What if the LW had adopted a different doctrine/strategy?

[michaelmaltby]

"... I went to a fight and a hockey game broke out?"

More-or-less, Bobbysocks. There's a age-old Canadian saying that is true and speaks to hockey's small-town Saturday night Canadian roots: "If you can't beat 'em in the alley you won't beat 'em on the ice".

Hockey (and lacrosse) are war games. We don't call hockey the beautiful game; we call it the best game,

Proud Canadian

MM

 

[Shortround6]

In an attempt to get this thread back on track;

What would the likely characteristics of a 1940 German 4 engine bomber have been?

Given historical engines and historical guns and gun mounts. To have an difference of doctrine or strategy they would have needed them in quantities of hundreds.

Assume that another engine factory could have been built to supply engines of the SAME TYPE in use in the summer of 1940 so engine shortage is not a big factor. Even assume the He 177 has the fire problem sorted out if you want but it has to use historic power levels from the engines. Assume that another airframe plant also exists so that there is less constraint on numbers than historically, at least for now

If a 4 engine plane, available in 500 or more examples at the time could have made a big difference in the campaign/s that is one thing. If it turns out that it doesn't represent a big increase in capability over the equivalent number of twin engine bombers, something less than double the number, then it pretty well puts to rest the notion that a different doctrine or bomber strategy would have made much difference.

As a base line what was the real capabilities of an He 111H-6(edit- early H series aircraft H-1,2s) ?
What could it carry over what distance and at what operational speed?

 

[lesofprimus]

Luftwaffe Doctrine would never have changed over to the developement and deployment of a 4 engine heavy bomber, as they didnt need it nor thought they would ever need it... Shortsightedness??? Maybe, but up until the BoB, they were virtually unstoppable...

If they had stayed concentrated on destroying the RAF and its airfields, and also introduced drop tanks for the 109's earlier, it could have altered the eventual outcome... Also, if the German Special Operations Command had in 1938/39 decided to send agents into Britian with assassination orders for the leaders of the various services, it could have altered the entire War....

 

[claidemore]

Also, if the German Special Operations Command had in 1938/39 decided to send agents into Britian with assassination orders for the leaders of the various services, it could have altered the entire War....

My understanding is that Germany had zero success with agents in Britain, so sending non-existant agents there to assassinate numbers of leaders seems unlikely. Besides, in 1938/39 Germany was not planning on fighting Britain, Hitlers focus was always on the East.

That being said, strategic bombing capability could have made a difference against the Soviet Union.

I'm halfway through "Deathride, Hitler vs Stalin" by John Mosier and he makes some excellent points about this very subject.
Mosier is fairly anti-Soviet, but he makes a good argument that Stalin seriously considered surrender. He was basically out of tanks and planes at a couple key points during 1941, and if the few replacements they were getting (or expected to get in the near future) had been further reduced by long range bombing of those hastily moved factories, he might have had no choice.

An interesting sidebar about Soviet tanks,(from Mosier) is that even though they had more tanks than Germany, and arguably better tanks (early war), quality control was poor and service life was 100 hours or less. A system for repair was non-existant, so basically it was a new tank every week or so, whether they were lost in combat or just broke down beside (or on) the road somewhere.

 

[davebender]

strategic bombing capability could have made a difference against the Soviet Union

RAF Bomber Command required 4 years before they made a worthwhile contribution to the British war effort. What makes you think Luftwaffe heavy bombers would be more capable early on?

 

[tomo pauk]

Does mr. Mosier have the numbers (how many thanks planes, in what fronts, in what time period), or he just says "Stalin was basically without tanks planes"?
What is his asesment of German logistical situation in, then , say, August, then September, then October of 1941?
How does he feels about 2:1 reduction of Luftwaffe's bomber force (replacing 2 medium bombers for 1 heavy)?
Perhaps he thinks German army commanders would welcome the fact they do not have medium bombers to provide them support, since the funding went to 4-engine bombers?
Does he think it's realistic to attack Russian factories, now (aug, sept, oct...1941) relocated in Ural, from, say, Minsk? From Minsk to Perm it's more than 1800 km - almost 3650 km two-way, so even B-24 would have range issues there.
Sure enough, the airbases containing the heavies would be free from Russian attacks, no?
Of course, he thinks that Luftwaffe would really achieve more in half a year than both USAAF BC within half of war?

Last but not least, by the time LW could use their 4-eng bombers vs. evacuated Soviet factories, help from UK US was started to pour in.

 

[tomo pauk]

...

An interesting sidebar about Soviet tanks,(from Mosier) is that even though they had more tanks than Germany, and arguably better tanks (early war), quality control was poor and service life was 100 hours or less. A system for repair was non-existant, so basically it was a new tank every week or so, whether they were lost in combat or just broke down beside (or on) the road somewhere.

It's always so that tanks planes get the limelight, however there is other weapons that people find useful. Artillery, for example, one of crucial things in wast East front. Unfortunately for Germans, it's where the Soviets have had the edge, both in quantity quality.

 

[fastmongrel]

It's always so that tanks planes get the limelight, however there is other weapons that people find useful. Artillery, for example, one of crucial things in wast East front. Unfortunately for Germans, it's where the Soviets have had the edge, both in quantity quality.

100 % agree with you there. German field and heavy artillery apart from exceptions like the 17cm heavy guns was very average.

Russian artillery was superb in virtually all aspects. Compare guns in each class where there was a similar weapon and the Russian piece was usually lighter, longer ranged and or threw a heavier shell. The 122mm M1938 gun-howitzer is reckoned to be one of the finest artillery pieces ever made. Nothing was particulary special but its combination of reliability, ease of use, good shells and ease of manufacture all combined to make it a battle winner. This is often the classic gun shown ranked up wheel to wheel firing by numbers in newsreels.
122 mm howitzer M1938 (M-30) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[BombTaxi]

Juat an additional point to Tomo's exceelent list:

Not only is Minsk to the Urals a log way, it's a very long way over hostile territory. Given that the 109 could barely get bombers across the Channel, how are these German bombers going to be escorted? Without any escort, they will be massacred, as Allied bombers were throughout the early years of the war...

 

[riacrato]

100 % agree with you there. German field and heavy artillery apart from exceptions like the 17cm heavy guns was very average.

Russian artillery was superb in virtually all aspects. Compare guns in each class where there was a similar weapon and the Russian piece was usually lighter, longer ranged and or threw a heavier shell. The 122mm M1938 gun-howitzer is reckoned to be one of the finest artillery pieces ever made. Nothing was particulary special but its combination of reliability, ease of use, good shells and ease of manufacture all combined to make it a battle winner. This is often the classic gun shown ranked up wheel to wheel firing by numbers in newsreels.
122 mm howitzer M1938 (M-30) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

But afaik they had one of the weakest fire control of all participating armies, at least early to mid-war.

 

[rgallant]

If you really want to stretch the Fw200 had the bomb load at 4000lbs more or less and decent range at 2700 mils. But but it really could not take a beating or maneuver very well. And of course no long range escorts, and very few 200's.

So if the Germans crank up production of these and do some structural work say (just spitballing here) they get 2100 miles of range and keep the bomb load that is at best 800 to 900 each way pretty short of what is required.

But can they interdict rail lines enough in the east to prevent easy movement of supplies and men. Allowing them to keep momentum.

So assuming up production of an structurally improved FW 200 and drop tanks for Me 110 (not sure when these appeared)

Keeping with the eastern front and this exercise we have a couple things potentially in the Germans favour:

No Russian radar net and a vast area to allow "surprise" attacks or at least attacks with little warning.

The Me 110 can with drop tanks escort for about 350 miles or roughly 1/2 way.

The Russians were taking heavy losses in 41, and decently organized "heavy bomber" force could disrupt their ability to make up on those losses.

Against are going to be likely significant losses of aircraft and that same vast are to hide factories in.

Comments ?

 

[BombTaxi]

Even if there are large areas of unwatched sky for German bombers to hide in, the Soviets can still concentrate defences around communications hubs, factories and other targets that they know the Germans will come after. And the lack of escorts is still a major issue. Given the 110s performance against single-seat fighters in 1940, Iwould argue that it would not be a highly succesful escort in 1941, even if freed from the strict 'close-escort' role. And admittedly, 110s half-way might be better than nothing at all..

 

[TheMustangRider]

RAF Bomber Command required 4 years before they made a worthwhile contribution to the British war effort. What makes you think Luftwaffe heavy bombers would be more capable early on?

Nazi Germany in contrast to the Soviet Union did not have the pressure of a massive invasion within its borders early in the war and it might be possible, in my opinion, that with a decent strategic bombing element coupled with the unstoppable drive towards Moscow the Germans achieved in 1941; the Soviet Union might had been force to capitulate early in the war leaving the overall Allied effort seriously comprised.

 

[Njaco]

Even if there are large areas of unwatched sky for German bombers to hide in, the Soviets can still concentrate defences around communications hubs, factories and other targets that they know the Germans will come after. And the lack of escorts is still a major issue. Given the 110s performance against single-seat fighters in 1940, Iwould argue that it would not be a highly succesful escort in 1941, even if freed from the strict 'close-escort' role. And admittedly, 110s half-way might be better than nothing at all..

With this point and rgalland's hypothesis, would the late war operation against the electrical plants be more effective and successful? I believe it was called Operation Martha/Marta?

 

[tomo pauk]

The problem Germans have had was that their air force was low on numbers, when compared with what was their task. The task was to destroy Soviet AF on the ground, then to attack Red Army Navy units, and further to aid German ground forces. In reality, performance of LW enabled the high pace of ground operations.
Now, if we play zero-sum game, LW need to cut on, say, medium bombers to acquire heavy ones. 1000 mediums for 500 heavy ones, perhaps?
That way LW could really try to attack targets deep behind the lines, but the task of helping ground forces now lacks medium bombers. So instead of capturing Smolensk on July 18th, that would have happened perhaps on August 8th, with higher German losses. I guess similar things would've happen all along the front line, resulting in far smaller German conquest in crucial 1941.

As for those heavies, they would be surely discovered after crossing the front line by Eyeball Mk.I and then attacked, preferably by rocket-carrying Mig-3 units.

 

[michaelmaltby]

It all comes down to what "if this" and "whattabout that" in these kind of threads. Nice, but really just a play ..... the fact is gents that Germany had very, very weak "strategy" - similar of a wolf of a tiger - ambush the weak and the sick on an "opportunity" basis.

If the LW was to have the "option" of an alternative air "strategy", that strategy would have to have been formulated and implemented - militarily and industrially, by 1938.

If the objective was Russia: then the LW needed long range escort aircraft, long range bombers, long range transports and long range reconnaissance.

If the objective was England (at any price) then the priorities change: air supremacy demands an escort fighter with loiter and legs.

If the objective is oil: different again.

The Nazis were drunk with power having picked off a few "stragglers" (no offense intended). They learned their "air" lessons in Spain. Good pilot training but absolutely the WRONG kind of a campaign from which to derive a LW strategy.

But as events unfolded, crippled by a lunatic leader and brilliant but obedient followers, nothing that 3rd Reich accomplished was going to last 1000 years - except the holocaust legacy. The miracle and tribute to the Third Reich is that Germans fought so well, and did so much, in such a short time.

So - the alternative strategy that the LW should have adopted under a sane leader - was to build the aircraft they would need to DEFEND GERMAN AIRSPACE.

When you see how the Me-109, FW-190/Ta-159 evolved in the period from 1937 to 1945, imagine if engine development and airframe development (pressurization) had been tightly focused on DEFENSE.

In contrast to Germany, Japan had a viable OFFENSIVE air strategy. The opening Japanese bomber attacks in June 1939 (Nomonhan/Gulkin Gol) were long range. China was a long range theater of operations. And the Zero was a game changer.

The Germans however didn't learn much if anything from the June-September Russo-Japan War. If they had they might have anticipated General Zhukov and not been so quick to think Russia was going to topple in 3 months.

MM

 

[davebender]

Nazi Germany in contrast to the Soviet Union did not have the pressure of a massive invasion within its borders early in the war

France attempted to invade Germany during September 1939 and got stopped cold by the German border defense system.

 

[fastmongrel]

But afaik they had one of the weakest fire control of all participating armies, at least early to mid-war.

I dont know about weakest fire control of all participating armies. Russian fire control philosophy was different to German and western allied ideas. Russian fire control emphasised centralised control and massed overwhelming bombardment in attack. Artillery was kept in artillery regiments and not parcelled out in batteries like German artillery this meant it was less flexible but was more effective. Also part of Russian philosophy was any artillery piece that could see a tank became an anti tank gun it wasnt unknown for 152mm pieces to be right in the front line operating as anti tank or assault guns.

An interesting read if anyones interested is J.B.A Baileys book Field Artillery and Firepower which has a very interesting section on Russian artillery in WWII. Bailey even mentions a German experiment to use there artillery in the Russian fashion but it was too little too late.

Field Artillery and Firepower Combined Army's Library Series, Vol 1: Amazon.co.uk: Major J.B.A. Bailey.: Books

 

[Shortround6]

It all comes down to what "if this" and "whattabout that" in these kind of threads. Nice, but really just a play ..... the fact is gents that Germany had very, very weak "strategy" - similar of a wolf of a tiger - ambush the weak and the sick on an "opportunity" basis.

If the LW was to have the "option" of an alternative air "strategy", that strategy would have to have been formulated and implemented - militarily and industrially, by 1938.

That is sort of the point, from several angles.

1. Could the Germans have built a viable 4 engine strategic bomber and put it into production in time for 1940?
2. Even give a few more resources, could they have produced enough to make a real difference?
3. IF the answers to BOTH of those is questions is yes, then we can argue were do the resources come from or what gets cut and the effects of the cut.

If the objective was Russia: then the LW needed long range escort aircraft, long range bombers, long range transports and long range reconnaissance.

How much did the Germans know about the Russian relocation planes in 1937-39?

The Nazis were drunk with power having picked off a few "stragglers" (no offense intended). They learned their "air" lessons in Spain. Good pilot training but absolutely the WRONG kind of a campaign from which to derive a LW strategy.

Agreed, but nobody was really paying attention to China either. The Japanese found that they could not operate bombers on long range missions without fighter escort. and that was against the Chinese air force even before they tangled with the Russians.

So - the alternative strategy that the LW should have adopted under a sane leader - was to build the aircraft they would need to DEFEND GERMAN AIRSPACE.

If they could see that their emphasis should be on defense then they never should have gone to war if they were sane. A good offence should have kept their enemies worried about their own defense. If you realize that your enemies can out produce you and you have to choose defense from the start then you have lost from the start.

To answer a few points by others the 'vastness' of Russia works to the Russian advantage not the attackers.

1. The radio beam navigation and bomb dropping systems used over England don't have the range to work over Russia.
2. Navigation over Russia looking for rivers or particular cities may not work very well either.
3. The Russians don't have to defend the whole of Russian airspace. Just the airspace over the manufacturing centers. Who cares if the fields of collective farm #126 gets hit with 20 tons of bombs?
4. Given the hours long flight time to get from the front lines to strategic targets an observer system with telephones/telegraph may be an acceptable substitute for radar. It worked fairly well in China which wasn't that much more sophisticated/developed than the Russians

Since the rest of the world was not able to produce a viable strategic day bomber by 1940 I doubt that the Germans could either which sort of stops the discussion at point #1. unless people want to talk about night bombers.
Or unless somebody wants to give details of of a hypothetical 1939=40 German bomber?

 

[drgondog]

Good post SR..