"Theyre cannons and rifles werent as good, and right, they were very long, which was meant, with the bayonet, to give them an advantage in close quarters fighting, because they were trained alot in it."
The length of the rifle being a hinderance was before the bayonet was even attached. It wasn't designed for close quarters combat, it was just that Japan didn't have a shorter design. The Japanese soldiers would have found a God send in a M1 Carbine.
The infantry cannon of the IJA were, in fact, extremely effective and deadly. It was small and adaptable which proved a shocking success against the Allied troops, who did not like it one bit.
The IJA artillery on the other hand left a lot to be desired. Compared to the OQF 25pdrs mostly used by the British in the CBI all Japanese artillery was clearly inferior for the combat conditions.
"Hell the officers carried some damn nice Katana, that wouldnt do much else besides be a good piece of show, unless you can get within three feet of an enemy, and that was rare, but when it happend....lop there goes a limb."
No offense but I don't think you know very much about the jungle warfare in WWII. On the contrary getting into hand-to-hand combat in the jungles was a common occurance in comparison to normal pitched warfare. In some jungles you can barely see three feet in front of your face and be stood on the enemy before you even know he's there.
More than once tens and hundreds of soldiers would come into contact and fight with cold steel rather than rifle in the jungles of South-East Asia. It was a distinct advantage for the Japanese officers to be armed with such a weapon when so often hand-to-hand combat took place.
My grandfather was once jumped in the jungle and had a knife to his throat, luckily the man who had jumped him was a Ghurka who soon realised his mistake.
"The japanese had rigid tactics based on intimidation and surprise. They used banzai charges as a scare tactic to overwhelm the enemy, a visiual "force multiplyer" relying on screams and human waves. They worked.....at first. As the war waged on, the troops understood the tactics, and the inflexibility at times of tactics."
While there is a good argument for the IJA being rigid in their approach, the opposite could be argued for in just the same manner. When the IJA caught on to an idea then they would often stick at it. Time and time again I've read of the Japanese charging the same spot over and over and over again, providing the Allied gunners good practice.
However, the IJA were able to change and when they did, it was drastic. They would use combinations of many different tactical approaches and more often than not their approach would be the best. The divisional tactics of the IJA were extremely good.
The basic principals of the soldier tactics in the IJA were to use fear and intimidation to crack the enemy before even attacking, the final charge was just the final nail in the coffin for the Allied soldiers. In the jungles it still managed to be effective in some circumstances even into 1945. But it was, on a whole, out-dated and the Allies knew what to expect. And, in fact, it was a hinderance to the Japanese effort.
So, I suppose in the personal combat point of view they were rigid (and clumsy at times), but above that they were flexible.
"Supplies on a besieged island the japanese held were hard to come by, so tactics were either to wait until theyre on the beach and then open up inland, or hit them when theyre on the shore. Either way they would get platsered from the air or naval guns, and howitzers when they came ashore."
This is hardly a fault of the IJA. When any nations armies are besieged there's little for them to do but wait for a rescue or attempt a breakout. A breakout off an island is impossible, the forces on those islands were at the mercy of the Allies.
" The machine guns the japanese were issued looked like they were from world war one armies. They used solid belt ammo, theyre firing rate wasnt the highest either, in part because of the need to constantly get a new belt of ammo. Theyre pouches they carried theyre ammunition in were inferior, in that they held little ammo, and they absorbed water, ruining and expanding the ammunition within, and i dont think they ever really solved that problem."
I don't see this as a problem in general. The Japanese support weapons were adequete for the job, and the ammo carried was always enough for combat. So, I don't think the problem would have been solved as it was not much of a problem.
"They became good jungle fighters, but the bushido code, and theyre never ending need for honor and fight to the last men made them not the most effective enemy, in that they could have caused many more casualties to the assaulting force had they operated differently."
The IJA was an excellent army, it was fast, flexible and lived off the land. Their movement skill was excellent, and as syscom mentioned, at night they were barely matched. In their movment and logistical ability the IJA cannot be faulted. They were also the masters of stealth, and combined arms. But in combat itself the IJA was clumsy and at points predictable.
By 1943 the Allied forces in the CBI were about equal of the Japanese in jungle warfare. At the time of the second Chindit operation, they had surpassed them. From the start, the commander of the 'Forgotten 14th' knew that the only way to win was beat the Japanese at their own game and that they did.
The IJA needed to learn to retreat, regroup and form effective defence but they never did. It was always an offensive attitude which did not serve them well during 1943, right up until the end.
