What is the best of these four Dive Bombers?

[davebender]

Typical bomb load was only 250 kg and the Val dive bomber was poorly protected against ground fire. It could bomb accurately but why bother if you cannot carry at least 1,000 lbs on a typical mission? Rudel destroyed a Soviet battleship at Leningrad during 1941 with a 1,000 kg bomb. That 250 kg Japanese bomb would have bounced off the deck armor.

What would happen during 1942 if IJN dive bombers carried 1,000 kg bombs?
- Coral Sea.
CV Yorktown suffered significant damage (required drydock) from a 250 kg bomb. A 1,000 kg bomb might sink Yorktown. Even if it didn't the damage would be much worse causing it to miss the Battle of Midway.

- Eastern Solomons.
CV Enterprise hit with three 250 kg bombs which caused serious damage. Three 1,000 kg bombs would almost certainly have put Enterprise on the bottom of the Coral Sea.

- Santa Cruz.
CV Enterprise hit with two 250 kg bombs. Make then 1,000 kg bombs and CV Enterprise would be in serious trouble.

BB South Dakota was hit by a single 250 kg bomb which bounced off the deck armor. A 1,000 kg bomb would have penetrated. Then it's a matter of luck which compartment the bomb is in when it explodes. In any case South Dakota will have significant damage.

CLAA San Juan was hit by a single 250 kg bomb which caused moderate damage. A light cruiser isn't heavily armored so a 1,000 kg bomb is going to hurt.

Of course the effects are cumulative. If CV Yorktown is sunk or seriously damaged at Coral Sea the USN might not defend Midway. If the USN defend Midway with only two CVs Japan might win the battle.

If the USN doesn't win at Midway there probably won't be a Guadalcanal invasion until CV Essex enters service during 1943.

 

[T Bolt]

The battle of Midway was so close that anything could have swung it. A single pilot tripping and breaking his wrist a day before the battle could have changed the outcome.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

The battle of Midway was so close that anything could have swung it. A single pilot tripping and breaking his wrist a day before the battle could have changed the outcome.

Certainly true, there was so much luck that contributed to the USN victory that it's unfortunately become a matter of habit to ignore the very professional nearly flawless job done by the Yorktown, including it's leadership, her airwing and her crew. The performance of her CAP was excellent. Her dive bombers were superb, flying directly to the target, scoring heavily and returning home with minimal loss. Her damage control teams were outstanding. Her torpedo bombers performed very well considering the handicap of the obsolescent aircraft they flew and of course Thach's TBD escort also performed superbly despite being under strength. (At the last minute, Fletcher pulled two of his weave-trained F4F escorts and assigned them to CAP; perhaps his only mistake in the battle.) Without Fletcher and his Task Force 17, the battle would surely have been lost even with the luck. But winning the battle certainly took luck. There was bad luck enough for both sides but it seems to me, that the really significant lucky breaks were enjoyed by the USN.

 

[SamPZLP.7]

I would say the Stuka because of its combat experience, not its performence.

 

[nuuumannn]

I'll be devil's advocate and raise the flag for the IJN dive bomber (even though the RNZAF also used the Dauntless, so I'm actually torn between the two types). It might not have had a very big bomb load, but what it did carry was used most effectively. This according to Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War by Rene Francillon: "..the aircraft received considerable success during the first ten months of the war and sank more Allied shipping than any other single type of Axis aircraft." "They achieved fame during the campaign in the Indian Ocean when the D3A1s placed respectively 87 percent and 82 percent of their bombs on target during attacks on the cruisers HMS Cornwall and HMS Dorsetshire and the carrier Hermes." Not bad for 250 kg load each.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Part of what made the Val so deadly wasn't only the quality of the aircraft, it was the quality and variety of the bombs used. Their bombs came as a mixed bag of HE, AP and SAP the latter two of which could burrow deep into the bowels of a ship and do some serious damage.Although it must be said, IJN Bombs were frequently found to be duds.

During the early carrier battles in 1942, USN SBDs put HE 1,000 pounders into Japanese flight decks on a regular basis without sinking them which suggests a strong case for the survivability of US carriers under similar assault. At Coral Sea, The Shokaku was hit by 3 thousand pounder HE Bombs, and steamed back to Japan with a propulsion plant essentially intact. At Santa Cruz, Shokaku was again hit but this time by 4 1,000 pounder HE Bombs with essentially the same result. On both occasions the Shokaku's flight deck was wrecked and put out of the battle but she survived. Hiryu suffered a similar fate at Midway. But, considering the difficulty of conducting salvage deep in enemy territory under constant threat of air attack, Hiryu was sufficiently damaged to warrant being scuttled. Recall that on each ocasion the IJN was able to plant one or more 250 pound Bombs of any variety into a US Carrier, the ship was able to resume flight operations and continue fighting within hours of the hits. In contrast, at Santa Cruz, Zuiho was hit by one 500 pound HE Bomb delivered by a scouting SBD on armed search and was put out of the fight.

On the other hand, I would expect a near miss by a 250 kg to be less damaging than one by an HE thousand pounder.

A thousand pounder hit would certainly be a very bad day under the best of circumstances but wouldn't necessarily mean the sinking of a full sized fleet carrier unless it was in the vulnerable state of conducting flight operations when it hit.

Later in the war, Aichi D4Y3 Judy's were carrying 500 kg bombs.

 

[renrich]

Just think what might have happened at Midway if the Hornet had had an effective air group? That wild goose chase of the Doolittle Raid may have been a lucky break for the Japanese.

 

[tomo pauk]

Without Doolitle raid, would there be the Midway battle? (not that I claim it would not, just asking)

 

[nuuumannn]

Later in the war, Aichi D4Y3 Judys were carrying 500 kg bombs.

Probably the best purpose built dive bomber of the war.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Just think what might have happened at Midway if the Hornet had had an effective air group? That wild goose chase of the Doolittle Raid may have been a lucky break for the Japanese.

Or if the Hornet had had a different air group commander or a different admiral select on the Hornet's bridge! One who could follow orders? Nimitz seemed to endorse the old adage that every dog deserves two bites. I guess that was Mitscher's first (and only?) bite.

From wikipedia:

"Mitscher captained [the Hornet] during the Battle of Midway 4 to June 6, but his air group's performance in that crucial engagement ranged from disappointing to outright disastrous. On the eve of the Battle of Midway, Mitscher, with the support of his Air Group Commander, CDR Stanhope C. Ring, denied fighter air cover to the Hornet's torpedo squadron, led by LCDR John C. Waldron. Mitscher then ordered the strike group to fly a course of 265 degrees true (instead of the 234 degrees of the enemies last sighting). This resulted in most of the air group never sighting the enemy. Waldron's Torpedo Eight squadron, because Waldron disobeyed orders and flew course 240 degrees, flew directly to the enemy carrier group's location. Torpedo Eight was the first carrier squadron to be in position to attack and, unescorted by fighters, was obliterated by Japanese Zeros.... The Hornet strike force following the orders of CDR Ring was unable to find the enemy, and eventually headed back toward either the Hornet, or Midway Island, to land and refuel. All ten fighters in the formation ran out of fuel and ditched at sea. Several dive bombers also had to ditch on their approach to the Midway base. Except for Torpedo Eight, none of the Hornet's strike force played any role on the first day of the Battle of Midway."

The mistakes at Midway apparently did not harm the career of either Mitscher or Ring. Ring was the son of a Navy Commodore, and retired as a Vice Admiral. Apparently the only admiral whose career suffered was that of Fletcher, the admiral whose early decisions secured the victory. A victory that his successor Spruance preserved.

Without Doolitle raid, would there be the Midway battle? (not that I claim it would not, just asking)

IIRC, the Midway operation was being considered and preparations were underway but there was some significant dispute about the Eastward strategy embodied by the Midway operation (I assume with the IJA), which was silenced by the Doolittle Raid.

 

[renrich]

I think that the Doolittle stunt caused the Japanese to plan the Midway attack is a myth cooked up by apologists for that Raid. The Japanese were much smarter than that. The fact is that FDR liked the idea essentially for political reasons. The war was going badly and the administration wanted something positive to bolster the president's image. A big gamble which they were lucky to get away with except for the cost at Coral Sea and Midway. You can bet that Nimitz would have not gone along if he had any choice.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I think the Doolittle raid played more a validating than a motivating role in the decision to attempt to take Midway. Yamamoto knew he had to take out the USN carriers in order to hobble the USN's options going forward in the Pacific. His plan to do it (Midway) was simply ill conceived in a number of ways. It could have gone very different had he chosen fist instead of fingers and kept his eye on the main objective (the USN carriers). (Is that Clauswitz I am quoting? I should be careful in who I quote, so as avoid the impression I know what I'm talking about )

 

[davebender]

Without the Doolittle publicity stunt the USN would have 4 CVs at Coral Sea rather then two. Instead of a propaganda victory we might achieve a real victory by sinking the two newest and most capable Japanese aircraft carriers. We might also have gotten the IJA amphibious force after overwhelming their naval escort.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I think that the Doolittle stunt caused the Japanese to plan the Midway attack is a myth cooked up by apologists for that Raid. The Japanese were much smarter than that. The fact is that FDR liked the idea essentially for political reasons. The war was going badly and the administration wanted something positive to bolster the president's image. A big gamble which they were lucky to get away with except for the cost at Coral Sea and Midway. You can bet that Nimitz would have not gone along if he had any choice.

Ren,

I agree that the assertion that the Doolittle Raid precipitated the Midway battle is a myth that falls before the history. However, I must admit that my initial reaction to your post was to cry, "Heretic!" Burn him! Burn the Heretic! But then of course I thought about it. I've never questioned it before, no doubt because the whole idea is so sexy on the surface. Launch B-25's from a carrier to take a jab at the Japanese for Pearl Harbor... Jimmy Doolittle has always appeared to me to be a heroic, larger-than-life, visionary (although evidently Ike didn't think so) and I would tend to accept on faith the wisdom and worth of anything of which he was a part. The raid was such a daring, and unexpected move that it is irresistable (for me at least) to admire. Of course the raid had little if any real military value, but what shot in the arm! That's all it ever seemed to me. An answer to the oft quoted post-Pearl Harbor question "Where is our navy?" The Phillipines situation was becoming ever more dire. Bataan's fall was imminent (to be followed by Corregidor a month later) and I am sure there was a desparate search for ways to soften the blow to the public. So, unable to put myself in the position of J.Q. Public after the Pearl Harbor attack and the continuing bad news issuing from the PI, it seemed to me to be a much needed moral boost on the home front. I am sure it did wonders for Roosevelt's popularity or perhaps more important, that of his party. I would expect that given there were 2 more years to the next presidential election (and campaigns started later back then), the raid wasn't staged purely for political gain, which is not to say that FDR's potential political gain wasn't an important consideration, but only if it worked. If it turned out to be a blunder of epic proporations (loss of a carrier and or loss of all or most of the crews, and especially Doolittle) and was made public. It could have seriously harmed his presidency and public moral.

It certainly retarded the Hornet's development as a potent carrier threat. I think that the biggest price paid (aside from its poor performance at Midway) was the absence of the Hornet from the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. (Not its absence from Coral Sea in May, which I don't think was going to happen for other reasons, see below) However, with hindsight, its hard to ignore the fact that if Roosevelt had simply waited 2 months he'd have gotten far better news than the Tokyo bombing from the results at Midway and I can imagine a more advantageous outcome if the Hornet had been a more effective Midway participant. So in the end, I have to agree there is a good case to be made for the Doolittle raid being a politically motivated blunder. Is there time to put out the fire and free Ren from the stake?

Without the Doolittle publicity stunt the USN would have 4 CVs at Coral Sea rather then two. Instead of a propaganda victory we might achieve a real victory by sinking the two newest and most capable Japanese aircraft carriers. We might also have gotten the IJA amphibious force after overwhelming their naval escort.

Dave, I think the Navy was still wedded to keeping a carrier task force nearer Pearl and its idea of supporting operations was to keep carrier groups about 1-2 days apart. At lease that's the impression I got from reading Lundstom's Fletcher book. The Navy didn't really begin to concentrate carriers (greater than 2 to in a tactical formation) until Midway when it's hand was forced and even there there were two separate and separated groups. CINCPAC did move Enterprise and Yorktown closer to the Coral Sea (near Ocean and Nauru Islands IIRC) after the raid but IIRC that was done to forestall an anticipated IJN invasion. I don't think serious consideration was given to such a move until USN losses were known and the IJN's not yet understood. I am not at home so I can't check my references, but that's the way I remember it.

 

[drgondog]

An A-36 carrying a 2,000 lb bomb cannot defend itself any better then a Ju-87D carrying a 1,000 kg bomb. All bombers carrying a payload require fighter escort.

A Stuka jettisoning its bombload versus a A-36 jettisoning its bombload - is still a Stuka? A-36s didn't have, nor did they need, escort.

 

[cimmex]

I don't think a A-36 can deliver the bomb load in a steep dive, so it is no dive bomber.
cimmex

 

[Shortround6]

It had dive brakes so somebody expected to deliver bombs in a steep dive.

 

[R Leonard]

. . . Thach's TBD escort also performed superbly despite being under strength. (At the last minute, Fletcher pulled two of his weave-trained F4F escorts and assigned them to CAP; perhaps his only mistake in the battle.)

Not to be overly picky, but there was no other "pure" VF-3 section - that is where both pilots were actually from VF-3 as opposed to one or the other or both coming from VF-42 - from which Thach could have possibly drawn a beam defense trained section.

In Thach's first division, he and his wingman Dibb were familiar with the tactic. I believe his third section, Cheek and Sheedy were familiar though to a lesser degree, Cheek was checked out for sure, but Sheedy had not long been in VF-3 so how much practice he may have had is problematical. I'd note in their action (Cheek and Sheedy, that is) they were operating as an unsupported section and did not themselves employ the beam defense when attacked. Thach's second section, Macomber and Bassett, were both from VF-42 and had not been exposed to, much less practiced in, the beam defense concept.

Those who flew fighters of Yorktown at Midway, Thach included, were very clear in that there was no familiarization, even on paper, with his beam defense on the trip out. The VF-42 pilots, in particular, had absolutely no training or any other familiarization with the beam defense.

There was only one other section in the whole squadron - third section of third division - which even had a section leader from VF-3 (Barnes with VF-42's Tootle as wing). Thach, himself, was the only VF-3 division leader; the other three division leaders were from VF-42. Of the 12 sections within the squadron's four divisions, 9 had section leaders from VF-42.

VF-3 organization at Midway:
Rank/Name | Parent Squadron | Bu# | Side#

1st Division
LCDR JS Thach | VF-3 | 5171 | 1
ENS RA M Dibb | VF-3 | 5170 | 2

LTJG BT Macomber | VF-42 | 5169 | 3​

ENS ER Bassett | VF-42 | 5168 || 4​

MACH TF Cheek | VF-3 | 5167 | 5​

ENS DC Sheedy | VF-3 | 5165 | 6​

2nd Division
LTJG RG Crommelin | VF-42 | 5152 | 7
ENS JB Bain | VF-42 | 5151 | 8

ENS RL Wright | VF-42 | 5150 | 9​

ENS GF Markham | VF-3 | 5149 | 10​

LTJG ES McCuskey | VF-42 | 5148 | 11​

ENS MK Bright | VF-3 | 5147 | 12​

3rd Division
LTJG WN Leonard | VF-42 | 5244 | 13
ENS JP Adams || VF-42 | 5245 | 14

LTJG WA Haas | VF-42 | 5144 | 15​

ENS GA Hopper | VF-42 | 5143 | 16​

MACH DC Barnes | VF-3 | 5142 | 17​

ENS MC Tootle IV | VF-42 | 5080 | 18​

4th Division
LTJG AJ Brassfield | VF-42 | 5066 | 19
ENS HB Gibbs | VF-42 | 5049 | 20

LTJG ED Mattson | VF-42 | 5153 | 21​

ENS HA Bass | VF-3 | 5050 | 22​

LTJG WS Woollen | VF-42 | 5093 | 23​

LTJG WW Barnes Jr | VF-42 | 5239 | 24​

Thus, 33% of the VF-3 pilots flying in the battle were VF-3 and 67% VF-42. 75% of Division leaders and 75% of section leaders were VF-42. But, despite the preponderance of VF-42 pilots, generally, and specifically in leadership positions (not surprising as VF-42 was the most combat experienced VF squadron in the fleet) the squadron was VF-3 and commanded by Thach. [That, by the way, should not be construed in any way, shape or form as a criticism.] Of course, most all these assignments of specific pilots to specific aircraft went out the window when action loomed. One took what was in the line-up for one's division. In the battle, only four pilots actually flew the planes to which they were nominally assigned. Everyone else flew "someone else's" airplane.

Also, what happened in terms of the make up of TBD escort was that Thach wanted to augment his 1st Division with an additional section from one of the other three . . . it was the Buckmaster, Arnold, Armstrong, and Pedersen planning group who scotched that idea, not Fletcher.

Regards

R

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I don't think a A-36 can deliver the bomb load in a steep dive, so it is no dive bomber.
cimmex

Define "steep dive."

"The A-36A proved to be a potent weapon; it could be put into a vertical dive at 12,000 ft (3,658 m), deploying its dive brakes, limiting the dive speed to 390 mph (628 km/h). Pilots soon recognized that extending the dive brakes after "peel-off" led to some unequal extension of the brakes due to varying hydraulic pressure, setting up an invariable slight roll which impeded aiming. Proper technique soon cured this anomaly and, subsequently, pilots achieved extremely consistent results."

Gruenhagen, Robert W. Mustang: The Story of the P-51 Mustang Page 61

"The dive brakes were operated hydraulically and located on the top and bottom of each wing outboard of the guns. Plan was that they limit the dive speed to 250 mph but in practice the angle of dive was reduced to 70 degrees because the high stress of pull-out from a higher angle."

The P-51 Mustang Variants: A-36 -MustangsMustangs

 

[DBII]

Nice thread guys.

DBII