Clay_Allison
Staff Sergeant
- 1,154
- Dec 24, 2008
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I thought the wildcat didn't perform so badly against the Japanese. It was mostly lack of experience that got the us pilots killed at the start of the war, not necessary the a/c's fault.
The two outboard guns could be fired separately from the four inboard guns, and many pilots would only use the four inboard guns, retaining the outboard guns as an emergency reserve.
'Poor performer in the Pacific' implies you're speaking of the plane's operational record, not its 'pure plane combat effectiveness'; however we define or calculate that nebulous concept.I have wondered for quite some time what it was about the Wildcat that made it such a poor performer in the Pacific Theatre.
I think that the actual service record was more a combination of good piloting and probably encountering Zeros in ones and twos while they were in larger formations. I don't know for sure if that last is true, but I think it's a good guess.'Poor performer in the Pacific' implies you're speaking of the plane's operational record, not its 'pure plane combat effectiveness'; however we define or calculate that nebulous concept.
Anyway operational record is a simple fact and your statement is exactly the wrong way around as far as operational record. The F4F had the best operational record of any Allied fighter in 1942 v Japanese fighters, especially the Zero. It was mentioned that its actual (per recorded losses on both sides) kill ratio v the Zero was around 1:1 in 1942, but to put that in context every other Allied fighter, which saw any significant combat that year, had a worse record, mostly much worse. Hurricane and Buffalo ballpark of 1:5 v the Zero in '42, P-39 and P-40 ballpark of 1:2~3, P-38's didn't establish superiority over Zero's in few encounters of late '42; even in 1943 the Spitfire V's fighter-fighter exchange ratio v the Zero was worse than that of the Hurricane in 1942.
In Sept 1944-Aug 1945 the FM-2 Wildcat's claimed fighter-fighter kill ratio was higher than that of either the F6F or F4U (which claimed almost exactly the same ratio in that period, again suggesting the possiblity of wasted breath and electrons debating whether the F6F or F4U was better based on stats: whatever real difference there was doesn't seem to have been enough to create any noticeable difference in results when flown by similar or same air arm, USN/USMC, against the same enemy fighters, same theater, same time period).
The Wildcat is, as was mentioned, exhibit A in the limited relevance of simple plane statistics to combat effectiveness of fighter units, and perhaps even limited relevance to combat effectiveness of planes themselves, depending whether the stats analysis emphasizes the stats which really mattered most in combat (and how do we determine that?), and if it leaves out less tangible but perhaps as important factors as for example 'good gunnery platform' (in which Grumman fighters were generally thought to exel).
Joe
F4U had 2155 kills in the Pacific, F4F had 1408 kills in the Pacific, 2 in ETO and 26 in the Med. As a matter of fact, in the early going in the Pacific, the F4F was usually outnumbered by IJN fighters.
That is from Wiki, but with good cited sources.Wikipedia said:Navy and Marine F6Fs flew 66,530 combat sorties (45% of all fighter sorties of the war, 62,386 sorties were flown from aircraft carriers[19]) and destroyed 5,163 (56% of all Naval/Marine air victories of the war) at a cost of 270 Hellcats (an overall kill-to-loss ratio of 19:1).[20] The aircraft performed well against the best Japanese opponents with a 13:1 kill ratio against Mitsubishi A6M, 9.5:1 against Nakajima Ki-84, and 3.7:1 against Mitsubishi J2M during the last year of the war.[21] The F6F became the prime ace-maker aircraft in the American inventory, with 306 Hellcat aces.[22]
F4F and Zero numbers were generally comparable in their 1942 combats, which were pretty extensive in a fair variety of tactical situations. Pilots are obviously always a big variable, the problem is always *quantifying* that variable, rather than just using it as a fudge factor when analysis of simple stats gives the 'wrong' answer (as it notably tends to do with the F4F's combat record compared to its simple performance stats).I think that the actual service record was more a combination of good piloting and probably encountering Zeros in ones and twos while they were in larger formations. I don't know for sure if that last is true, but I think it's a good guess.
As of late 1942, USN intel reports noted that it was the *Zeroes* who tended to use boom and zoom tactics v the F4F; both tried to get altitude and energy advantage if they could. That was unsurprising, for this was the Zero's standard tactic in China in pre-Pacific War combat when it was faster than all its opponents. IJN pilots sometimes fell back on earlier individual aerobatic tactics, but the IJN's official doctrine based on experience in China emphasized cooperative quick firing and break away passes by the 3 plane 'shotai'. Their coordination skills were to be honed by such intense training that they didn't need radios to anticipate one another's moves, and that worked with the highly trained 1942 (and actually, 1943 to a still significant extent) IJN pilots.Boom and Zoom tactics along with the Thatch Weave are what made the Wildcat competitive.
F
As of late 1942, USN intel reports noted that it was the *Zeroes* who tended to use boom and zoom tactics v the F4F; both tried to get altitude and energy advantage if they could. That was unsurprising, for this was the Zero's standard tactic in China in pre-Pacific War combat when it was faster than all its opponents. IJN pilots sometimes fell back on earlier individual aerobatic tactics, but the IJN's official doctrine based on experience in China emphasized cooperative quick firing and break away passes by the 3 plane 'shotai'. Their coordination skills were to be honed by such intense training that they didn't need radios to anticipate one another's moves, and that worked with the highly trained 1942 (and actually, 1943 to a still significant extent) IJN pilots.
The Thach Weave was seldom used in 1942. Thach himself experimented with it in his own division at Midway, but it didn't fully work itself through the USN training system to become standard, until later.
I don't think there is a single simple explanation why the Wildcat overperformed its paper stats so much in effectiveness in fighter combat, especially compared to other Allied fighters v the Zero in 1942. Pilot training (gunnery training particularly) was certainly one aspect; the fact that it turned relatively well compared to the Zero (though not *as* well) was probably another reason. Real knowledge of the Zero was pretty limited until quite late in '42 (by which time there was cumulatively a fair amount of combat experience against it, plus the flight results of the example captured in the Aleutians came out out late in the year). Instinctively engaging in turning combat, an F4F wouldn't be at as much of a disadvantage as some other Allied fighters v the Zero.
Joe