Key point IMO re: the orig thread topic.
What if the LW had adopted a different doctrine/strategy?
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Key point IMO re: the orig thread topic.
michaelmaltby
Colonel
@Nikademus: ".... RAF Bomber Command required 4 years before they made a worthwhile contribution to the British war effort."
Not sure that statement is true. I would consider the bombing of the invasion barge sites along the channel during the B of B and immediately after - however expensive it was in Hamptons, Whitleys, or whatever, to have been a success. It demonstrated that not only could Germany NOT achieve air superiority over Britain, it was also unable to protect mission critical assets that it needed for its next campaign.
MM
Not sure that statement is true. I would consider the bombing of the invasion barge sites along the channel during the B of B and immediately after - however expensive it was in Hamptons, Whitleys, or whatever, to have been a success. It demonstrated that not only could Germany NOT achieve air superiority over Britain, it was also unable to protect mission critical assets that it needed for its next campaign.
MM
From a strategic context, i think Dave's comment has merit. Both the USAAF and RAF's strategic bombing 'campaign' required several years to really start bearing tangible fruit that was truely war impacting. Given such, it seems odd to think that a small or even medium sized 'strategic force' on the Luftwaffe's side could do better, hence the German's de-emphasis on a SB component.
drgondog
Major
The USAAF via 8th AF started combat operations on August 17, 1942. Depending on your choice of criteria for 'bearing tangible fruit' the Latest date would be May 12, 1944 when the Oil Campaign began. That would certainly dovetail to Speer's assessment of 'doom'.
One can not overlook the beginning of the end for Petroleum supplies to Germany of the Ploesti campaign by the 12th and then 15th AF resulting in reducing the single greatest supply point to less than 10% pre war capacity - that would be August, 1943.
Several years by that definition then is 11 1/2 to 21 months, or less than two years.
One could then back out subjective results which could include wholesale destruction of the Daylight Fighter capability of the Luftwaffe which was a steady erosion through ~ November 1943, reaching a peak in May 1944 for the existing capacity of LuftFlotte Reich.
One could also theorize that the Daylight Strategic Bombing efforts by USAAF forced the Luftwaffe to suck into LuftFlotteReich 30+ squadrons from the East and South - having both strategic and tactical impact on control of the air across Russia, Romania, Italy.
Next, the assault on the airframe industry, while NOT reducing the ability to supply fighter airframes to the front, forced an allocation of labor and materials approximately twice what would have been required absent molestation by the USAAF, thereby taking those resources away from other high importance production requirements.
Last, the assault on Strategic targets like ball bearings, major airframe factories as well as assembly and repair depots, forced distribution of plants including building from scratch underground facilities - further detracting from available resources to produce timely front line production.
One very simple example of 'ripple down' effect of the combined strategic efforst was forcing the Wermacht to fall back on horse drawn 'vehicles' to augment motorized transportation to offset the lack of motorized vehicles - which certainly did not help mobility.
IMO - the USAAF Strategic bombing campaign based on a start of August 17, 1942 could easily be assessed as 'effective' no later than August, 1943 because of Ploesti alone.
Shortround6
Major General
I guess it depends on how someone defines "effective".
Is a bombing campaign only effective if it causes the enemy's production capacity to actually drop while the enemy is is making major efforts to increase production?
What would the Germans production have been in 1943/ early 1944 without the historical bombing campaign?
Is the loss of production from a given factory for several weeks and the reduction in capacity for several more worth the bomb raid and losses or not?
Looking at the bombing of the Supermarine factory of Southampton in 1940, The building was destroyed but production was dispersed to other buildings in the area, production resumed but several weeks output was lost and how long did it take for production to reach pre-bombing levels?
No, bombing the factory didn't win the BoB for the Germans but how many more Spit fires would have been available if it wasn't bombed?
What else could have been done with the effort it took to disperse and set up production in those other buildings/locations?
Were the German losses worth it?
Apply that to the American/British campaign and throw in the different allocation of German resources. How many AA guns stayed in Germany or what was the difference in gun production between AA guns and general artillery if there had been no bombing campaign?
Is a bombing campaign only effective if it causes the enemy's production capacity to actually drop while the enemy is is making major efforts to increase production?
What would the Germans production have been in 1943/ early 1944 without the historical bombing campaign?
Is the loss of production from a given factory for several weeks and the reduction in capacity for several more worth the bomb raid and losses or not?
Looking at the bombing of the Supermarine factory of Southampton in 1940, The building was destroyed but production was dispersed to other buildings in the area, production resumed but several weeks output was lost and how long did it take for production to reach pre-bombing levels?
No, bombing the factory didn't win the BoB for the Germans but how many more Spit fires would have been available if it wasn't bombed?
What else could have been done with the effort it took to disperse and set up production in those other buildings/locations?
Were the German losses worth it?
Apply that to the American/British campaign and throw in the different allocation of German resources. How many AA guns stayed in Germany or what was the difference in gun production between AA guns and general artillery if there had been no bombing campaign?
My understanding is that the initial raid although doing significant damage, did not reduce the output of that field for any long period of time. Indeed those fields were attacked several more times so this argument is not really valid.
I would tend to put a later date as to the effectiveness of whole strategic bombing campaign. But now we hit what is effective, so in my mind for it to be effective :
- Constant reduction in quantity and quality of enemy munitions produced
- Constant and effective disruption of enemy transportation networks
bridges, railway switching yards etc. - Disruption and destruction of critical technical industries oil refining, ball bearing, complex alloy production
- Disruption of production facilities manpower either directly or by threat of air raid.
This was hardly accomplished by mid 1943. But taking these terms of reference in place and given the huge numbers of both aircrew and aircraft the allies had.
It is unlikely the Germans could have significantly changed the outcome even given the doctrine and equipment.
I can see 1 and only one possibility which is more a result of Great Britain being an island nation. Given the doctrine and equipment for long range bombing and a hard line focused U-boat camping working in conjunction with the bombing campaign. It may have been possible to bring GB to her knees and have a successful invasion, now that would have effected the rest of the war.
But it is also off topic as it really is not a result of only a successful air campaign, but rather a completely different way of fighting the war focused only on GB.
Shortround6
Major General
I think people are confusing permanent damage with effectiveness.
Consider a tactical situation where a torpedo hit is made on a large ship like a cruiser. The Cruiser ,while not sunk suffers a certain amount of damage and is no longer fully combat effective, It makes it back to port and is in dockyard hands for 6-9 months before it can take it's place in fleet operations again. The fleet operates short of it's potential even if another new cruiser joins the fleet. No reduction in numbers but no gain either until the older ship is repaired. Thousand so of man hours spent on repairs rather than new construction.
Was the torpedo hit ineffective?
are only torpedo hits that result in sinkings considered effective?
Should torpedo attacks be suspended until such time as they can be made with such overwhelming numbers that multiple hits can be assured and sinkings guaranteed?
As far as strategic bombing goes the results almost always fell short of it's proponents claimed. But to say that thousand of tones of bombs did little or no damage, didn't affect the Germans production at all ( holding production levels or increasing them in spite of damage doesn't tell us what production would have been with NO bombing) or had little or no effect on German production, planning or resource allocation seems to be twisting reality also.
Consider a tactical situation where a torpedo hit is made on a large ship like a cruiser. The Cruiser ,while not sunk suffers a certain amount of damage and is no longer fully combat effective, It makes it back to port and is in dockyard hands for 6-9 months before it can take it's place in fleet operations again. The fleet operates short of it's potential even if another new cruiser joins the fleet. No reduction in numbers but no gain either until the older ship is repaired. Thousand so of man hours spent on repairs rather than new construction.
Was the torpedo hit ineffective?
are only torpedo hits that result in sinkings considered effective?
Should torpedo attacks be suspended until such time as they can be made with such overwhelming numbers that multiple hits can be assured and sinkings guaranteed?
As far as strategic bombing goes the results almost always fell short of it's proponents claimed. But to say that thousand of tones of bombs did little or no damage, didn't affect the Germans production at all ( holding production levels or increasing them in spite of damage doesn't tell us what production would have been with NO bombing) or had little or no effect on German production, planning or resource allocation seems to be twisting reality also.
drgondog
Major
Good points, we disagree on perhaps the crossover from 'non-effective to 'effective' and this is an area even the post war USSBS was divided on.
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I understand your point in the post, and there in lies the problem at what point was the strategic airwar causing damage that disrupted the German war effort enough to make a difference. Considering the people at the time could not really make that judgment, I don't think we can either.
I would suspect by early to mid 44 the effects would be pronounced enough to call it effective.
parsifal
Colonel
Its also substantially untrue that it took 4 years for BC to achieve meaningful results.
The biggest raids in 1940 were those that caused such a violent reaction by Hitler....the bombing of Berlin by a mere 80 aircraft. These raids caused a change in German strategy that contributed to the defeat of the LW in the BoB....a tangtible result in its own right. In 1941, the majority of BCs efforts were directed toward defeating the garrison forces in France...this was achieved in cncert with FC by the end of the year.
The bombing camapign against germany began in earnest in July 1941. initially it suffered defeat, but under harris it returned in March of 1942, to deliver the first of the 1000 bomber raids....that only 8 months after the start of the campaign. Devastating blows were inflicted on the Germans in July 1943, with the raids on Hamburg....and all the while pressure was being applied to the German airforce that kept it on the ropes and unable to rest of recuperate losses......a long slow grinding process that was achieving results from day one of the campaign.
What bombing did not deliver was an instant, knock out blow....that much is true.....but it was achieving results from the very beginning IMO
The biggest raids in 1940 were those that caused such a violent reaction by Hitler....the bombing of Berlin by a mere 80 aircraft. These raids caused a change in German strategy that contributed to the defeat of the LW in the BoB....a tangtible result in its own right. In 1941, the majority of BCs efforts were directed toward defeating the garrison forces in France...this was achieved in cncert with FC by the end of the year.
The bombing camapign against germany began in earnest in July 1941. initially it suffered defeat, but under harris it returned in March of 1942, to deliver the first of the 1000 bomber raids....that only 8 months after the start of the campaign. Devastating blows were inflicted on the Germans in July 1943, with the raids on Hamburg....and all the while pressure was being applied to the German airforce that kept it on the ropes and unable to rest of recuperate losses......a long slow grinding process that was achieving results from day one of the campaign.
What bombing did not deliver was an instant, knock out blow....that much is true.....but it was achieving results from the very beginning IMO
BombTaxi
Tech Sergeant
I would echo Parsifal's view, 2 Group was in action from day 1 against German interests, and while the results were not impressive in terms of damage done and casualties suffered, it all contributed to pile pressure on the Germans and require them to defend against such raids.
drgondog
Major
Galland remarked in First and the Last that the combined Hamburg raids of late July 24, 1943 were a huge body blow to Germany, exceeding Stalingrad in the context of damage to morale. While 8th AF contributed, they were focused more on point targets and contributed far less to the wholesale devastation of the city.
Speer also remarked that had such raids continued with similar effects that the war could have been lost for Germany soon.
In retrospect, the 8th was not yet capable of joining with the RAF for such a campaign during daylight as deeper penetrations would soon prove extremely costly - like ~ two weeks later.
There is no question the RAF was 'effective' in 1943. Once again the devil is in the imprecision of the English language
Speer also remarked that had such raids continued with similar effects that the war could have been lost for Germany soon.
In retrospect, the 8th was not yet capable of joining with the RAF for such a campaign during daylight as deeper penetrations would soon prove extremely costly - like ~ two weeks later.
There is no question the RAF was 'effective' in 1943. Once again the devil is in the imprecision of the English language
My point about Dave's comment having merit does not revolve around the specific time frame. One can argue the context of effectiveness and when till one is blue in the face. (3 years? 2 years? 4 years?) What i was referring to when i highlighted his comments was that most of the talk regarding the Luftwaffe "changing" it's doctrine involved reletively short term engagements in which there would be a "strategic air force" now available that could have changed the course of events for Germany. I disagree, because, as referenced to Dave's comments....the SB campaigns conducted by Great Britian and the US took "years" to produce returns that can now be argued till the crack of doom. (One example is petroleum....however even before the ball got rolling, Germany was suffering petroleum shortages....but she still fought on and the war remained a long one)
Given Germany's *immediate* needs and situation, any kind of short term/small-moderate scale SB attacks, similar in scale and scope to those of the USSR Long Range Aviation would not have greatly impacted the operational situation on the ground and given you can't get something for nothing...might have had a detrimental effect by taking away assets that were vital in other areas.
The point being (again) that the bombing of Germany was a long term effort requiring massive investments of resources. Thats the point I felt worth highlighting A Schweinfurt or Polesti in insolation really didn't change the war to a tangible degree. It was the culmination of damage over time from late 42 all the way into 45. (and even then it can be argued that it was the attrition of the Luftwaffe which was the most tangible result....ensuring Allied air superiority after the D-day landings in combination with the drain of the Eastern Front)
I think it's unrealistic to assume or postulate that Germany could have acheived anything decisively tangible (such as shortening a war/taking away a side's ability or desire to wage war (an event which did not come to pass in RL)) without having to commit to a similar scale and time frame for a long term effort..which given Germany's geographical and military situation, was not feasible.
drgondog
Major
Nikademus - I believe we are pretty much in agreement..
Erich
the old Sage
back to D's original posting think personally and I feel very strong about this opinion in consideration of the numbers of LW night vets I have interviewed over the years through letter, had in 1941 the Fernenachtjagd operations been considered worthy (and they were not), the whole nachtjagd and the whole KG units operating low level and at night bombing every known airfield and not the cities would of really hampered and delayed any BC or even US heavy bomber involvement in the war.
now where do you think the day time air war would have gone and when ? Would England have been able to cope ? ............. possibly in time but night after night the LW could of kept up with the losses but the LW hierarchy even in 1941 were off the planet with their own mindful and selfish desires of total world war due to a delirious 'FAT MANS' and puny Austrians ideals
now where do you think the day time air war would have gone and when ? Would England have been able to cope ? ............. possibly in time but night after night the LW could of kept up with the losses but the LW hierarchy even in 1941 were off the planet with their own mindful and selfish desires of total world war due to a delirious 'FAT MANS' and puny Austrians ideals
Glider
Captain
Low level bombing at night is a dangerous and difficult task. Navigation is very difficult and losses would have been pretty high. Both sides found it difficult to find targets at night and a target as small as an airfield almost impossible resulting in a lot of ineffective missions.
Plus of course the RAF would have given a higher priority to nightfighters.
Would these attacks hindered the RAF yes, without doubt they would have done, but would it have stopped them, no. There were too many airfields and too many stations and German intelligence about which airfields did what was very poor, any review of the BOB can tell you that.
A second question would be 'would the RAF overcome most of these problems by the time BC became effective in 1943, probably. Its also worth remembering that the RAF would be able to do the same to the German bases and the RAF put more effort into training aircrew at night flying.
By 1942 the RAF were in a position to defend our airspace at night pretty effectively. I don't see how it would have impacted the development of the 8th Air Force in the second half of 1943.
Erich
the old Sage
Glider I have to disagree. the LW would of added the necessary drop tanks and intel was better than one imagines, even in 1941, the LW hierarchy was simply not sold on the idea of long distance night flights they never were through the whole course of the war. Bob was more in the mind set of the cry babies above and never fully implemented ill conceived really and a real misuse of Lw talent if you ask me, I did a full on treatise of the BOB back in the early 1960's and what I found was alarming enough leading to the total disarray of the LW command and future doom of the German airforce especially fighter Command at all levels.
the success of I./NJG 2 was to lead to the overall night bombing campaign if anything delays would of occurred maybe the abandonment of the 8th AF or at least would of had to rethink just where to place effective airfields as they would or would of been under LW scrutiny. but history speaks plainly it didn't happen thank God.
the success of I./NJG 2 was to lead to the overall night bombing campaign if anything delays would of occurred maybe the abandonment of the 8th AF or at least would of had to rethink just where to place effective airfields as they would or would of been under LW scrutiny. but history speaks plainly it didn't happen thank God.
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buffnut453
Captain
This is nothing but an opinion but about the only thing the LW might have done differently would have been to continue attacks on RAF airfields in southeast England and (with better intel) the Chain Home radar stations. Experience shows that it's very difficult to comprehensively knock out an airfield but hindering Fighter Command's ability to defend London was about the only way Hitler might have achieved his objective of removing Britain from the fight.
Glider
Captain
I certainly agree that the Luftwaffe would use drop tanks and that the range issues would have been solved. However I cannot agree that there intell was any good. There were numerous cases in the BOB where training and army co operation bases were hit and that was in daylight. Before the war PR was given a high priority in the Luftwaffe but this was soon diluted when war broke out. I cannot see any way that the 8th Air Force would have been delayed as Luftwaffe scrutiny (PR) coverage was very poor.
Had Germany started night operations then they would have had some success but low level navigation, at night in 1940/41 was very difficult and trying to find a small target like an airbase close to impossible. On the plus side the RAF who had a lead in air to air radar would be learning for the majority of 1941 during which the Luftwaffe would have the advantage, but with more pressure nightfighters would have a higher priority and by 1942 would be pretty formidable.
I must emphasise that German night attacks would have had an impact, but it wouldn't have stopped anything.
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