing was in many ways a natural evolution of thought that was grasped the most tightly by those nations that wished to avoid another costly ground war. For Britian, whose army traditionally was small in comparison to other continental powers, protected by water, Douchot's theories were both terrifying but also provided a potential means by which another Ypres or Somme could be avoided, hence the costly investment in 4E bombers. For the US, protected by two *oceans*, and rich enough to look for technological solutions to traditional (and costly) ground operations, 4E development made sense given the political and geographical situation. (recall that the B-17 was originally envisioned as a naval deterrent as well as SB.)

The developing Luftwaffe did contain a strategic element but it did not take root, because the Germans didn't place high stock in the pre-war notions that Strategic Bombing promised. (Recall that the Germans experimented with such operations during WWI, which while making great press ultimately achieved nothing towards their cause) Given limited resources, and facing potential land enemies on both flanks, it can also be argued that the developing Luftwaffe didn't have the "luxery" of producing both a conventional Operational airforce capable of directly assisting a traditional ground campaign as well as one that might hit distant 'strategic' targets that might eventually in the long term assist in a war. Therin lay another point. Germany wasn't planning for long wars.

There is some minor wiggle room revolving around the devotion and attention given to dive bombers and bombing at the expense of newer and bigger 2E/4E bombers but ultimately i personally don't see how the Luftwaffe could have developed any other way than it did. Their airforce was integral first to German operational victories over their opponents and then later, in the army's survival during the tougher times such as in winter Russia.

As others have already mentioned too....fully embracing a "strategic airforce" would require substantial resources that would have had to come from other areas, including the Army. One need only look at the size of the USAAF as it grew from tentative beginnings in 1942 to the monster org it became in 1944-45 (along with BC).

Germany actually took a serious look at a strategic bombing force, whilst wever was on the scene, but abandoned the concept. There were a number of reasons for this. Nazi Germany was short of cash and the establishment costs of putting the force in place would have forced the germans into near bankruptcy. The oil demands for a full on strategic bomber force were also seen as too high. Germany did not have a secure oil supply pre-war, with the British and the French delliberately using their better cash flow positions to buy out the available stocks. Developing a four engined bomber force was rather like dveloping a viable heavy tank force in the prewar period.....the germans could simply not afford either in the pre-war armement, so they made do, and went to war with light tanks and ex-civil aircraft.

Lastly, in 1936 when all of this was being considered, a viable four engined bomber did not exist anywhere in the world, and german development of the type was even further behind than most other nations.....the B-17 was not really an effective type until 1942, the Short Stirling did not enter service until 1940, and the French had the unsatisfactory Farman series. The germans were playing catch up with their aircraft development which explains why they went for the fast expedients. Aircraft like the He111, the Dornier 17 and Ju52 were all civil airliner conversions. The Ju87 was selected, not so much because of its ground attack capabilities, but because it was a single engined aircraft, relatively cheap to build, and quick to develop. Its ground attack capabilities were just an added bonus, not a design priority.

Germany did develop dedicated ground support with its Stukas, but the emphasis for the LW prewar was in fact tactical bombing, using relatively cheap level bombers.

Less emphasis was placed on fighter development than one might expect because the germans were just as wedded to the concept of the "bomber will always get through" as the Allies. They believed that the speed of their medium bombers would make them invulnerable. This was the first shock, and the first mistake that they made...they in fact found their bombers to be highly vulnerable. this massacre of German bombers started from the very beginning of the war. The germans suffered the loss somewhere between 300 and 500 bombers over Poland. They also lost more than 1000 aircraft over France, and then of course there were the heavy losses over England. The Germans had developed their fighters not for escort, but for point defence (for the Me109) and attack fighter (for the Me110). They never really developed a dedicated escort fighter in the way the Mustang was developed...mistake two in my opinion. In the tactical frenzy of Europe 1939 and 1940, this omission was not too obvious...the 109s and 110s were able to demolish all opposition close to the front, and thereby, indirectly, protect their bombers. But bombers forced to fly beyond the range of that air umbrella invariably suffered catastrophic losses

The Germans failed to develop an adequate aeronaval force pre-war. They lacked an effective aerial torpedo and dedicated units with maritime training were not really developed until after the war broke out. They did not develop a long range maritime patrol and attack aircraft....mistake number 3.

The Germans opted for a strategy that put everything in the shopfront window....ther was never enough emphasis on developing adequate reserves, inadequate resources were put into training, and pilots were not really rotated properly. Germany had not planned for a long war, so none of this entered into their strategic thinking. The front line pilots were exceptionally well trained but the aircrew replacements were relatively small in number, and generally less well trained. Bomber instruction was undertaken by the Ju-52 fleet, that also doubled as their transport fleet. When the transports took losses, they lost with them the irreplaceable instructors, which was the major reason why bomber production had to be curtailed later in the war.

What would I have done if I had been in charge of the LW pre-war. The Luftwaffe was given access to a massive proportion of the Reich defence budget prewar. It was 43% in 1939, which rose steadily to about 67% by 1943 (including flak defences etc). But assuming no greater amounts of resources are available, I would have to seek quid pro quos for any additional resources I might expend.

To free up resources, I would not spend as much on flak prewar. I would instead pour some of those resources into expanding the training fleet.

Instead of developing the FW190 as another point defence fighter, I would pour resources into developing it as a long range escort fighter. I would not develop the Me 110 at all...its a waste of resources. The two main types for daytime fighters would be the me109 and the FW190, with the FW 190 (LR version) scheduled for squadron entry in the summer of 1940.

I would phase out two of the three level bomber types, probably settling on the He111 initially, but then shifting to the Ju88 once that ship became available. I would pour resources saved from this rationalization into developing a Ju88 subtype as a night fighter.

I would pour resources into developing and building a proper LR maritime strike aircraft, by further development of the FW200. I would convert it from an aircraft built to a civil standard, to an aircraft built to a military standard. I would achieve this, and commission approximately 500 airframes for the purpose by a corresponding reduction in the level bombing forces

The luftwaffe under those conditions would still possess its crucial ground support capabilities, it would have reduced level bombers, but a superior fighter force would be on the way. It would have a much enhanced training and replacement organization, and lastly it would possess a credible maritime strrike capability....enough in fact to bring the british to their knees in 1940.

Thoughful post, pasifal, thanks. Can you imagine if the Germans in 1940 had been able to escort their bombers to England and then LOITER as the RAF came up for them.

Your comment about everything in the "shop window" is spot on... ..suggesting that there was a huge political component to Nazis military committments.

MM

as said in another thread the LW should of stayed and this was not with the puny Austrians consent of course, but stay on track in 41 till wars end with long range night intruder actions en-masse, would of made it very hard to perform long distance day/night missions over the Reich by Allied forces. Of course we all can plainly see without the US/British involvement in the air what the LW could of done then on the Eastern front against the Soviets. Enough of the silly inept LW hierarchy under "Fatty" he was so dependent on drugs that he was not even on the planet and simple reason was beyond him

Its also worth mentioning that in regards to Operational and tactical support, the Germans were way ahead of the Allies which didn't begin to catch up till the end of 42 onwards. (and later evolved, with mass resources available....to the formation of "Tactical" Air forces specifically devoted to Operational (interdiction) and ground support duties.

So one can see the influence of pre-war decisions and thinking in both Allied and Axis airforces. UK/US ground airforces emphased SB but were far less developed Operationally/tactically in the first half of the war while the opposite situation existed for the Luftwaffe. Ultimately the Allies were rich enough to do both at the same time.

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: Tank Industry Report
Summer 1942 is the middle of the European war so let's look at that.

1.8% Tractors
2.8% Powder
3.6% Tanks
5.2% Motor Vehicles
6.6% Weapons
12.1% Warships
29.2% Ammunition
38.7% Aircraft

Ammunition + Powder = 32%. That's what happens when you have 200+ Heer divisions permanently in combat on the Russian front. Land combat is expensive.

davebender said:

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: Tank Industry Report
Summer 1942 is the middle of the European war so let's look at that.

1.8% Tractors
2.8% Powder
3.6% Tanks
5.2% Motor Vehicles
6.6% Weapons
12.1% Warships
29.2% Ammunition
38.7% Aircraft

Ammunition + Powder = 32%. That's what happens when you have 200+ Heer divisions permanently in combat on the Russian front. Land combat is expensive.

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Are you saying the Lw and KM didn't need powder and ammunition?

Theres also the percentage of resources devoted to building and maintaining the flak forces. Something like 80% of the artillery produced was flak artillery.....

michaelmaltby said:

"... In the beginning of the war, that strategy actually worked. Using the lightning war tactic, they took most of Europe rather quickly." True - but Europe had been sleeping and the 'Krauts' had been re-arming. And THAT was why Blitzkrieg worked.

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I don't believe that this was true. French fighters plane for plane were only out performed by the Me109E the 109D wasn't considered to be a major threat. Even the 109E would have had a hard time against the De 520, it was still better but the gap would have been pretty close. Some of the newer French bombers were pretty good. British fighters and bombers were as good as the German aircraft and production was increasing rapidly.
French tanks and anti tank guns as good as if not better than the German tanks as were the British tanks and anti tank guns. The British Army was fully mechanised and the French had a higher proportion of mechanisation than the German Army. Also the French navy was a good match for the German Navy as of course was the British Navy.

The Blitzkrieg didn't work because Europe was asleep.
The Blitzkrieg worked because it was clever, new, imaginative, the troops were trained to a high degree and to work with the Air Force to a level never seen before.
.

Glider said:

The Blitzkrieg didn't work because Europe was asleep.
The Blitzkrieg worked because it was clever, new, imaginative, the troops were trained to a high degree and to work with the Air Force to a level never seen before.
.

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While I don't necessarilly agree with your intro facts, they are close enough for game. But your conclusion in my eyes is indisputable.

Something like 80% of the artillery produced was flak artillery

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That is misleading. A 2cm flak weapon and ammunition costs nowhere near as much as a 10.5cm field howitzer and ammunition.

Production Stats on German Tube Fired Weapons 1939 to 1945
Production Stats on German Tube-fired Weapons 1939-1945

Ah, true, but then it costs a lot more than a recoilless rifle, a rocket launcher or a mortar.


I dont think it misleading at all. I think it just reinforces the original supposition, that the Germans spent a lot on air defence.

Of course. So did Britain. It's what anyone would do when threatened with serious air attacks. However fighter aircraft and associated consumables like fuel were the most expensive component of air defense in both nations.

davebender said:

Of course. So did Britain. It's what anyone would do when threatened with serious air attacks. However fighter aircraft and associated consumables like fuel were the most expensive component of air defense in both nations.

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The expenditures we are looking at though are not just about air defence as such...they include "air offense" as well....the bombers, R&D, etc. Looked at in that context, the most expensive items must surely be the bomber components, and the resources needed to keep them maintained. Every bomber produced needed something like 70 people to keep it in the air....everthing from the aircreww through to the groundcrews, and the people training those crews and ground staff.

A mustang cost $144000 USD (from memory), It cost around 300K to put it in the air and ship it off to the front line. Deployment costs were far less for the Germans, once they retreated back to Germany.


You make a valid point about everyone spending a lot on air defence. From memory, I believe the biggest spender on air related defence items were the japanese, something like 70% of their defence expenditures went into air . Germany was high, but by no means the highest. I think you will find that as a proportion of defence spending Germany and Britain were similar.

What made the returns poor for Germany was the introduction of new types as the war progressed. The Allies did this as well, but they could afford to do this better than the Germans, plus there were never as many changes, IMO or new types not already under development. The expenditures on Jet and rocket technologies were staggering. And each new type skyrockets the unit costs. A Tiger tank produced in 1942 costs more than 800000RM....a tiger tank in 1944 costs a quarter of that. And small production runs are also diabolical to the cost effectiveness issue.

tail end charlie said:

The LW should have appointed the grandfathers of the resident experts here to produce from a hat new planes pilots fuel spares and airfields as they do on this forum unfortuantely the same experts grandfathers will produce the USAAF to dash them from the skies at the last moment.

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Ya know I'm sick of your crap - now go sit in the corner like a good little wannabe twit and if you're good and have no diaper accidents I'll think about letting you play again.

why did he have such a sh*tty attitude....I must have missed something

that's better guys! i was half afraid to check this because i wrote that after a LONG night out! too much capt. morgan... . and yes i have "kraut" blood...my grandfather and a host of uncles and aunts came from deutschland...more specifically...most from the sudetenland (steinschonau) at the turn of the last century. i have relatives there whom my grandparents, uncles, etc...helped during the german depression. hey sent 'care" packages of coffee, lard, bacon grease. etc. after all the wars....most of the connections have been lost. i do understand this is a silly and speculative, and after the fact proposition...but you know history is mostly a series of missed opportunities or wrong ( sometimes right ) decisions. hitler built a great empire....but made some fatal decisions. trust me i am not a hitler lover. far from that. but had he ( or allowed his generals) made several "better" decisions....the world would have endured many more years of heartache and suffering imho.

Without the benefit of hindsight it's impossible to know which new technologies will work and which ones won't. Or won't be ready in time like the Type XXI submarine. All said and done I think Germany was as least as good with new technology as everyone else.

It was German politicians who lost WWII. Not German scientists and military personnel.

davebender said:

Without the benefit of hindsight it's impossible to know which new technologies will work and which ones won't. Or won't be ready in time like the Type XXI submarine. All said and done I think Germany was as least as good with new technology as everyone else.

It was German politicians who lost WWII. Not German scientists and military personnel.

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Ah, that old chestnut, the favourite variation of the "we were stabbed in the back" argument used to get hitler into power, only blame the politicians instead of foreign countries this time.

I totally reject the argument that germany wasnt defeated from top to bottom, comprehensively.

Dont get me wrong. The twisted leadership of Nazi Germany did more than its fair share to bring about the defeat of germany, but in this they were ably supported by every element of german society

Take the military.....they enthusiastically supported them as they led them down the pathway to destruction. They supported the invasion of Russia, they produced the plan that ultimately failed, they executed that plan, and were defeated, and not just by superior numbers....in the end they were out generalled, outsoldiered, and out endured by those they sought to subjugate. dont tell me that they were not defeated...sure they were let down by their leadership, but they were also part of the malignancy that was German agreession, and were part of the apparatus for defeat.

The economic combine ended up being sloth ful and innefficient in their ecnomic management, at least until Speer arrived.

In the area of scientific research, the allies centraized and controlled the direction of their research, culling projects unlikley to bring fruition in the short term. The Germans did not...research was not managed to nearly the same extent, and the result was much wasted effort on projects unlikley to bring fruition in the wartime context.

Industry was also not nearly as centrally managed at least in the 1st half of the war. The rationalization plan for motor transport prewar is a classic example of that. Though ther was some progress in standardization, it was nowhere near as efficient as their opponents , consequently Germany went to war with a relatively innefficient truck park. This innefficiency was repeated time and time again.

The leadership in Germany was not what most people think it is....a centralized monolithic structure....Not at all, in fact it was run more like a feuadal state, with little fiefdoms and turfs allover the place. This led to much dissipation of effort and innefficiency.

But to summarise, no, it is not possible to tell excactly what research will work, and what wont....but it is possible to centralizer and control the direction of research, to maximise its benefit for the war effort, and the germans failed pretty badly in that repect.