Lets take a different approach Mr. Sinclair. Help me (us) understand your propensity for unleashing a torrent of data, from which little insight may be gained?
No it is the same approach, you make a mistake and it is time to move onto the claimed defects of other people.
For whatever eason you have descended upon a website with a collection of one of the most knowledgable experts in many historical disciplines related to WWII that I have ever been associate with - and I'm old - and rather than observe, ponder, question - you seemingly fling a torrent of stuff that spatters everywhere and stinks up the place.
I observe and ponder and question.
The stink I am seeing is someone gliding on other achievements, relying on bursts of hot air to keep aloft. I observe the self awarded right to lecture, but avoiding the responsibility of an accurate lecture. I ponder the lack of self awareness, maybe it will be noticed every insult is returned, a thank you is sent for good data, the need to correct your mistakes, (given this forum we all do it, typo or incorrect memory or transcription) when reliable people correct their errors. And I question things based on documents I have and receive the lecture and a shut up message. This thread would have ended a long time ago if there had been a sorry for the typo message instead of the water pistol level of attacks instead.
Add the self appointed decider of what is to be discussed, the US heavy bomber versus Luftwaffe fighter exchange rate, the way the damage changed in returning US bombers, was that due to a change in the intercepting fighter mix, an upgunning of the individual fighters like saying reducing or retiring rockets in favour of more cannon or something else and in what sort of proportions. Your contribution was an incorrect claim about US bomber gunner overclaims, why not the Luftwaffe ones as well, than declaring the whole thing was boring.
The contradiction of a higher percentage of B-24 losses made it back to friendly territory than B-17, how much of that is due to differences in crash worthiness? The evidence of the Luftwaffe quite consistently claiming 2 B-17 for every one actually shot down, versus 1.8 to 1 for B-24, and, along with a higher B-24 crew casualty rate, what that means.
What do you believe that you may (can) bring to this group and contribute to the knowledge base? What is your expertise? what have you been confident enough about to publish your views in a commercial environment where someone actually would pay real $$ to soak up your eloquence and brilliance and feel that value was received?
As for publishing material that is another, and now old, story and non aviation anyway. WWII era aircraft production, monthly, make, model, manufacturer/factory, daily orders of battle, daily operations, aircraft movements/shipments are references, not publishable book material.
You rubbed me the wrong way from your first post - for that indiscretion I apologize,
Thanks for the apology.
but for your part in this dialogue, why don't you lurk for awhile until you see an opportunity to contribute to the base knowledge of the group?
By the way I did check out the site before doing anything, and the response to that first posting indicates finding a couple of contradictory totals on web sites counts as research is the standard of this site, for some anyway and endorsed in silence versus the various interventions in this thread.
So you certainly know how the 9th Air Force received at least some fuel in France in stinking boring Jerricans. July 1944 the US places orders with the British for 500,000 jerricans a month for the Army and 310,000 jerricans a month for the USAAF. The USAAF policy is to use the cans once then release them to the army.
August 1944 as the 9th Air Force mounts operations from unprepared forward bases it found it could not release the 310,000 jerricans a month promised to the ground forces.
So tell us all, how the jerrican shortages impacted on the 9th Air Force operations, how much did the fuel problems affect the location of units and contribute to the overall decline of operational flying hours from 110,966 in the surge month of June 1944, to 54,225 hours in October, excluding transports. The twin engined bombers flew around a third the operational hours of June. Throw in non operational flying, again excluding transports, hours go from above 140,000 in May and June to 80,500 in October. August fuel consumption 52,000 short tons, October 25,000.
As you will undoubtedly know in June the bombers flew on 24 days, in October it was 15, the fighters 28 and 26. Of these June saw the bombers have 16+1 days of full + partial operations, October 5+6, Fighters 21+2 and 12+11.
Over to you, since this is obviously in the base knowledge of the group.
After that comes the difficulty of actually getting key air force supplies into France and what effect that had. For example the 35,000 tons of pierced steel planking and associated airfield construction materials in 21 ships that was sent to Europe, not unloaded, returned to the US and sent back to Europe on the next sailing.
www.abebooks.com
