Which aircraft would you cancel?

buffnut453 said:

Sorry Steve but I have to disagree with this statement. The role intended for the Defiant was as a bomber destroyer. It was never intended to go toe-to-toe with single-engine fighters. In many respects, the Defiant concept (flying along the length of a bomber and raking it with fire) was not dissimilar to the Luftwaffe's Schrage Musik. The Air Ministry never envisaged enemy (in this context Luftwaffe) single-engined fighters having the legs to reach the UK because nobody could imagine France falling (a not unreasonable assumption to make). As a bomber destroyer, the Defiant was a reasonable design, particularly against the lightly-armoured Luftwaffe bombers of 1940. Unfortunately, the poor Defiant crews were thrown into a fight for which their aircraft was not designed - aerial combat with single-engined fighters.

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This is true, but there were many sceptical of the entire turret fighter concept in any case. These doubts were being expressed at the highest level before and at the beginning of the war, even before the fall of France which did, as you say, change everything.

On 30th January 1940 Wing Commander Armaments wrote in response to the results of trials with the Defiant at the AFDU and reports from Defiant squadrons that,

"The position is, therefore, that there is nothing to show whether a section of Defiants have a sufficient speed margin to make an interception under operational conditions, and to carry out an attack on a bomber flying at 230 mph"

This is a serious reservation and has nothing to do with the presence or otherwise of enemy single engine fighters.

Cheers

Steve

Agree entirely, although in fairness even Hurris and Spits struggled to catch some of the faster German bombers that, having had dropped their ordnance, were placed in a gentle, homeward-bound dive. It all depends on the nature of the tactical engagement. A head-on attack by Defiants, with the fighters flying beneath the bombers, ought to have been quite effective, although not the same sustained concentration of fire if the Defiant came up from the rear.

The Defiant was an interesting concept with a number of shortfalls but I still think it's a stretch to say they were operationally useless in their intended role.

buffnut453 said:

It all depends on the nature of the tactical engagement. A head-on attack by Defiants, with the fighters flying beneath the bombers, ought to have been quite effective, although not the same sustained concentration of fire if the Defiant came up from the rear.

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This was what Fighter Command had in mind:



The trials referred to are those referred to in my post earlier, which cast the whole concept into some doubt. The trials showed that the poor old Defiant was unlikely to be able to make an interception at all!

Cheers

Steve

But, in reality, it did make interceptions and shot down a number of bombers including the Do17 recovered 2 years ago. Undoubtedly, it would have struggled against the Ju88 (although a claim was made against one over Dunkirk) but the slower bombers like the Do17 and He111 still ought to have provided viable targets. Unfortunately, Fighter Command didn't have the structure, or even the tactical ability, to dedicate resources to specific missions - it was case of throwing available resources into the fray, and that proved to be the Defiant's undoing.

Probably the best locations for the Defiant squadrons were either 10 or 13 Groups where the chance of intercepting unescorted bombers was greatest but instead they were based at Manston, about as far forward as it gets and tasked with convoy patrols right in the sweet spot of German fighter protection for their bombers. Undoubtedly, the Defiant lacked the tactical flexibility that was needed in 1940 and, as schrage musik proved, there were better ways of engaging at night using a similar tactical approach.

I remain amazed at the courage of the Defiant crews going up day after day and seeing their mates shot down. I believe the leadership of 264 Sqn by Sqn Ldr Hunter was outstanding and his loss must have been sorely felt by the Sqn. He was a courageous and innovative tactical leader who made the most of the poor hand he was dealt.

The potential limitations were well known to Hunter's predecessor (Squadron Leader Stephen Hardy ) who is the OC No. 264 Squadron referred to here.



It says much for Hunter that when he took over a couple of months later he was prepared to take an aircraft (and concept of aerial combat) that were fundamentally flawed into a fight that he stood little chance of surviving, let alone winning. Of course many others did similar things in other types, but that does not diminish their courage and determination.

If only the decision had been taken sooner to implement the suggestion in the letter's final paragraph.

Cheers

Steve

Nobody seems to have suggested cancelling any Japanese aircraft but there does seem to be some slight scope for rationalizing their production priorities. Should they have produced the A5M and the Ki-27, the A6M and the Ki-43, the D3A and the Ki-51 or the J1N and Ki-45? OK, I know that the IJA and the IJN were not very good at cooperation. However, should the IJA have produced the Ki-43, Ki-44 and Ki-61? Could any of those have replaced the J2M? Should the IJN have produced the N1K or could the A6M2-N have sufficed if even that was necessary?

Other comments and suggestions?

cherry blossom said:

Nobody seems to have suggested cancelling any Japanese aircraft but there does seem to be some slight scope for rationalizing their production priorities. Should they have produced the A5M and the Ki-27, the A6M and the Ki-43, the D3A and the Ki-51 or the J1N and Ki-45? OK, I know that the IJA and the IJN were not very good at cooperation. However, should the IJA have produced the Ki-43, Ki-44 and Ki-61? Could any of those have replaced the J2M? Should the IJN have produced the N1K or could the A6M2-N have sufficed if even that was necessary?

Other comments and suggestions?

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Now please, I'm probably totally wrong, but I think the IJN should have cancelled the A6M sooner rather than later.

The A6M in all it's variations, remained the backbone of the IJN...you need to have a solid replacement for the A6M and in sufficient quantity before just dropping it. Unfortunately, the IJN didn't have such an aircraft until too late in the war.

For example, the N1K was a surprisingly potent adversary to the Allied fighters, however, it's development and production took much too long, finally getting into service and seeing combat by 1944.

The same can be said for the IJA's potent KI-100, which was actually a modification of the equally potent KI-61, either of which came about much too late in the war.

Simply abandoning one airframe doesn't accelerate the production of it's successor.

GrauGeist said:

The A6M in all it's variations, remained the backbone of the IJN...you need to have a solid replacement for the A6M and in sufficient quantity before just dropping it. Unfortunately, the IJN didn't have such an aircraft until too late in the war.

For example, the N1K was a surprisingly potent adversary to the Allied fighters, however, it's development and production took much too long, finally getting into service and seeing combat by 1944.

The same can be said for the IJA's potent KI-100, which was actually a modification of the equally potent KI-61, either of which came about much too late in the war.

Simply abandoning one airframe doesn't accelerate the production of it's successor.

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Yes GrauGeist, I meant that they should have a successor in place sooner, I should've stayed that.

The Japanese could have done a lot of things. We are back to not enough engineers. Not enough to develop the Zero while at the same time developing it's successor. The A7M was first proposed (or specification issued) as a replacement for the A6M in fall of 1940. The project had to be put on hold until 1942 while they got the A6M into service and through the first improvements. Starting work in the Summer of 1942 is just too late. For example the F8F Bearcat started in June of 1942 with initial ideas. "The design was completed in November 1943 and an order for two prototypes was placed on 27 November 1943 under the BuAir designation XF8F-1. The first prototype flew on 21 August 21, 1944,"
Any changes the Japanese make have to be done at least two years before the need shows up in order to have any real effect.

This is the problem, though...

Wartime saw many airframes pushed through at a crazy pace, but even still, they simply didn't get into combat soon enough. It wasn't just Japan and Germany, the U.S. had several types in the works but arrived too late to see any combat such as the F8F, P-51H, F7F and even the A-1.

It's a difficult task to select an aircraft and remove it out of the historical timeline, because the developing aircraft designs are all influenced by the successes and failures of thier predecessors and the combat environment they served in.

Before the war, there were several theories on how the next war would be fought, such as unescorted heavy bombers, dive bombing and so on. But once the sh!t hit the fan, alot of these theories and concepts were turned on their ear. The Brewster F2 would be a peime example: it was thought to be a very capable fighter and yet, when it saw battle, it came up horribly short...but if we consider it "worthless" and pull it from the timeline, the lessons learned from it's failure would not been passed along to the next design in line.

GrauGeist said:

The Brewster F2 would be a peime example: it was thought to be a very capable fighter and yet, when it saw battle, it came up horribly short...but if we consider it "worthless" and pull it from the timeline, the lessons learned from it's failure would not been passed along to the next design in line.

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MUST...NOT...RISE...TO...THE...BAIT!!!

Phew...succeeded!

Shortround6 said:

The Japanese could have done a lot of things. We are back to not enough engineers. Not enough to develop the Zero while at the same time developing it's successor. The A7M was first proposed (or specification issued) as a replacement for the A6M in fall of 1940. The project had to be put on hold until 1942 while they got the A6M into service and through the first improvements. Starting work in the Summer of 1942 is just too late. .....

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Agreed! However, something has to be cancelled to speed up the A7M development. Jiro Horikoshi started work on the J2M in 1939, which was the year when the Zero first flew, and finally started work on A7M roughly when the J2M made its first flight as described below:

The Design and Development of the Mitsubishi Carrier Fighter Reppu

By Jiro Horikoshi via Martin Caidin

In 1940 the Mitsubishi firm received from the Japanese Navy the preliminary specifications for the 16-Shi carrier fighter which was to replace the Zero. It was intended that the new aircraft, which would not be available in quantity for several years, would become the Navy's standard carrier fighter when the Zero had reached its limit in modification and improvement.

However, in 1940 the Mitsubishi firm was experiencing serious difficulties in the development of the 14-Shi land-based interceptor (J2M Raiden); the company was plagued by a shortage of competent engineering personnel and the lack of a satisfactory engine for the J2M Raiden design. These circumstances delayed the 16-Shi carrier fighter program for at least a year.

With the major problems of the J2M Raiden interceptor solved, the proposed carrier fighter program was again postponed. In the autumn of 1941 I became seriously ill and did not recover until several months had passed. The Navy preferred not to undertake the design project without my active participation.

The first engineering meeting to plan the new fighter was held on 14th April 1942, at the Japanese Naval Air Research and Development Center. In the long interval which had elapsed, the 'plane was renamed the 17-Shi carrier fighter. The lessons of the air war to date played a large part in modifying the original proposals. The naval officers, especially the fighter pilots, present at the meeting, were in high spirits, flushed with the succession of our victories in every theatre of war.

--- end quote ---

The only ways to have speeded up development of a shipboard fighter to replace the Zero were either to avoid diverting Mitsubishi into developing the J2M, for example by either issuing the specification to Kawanishi instead of the N1K specification or by adopting the Ki-44, or to issue a specification for a shipboard fighter to another company.

The IJN would have still hit the problem that there was no suitable engine available for an A7M for an in service date of early 1944 when it would have been needed. Thus at least one of the 18 cylinder engines developed by 1945 needed to be ready earlier.

buffnut453 said:

MUST...NOT...RISE...TO...THE...BAIT!!!

Phew...succeeded!

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lol...it did prove it's worth in the hands of the Finns, yes...but not for the U.S.: the confidence of it's design and purpose fell short when it was put to the test. Many factors involved in this disaster, such as being pitted against better performing enemy aircraft and their seasoned pilots, green pilots that had trained in techniques from a bygone era, etc.

So for the U.S., it was a failure but if we remove it from the timeline, we'd lose valuable input that helped guide the design of the fighters that succeeded it.

cherry blossom said:

Thus at least one of the 18 cylinder engines developed by 1945 needed to be ready earlier.

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This might require a bit fandangling, but what about a license version of the BMW 802? It would have the added affect of not overstraining Japanese engineers even more than they were historically.

Actually the way things went what they learned from plane "A" (say the Buffalo) was only slightly applied to plane "B" (F6F Hellcat) and only was in full force on plane "C" (F8F Bearcat) as the contract for the prototype F6F was signed in June of 1941, a full year before Midway, granted this was for the R-2600 powered version. You may find similar progressions. It was not uncommon in the 30s to be ordering (or issuing a requirement) a plane's replacement about the time it entered service leaving little time to actually profit from 'experience'. You had 3 planes in the "pipe". The one being replaced. The one doing the replacing and the future one to replace the one going into service.

Actually, I think the greatest contribution of the poor old F2A was to pull the USN out of the myopia that fighters operating from carriers had to be biplanes. Without the (for its day) innovative design, the USN would likely have ordered the original Grumman XF4F-1:



Imagine a squadron of those at Midway or Guadalcanal! And how long would it have taken for a better-performing replacement...would the technology jump go straight to an aircraft of the F6F ilk or would the USN have been getting a Wildcat-class aircraft in 1943?

RATS! I RESPONDED!!!!...resistance was futile!

cherry blossom said:

Nobody seems to have suggested cancelling any Japanese aircraft but there does seem to be some slight scope for rationalizing their production priorities. Should they have produced the A5M and the Ki-27, the A6M and the Ki-43, the D3A and the Ki-51 or the J1N and Ki-45? OK, I know that the IJA and the IJN were not very good at cooperation. However, should the IJA have produced the Ki-43, Ki-44 and Ki-61? Could any of those have replaced the J2M? Should the IJN have produced the N1K or could the A6M2-N have sufficed if even that was necessary?

Other comments and suggestions?

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With some hindsight they probably should have canselled the Ki-49. But only because we know it wasn't really much of an improvement on the Ki 21. And the Ki-67 should preferrably have become operational earlier even then, but canselling a nakajima is unlikely to help Mitsubishi's designers.

I think the Ki-45 had it's uses, just not in the role it was designed for. I think it was the fastest Japanese aircraft for a short while (apart from the Ki-46). Cansel the Ki-48, and more ressourses can og into the Ki-45 and its successors. DONT cansel the Ki-96, but at least downprioritize the Ki-102. Ki-96 might have become an effective B-29 interceptor (and a better performer generally), and indeed the Ki-108 was in many ways a throw back to it by detour of Ki-102 (minus the turbosuperchargers that didn't reach a state of reliability).

if only i can believe the performance figures for the 96 (630 km/h at 9500 meters) - Green , William and Swanborough, Gordon: "Japanese army fighters: Part 1", Macdonald and janes 1976.

The navy could cansel the J2M, considering that it was build in few numbers and encountered many troubles. But the IJN couldn't even know that the N1K1-J would emerge as a decent alternative. It's perfect hindsight, but Kawanishi obviously had the ability and design capacity to design an outstanding fighter. By canselling the N1K1 they could consentrate on a land fighter, redesigns as moving the wing to the bottom of the fuselage wouldn't be nessessary.

I know that the J2M is supposed to have been the most successful B-29 killer, but I guess (sic!) that it didn't shoot down staggering amounts.
If the navy would have the good sense to use Ki-45's they could cansel the N1N, if they wouldn't miss the range of it too much. Range is the main reason I doubt the Ki-67 could replace the P1Y. Nakajima G5N and G6N did, again as it turned out, achieved little.

But the only part where hindsight isn't heavily applied, is going directly ahead with the Ki-96 instead of redesigning it as the Ki-102.

GrauGeist said:

This is the problem, though...

Wartime saw many airframes pushed through at a crazy pace, but even still, they simply didn't get into combat soon enough. It wasn't just Japan and Germany, the U.S. had several types in the works but arrived too late to see any combat such as the F8F, P-51H, F7F and even the A-1.
.

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Valid point GrauGeist but the term too late only applies if the war ends when it actually did. When for example the P 51H was first proposed what was the expected end of the war in the worst case scenario.

SpicyJuan11 said:

This might require a bit fandangling, but what about a license version of the BMW 802? It would have the added affect of not overstraining Japanese engineers even more than they were historically.

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You are a sadist! The BMW 802 was a very impressive engine with numerous advanced features such as two stage supercharging with an intercooler and, according to the BMW site, the first use of variable valve timing. However, the design was only started after the 801 entered production, so it was not likely to be ready for operational use from 1/1/1944. At least the fuel injectors for BMW engines were not made by Bosch, so there is some chance that anyone taking a licence to produce a BMW engine would not be sabotaged as Japan was over the DB 601.

Mitsubishi built two 18 cylinder engines using the bore and stroke from the 14 cylinder Kinsei and Kasei, the MK9 and the Ha 104. The MK9 was entering production in December 1944 but B-29 raids prevented many being completed. The Ha 104 was in combat in the Ki-67 by October 1944 but it had a 1372 mm diameter and only gave 1900 hp for take off. However, that was at 2450 rpm and the Kasei with similar cylinders could run at 2600 rpm, so it may have been possible to raise the output. Nakajima produced three 18 cylinder radials. The Homare was ready first but the actual power available has occupied several threads here. The middle one was the Ha 44 and seems to have been magical with 2450 hp at 2800 rpm claimed from 48.1 litres with only a 1280 mm diameter. It would have powered the Ki-87 and Ki-94 but only prototypes of those were constructed. The Ha 217 was actually flown in a Ki-49 test aircraft. It was based on the Mamoru cylinders and may have given 3000 hp from 57 litres. Since the Mamoru never worked reliably, I guess it was a big waste of time. However, Nakajima was thinking of the post-war airline market.

My best hope would be an early Ha 44. The question is whether Nakajima could have produced a genuine 2000 hp Ha 44 in time, starting from the 14 cylinder Ha 41 or Ha 109 of the Ki-44 if they had been asked in 1939-40 when a Zero replacement should have been requested.