renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
SR, very good post. The large size of the USSR would have worked for them against a LW longe range bomber threat just like it did against the WM.
What if the LW had adopted a different doctrine/strategy?
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Whom do you mean by stragglers?
Very good points SR, but remember Russia at the time had a very limited road and rail network outside of major centers so effectively attacking that as well would help.
The objective as I see it would not so much be to destroy the Russian manufacturing centers as to limit there ability to move equipment and materials to where it is needed.
Most certainly you want to strike factories, refineries, pipelines etc. But rail heads, bridges and tunnels are equally important. A long range bomber is not ideal for these tasks but with the Russian environment you would have no choice.
Also to address the point defense issue, most certainly a big problem for the attacker but also for the defender. After all each aircraft and crew used to defend factories is not on the front lines.
As well lacking radar the Russians would need to keep some form of CAP running as telephones and radios were exactly common. So even more aircraft and crews in use.
You may note I have avoided the west in my speculation, that is because i believe that a German attempt to use long range bombers in the west would end up like early war English and American attempts, not viable without an effective long range escort, for the same reasons the Allies failed. And if you will, why German daylight raids in mass dwindled away.
The objective as I see it would not so much be to destroy the Russian manufacturing centers as to limit there ability to move equipment and materials to where it is needed.
Most certainly you want to strike factories, refineries, pipelines etc. But rail heads, bridges and tunnels are equally important. A long range bomber is not ideal for these tasks but with the Russian environment you would have no choice.
Also to address the point defense issue, most certainly a big problem for the attacker but also for the defender. After all each aircraft and crew used to defend factories is not on the front lines.
As well lacking radar the Russians would need to keep some form of CAP running as telephones and radios were exactly common. So even more aircraft and crews in use.
You may note I have avoided the west in my speculation, that is because i believe that a German attempt to use long range bombers in the west would end up like early war English and American attempts, not viable without an effective long range escort, for the same reasons the Allies failed. And if you will, why German daylight raids in mass dwindled away.
parsifal
Colonel
with regard to soviet fire control, it was not so much backward, as inflexible. If the fire plan was a predetermined, planned affair, like a planned offensive, the Russians were peerless. Not even the Germans could match their meticulous planning. Everything was covered in these sorts of operations. Russian artillery offensives were rightly feared by the germans and not just because they were of a massive scale.
however, in defence, or when flexibility was needed, the Russian systemn generally broke down hopelessly. They could not react to fast moving threats or situations at all really
The Germans tended to oblige their own destruction, by sitting tight, per Hitlers stand fast orders. This ensured their destruction usually.
However, as the war unfolded, German mobility plummetted, making rapid movements of their Infantry in particular very difficult. In 1941 a standard Infanry division posessed about 850 vehicles and about 6500 draft animals. By 1943, this same formation, even at full strength, could only muster about 2-300 vehicles, and about 2500 animals. This gravely affected their mobility, partilularly for the artillery regiments. So large ascale movements without loss for the Germans became very difficult.
however, in defence, or when flexibility was needed, the Russian systemn generally broke down hopelessly. They could not react to fast moving threats or situations at all really
The Germans tended to oblige their own destruction, by sitting tight, per Hitlers stand fast orders. This ensured their destruction usually.
However, as the war unfolded, German mobility plummetted, making rapid movements of their Infantry in particular very difficult. In 1941 a standard Infanry division posessed about 850 vehicles and about 6500 draft animals. By 1943, this same formation, even at full strength, could only muster about 2-300 vehicles, and about 2500 animals. This gravely affected their mobility, partilularly for the artillery regiments. So large ascale movements without loss for the Germans became very difficult.
Shortround6
Major General
thank you, drgondog, renrich and rgallant.
rgallant,
a few relies:
The Russians in warm weather used river traffic to quite an extent.
A rail line cut by a single bomb hit could usually be repaired in 24 hours.
Most roads outside the cities were dirt so bomb damage was also easily repairable.
Paved roads, railyards/junctions, river docks and other significant infrastructure are going to be in cities of at least some size. These tended to be further apart than in western Europe. While this may cut down on mistaking one city for another it also means finding the city may not be that easy in the first place.
Bombing rail heads, bridges and tunnels 500-800miles behind the lines may affect the Russians front line operations weeks or months in the future while bombing such targets 100-200 miles behind the lines may affect Russian operations in days or weeks. That is a difference in tactical and strategic bombing.
It is also a consideration of this thread, "what if the LW had adopted a different doctrine/startegy".
If they could have done BOTH it is a different question. If they could only pick one, should it have been tactical or strategic?
I would note that at times not even the western allies could do both. Granted it is a bit easier to "borrow" strategic bombers to do tactical work than the other way around.
As for point defense that is true but even a rather primitive telephone/telegraph net can work if the the targets are both far from the front involving a lot of flying time to reach AND if the probable targets are rather widely separated so that once the incoming raid has been plotted for an hour or two the number of probable targets shrinks to a manageable level.
try google maping Russia even today to get an idea of the amount of empty space compared to western Europe.
rgallant,
a few relies:
The Russians in warm weather used river traffic to quite an extent.
A rail line cut by a single bomb hit could usually be repaired in 24 hours.
Most roads outside the cities were dirt so bomb damage was also easily repairable.
Paved roads, railyards/junctions, river docks and other significant infrastructure are going to be in cities of at least some size. These tended to be further apart than in western Europe. While this may cut down on mistaking one city for another it also means finding the city may not be that easy in the first place.
Bombing rail heads, bridges and tunnels 500-800miles behind the lines may affect the Russians front line operations weeks or months in the future while bombing such targets 100-200 miles behind the lines may affect Russian operations in days or weeks. That is a difference in tactical and strategic bombing.
It is also a consideration of this thread, "what if the LW had adopted a different doctrine/startegy".
If they could have done BOTH it is a different question. If they could only pick one, should it have been tactical or strategic?
I would note that at times not even the western allies could do both. Granted it is a bit easier to "borrow" strategic bombers to do tactical work than the other way around.
As for point defense that is true but even a rather primitive telephone/telegraph net can work if the the targets are both far from the front involving a lot of flying time to reach AND if the probable targets are rather widely separated so that once the incoming raid has been plotted for an hour or two the number of probable targets shrinks to a manageable level.
try google maping Russia even today to get an idea of the amount of empty space compared to western Europe.
TheMustangRider
Senior Airman
I believe you have misinterpreted my point davebender. I'm not pointing out a potential invasion by France against Nazi Germany that never materialized; rather a massive invasion by Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union that did materialized and in a overwhelming force at least in its earliest stages.
France attempted to invade Germany during September 1939 and got stopped cold by the German border defense system.
BombTaxi
Tech Sergeant
France attempted to invade Germany during September 1939 and got stopped cold by the German border defense system.
Not quite the case. The Siegfried Line was barely complete, and was in any case obsolete, even by the German;s own admission. The French attacks were limited and did not attack any major fortresses along the line. The bunkers themselves were gasproof, but not sufficiently well built to withstand serious, heavy artillery bombardments. In the vast majority of emplacements, only small arms could be fielded. So it was less a case of the French failing to break through than simply not trying to.
Back OT, I can't see how the Germans are going to effectively conduct a strategic bombimg campaign against Russia in 1941. Technically, operationally, it is a total non-starter. Even if a Ural Bomber had been built, it would not have been very effective. See below for specs of two pre-war Ural Bomber concepts:
Dornier Do 19 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Junkers Ju 89 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Basically, you're talking about shifting 1-1.5 tons of bombs up to 900 miles with 2 mg's and 2 cannon for defence, at less than 200mph and at an altitude of 15-20k ft tops. With no escort. That is not a horse I would back, over any distance...
parsifal
Colonel
The germans potentially had the resources to build a large strategic bomber force. In 1938 they commanded the second largest economy in the world, and compared to the largest, were well on the way to a fully militarized economy.
What they lacked were the organizational skills to utilize that power. The Nazis could not run a chook raffle at a CWA meeting basically. Moreover this disorganization permeated just about every endeavour the germans applied themselves to. Puffed up with false pride, they frittered away their industrial potential and technical research capability.
So, I dont think it is a question of where do they get the resources, or, do they have the resources....they have them alright. What they needed was the ability to utilize those resources intelligently. Given the inherent corruption of the regime, I dont see this as a solvable problem
What they lacked were the organizational skills to utilize that power. The Nazis could not run a chook raffle at a CWA meeting basically. Moreover this disorganization permeated just about every endeavour the germans applied themselves to. Puffed up with false pride, they frittered away their industrial potential and technical research capability.
So, I dont think it is a question of where do they get the resources, or, do they have the resources....they have them alright. What they needed was the ability to utilize those resources intelligently. Given the inherent corruption of the regime, I dont see this as a solvable problem
Glider
Captain
I don't believe that Germany had the second biggest economy in 1938, they were some way behind that aspiration. When Japan were negotiating to join the Axis Alliance Japanese Politicians were very keen Not to sign the pact and one of those reasons was the weakness of the German economy.
Japan recognised that Germany had made remarkable gains but the economy was still weak compared to the USA and the UK when combined with the other commonwealth countries.
The problem didn't lie with the GDP but in the lack of reserves and exports plus the recognition that Germany had a significant shortage of key materials in particular Oil and Tungsten.
Another problem was that German GDP was concentrated on war materials and not for trading purposes. An example of this was in the number of trucks, cars and other forms of motor transport. I don't have the figures to hand but if I remember correctly the ratio of motor transport to population was roughly half the USA and 2/3rds of the UK. A high proportion of what they produced was aimed at the expensive military equipment.
One other figure that I remember was that until around 1943 Germany produced more staff cars than light/medium and heavy trucks. So the people at the top of the tree knew how to look after themselves.
I should be able to check these figures on Wednesday if that would help.
Japan recognised that Germany had made remarkable gains but the economy was still weak compared to the USA and the UK when combined with the other commonwealth countries.
The problem didn't lie with the GDP but in the lack of reserves and exports plus the recognition that Germany had a significant shortage of key materials in particular Oil and Tungsten.
Another problem was that German GDP was concentrated on war materials and not for trading purposes. An example of this was in the number of trucks, cars and other forms of motor transport. I don't have the figures to hand but if I remember correctly the ratio of motor transport to population was roughly half the USA and 2/3rds of the UK. A high proportion of what they produced was aimed at the expensive military equipment.
One other figure that I remember was that until around 1943 Germany produced more staff cars than light/medium and heavy trucks. So the people at the top of the tree knew how to look after themselves.
I should be able to check these figures on Wednesday if that would help.
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Shortround6
Major General
That, I think, is the heart of the problem. even upgraded to 1000-1100hp engines in1940 and 1300-1400hp engines in 1941 there is going to be a performance problem. It is not until the 1300hp+ engines show up that the idea really becomes workable. And you still have no escort fighters.
The two cannon turrets are rather debatable too. One source says that they were two man turrets with one man controlling traverse and another controlling elevation. The 20mm MG/FF may not have been the best defensive weapon either. By what year do the Germans come up with a decent defensive armament arrangement? It may not do that much good but before somebody gives the OK(s) to start the project or continue it the defensive armament has to give the appearance of working. Like the Americans thinking that the improved guns/turrets of the B-17E/F would allow operations that the older B-17C/Ds couldn't do.
The British "bomb trucks" used engines of 1300-1700hp and while the Americans used 1200hp engines for the most part they also used turbo chargers that, while they did nothing for take-off, helped their 'smaller' engines come close to the cruising power of the bigger engines at altitude.
And they could not do long range, unescorted day missions without unacceptable losses.
Shortround6
Major General
I don't know how true that actually is. The Germans did produce a lot of military 'cars' that were based of off civilian models with stripped down military bodies. Some of them were used as radio cars or even for towing light AT guns. Jobs that normally went to light trucks in other armies. They might have been more useful had they been fitted with 2 man cabs and a cargo bed rather than 4-5 seat open (no doors) body work.
Shortround6
Major General
While they may have been the second largest they were in second place by a considerable margin. They also weren't that far head of third place (Soviet Union)or a combination of England and France.
And compared to the largest, while well on their way to fully a militarized
economy it also meant that there was a smaller percentage left to convert.
trying to compare economies is difficult because of the different things that are measured. GDP can be especially misleading because a large country with a large agricultural sector will look good even if it's industry is small and backwards.
BombTaxi
Tech Sergeant
I think the economy is a moot point here, really. The designs the RLM was actually considering for the job of long-range bombing before the war simply weren't any good - and hence they were scrapped and the decision made to concentrate on tactical bombers.
If we contrast this with the RAF approach, we can see that a Whitley, Hampden or Wellington wasn't the best solution for long-range bombing either. They were slaughtered by daylight and unable to bomb anything smaller than a city by night. The RAF, however, was totally committed to strategic bombing, and did not have to support an army engaged in massive operations on several fronts either. Resources were therefore available to develop the heavy bomber until the Lancaster was arrived at. The LW, having to support the Wehrmacht on the Eastern, Mediterranean and European fronts in 1941-44, as well as defending the Reich, did not have the resource to carry on developing heavy bombers even if it wanted to. Priorities in the field would not permit it. For the Germans to develop a credible strategic bombing force, they would have to go the same journey as the RAF and USAAF; first, build bombers before the war; second, suffer awful casualties due to flawed tactics and inadequate aircraft, and finally overcome these obstacles in order to achieve ultimate success late in the war. As Germany planned for a short Blitzkrieg war in which the LW would act as flying artillery, it follows that Germany would have had to abandon Blitzkrieg altogether and plan for a long, 'trench' war, as Britain and France did, forn there to be any realistic chance of a strategic bomber force being developed. Otherwise, there was simply no need for it...
If we contrast this with the RAF approach, we can see that a Whitley, Hampden or Wellington wasn't the best solution for long-range bombing either. They were slaughtered by daylight and unable to bomb anything smaller than a city by night. The RAF, however, was totally committed to strategic bombing, and did not have to support an army engaged in massive operations on several fronts either. Resources were therefore available to develop the heavy bomber until the Lancaster was arrived at. The LW, having to support the Wehrmacht on the Eastern, Mediterranean and European fronts in 1941-44, as well as defending the Reich, did not have the resource to carry on developing heavy bombers even if it wanted to. Priorities in the field would not permit it. For the Germans to develop a credible strategic bombing force, they would have to go the same journey as the RAF and USAAF; first, build bombers before the war; second, suffer awful casualties due to flawed tactics and inadequate aircraft, and finally overcome these obstacles in order to achieve ultimate success late in the war. As Germany planned for a short Blitzkrieg war in which the LW would act as flying artillery, it follows that Germany would have had to abandon Blitzkrieg altogether and plan for a long, 'trench' war, as Britain and France did, forn there to be any realistic chance of a strategic bomber force being developed. Otherwise, there was simply no need for it...
parsifal
Colonel
Its true that german finances were not in great shape, however they had sufficiently recovereed under Halfour Schacht, the legendary Reichsbank chairman after 1923, to the point that germany was at least in positve ground with her liquidity. Financially Britain was better off than germany, but not greatly so. WWI had brought Britain nearly to her knees economically, and she too struggled throughout the interwar years.
In terms of the economic indices, I see neither great difficulty in determining the strength (potentially) of the German economy, nor that she was greatly behind the economy of the her opposing european countries. She was a distant second to the US, admittedly. At that time, the world economies were changing, however compared with today, the standards by which economic strngth were measured were a lot simpler than they are today. And it isnt that big an aissue to determine economic strengths in the complex modern economic climate.
Economic potential was pretty universally measured on the industrial basics....things like coal production, iron production, and steel production. In the context of the period immediately preceding WWII you might also throw in aluminium, copper, rubber and petroleum production
In terms of Coal, iron, steel ....the basics of the early 20 century economies, Germany was far ahead of any of its European rivals. It produced 332 million tons of coal, to Britains 220 million, and the US 528 million. Steel production, 30.6 million tons to Britains 13 million, and the US 82 million tons, aluminium 432 million tons, to Britains best effort of 55 million tons, and the US 1528 million tons. In oil refining capacity, the Germans did lag slightly behind that of Britain, but if the refining and production capabilities of Hungary and Rumania are include3d, it surpassed the British
By any standard, the Germans had the economic sinews to eclipse that of its enemies, but it failed to do so. If you look at the manufacturing results from such impressive economic indices, the results were disappointing. Why? Because in terms of getting the rubber on the road, the germans (or more accurately, the Nazis) lacked the organizational skills to translate that economic potential into anything moderately creditable. This is where their lack of financial depth comes home to haunt them, but also it is a reflection of the inane short sightedness of their leadership. Besotted by front line strengths, everything military in Nazi Germany was put into the shop window. They never planned for a long war, firstly because they couldnt afford it, but also because they arrogantly believed they didnt need to.
In terms of the economic indices, I see neither great difficulty in determining the strength (potentially) of the German economy, nor that she was greatly behind the economy of the her opposing european countries. She was a distant second to the US, admittedly. At that time, the world economies were changing, however compared with today, the standards by which economic strngth were measured were a lot simpler than they are today. And it isnt that big an aissue to determine economic strengths in the complex modern economic climate.
Economic potential was pretty universally measured on the industrial basics....things like coal production, iron production, and steel production. In the context of the period immediately preceding WWII you might also throw in aluminium, copper, rubber and petroleum production
In terms of Coal, iron, steel ....the basics of the early 20 century economies, Germany was far ahead of any of its European rivals. It produced 332 million tons of coal, to Britains 220 million, and the US 528 million. Steel production, 30.6 million tons to Britains 13 million, and the US 82 million tons, aluminium 432 million tons, to Britains best effort of 55 million tons, and the US 1528 million tons. In oil refining capacity, the Germans did lag slightly behind that of Britain, but if the refining and production capabilities of Hungary and Rumania are include3d, it surpassed the British
By any standard, the Germans had the economic sinews to eclipse that of its enemies, but it failed to do so. If you look at the manufacturing results from such impressive economic indices, the results were disappointing. Why? Because in terms of getting the rubber on the road, the germans (or more accurately, the Nazis) lacked the organizational skills to translate that economic potential into anything moderately creditable. This is where their lack of financial depth comes home to haunt them, but also it is a reflection of the inane short sightedness of their leadership. Besotted by front line strengths, everything military in Nazi Germany was put into the shop window. They never planned for a long war, firstly because they couldnt afford it, but also because they arrogantly believed they didnt need to.
michaelmaltby
Colonel
"... Whom do you mean by stragglers?"
Rhineland, Austria, Poland, Belgium, Denmark and Holland .... no "stragglers" after that but Germany had gained a needed resource transfusion.
I guess I am stuck on this whole notion that Germany had "rational" alternatives - the decision to confiscate the Junkers aircraft works, turn it over to a Nazis apparatchik to operate, and then say - by way of "strategy", this bomber (the Ju-88) is our go-to-platform is hardly a "rational" approach by a government or a military. The Nazis made those kind of political decisions all the time and they paid for it.
There wasn't a 4-engined bomber in 1938 cause Junkers hadn't built one - if they had - then maybe Germany would have had the strategic bomber they needed to attack deep in Russia. (And lets remember the FW Condor was a passenger aircraft first).
A word about Japan. I fully understand the weaknesses of Japanese bombers (aircraft) in terms of survivability - but - the Mitsubishi "Betty" had more than twice the range of a Junkers 88, more than a B-17 - albeit with a light bomb load. The point being that Japan was able to project themselves by way of air power in a way that Germany never could ... (although I grant the Germans mastered Blitzkrieg and the Japanese did not) ... think of Pearl Harbor and the sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales.
Japan had been exploring its options for economic growth and influence ever since its victory in 1904-05, and at that time the Japanese felt that they had won the war but lost the peace. Everything they built militarily they built to go off and carve themselves an empire (Naturally Japanese bombers were vulnerable to any fighters - even the few the Chinese had - but so were Hamptons, Whitleys, etc. too.)
Can any of you think of any tactic that the Germans "innovated" in 1939 that they hadn't: (1) deployed in 1914-18, or (2) had deployed against them.?
I'm curious ...
MM
Rhineland, Austria, Poland, Belgium, Denmark and Holland .... no "stragglers" after that but Germany had gained a needed resource transfusion.
I guess I am stuck on this whole notion that Germany had "rational" alternatives - the decision to confiscate the Junkers aircraft works, turn it over to a Nazis apparatchik to operate, and then say - by way of "strategy", this bomber (the Ju-88) is our go-to-platform is hardly a "rational" approach by a government or a military. The Nazis made those kind of political decisions all the time and they paid for it.
There wasn't a 4-engined bomber in 1938 cause Junkers hadn't built one - if they had - then maybe Germany would have had the strategic bomber they needed to attack deep in Russia. (And lets remember the FW Condor was a passenger aircraft first).
A word about Japan. I fully understand the weaknesses of Japanese bombers (aircraft) in terms of survivability - but - the Mitsubishi "Betty" had more than twice the range of a Junkers 88, more than a B-17 - albeit with a light bomb load. The point being that Japan was able to project themselves by way of air power in a way that Germany never could ... (although I grant the Germans mastered Blitzkrieg and the Japanese did not) ... think of Pearl Harbor and the sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales.
Japan had been exploring its options for economic growth and influence ever since its victory in 1904-05, and at that time the Japanese felt that they had won the war but lost the peace. Everything they built militarily they built to go off and carve themselves an empire (Naturally Japanese bombers were vulnerable to any fighters - even the few the Chinese had - but so were Hamptons, Whitleys, etc. too.)
Can any of you think of any tactic that the Germans "innovated" in 1939 that they hadn't: (1) deployed in 1914-18, or (2) had deployed against them.?
I'm curious ...
MM
BombTaxi
Tech Sergeant
No argument from me on the 'innovative' nature of German tactics. But the Germans were the first to use it on a scale that bought down entire countries in a matter of weeks. Brusilov, Ludendorff et al had only seen 'stormtooper' tactics as a means of breaching the trench line and then 'breaking into open country' - a project that no-one ever really defined, because of course, they never managed it. It was the German generals of the next generation who understood you could skip the trench line altogether and sever the jugular on a national scale before the enemy had time to respond.
Oooh, just thought. Glider assault on fixed fortifications - no-one had done that before Eben Emael. And the paradrop into the Low Countries was a first too
Oooh, just thought. Glider assault on fixed fortifications - no-one had done that before Eben Emael. And the paradrop into the Low Countries was a first too
michaelmaltby
Colonel
"... Ludendorff et al had only seen 'stormtooper' tactics as a means of breaching the trench line and then 'breaking into open country' - a project that no-one ever really defined, because of course, they never managed it."
Off topic, but I can't resist - Google "Canada's 100 Days -1918". Canadians "managed it".
"... Glider assault on fixed fortifications - no-one had done that before Eben Emael. And the paradrop into the Low Countries was a first too"
You're right.. But both countries were - sadly - "stragglers".
I'm not slagging Germans or Germany but - for a hugely competent, rational people - Germany really sunk the Nazis' hook in its mouth. In contrast - 60 years layer - nice to see Angela Merkle standing tough and tall.
MM
Off topic, but I can't resist
- Google "Canada's 100 Days -1918". Canadians "managed it". "... Glider assault on fixed fortifications - no-one had done that before Eben Emael. And the paradrop into the Low Countries was a first too"
You're right.
. But both countries were - sadly - "stragglers".I'm not slagging Germans or Germany but - for a hugely competent, rational people - Germany really sunk the Nazis' hook in its mouth. In contrast - 60 years layer - nice to see Angela Merkle standing tough and tall
.MM
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michaelmaltby
Colonel
"... Think that Ju-88 program was one of most rational production decisions made by 3rd Reich."
I don't entirely disagree - it was the best bomber available at the time for the Germans and concentrating on one platform was sensible.
I'm not discounting rationality. I'm critical of the process the Nazis used - including taking over Hugo's aircraft factory. The Nazis played politics with the "weapons" their soldiers needed/used to fight. Speer loved the "V" weapon program because the people loved to hear about them and it got his picture in the media (source, Adan Tooze, Wages of Destruction).
And extrapolating our from that small example, I'm simply saying that all the "what ifs" in the world can't discount the facts that a "rational" people - a courageous people - allowed themselves to be led and controlled by a 100% whack job.
So Juha, I got no argument with you on the impressive JU-88.
I don't entirely disagree - it was the best bomber available at the time for the Germans and concentrating on one platform was sensible.
I'm not discounting rationality. I'm critical of the process the Nazis used - including taking over Hugo's aircraft factory. The Nazis played politics with the "weapons" their soldiers needed/used to fight. Speer loved the "V" weapon program because the people loved to hear about them and it got his picture in the media (source, Adan Tooze, Wages of Destruction).
And extrapolating our from that small example, I'm simply saying that all the "what ifs" in the world can't discount the facts that a "rational" people - a courageous people - allowed themselves to be led and controlled by a 100% whack job
.So Juha, I got no argument with you on the impressive JU-88
.Gixxerman
Senior Airman
I think it comes down to, irrespective of whichever tactic is used, that you can't be a medium sized European country pick a quick succession of fights ending up with rest of the whole world as your enemy and expect it to go well in the long-run.
Even with most of Europe over-run it just can't be assimilated into the war economy efficiently fast enough.
It is also not helped by Germany being on the verge of bankruptcy in 1939 (which I suspect had a knock-on effect of ensuring that they were incapable of matching the British tactic of buying up years of vital strategic resource supply from certain neutral countries).
The quick 'smash grab' idea was I suppose fine as long as the war(s) were always short easily won but in a world where the combatants have comparable technologies then the instant it got drawn out and engaged in multiple theatres I just do not see how they could ever expect to win.
An interesting idea might be what would have happened if the British had been persuaded to declare war against Germany's then ally Russia after the attack on Finland.
I suspect they would have come to terms following a German attack on Russia but if that had not happened then (like the idea of a Japanese attack on Russia not the USA) things might have been different in Europe at least.....although how the Japanese cope with the US blockade in those circumstances is another question.
Even with most of Europe over-run it just can't be assimilated into the war economy efficiently fast enough.
It is also not helped by Germany being on the verge of bankruptcy in 1939 (which I suspect had a knock-on effect of ensuring that they were incapable of matching the British tactic of buying up years of vital strategic resource supply from certain neutral countries).
The quick 'smash grab' idea was I suppose fine as long as the war(s) were always short easily won but in a world where the combatants have comparable technologies then the instant it got drawn out and engaged in multiple theatres I just do not see how they could ever expect to win.
An interesting idea might be what would have happened if the British had been persuaded to declare war against Germany's then ally Russia after the attack on Finland.
I suspect they would have come to terms following a German attack on Russia but if that had not happened then (like the idea of a Japanese attack on Russia not the USA) things might have been different in Europe at least.....although how the Japanese cope with the US blockade in those circumstances is another question.
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