What plane (if any) could have made a difference for Germany in the Battle of Britain

[Glider]

So post 48 was said in jest?

I hope so

 

[Nikademus]

 

[zoomar]

This is something that when judging the poor performance of the Allied a/c in the Pacific in the early years. Early warning did not exist while the fighting area was much bigger. In the BoB, the British only had to expect the Germans in the south-east, while having a fair early warning. This was not the case in the far east. A great advantage for the attacker who will dictate where and when the fighting will take place.

This and Claidmore's point above it are also something we tend of forget when focusing only on planes. Frankly I had forgotten about the advantages EWR gave to the RAF and how this could negate some of the advantages that long-ranged escorts could provide. But nonethess, I believe the absence of a good high-endurance escort fighter was still the key failing of the German plane mix in 1940, not the Bf-109, not the twin-engineed bombers.

 

[Nikademus]

To acheive its objective, an escort fighter does not need to be better than the defenders. It just has to be there and be good enough to be a credible threat to the interceptors so that they have to worry about avoiding it, rather than shooting down bombers. Every time a Hurri or Spit had to dive away to escape a Zero, a He-111 might make it to the target. The Bf-110 was not such a threat, and no single engined German fighter had the endurance to be a escort fighter. The A6M would have been this, even if it only acheived a 1:1 kill ratio against the RAF fighters. The Fw-187 might have also.

My point exactly....only better worded.

 

[zoomar]

My point exactly....only better worded.

Thank you, sir.

 

[Nikademus]

I haven't seen a lot of comment about the bombers that were used. It seems the Luftwaffe could've used a decent 4 engined bomber, especially given the armament of the average RAF fighter.

I'm of the view that the bombers were good enough to get the job done.....especially in context of knocking out the key airfields and sector stations. The Luftwaffe acomplished alot when the bombers were well protected...even the Stuka.

 

[Hop]

The Bf-110 was not such a threat, and no single engined German fighter had the endurance to be a escort fighter.

That depends on how far away the targets are.

Britain was in the unfortunate position of having the Luftwaffe camped on the doorstep. Dover is 25 miles from the Luftwaffe fighter bases, central London 95 miles. The battle was fought at less than a quarter of the range of the 109.

The Germans didn't need a long range escort fighter because their targets were in the SE of England. They concentrated their force against the SE and still failed to bomb enough targets or shoot down enough fighters. Dispersing their effort over the rest of the country would have meant less pressure against 11 Group.

 

[Nikademus]

(dup post)

 

[Nikademus]

A good long range fighter isn't just about being able to reach distant targets, it's also about having a large fuel reserve allowing maximum flexability over targets at short and medium distances. Even over SE England, the 109's 'linger' time was constrained which hurt their efforts to protect the bombers and engage the defenses.

On another note....same fighter would also have allowed Luftflotte 5 to remain engaged in the battle which would have diverted Fighter Command resources and created more fatigue and wear. (basically increase the pressure.)

 

[Colin1]

The Germans didn't need a long range escort fighter because their targets were in the SE of England.

They concentrated their force against the SE and still failed to bomb enough targets or shoot down enough fighters. Dispersing their effort over the rest of the country would have meant less pressure against 11 Group.

You can be sure that they did. Loiter time over SE England was poor, full power combat duration over London would be in the order of 10 minutes. Then it's home-time and pray you're not intercepted en route.

This wasn't because of the range issue, it was because the Luftwaffe switched to bombing London; had the Jadgwaffe been given free rein to escort the bombers going after RAF airfields, they would have drawn Fighter Command into the air and into an attrition war where the Luftwaffe hold the initiative; eventual greater fighter production than the Germans would have counted for nought if the guys being strapped into them have barely six weeks training.

 

[BombTaxi]

Four-engined bombers with greater payloads would have helped the LW. If heavy raids could have been mounted across the North Sea by Luftflotte 5, the RAF would have had to spread resources thinner to counter the threat, thereby helping the offensive in the Southeast. It would also have made it harder for the RAF to rest pilots by moving them to 12 Group, further weakening the overall defense. However, such a strategy would demand an effective long range escort, and we know the LW didn't have that. I don't think thier doctrine of close support for Blitzkrieg ever envisioned a need for long range fighters...

 

[Glider]

Four-engined bombers with greater payloads would have helped the LW. If heavy raids could have been mounted across the North Sea by Luftflotte 5, the RAF would have had to spread resources thinner to counter the threat, thereby helping the offensive in the Southeast. It would also have made it harder for the RAF to rest pilots by moving them to 12 Group, further weakening the overall defense. However, such a strategy would demand an effective long range escort, and we know the LW didn't have that. I don't think thier doctrine of close support for Blitzkrieg ever envisioned a need for long range fighters...

There is no doubt that the Zero would have been invaluble with Luft 5. In the SE of England I don't personally believe that it woulve made much difference, the pluses balanced out by the minus's. With Luft 5 it was a clear cut case.
The bombers lacked the payload and 4 engined bombers would have been a great help.

The only problem of course is that we are now talking about bombers that didn't exist being escorted by fighters that to all intents and purposes didn't exist.

 

[Hop]

If heavy raids could have been mounted across the North Sea by Luftflotte 5, the RAF would have had to spread resources thinner to counter the threat, thereby helping the offensive in the Southeast.

The RAF already were spread around the country. Covering against German raids across the North Sea were the following Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons:

Coltishall, Norfolk - 3 squadrons
Wittering, Cambridgeshire - 1 squadron
Digby, Lincolnshire - 3 squadrons
Kirton-in-Lindsey, North Lincolnshire - 1 squadron
Church Fenton, Yorkshire - 3 squadrons
Carrerick, North Yorkshire - 1 squadron
Acklington, Northumberland - 2 squadrons
Usworth, Tyne and Wear - 1 squadron
Turnhouse, Falkirk - 2 squadrons
Drem, East Lothian - 1 squadron
Prestwick, Ayrshire - 1 squadron
Dyce, Aberdeenshire - 1 squadron
Wick sector, North Scotland - 2 squadrons

That's 21 squadrons spread out along the east coast of Britain from the midlands northwards.

It would also have made it harder for the RAF to rest pilots by moving them to 12 Group, further weakening the overall defense.

That would be true if any German long range presence in Norway was in addition to what they had in the real world. In that case there would be extra pressure on the RAF that didn't exist historically.

But if the Germans had the same number of planes, with some based in Norway instead of France, then any pressure on the RAF in the north comes at the expense of reduced pressure on the RAF in the SE. In effect the German attack would be diluted, which would make the RAF job easier.

More aircraft would of course have helped the Luftwaffe. But even with more long range aircraft it would still make more sense to base them in France and keep up pressure on 11 Group, not mount sporadic raids on the North.

it was because the Luftwaffe switched to bombing London; had the Jadgwaffe been given free rein to escort the bombers going after RAF airfields, they would have drawn Fighter Command into the air and into an attrition war where the Luftwaffe hold the initiative

This is precisely what the Luftwaffe tried to do. They failed at it. Luftwaffe losses were very high which is one of the main reasons they abandoned the tactic.

eventual greater fighter production than the Germans would have counted for nought if the guys being strapped into them have barely six weeks training.

The problem for the Luftwaffe is their replacements were of similar quality. When Milch did a tour of airfields in late August and early September, he found new pilots who had only made 10 landings in 109s, and had never fired a cannon in training.

How long was a 109 training flight? I'd say 10 landing would equal less than 10 hours flying training on type.

Steinhilper wrote about one of his replacement pilots:

High also on the list of losses as the battle wore on were the replacement pilots. They simply didn't have the experience that we pre-war regulars had acquired. In our Gruppe at the beginning of the French Campaign we had thirty-six experienced pilots, none of whom had less than three years flying experience. Now we were getting replacements for the experienced pilots we had lost straight from Jagdfliegerschule (fighter school]. At that time we still tried our best to take care of these fledglings until they could accrue some experience.
Typical of these youngsters was a young Gefreiter who arrived in late September. His flying time was minimal - he had only fired a few shots at a ground target, had never flown on oxygen and still had no idea how to use his radio. We tried to increase their experience before they actually came along on combat missions by taking them up on patrols between missions. Then we would talk on the radio, climb to altitudes in excess of 8,000 metres (25,000 ft) and make them use oxygen. Of special importance was teaching them how to change the pitch of their propeller to get maxmum pull from the engine at high altitude. A flat pitch would allow the engine to rev up to its maximum so that the super-charger would deliver the maximum volume of air to the cylinders and produce optimum power; changing to a coarser pitch would have that engine power converted into more pull and consequently speed our rate of climb. It was vital they mastered this technique if they were to keep up in a battle-climb or at high altitude.5
After about ten hours of 'tuition' we would take them out over the Channel to shoot at shadows on the water or cross to Dungeness and shoot at a black medieval tower which stood there (the old Dungeness Lighthouse). Finally when we could not excuse them combat duty any more we would have to take them along with us. This became the case with the Gefreiter and so I took him as my Rottenhund Iwingman]. We began our climb almost immediately after take-off and he was constantly using the radio to ask us to slow down so that he could keep up. It was obvious that he wasn't manipulating the pitch control with the skill of the more seasoned pilots to produce the same power as our machines. We tried to tell him what to do on the radio but to no avail. Eventually, about half-way across the Channel and at 4,000 metres (13,000 ft) Kiihle told him to leave the formation and return to base. He broke away but in his confusion he turned not for home but towards Dover. Kiihle realised what was happening and ordered me to give chase and take him home. I rolled out and soon overhauled him, just before we reached the balloon barrage at Dover. I had tried to raise him on the radio but he was in such a state of anxiety that he wouldn't or couldn't respond. Positioning myself in front of him I rocked my wings, using the signal for him to follow me. He dutifully hung onto my tail and we were soon back at Coquelles. This was one of only two missions I missed during the whole of our time in the Battle of Britain.
As a result we decided that we would not take any more replacements on high altitude missions until we could give them more, much more, training. They were supposed to be replacements but in the event they were more of a problem for us than reinforcement for the squadron.

 

[Glider]

Hop Very interesting post. I never realised before the skill needed to get the best out of the 109.

 

[Njaco]

I don't believe that a change among any of the a/c that populated both sides would have changed the outcome for Germany in the BoB. To my mind, there is only one: Stay the course! If objectives hadn't been changed based upon emotion and instead, RAF airfields and production centers had gained more attention, it would be different.

Someone mentioned that it might have been a fallacy that the RAF was on its 'last legs' on 7 Sept. Depends upon your definition. Dowding was needing more pilots, desperately. The results of the "Bad Weekend" in late August/early Sept devastated the airfields almost to the point of uselessness. And aircraft production was reaching a point where the daily arrival of new aircraft wasn't exactly matching the losses. It was hitting the RAF and everyone from pilots to map plotters were exhausted (during the weeks previously EWR units at many of the airfields took a pounding: many ended up in tents working with damaged equipment.)

If the Luftwaffe had stuck to hitting the RAF (and that includes leaving the relatively strategically useless satellite airfields like the Coastal Command stations alone!), I believe it would have collapsed - at least for the areas near landing sites. The RAF could have continued from northern areas but it would have been daunting.

Since going through my thread "Tactics: Spitfire vs Zero", I understand that the Spitfire didn't really have long legs. So maybe zoomar's opening statement of Germany needing a long-range aircraft like the Spit might be wrong? IIRC the early attempts by Bomber Command were mostly unescorted Blenheim bombers - those that were escorted were by fighter versions of the Blenhiem.

 

[zoomar]

Since going through my thread "Tactics: Spitfire vs Zero", I understand that the Spitfire didn't really have long legs. So maybe zoomar's opening statement of Germany needing a long-range aircraft like the Spit might be wrong? IIRC the early attempts by Bomber Command were mostly unescorted Blenheim bombers - those that were escorted were by fighter versions of the Blenhiem.

I never meant to imply in my initial post that the Spit was long ranged. It isn't and I know that. What I said, or meant to say, was that the LW needed a long range escort fighter that could meet the Spit and Hurri on equal terms over England...and they didn't have a plane that could do that. I then suggested the Fw-187 and A6M as planes that would good choices if there were available. I was hoping to hear people who know more than me talk about the Fw-187, but instead the Zero became the focus of interest - which is also a fascinating discussion. On re-reading the post I can see how my statement could be misunderstood as you misunderstood it. Thankfully, most folks either didn't read that statement or understood it how I meant it.

 

[Nikademus]

Four-engined bombers with greater payloads would have helped the LW. If heavy raids could have been mounted across the North Sea by Luftflotte 5, the RAF would have had to spread resources thinner to counter the threat, thereby helping the offensive in the Southeast. It would also have made it harder for the RAF to rest pilots by moving them to 12 Group, further weakening the overall defense. However, such a strategy would demand an effective long range escort, and we know the LW didn't have that. I don't think thier doctrine of close support for Blitzkrieg ever envisioned a need for long range fighters...

The Bf-110 was supposed to fill that role for deep penetration raids on the Operational/Strategic level. It's early successes over Poland and France (against light opposition) lulled Goering into further delusion regarding his beloved Zerstorer. The Luft5 debacle over NE Britian paid proof to the power of misplaced faith.

 

[renrich]

Hop, many thanks for your post about the LW fighter pilot training. That was interesting and informative. The bit about the changing pitch of the prop explains why the FW190 was designed to make mixture and prop automatic tied to throttle. Contrast that training to that of the wartime training of USN pilots explained in Lundstrom's books. What a difference!

I still believe that if the RAF near the end of the BOB had been stressed enough their bases would have been withdrawn enough to the west or north to be out of range of the escort fighters of the LW. The cities like London would have suffered more but weather was beginning to be more of a factor and the targets could have taken a pounding from the relatively puny bombloads of the LW bombers without undue overall effect. Sort of the "rope a dope" tactics.

 

[Nikademus]

I
Since going through my thread "Tactics: Spitfire vs Zero", I understand that the Spitfire didn't really have long legs. So maybe zoomar's opening statement of Germany needing a long-range aircraft like the Spit might be wrong? IIRC the early attempts by Bomber Command were mostly unescorted Blenheim bombers - those that were escorted were by fighter versions of the Blenhiem.

Didn't the RAF experiment with a twin engined long range fighter as well? (saw a thread around here on such) I think the RAF, conservative in many ways gave up on the idea of a long range fighter (by necessity twin engined) because it was felt such a design couldn't compete with a modern1E intercetor in overall performance. There was also the lingering "the bomber will always get through" crowd. BC's initial forays (using Blenheims, Whitleys and Wellingtons) attempted sporadic unescorted day raids which ceased after the disaster of Dec 18, 1939, convincing BC that unescorted night bombing was the only viable option.

 

[Colin1]

...would any of these plane really make a difference given that the Germans probably lost the BoB as much a result of poor tactics and preparation rather than poor combat capability of their planes

I know what you probably meant
but I'll pick it up anyway. The Bf109 had a poor endurance capability wrt the role that was being asked of it in the Battle of Britain; I doubt any RAF pilot in 1940 would have accused the Bf109 of poor combat capability