What plane (if any) could have made a difference for Germany in the Battle of Britain

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Different aircraft for the LW: Do-19 instead of Do-17 - even if two for five basis; Me-110 as an attack/light-bomber, Fw-187 - longe range fighter, and maybe a mix of He-100D Me-109.

Yet, with all the debate about a longer range single engined fighter, it won't make that much difference it it only has 60 rounds per cannon!

The Do-19 was a loser. Germany didn't have the engines to power such a plane at the time. Much like the Boeing B-15 or Douglas B-19.
The Do-19 had a wing that was about 22-23% larger than a B-17 wing and a fuselage 10 feet longer. changing from the prototype's 810hp engines to 1000-1100hp engines available in 1940 is not going to improve performance enough to allow anything except night bombing or escorted day light flights. The first needs better navigation to be effective, especially at longer ranges, and the second limits the range to that of the fighters.
Perhaps a smaller number of big bombers in a smaller formation is more easily protected than a large formation of smaller bombers?
The Do-17 has been described as a very good low level bomber even if it's bomb load was rather small.
 
Germany had no desire to fight either Britain or France. So why would pre-WWII Germany spend massive amounts of money on a bomber force geared to that purpose? It's not going to happen.
 
No doubt the A6M would have been more effective than the Bf109 in the escort role during the BOB especially if the LW pilots had been trained as the IJN pilots were. Whether or not the additional range of the A6M would have enabled the LW to "win" the BOB is not clear to me. Hitler was never serious about Operation Sea Lion and even if he had been a German invasion at that time was not likely to be successful. Nik, the statement that the war was lost as soon as the escort fighters became available is, to me, an overstatement. No doubt, strategic bombing played a role in the war but I believe that most "experts" agree that the Allies would have won the war regardless. I believe the war was lost for Germany the moment the US entered the war. As long as Hitler invaded the USSR and the US was in it, the Axis was doomed.
 
No doubt the A6M would have been more effective than the Bf109 in the escort role during the BOB especially if the LW pilots had been trained as the IJN pilots were. Whether or not the additional range of the A6M would have enabled the LW to "win" the BOB is not clear to me. Hitler was never serious about Operation Sea Lion and even if he had been a German invasion at that time was not likely to be successful. Nik, the statement that the war was lost as soon as the escort fighters became available is, to me, an overstatement. No doubt, strategic bombing played a role in the war but I believe that most "experts" agree that the Allies would have won the war regardless. I believe the war was lost for Germany the moment the US entered the war. As long as Hitler invaded the USSR and the US was in it, the Axis was doomed.

I would second this statement. The only point I would disagree with is that if the Luftwaffe pilots were trained as the IJN. In my view if they did this then they could easily be in trouble. One of the strengths of the Luftwaffe was the training to fight as a team and the finger four formation. One of the weaknesses of the IJN was the emphasis on fighting as an individual.

There is one problem with both the Zero and the 109 with drop tanks, and that is the lack of ammunition for the 20mm. In the Pacific the Zero tended to fly considerable ranges to combat but the actual combat was limited. A long range mission over the UK could easily involve considerable fighting and the lack of 20mm ammunition would be critical. To be left with 2 x LMG after firing approx three bursts, is almost equal to being left unarmed. The Spitfire in particular was well protected against LMG fire from the rear, lacking the wing tanks of the Hurricane.
 
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The He 111 could carry about 2 tons worth of bombs in 1939-40. This is about as good as most other peoples bombers except perhaps the Whitley, at least those bombers that existed in any numbers. While the range might be a little short it was good enough to reach just about anywhere in France from Germany.

It was also only about 400 miles from Düsseldorf to Birmingham, Cardiff, or Southampton.

Granted people in many countries thought the "bomber would always get through" in the late thirties but as shown by actual war experience an unescorted "Ural" bomber would have been little more than targets for the Soviet Air force had such long range missions been attempted in daylight.

The Germans really needed a "bomber" engine in the category of the R-2600 or Hercules (1400-1700hp) flying in prototypes in 1940 for production models in 1941. The Jumo 222 and the Daimler double engines were too far in the future. Even the BMW 801 reached production status too late for a smooth transition to improved bombers in 1941-42.
Maybe they should have taken the Do 217 and ditched the dive bomber requirement and stuck a bigger wing on the thing and gone for payload and range over speed.
 
only about 400 miles from Düsseldorf to Birmingham, Cardiff, or Southampton.
Unfortunately (for Germany) the KM failed to stockpile aerial mines in quantity. Consequently the Luftwaffe was forced to bomb port facilities rather then simply mining British ports shut. Fixing the aerial mine shortage would probably do more for Germany then substituting heavy bombers and longer range Fw-190 fighter aircraft.
 
Germany had no desire to fight either Britain or France. So why would pre-WWII Germany spend massive amounts of money on a bomber force geared to that purpose? It's not going to happen.

Yes, but there was the SU to contend with and long range would be required there.
 
Yes, but there was the SU to contend with and long range would be required there.


It is fortunate for the Germans (and unfortunate for everybody else) that the Germans didn't get sucked into the strategic (or Ural) bomber plan. While it looks good on paper and everybody thought it would work during the 1930s they also thought the bomber would always get through. They also assumed that small numbers of aircraft carrying light bombloads could do major damage.
Experience in Spain reinforced all these notions.
The Japanese were already having problems in China with the bomber getting through without escorts though.
The British managed to show by early 1940 (if not late 1939) that unescorted bombers could NOT get through without such high losses as to making the tactic unsustainable in daylight. It did take the British and few other people (like the Americans) somewhat longer to fully absorb these lessons. Germans managed to figure it out during the BoB.
Without suitable escort fighters this leaves night bombing.

It also means night navigation, which neither the British or the Germans managed to pull off with any degree of regularity for quite some time. Small percentages of bombers finding even the right city let alone a military target was the norm.
Considering the problems the Germans had navigating over the British Isles with landmarks like the coast, major rivers and estuaries and even major cities not all that far apart, while using good maps or charts one wonders what the navigation would have been like flying over hundreds of miles of Russian steppes and trying for targets hundreds of miles beyond Moscow using maps of what reliability? Using what for land marks?
The Germans did use electronic navigation aids and bombing aids against England (which the English managed to spoof a number of times) which would have been useless against the Russians. The range of the radio beams wasn't long enough.

You also have the problem of how many aircraft would really be needed.
How many thousands of aircraft did the British use before it had any real effect on the German war effort?
The British built almost twice the number of Short Sterlings as the Germans did He 177s and almost 5 1/2 times the number of Halifax's let alone Lancasters.
Throw in the thousands of Wellingtons, the Whitleys and the Hampdens used in the Early part of the war (and leaving out the Americans for now) one can see that a true strategic bombing campaign would require not just a few thousand bombers but something much closer to if not over (well over?) 10,000 Heavy bombers.
Germany may not have had the necessary resources to build large aircraft in such quantities or the fuel to power them. Even the provision of thousands of tons, if not ten's of thousands of tons of explosives for such a bombing campaign might have strained German resources.
 
Nik, the statement that the war was lost as soon as the escort fighters became available is, to me, an overstatement. No doubt, strategic bombing played a role in the war but I believe that most "experts" agree that the Allies would have won the war regardless. I believe the war was lost for Germany the moment the US entered the war. As long as Hitler invaded the USSR and the US was in it, the Axis was doomed.

I agree. I should have clarified and said that the "Air war" [over Germany] was lost as soon as long range escort fighters appeared that could escort to and from the deepest targets inside Germany. Whether it be a P-51, P-38 or P-47...the Luftwaffe could not win an attrition battle with the Western Allies and against Russia at the same time.
 
Glider, the early war IJN pilots were as well trained as any in the war and they were trained to fight in the three plane shotai and contrary to popular and incorrect opinion, they did not fight as individuals but like their counterparts in the USN "they relied mainly on hit and run tactics, predicated on deflection shooting and teamwork, without merely trying to ride their opponent's tails in a dogfight." That is a quote from Lundstrom, "The First Team." The probem was that their tactics took a long time to learn and become proficient in but they suited the characteristics of the A6M very well. They were not likely to be hit executing the tactics and they could use the excellent climb of the A6M to reattain a firing position after a firing run. The IJN training program was inadequate to replace those splendid pilots who were lost in the meat grinder of the Pacific War in mid to late 1942.

However, as you mentioned the 60 rounds per cannon in the Zero was a handicap, just like the low cannon ammo capacity of the 109 was. The Japanese had quite a lot of luck though shooting down "rugged aircraft" like the Hurricane and P40 with the two 7.7 mm MGs of the Ki 27 and the two 12.7s of the Ki 43. Was the Spitfire more survivable than the Hurri and P40?
 
If the Germans wanted to 'win' the BoB - which I'm taking as the elimination of the RAF as an effective fighting force, they didn't need different a/c or more of them. The solution was simple; bomb airfields in daylight, factories at night. Do that for a couple of months, and the RAF would have been finished. In 'real life' the RAF was a matter of weeks away from actually being bombed out of action, before the LW turned to bombing London, which achieved absolutely zero.

Of course, the point is somewhat moot, because even if the LW had gained air superiority over the UK, there was simply no way that the Kreigsmarine could actually have got the troops over to invade. They didn't have the kit, and the RN hadn't been neutralised. That was a task which neither the LW or KM was capable of completing...
 
Glider, the early war IJN pilots were as well trained as any in the war and they were trained to fight in the three plane shotai and contrary to popular and incorrect opinion, they did not fight as individuals but like their counterparts in the USN "they relied mainly on hit and run tactics, predicated on deflection shooting and teamwork, without merely trying to ride their opponent's tails in a dogfight." That is a quote from Lundstrom, "The First Team." The probem was that their tactics took a long time to learn and become proficient in but they suited the characteristics of the A6M very well. They were not likely to be hit executing the tactics and they could use the excellent climb of the A6M to reattain a firing position after a firing run. The IJN training program was inadequate to replace those splendid pilots who were lost in the meat grinder of the Pacific War in mid to late 1942.
I was basing my comment on a number of actions that Sakai mentioned where he complained about the lack of discipline where little was achieved because each pilot got in the way of others. Assuming that my memory is inaccurate, of it was a one off situation which could happen to any unit there can be little doubt that the German four plane unit was a lot more flexible than the three plane shotai.

However, as you mentioned the 60 rounds per cannon in the Zero was a handicap, just like the low cannon ammo capacity of the 109 was. The Japanese had quite a lot of luck though shooting down "rugged aircraft" like the Hurricane and P40 with the two 7.7 mm MGs of the Ki 27 and the two 12.7s of the Ki 43. Was the Spitfire more survivable than the Hurri and P40?
I don't know sufficient about the internal protection of the P40 to comment but the big difference between the Hurricane and the Spitfires protection is that the Hurricane had wing tanks. These were an additional vulnerability open to attack from the rear. On the Spitfire you had to penetrate the pilots armour protection to get to the fuel tanks.
Its also worth remembering that we were fighting over England not Jungle. A hit in the Rad may well bring the plane down, but over England so what?. There were plenty of aircraft in reserve, a number of places to make an emergency landing and the pilot had a good chance of surviving a landing or a bail out.
Nothing is certain about combat but a SPitfire being chased by a 109 or Zero with 2 x LMG would have a good chance of getting away with it, a better chance than a Hurricane, plus of course its extra speed.

This talk about the Zero is of course just that. During the BOB there were if I am not mistaken the grand sum of 15 (ish) prototypes and 30-40 of A6M2. They wouldn't have lasted two weeks with the attrition rate.
 
Well the trip from France to the UK, is a bigger difference than from UK to Germany, so P-51 range is not the requirement. but why not add an additional internal tank behind the pilot or more external fuel to the 109F, or perhaps a German adaptation of the Arsenal VG-33 with its 700+ mile range? just a what if.
 
I have Saburo's book but have not reviewed it in a while. If memory serves he was referring to a late war incident where a bunch of Hellcats were chasing him and getting in each other's way. I may be wrong. The P40 was supposed to be a very rugged AC. My guess is that it was more robust than the Spitfire.

It is interesting to me that it appears that, on this forum, there is a distinct Eurocentric POV which somewhat dismisses the war in the Pacific as kind of the second string. After reading Shores' books and others, I have a different viewpoint. The fact is that the premier fighters in the early going in Europe could never really match the Zero, because they could not get there. If you can't be in the fight, you can't win. Britain never was able to develop a single engine fighter that had an extended range which could compete. Neither could Germany. The US did. Most of their fighters, P51s, Hellcats, Corsairs and even late P47s could fight successfully many miles further from base than Britain's and Germany's. Some of Japan's also and they had much more limited resources than the other combatants. The Ki84, which first flew in 1943 and which reportedly could compete with the best of the American fighters had a max range of 1815 miles. To me, it is good to recognise that.

Facts don't lie. The best of the European fighters, in spite of some gaudy performance figures, could not even get into the fight in the Pacific. Those wonderful LW fighter pilots which we all have heard so much about never landed on a carrier and never had to do much navigating over miles of the trackless Pacific. The IJN, USN and FAA pilots knew those skills and could be successful in ACM. It is true that the kill claims of a lot of the AAF and especially USN and UCMC pilots were inflated by kills on kamikaze pilots or raw JAAF pilots but the early war Japanese pilots and their mounts were as good as most and much better than generally accepted by those whose focus is the war in Europe.
 
Excellent post ren, and if Joe Bs comments about spitfire vs Zero comments are to be accepted, the exchange rates of Spit to zero losses is very poor. The zero could outmanouvre spit mark V and VIIIs so it should be able to deal with a mk I and II with little difficulty
 
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If the Germans wanted to 'win' the BoB - which I'm taking as the elimination of the RAF as an effective fighting force, they didn't need different a/c or more of them. The solution was simple; bomb airfields in daylight, factories at night.

That's pretty much what they did. They weren't too successful at either.

In 'real life' the RAF was a matter of weeks away from actually being bombed out of action, before the LW turned to bombing London, which achieved absolutely zero.

In reality the RAF was in a much stronger position relative to the Luftwaffe than they had been at the start of the battle.

The Germans began their campaign proper on 13 August. They switched to London on 7 September.

Serviceable fighters, 13 August:

Bf 109 - 853
BF 110 - 189
Spitfire - 226
Hurricane - 353

Serviceable fighters, 7 September:

Bf 109 - 658
Bf 110 - 112
Spitfire - 223
Hurricane - 398

Excellent post ren, and if Joe Bs comments about spitfire vs Zero comments are to be accepted, the exchange rates of Spit to zero losses is very poor. The zero could outmanouvre spit mark V and VIIIs so it should be able to deal with a mk I and II with little difficulty

I don't think you can reasonably compare. The RAF effort in the far east was very much a second string affair, fighting against a Japanese first team. The RAF was focused on Europe, not the far east.

As they always say, it's the pilot, not the plane. I'd add organisation too.

As to range for the Luftwaffe, it wouldn't really achieve anything because of 11 Group's tactics. Park used to send very small forces to intercept, then reinforce with more as the battle continued.

Caldwell in JG 26 details the first combat JG 26 got in to during the BoB. A force of 40 109s, escorting 18 Dorniers, was intercepted by 6 Spitfires. Later another 6 Spitfires were sent as reinforcements. The fighting lasted so long the 109s had to break off with low fuel. The combat was over the channel.

The RAF tactic meant the withdrawal of British fighters for low fuel was covered by the newly arrived fighters. The downside was that the RAF would fight most of the battle outnumbered. What the Luftwaffe needed wasn't more range, it was a way of dealing with the first squadron whilst they outnumbered them, before the next squadron showed up.

Of course, if 11 Group had been operating Leigh Mallory's big wing, things might have been different. Then combat persistence might have allowed the Luftwaffe to outlast the RAF and chase them down when the British fighters broke for fuel. But with 21 squadrons of Spitfires and Hurricanes in 11 Group, being committed in small numbers (sometimes as little as a third of a squadron) at a time, it wasn't really possible for the Germans to outlast the RAF in combat.
 
I believe the war was lost for Germany the moment the US entered the war. As long as Hitler invaded the USSR and the US was in it, the Axis was doomed.

I agree. Germany's fate was sealed when they invade a country with "unlimited" manpower, and declared war on a country with "unlimited" materiel.
 
If the Germans wanted to 'win' the BoB - which I'm taking as the elimination of the RAF as an effective fighting force, they didn't need different a/c or more of them. The solution was simple; bomb airfields in daylight, factories at night. Do that for a couple of months, and the RAF would have been finished.

I'm sure there has been a new study of the numbers (including all the peripherals like pilots downed but returning to service, training school numbers, production etc etc and projecting the losses if things had not changed) that disproves this idea.

I too once believed this was the case and that the RAF was perhaps as few as one or two weeks away from defeat until the LW turned to the bombing of London, but, IIRC the latest research says that in fact the RAF never came even close to outright defeat and that it was the LW that was the force which was always going to lose - on either of their adopted tactics.
The RAF could stand the (lesser) losses but the LW was always losing the war of attrition over the UK and simply had no means to increase the rate of RAF losses.

My apologies for not remembering turning up the books title, it's a recent publication and I'm sure (I hope!) someone will mention it.
(please do as I'd like to buy it )
 

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