What plane (if any) could have made a difference for Germany in the Battle of Britain

I have the wing loading of the Fw 187 at 164.14 kg/m² (33.62 lb/ft²) how did it turn? how does it stack up in a dog fight against the Spitfire? Is it a contender? or would it have been a just a bit better than the bf 110 (but they needed a lot better)? I think to "make a difference" the Germans would have had to developed a single engined fighter for the role. I love those twin engines, but in a dog fight... not so much.

zoomar said:

I never meant to imply in my initial post that the Spit was long ranged. It isn't and I know that. What I said, or meant to say, was that the LW needed a long range escort fighter that could meet the Spit and Hurri on equal terms over England...and they didn't have a plane that could do that. I then suggested the Fw-187 and A6M as planes that would good choices if there were available. I was hoping to hear people who know more than me talk about the Fw-187, but instead the Zero became the focus of interest - which is also a fascinating discussion. On re-reading the post I can see how my statement could be misunderstood as you misunderstood it. Thankfully, most folks either didn't read that statement or understood it how I meant it.

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No problem and I didn't mean that in a bad way. As I read through the posts I wondered if I had it wrong!

dennis420b said:

I have the wing loading of the Fw 187 at 164.14 kg/m² (33.62 lb/ft²) how did it turn? how does it stack up in a dog fight against the Spitfire? Is it a contender? or would it have been a just a bit better than the bf 110 (but they needed a lot better)? I think to "make a difference" the Germans would have had to developed a single engined fighter for the role. I love those twin engines, but in a dog fight... not so much.

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I would expect any modern single engined fighter to have an advantage against a twin. The single engined machine would have the advantage in roll rate, and that has to be done before you can turn. What I would be interested to know is how would a Fw 187 stack up against a Whirlwind, in many ways a very similar aircraft.

Unfortunately that match turns into a real "what if".

Historically I would have to say the Whirlwind would be the winner. All it's book performance numbers are with 87 octane fuel and little seems to survive saying if they ran it on 100 octane and if so what the changes were.

The FW 187 numbers are with Jumo 210 engines and speed is enough below the Whirlwind to give the nod to the Whirlwind.

BUT would have production versions shifted to the DB 601 engines? One prototype did use them but again, what would a production version have posted for numbers?

We maybe guessing at the performance of both aircraft?

One must remember that the BoB was neither planned for or expected so the Germans would always have to run what they brung.

A long range fighter had to carry a lot of fuel which made it big and heavy and with the 1,000 bhp engines on offer...instantly turned it into a twin. And the Bf 110 had excellent stats for its type.

A big single engined fighter would have the performance of the Defiant so no help their either.

All the combat machines in the BoB were based on the 1930s dogma and technology which created them.

A good example of this is the P-51. It was designed for a more powerful engine so could be physically larger and the designers could learn from shortcomings that current fighters had at the time. Both Japan and USA needed long range fighters because they thought in long range terms. Either due to Pacific operations or large size of US land mass.

The Spitfire could get away with short range because its role was purely interceptor over a relatively small island.

So...my view is that the Bf 110 and 109 were perfect for the roles which they were designed for but ill suited to a role for which they weren't. They didn't need range as they were designed to operate from home or forward bases in support of ground forces.

Hop said:

The problem for the Luftwaffe is their replacements were of similar quality. When Milch did a tour of airfields in late August and early September, he found new pilots who had only made 10 landings in 109s, and had never fired a cannon in training.

How long was a 109 training flight? I'd say 10 landing would equal less than 10 hours flying training on type.

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There's a tad bit of difference.


Alll RAF fighter pilots arriving with a mere 6 weeks of training (instead of the orginal, iirc 3 months..), very little flight experience with either general flying or on their operational type to their operational units. How can you fly the Spitfire if you haven't even mastered the Tiger Moth yet..?

In contrast the training in the Luftwaffe wasn't shortened at all, it was also quite different than in the RAF. Pilots who finished their training in Germany were not posted immediately to combat units, they were first posted to the replacement unit of their future operational unit, where they got a practical flight training on their operational under the wings of experienced fighter pilots. Pilots had plenty of flying experience on trainers, and after receiving their basic training on their operational type at their flight school, they were posted to these units until they were seen fit for combat, and were re-assigned to frontline units.

BTW anyone who reads Heinz Knoke's diary can get a farily good idea how long did this process take in the Luftwaffe early in the war.

He made his first flight in April 1940, and finished basic flight school sometime in August 1940, and was then transferred to the fighter school. He began flying the 109 in October, and it was not until January 1941 he was re-assigned to the replacement/operational training unit of JG 52 (made up of 2 Squadrons and a command Schwarm), where the pilots were posted before assigned to operational duties. He was not actually posted to an operational unit (2./JG 52) until 23 May 1941 and flew his first combat sortie on the next day.

His training lasted a bit over a year. His opponents on the other side of the channel had six weeks to match his skills - impossible. Essentially the RAF was filling the breach in the wall with hastly trained cannon fodder; it was dictated by military logic, and it was sound in the short term, but there was a bloody price to pay for that in 1941.

So IMHO drawing a parellel between RAF and LW flight training in 1940 borders a bit the ridiculus. Unless someone has some other reasonable explanation why Fighter Command's losses were so devastating - practically 100% of the initial British force was lost during the battle, compared to about 50% losses in the Jagdwaffe... difference in pilot training was a major factor in that.

Hello Kurfürst
what is your source of that 6 weeks training?
After all Neville Duke, later ace and a famous test pilot, first fly on 20 Aug 40, first solo on 6 Sept 40, at the end of the year 100h, sent to 92 Sqn at Biggin Hill 2 Apr 41 with some 145h flight time.
A bit later, Tony Jonsson, the only Icelander ace, to RAF June 40, the first flight in Oct 40, to 17Sqn in July 41.

But anyway, at the height of the BoB, OTU courses' were of two weeks duration with final training on the "C" Class sqns, ie on fighter sqns resting in north and having some 2/5 of their pilots combat ready in case of surprising LW appearance and 3/5 of pilots non-operational and under training. That according to Norman Franks RAF Fighter Command 1936-1968. I have some doubts that pilots were rushed through elementary and service flight training in appr 3 weeks at most.

Juha

I believe Kurfurst is correct with LW training. Hartmann I think joined late 40/early 41 and wasn't operational until fall of '42.

Hartmann's first training flight was Mar. 5 1941 but this is after the BoB.

You would be pushed to get a license for a Glider within four weeks with one to one tuition.

Hello Njaco
I have no difficulties to believe Kurfürst's info on LW training, having read some LW memoirs, best of which on training is Kauffmann's, who served as a Bf 110 pilot.
But I have serious doubt on that 6 week claim. After all if we looked on William Murray's Strategy of Defeat p. 314, early in the war, up to Sept 42, LW fighter pilots got some 240h of flight training, of which some 80h on operational types, RAF fighter pilots got some 200h, of which 50h on operational types.

Chaz Bowyer in RAF Handbook p. 22 writes prior to the outbreak of war RAF pilots received almost 150 flying hours' instruction and practice before being posted to sqns, where they underwent further "continuation" training until considered fully competent to undertake normal sqn flying duties. When war broke out the sqn training was substituted by training on Group Pool or Reserve sqns, later on Operational Training Units (OTUs). By 1941 pilot tryining incl. 8 weeks ground instructions at an initial training wing, 10 weeks flying and ground lessons at an elementary flying training school followed up to 16 weeks at a service flying training school and in the end 4-6 weeks at an OTU. So pilots received some 200 flying hours before commencing operational duties.

Besides that the critique I have seen on training unit operations during the BoB wasn't that training time was drastically cut short but that training schools continued to work much like peacetime, ie not utilicing their resources fully.

Juha

Quality of training is another factor. Much of early RAF training focused on formation flying and rigid pre-established attack patterns. There was very little (if any) actual gunnery training. This "raw"/green issue continued even after the BoB and is fairly well documented during campaigns such as NA, Tunisia, Malta and Malaya.

Hello Nikademus
Quote:" Much of early RAF training focused on… rigid pre-established attack patterns"
IMHO that is not so much true on pre-sqn service training, but is true on how the training was done in sqns.

Quote:" There was very little (if any) actual gunnery training"

IMHO there was some gunnery training during yearly armament camp week, but of course those coming to sqn after last armament camp week not necessary have any gunnery training to speak with. But in fact I cannot recall other AFs other than USN that gave a good gunnery training to its pilots, the Finnish AF in theory also gave rather good gunnery training, but in FAF there were fighter pilots who had not got that training.

Juha

Usual sequence of pilot training in the BCATP

Dec 1940

Recruiting Center > Manning Depot - 4-5 weeks > Initial Training School - 4 weeks > Elementary Flying School - 7 weeks > Service Flying Training School - 10 weeks > Overseas Pool or BCATP instructors/staff pilots

more info see table A-2, http://www.airmuseum.ca/refs/aerodrome_of_democracy.pdf

"Of the schools transferred by the RAF special mention must be made of the operational training units which added an altogether new dimension to the air training in Canada. The OTU concept, a simple yet radical development in flying training, did not come into general use until after the war began. In the RAF until 1938, and in the RCAF until the outbreak of war, pilots went directly from advanced training to operational squadrons, where they had to be taught to fly operational aircraft before they were of any use to the squadron. In 1938, to remove the training burden from front-line squadrons, the RAF set aside special units whose function was to conduct training on operational aircraft and whose graduates would be passed on to fighter, bomber, and maritime air squadrons. In April 1940 these were designated as OTUs."

I would appear that, what would be called OTUs, existed pre-war.

BTW, those RAF hastly trained cannon fodder pilots put up a pretty good fight with those superior trained LW pilots.

Hello Milosh
IIRC, and that on BC, those sqns designed to become Group Pool or Reserve sqns became those when the war began, not before. Before that they were counted as first-line sqns. So plans were there before Sept 39 but they were implemented only when the war broken out. And LW pilots had a bit longer training than RAF pilots before Sept 42.

Juha

Milosh said:

BTW, those RAF hastly trained cannon fodder pilots put up a pretty good fight with those superior trained LW pilots.

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Well said Milosh. Its amazing isnt it according to a lot of threads on this forum and other aircraft forums. The Luftwaffe had better aircraft, better engines, better guns, better tactics, better pilots, better pilot training, better ground crew, better fuel and probably better food in the mess for all I know.

Yet the stupid little RAF with its inferior aircraft, inferior engines, inferior guns, inferior tactics, inferior pilots, inferior pilot training, inferior ground crew, inferior fuel and bloody awful food. Still managed to give the oh so superior Luftwaffe a bloody nose and Germanys first defeat (Or more correctly Germanys first non victory)

I mean those inferior RAF types probably just flew around wingtip to wingtip twirling there moustaches and shouting "tally ho" and baring there inferior teeth at the boche. Whilst the Luftwaffe with its deadly efficency went about crushing the RAF.

Fastmongrel, don't forget they had to stop for tea every so often, but they were still pretty effective.

Joking aside, Kurfurst have you anything to support your six week statement? It could be between the pilots getting thier wings and going to the squadrons but I don't have any evidence.

I'm kinda curious, I've read about how Germanys training program was not adequate to replace pilot losses near wars end, but I've read little about how serious pilot attrition was for the Luftwaffe during BoB.
Obviously all Luftwaffe pilots shot down over Britain would end up in British hands, so those were not recovered. Were there enough reserves that Germany didn't worry too much about it, and consequently did not change their training program? Or were there enough new pilots coming down the pipeline that they thought they would be ok?
Did the RAF's 'more serious' attrition problem encourage the massive training programs they initiated which resulted in a surplus of pilots by wars end contribute to the eventual allied victory?
Hmmm, this maybe could be a new thread?

Juha said:

Hello Njaco

But I have serious doubt on that 6 week claim. After all if we looked on William Murray's Strategy of Defeat p. 314, early in the war, up to Sept 42, LW fighter pilots got some 240h of flight training, of which some 80h on operational types, RAF fighter pilots got some 200h, of which 50h on operational types.

Juha

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Len Deighton specifically mentions this in "Fighters", that fighter training was drastically cut from, I believe, 3 months to 6 weeks (canát seem to find the book atm) and I believe Wood and Dempster mentions this, too. The latter are very concious of the pilot replacement and experience problems in Fighter Command, and I remember them having some figures on German training programme (which they consider sufficient and to have been in a far more extended stage at that time of the war compared to the British), but I can't seem to find the exact figures, they are hidden in some chapter of the book.

All in all it seems pretty common knowledge, as a poster just mentioned the same a couple of posts before mine as well.

EDIT: found a summary giving a pretty good insight about the problems in RAF's early war traning programme. Basically pilots were issued to operational Squadrons with very little to no operational tactical training, and were expected to learn this at their Squadron in time. Now, this worked in peacetime, and even during skirmishes of the Sitzkrieg, but once the meat grinder started to kick in, there were simple no time or possibility to teach them the necessary skills between two combat sorties.


By June 1940 the vigorous efforts which had been made to complete Fighter Command's preparations now made it all the more imperat ive that the squadro ns sho uld be supported by a proper backing for operat ional training, and it was agreed that every pilot sho uld go through an OTU on the same basis as that to which Bomber Command had already been working. . .. Their backing in operational training resources was extremely slender. By that time they only had three OTUs behind them. These OTUs were all under the direct control of one of the
operational Groups (No . 10). The Battle of Britain was to show most clearly how essential was organised operationa l training. It was only by a most drastic shortening of courses that the flow of pilots to squadro ns was maintained, and had the Service Flying
Training School organisation been properly geared to the programme for first line expansion the Fighter OTUs would have formed a most severe bottleneck. As it was it was necessary to resort to many expedien ts in order to give the pilots their conversion.'

In October 1940 the numbering system of the OTUs was changed, with Aston Down becoming No. 55 OTU, Sutton Bridge No. 56 OTU and Hawarden No. 57 OTU. By late 1940 the Fighter Command plan was to have one OTU for every ten fighter squadro ns, with each OTU turning-out 34 pilots a month from a six-week course.

From Delve's Fighter Command.