Which aircraft would you cancel?

[Shortround6]

This is a misconception. Bomber Command had to fight tooth and nail for everything it got, certainly motivated by that imperative, particularly in the face of such poor results in the first two years of the war.

The 'Bomber Boys' couldn't even keep hold of the men coming from its own OTUs at the very time it was attempting a huge expansion. From April 1941 it had to provide several, repeated, personnel draughts. It provided men to the MTO, to the Atlantic ferrying organisation and also three squadrons to Coastal Command. For the year 1941 of the 17 squadrons raised from Bomber Command's OTUs ALL went to other Commands.

Throughout 1941 Bomber Command saw a steady decline in its capability. Only 41 heavy bombers were produced in 1940 and just 498 in 1941. In August 1941 Bomber Command lost 525 bombers destroyed or severely damaged (more than that years total production) and received just 106 replacements. The '4,000 bomber plan' was really dependant on the availability to the British of US aircraft. The Slessor-Arnold agreement was to supply the British with US bombers from US production at a 50-50 ratio. In April 1941 Arnold agreed that four fifths of US bomber production would go to Britain. In August 1941, at the Argentia Summit, the Americans reneged on the deal, offering just 238 bombers (rather than 800+) with no further deliveries beyond July 1942.

Bomber Command never had enough aircraft. This caused an odd problem, the opposite problem to that the Luftwaffe had in 1940; by the end of 1941 the British had a stockpile of more than two million bombs of all types which it did not have the ability to drop. Monthly production was double monthly expenditure.

You can see why I find the popular 'Bomber Command took precedence over everyone else' trend hard to agree with
I often read about how resources would have been better spent on Coastal Command, fighting the U-Boats in the Atlantic. I would ask what resources and how was this fight to be carried out? Britain had neither the means nor the technology to fight this battle at the time.

There was also a large political element to the early bombing campaign that certainly helped Bomber Command to fight its corner. The one military promise that Churchill made in his speech on 22nd June following the German invasion of the USSR was 'to bomb Germany by day as well as by night with ever increasing measure'. On 7th July Churchill sent a telegram to Stalin explaining that the best Britain could offer as direct military assistance to the USSR was bombing which Churchill thought would divert German fighters to the west and ease the pressure on the Soviet front.
Stalin replied, unsurprisingly, that he would prefer Britain to open a second front in northern France or Scandinavia which says more about Stalin's ignorance of the situation in which Britain found herself than it does about his grasp of reality. Nonetheless it was the bombing of Germany that was offered as help and though the RAF still lacked the ability to carry out a meaningful campaign it would do what it could.

Cheers

Steve[/QUOTE]

Thank you but we have a difference in time here. I could still be wrong but the "Bomber boys" were getting their way in the late 30s and first year of so of the war. As the actual conditions of war sank in and everyone realized that the vast (seemingly at the time) number of pre-war bombers (Battles, Blenheims, Hampdens, and early Wellingtons) weren't actually much good at daylight bombing (the bomber was NOT always going to get through) and with new strategic threats cropping up (U-Boat bases in France instead of U-boats having to cross the North sea) AND distance from Germany no longer aiding the aerial defense of Britain and the other theaters opening up (MTO) everybody's (Army and Navy let alone other branches of the RAF) resources were stretched thin.

Some of Bomber Commands woe's in 1941 are the result of enemy action, both of Short's factories having been hit by bombs in 1940 which not only destroyed about a squadrons worth of planes but delayed production by several months (or up to year, depending on account) this would certainly affect Stirling numbers in 1941. Not sure how many other factories got hit in 1940/41. Delays in Hercules production didn't help Bomber command in 1940-41. There is a lot stuff written about Stirlings getting priority for Hercules engines and that is why Beaufighters got Merlins and why Wellingtons got Merlins (and P W R-1830s) but I don't know if that is true or just a bit of cover for the general shortage of Hercules engines at the time. With Merlins needed for Halifax production I don't know what the trade off was and it might change from month to month.
Bomber Command wanting things and getting things changed from the Pre-war days. Of course other services had to give up a lot of things they "wanted" to. RN gave up on Lion Class battleships and any new "heavy" cruisers. The RN was lucky they were getting light AA guns for existing ships. A WW I 3in AA gun for a destroyer with the gun captain's wetted finger held high for fire control (an exaggeration) was hardly what was actually needed and was much more in the way of moral support for the crew than any real expectation of shooting down enemy aircraft.

The argument over more squadrons for coastal command can go both ways. 3-4 squadrons might have made a large difference in the early days but then, as you say, Bomber command didn't have a lot of squadrons to give. However even Whitleys or Wellingtons would have been ever so much better than Ansons. Even if they couldn't close the Atlantic gap (a dream of armchair generals and admirals in many threads) extending air coverage even 200 miles on each side of the Atlantic means about a full days sailing under air cover on each side of the gap. That would have reduced sinkings and THAT is what air cover was about. Not actually killing U-boats. Killing one was sort of bonus and, as you say, needed better technology that came in the later years. Forcing them under water limited their mobility and their vision or ability to detect convoys making them much less effective and that could be done with the technology of the time. It was done in WW I. In late 1940 or a good part of 1941 4 squadrons of twin engine bombers wasn't going to change the bombing campaign over Germany by much.

 

[stona]

I don't agree with that either. There was a wide gap between the strategic vision at the heart of the inter war RAF and the reality of Britain's bombing capability and defence strategy in the 1930s. Imperial air policing (undertaken in ideal weather conditions with little or no opposition and from low level) did little to persuade Britain's military leaders to bank everything on the bomber. Fear of being bombed, particularly once Nazi Germany had been identified as the most likely opponent in the mid 1930s was a powerful spur to alter Britain's priorities in the air to ones that were more defensive. Most here will be aware of the dire prognostications, not just in Britain by the military Joint Planning Committee report of 1934, for the sort of damage and casualties expected to be inflicted by bombing. It was why in 1937 Inskip told the RAF that its role was not to inflict a knock out blow on the enemy (which it couldn't do anyway) but to "prevent the Germans from knocking us out".
The Committee for Imperial Defence spelt out guidelines for air strategy which required the RAF to support the navy and army (a bitter pill for the relatively newly independent service), defend the mainland United Kingdom from aerial attack and finally to inflict damage on the enemy's strike force. Instructions were given to prepare for a possible attack on German industry in the Ruhr, but only after political permission was given and only after the RAF met its other commitments.
Despite the prevailing feeling within the service that bombing was what the air force should do, the British defence chiefs insisted on a more balanced force. Between 1937 and the outbreak of the war this meant that the lion's share of resources went to Fighter Command, the air defence network and civil defence. Once again the "Bomber Boys" certainly did not get what they wanted.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

Lions share?

In Sept 1938 16 squadrons had Blenheim Mk 1s in service at home, they may not have been fully equipped with them. By the end of 1939 most (all?) these squadrons had been re-equipped with MK IV Blenheims. and in 1939 some Hurricanes and SPits were getting the two blade propeller.

176 Vickers Wellesley bombers are built between March of 1937 and May of 1938

50 Bristol Bombay bombers.

178 of the dreaded Hawker Hectors were built Granted not for bomber Command.

Sept 1939 saw 15 Squadrons regular bomber squadrons equipped with Fairey Battles.

Out break of the war saw 7 heavy bomber squadrons equipped with Whitley MK IIIs and IVs. The MK Is and IIs already withdrawn for operational service.

8 squadrons of Wellingtons were in service on Sept 1939 or perhaps 8 squadrons had received Wellingtons which is not the same.

5 bomber Squadrons had Handley Page Harrows at the start of the war.

10 Bomber squadrons had received Handley Page Hampdens by the start of the war even if some were not declared operational on them yet.

I think that is around 60 bomber squadrons in Service in Sept or by the end of 1939. (I didn't count the Hectors)
This does not count the effort going into the next generation of bombers (Manchester, Warwick, Stirling,Halifax). The "Bomber Boys" may NOT have been getting what they wanted but they were far from being a red headed step child begging for scraps. One does not go from a small force of Biplane bombers to dozens of squadrons of 4 engine monoplanes in just a few years and while many of Bomber Command's aircraft in 1939 were unsuitable for the coming war that does not mean they didn't exist or resources were not spent on them.

There well have been a gap (and a big one) between Bomber Command's Strategic Vision of the 1930s and Britain's bombing capability in 1939 and 1940 but Bomber Command had certainly been building up numbers of squadrons (even if ill equipped) in pursuit of their goal, it is much easier to re-equip squadrons than create them from scratch, especially if you are equipping them with complex aircraft like 4 engine bombers with power turrets.

 

[Juha]

Hello Shortround
Bombays were first transports and only secondary bombers, they were based on the Specification C. something

 

[Shortround6]

Hello Shortround
Bombays were first transports and only secondary bombers, they were based on the Specification C. something

You say potato, I say pototo, you say tamato, I say tamoto.

The Bombay was designed to a specification that saw the Handley Page Harrow and the Armstrong Siddeley A.S. 23. The A.S. 23 turned into the Whitley. It took 4 years from flight of the prototype Bombay to deliveries of production versions. Why it took 2 years from flight of prototype to even order production examples I have no idea. Had it gone into service in 1937 it would have been no more obsolete as a bomber than the Ju 52s used in Spain. The Stirling had the same requirement to carry 24 troops, at least start.
By the time the Bombay was built and issued it did make even the Wellesley look good.
If people don't want to count it fine. 58 Squadrons of Bombers in the fall of 1939?

Bomber Command may not have been getting their dream machines (1935-39 equivalents of the HP V/1500) but they were certainly getting a big piece of the pie.

 

[stona]

By November 1938 there was a complete switch of emphasis to Fighter Command. When Kingsley Wood announced the latest expansion scheme to parliament (Scheme M) he said.

"I propose to give the highest priority to the strengthening of our fighter force, that force which is designed to meet the invading bomber in the air."

There had been a complete 'volte-face' from Baldwin's earlier dictum 'the bomber will always get through'. It was not random. Advances in technology, not least in fighter aircraft themselves, now allowed the possibility that the bomber might indeed be effectively opposed, at least in daylight.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Juha]

Y... It took 4 years from flight of the prototype Bombay to deliveries of production versions. Why it took 2 years from flight of prototype to even order production examples I have no idea. Had it gone into service in 1937 it would have been no more obsolete as a bomber than the Ju 52s used in Spain. The Stirling had the same requirement to carry 24 troops, at least start... If people don't want to count it fine. 58 Squadrons of Bombers in the fall of 1939?...

IIRC after Bombay won the production order they found out that Bristol had its hands full with Blenheim production and after a while the production was given to Harland and Wolff in Belfast but it had problems with the production of 7 ? spars wings of the Bombay and that delayed the production still further. And Bombay was a kind of RAF's reply to the LW's Ju 52s.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

The Bombay was in response to a 1931 Air Ministry requirement for a "twin-engine bomber-transport monoplane for use principally in tropical climates." An added item was that "The aircraft is to be easy to maintain and repair in the field under desert conditions," which hardly sounds as if it was designed with a view to bombing Germany. The prototype first flew 23-6-35, and spent a year on trials at Martlesham Heath, where tail surfaces and airscrews were changed, and more powerful Pegasus XXIIs and hydraulic turrets fitted.
The A.W.23 (Armstrong-Whitworth, not Armstrong-Siddeley) was loaned to Air Refuelling Ltd., as a tanker aircraft. It was later developed, for a 1936 specification, into the A.W.38 Whitley.
The H.P.51 was withdrawn, but also went to Martlesham Heath and was employed on a variety of tasks. It was developed for a 1935 specification into the H.P.54 Harrow.

 

[Juha]

Yes indeed, the Specs was C.26/31 and Bombays were intended for ME use, but when the war broke out some were kept in the UK to transport supplies and personel between the UK and France. And the factory which produced them was Short and Harland Ltd at Belfast, formed by Short Brothers Ltd and Harland Wolff Ltd who operated the new Government-owned 'shadow-factory' there, and yes, it was the complex wing structure that delayed production at Belfast.

 

[merlin]

By November 1938 there was a complete switch of emphasis to Fighter Command. When Kingsley Wood announced the latest expansion scheme to parliament (Scheme M) he said.

"I propose to give the highest priority to the strengthening of our fighter force, that force which is designed to meet the invading bomber in the air."

There had been a complete 'volte-face' from Baldwin's earlier dictum 'the bomber will always get through'. It was not random. Advances in technology, not least in fighter aircraft themselves, now allowed the possibility that the bomber might indeed be effectively opposed, at least in daylight.

Cheers

Steve

Whilst, on face value, the Government's intention was to strengthen Fighter Command. But that was just the by-product - the real intention, was to delay the 4-engine bomber programme with the huge expenditure that that would entail. After all, if that was in process and War did not happen!? So by buying more aircraft - s/e - it gave the illusion, that the RAF was getting stronger and more powerful. Fortunately, this 'by-product' worked out in Britain's favour.

 

[merlin]

My thoughts:
UK.
AW Albermarle - doesn't exist - the original spec. for a medium bomber using non-strategic materials is fulfilled by De Havilland = Mosquito slightly earlier.
Blackburn (not a success story) - Roc (words fail me),either convert back to Skua, or at an stage - Bomber Command protest all gun-turret production should be allocated to their aircraft, Skua - starts getting replaced in mid-1940 by the Henley, and Botha - plenty been said already - why did it get an order!?
Bristol Blenheim - in production too long, should have been replaced earlier.

To be continued - need to feed the cat.

 

[pbehn]

Many of the comments here about Bomber/Fighter/Coastal command merely reflect the changing reality from the theory of waging war with Germany on land in Belgium and France while raiding by air from UK to being surrounded and alone in Europe.

 

[Shortround6]

what the "bomber boys" were dreaming of was a modern version this.

It was capable (supposedly) of flying to Berlin and back from East Anglia in 1918, 40 built and another 22 in spares before production stopped.

What the "treasury boys" would pay for in the 1930s is another story as shown by the clipping of the wings of the Stirling.

Just because the "Bomber Boys" didn't get what they wanted didn't mean they didn't get a good share of the budget. Some of the expansion schemes had bomber command getting 50% of the aircraft and since twin engine bombers not only need twice the engines of single seat fighters but the airframes are easily twice as expensive. Even an empty Battle weighed more than loaded Hurricane or Spitfire indicating it it was probably more expensive.

As of Jan 1st 1940 the British had 43 squadrons of bombers on the list at home. Some were not fully equipped operational.
9 had Hamptons.
10 had Wellingtons.
8 had Whitleys. (although any with Tiger powered versions were operating as trainers)
11 had Blenheims.
3 had Battles.
1 was supposed to have Beauforts
1 had Vildebeests.

Another 14 squadrons were in France
8 with Battles and
6 with Blenheims

Overseas saw 9 squadrons in the Mid-east.
6 with Blenheims
2 with Wellesleys
1 with Vincents.

and 8 in India or the Far East.
5 squadrons of Blenheims
2 squadrons of Vildebeests
1 Squadron of Wapitis.

Please note that the overseas Blenheims (11 squadrons) and 1/2 the ones in France were Blenheim Is which had been replaced (mostly) in home Bomber Command units by MK IV Blenheims or other (Hampden/Wellington?) new bombers when less than 3 years old. There may have been some re-posting of units but that was the net effect. Please note if you add the Units in France to the home units you get 57 squadrons (or 53-54 if you take out a few of the under equipped ones).

What they were allowed to do or what they were capable of doing are different subjects than the amount of money/resources invested in them. But you have to start somewhere and less money invested in Bomber Command in 1936-39 would mean and even slower build up of the bombing campaign in 1941-43. Hw much slower may be subject to debate.

 

[merlin]

To continue:

Fairey - it shouldn't have been too difficult to go from the Swordfish to the Barracuda, missing out the Albacore. The Battle could have been short lived, once the Geneva Disarmament talks didn't stipulate a bomber weight, but IMHO production shouldn't have gone on so long - e.g. use the Austin Shadow Factory for Hurricanes. Fulmar - short lived, supplanted by the more versatile Sea Henley, and S/Ss.
Gloster Gladiator - by the start of the war not in RAF service - passed on to the SAAF, IAF.
The spec. for medium range flying-boats is itself cancelled, in future flying-boats will be short-range for air-sea rescue, long-range very-long-range, medium will be catered for by land-planes - so no Lerwick.
Stirling - doesn't exist (see previous thread) RAF went for the Boulton-Paul Barnsley instead.
Stranraer - replaced by the Sunderland.

R-R Vulture - cancelled much earlier, after the crash of the Boulton-Paul P.88b powered by the Vulture - cause of the crash was found to be problems to do with the engine, Rolls were told to concentrated on the Merlin Griffon engines(the latter hence becomes available earlier!

 

[Juha]

My thoughts:
UK.
AW Albermarle - doesn't exist - the original spec. for a medium bomber using non-strategic materials is fulfilled by De Havilland = Mosquito slightly earlier.
Blackburn (not a success story) - Roc (words fail me),either convert back to Skua, or at an stage - Bomber Command protest all gun-turret production should be allocated to their aircraft, Skua - starts getting replaced in mid-1940 by the Henley, and Botha - plenty been said already - why did it get an order!?
Bristol Blenheim - in production too long, should have been replaced earlier.

To be continued - need to feed the cat.

I don't have any idea who well Henley could have been adapted for carrier use, so no comment on that but yes, Roc, Albemarle and Botha were waste of meager resources. On Blenheim, the RAF thought that they needed a day light bomber and because the Bristol sleeve-valve radials were running late and had reliability problems Britsh could not developed anything like Boston or even like Baltimore, so there was nothing to replace Blenheim before they got enough Mossies and Bostons. But Blenheim V was a awful mistake.

 

[Juha]

To continue:

Fairey - it shouldn't have been too difficult to go from the Swordfish to the Barracuda, missing out the Albacore. The Battle could have been short lived, once the Geneva Disarmament talks didn't stipulate a bomber weight, but IMHO production shouldn't have gone on so long - e.g. use the Austin Shadow Factory for Hurricanes. Fulmar - short lived, supplanted by the more versatile Sea Henley, and S/Ss.
Gloster Gladiator - by the start of the war not in RAF service - passed on to the SAAF, IAF.
The spec. for medium range flying-boats is itself cancelled, in future flying-boats will be short-range for air-sea rescue, long-range very-long-range, medium will be catered for by land-planes - so no Lerwick.
Stirling - doesn't exist (see previous thread) RAF went for the Boulton-Paul Barnsley instead.
Stranraer - replaced by the Sunderland.

R-R Vulture - cancelled much earlier, after the crash of the Boulton-Paul P.88b powered by the Vulture - cause of the crash was found to be problems to do with the engine, Rolls were told to concentrated on the Merlin Griffon engines(the latter hence becomes available earlier!

But the fact is that Barracuda development ran into problems, skipping over Albacore would have release at least some resource to solve those problems but that would be a risk because while not a great plane Albacore had clearly longer legged than Swordfish and also somewhat faster. Swordfish was hopelessly too shortlegged for FE if something would have boiled over there before Barra was ready and in sqn service with reasonable numbers.
Agree that Battle was produced too long. And lerwick was a failure.

 

[fastmongrel]

The Battle was definitely produced too long as a bomber but what was going to replace it. More Hurricanes or Wellingtons would have been nice in 1940 but were there enough pilots to man them. No good producing lots of aircraft if they sit waiting for the crew, Britain needed pilots more than they needed planes.

 

[Glider]

The Battle was definitely produced too long as a bomber but what was going to replace it. More Hurricanes or Wellingtons would have been nice in 1940 but were there enough pilots to man them. No good producing lots of aircraft if they sit waiting for the crew, Britain needed pilots more than they needed planes.

This has been debated before so apologies to those who remember but I would replace the battle with the Skua. It was quite a decent dive bomber and better able to take care of itself in the air.

 

[Shortround6]

This has been debated before so apologies to those who remember but I would replace the battle with the Skua. It was quite a decent dive bomber and better able to take care of itself in the air.

Fine choice, now build 700-800 more Ansons or Oxfords to act as crew trainers to replace the Battles you aren't going to make. While both of those planes were built by thousands you need the extra 700-800 by the fall of 1940.

" From August 1939, 739 Battles were stationed in Canada as trainers in the Commonwealth Air Training Plan" and around 300 went to Australia. The 700-800 Ansons/Oxfords may be conservative.

 

[stona]

Whilst, on face value, the Government's intention was to strengthen Fighter Command. But that was just the by-product - the real intention, was to delay the 4-engine bomber programme with the huge expenditure that that would entail. After all, if that was in process and War did not happen!? So by buying more aircraft - s/e - it gave the illusion, that the RAF was getting stronger and more powerful. Fortunately, this 'by-product' worked out in Britain's favour.

It was not a by-product at all. The intention was to expand Fighter Command and the entire UK defence system (including civil defence) The by-product was the production of aircraft like the Defiant, which bolstered Fighter Command's numbers whilst eventually proving operationally useless in the role intended for them.

Expansion of the heavy bomber force was so slow that in June 1942 Harris complained to Churchill in a letter in which he sought to show that Bomber Command might still be a war winning instrument, that his command comprised just 36 squadrons with 548 aircraft of all types amounting to just 11% of the strength of the RAF and Fleet Air Arm combined. He also said that half his strength was being used in support of the Royal Navy. In August 1942 he complained to Portal that he had only 22 effective squadrons for bombing Germany. Harris was making excuses. He reckoned that 6 squadrons were 'on loan', 6 were re-equipping or forming, 5 were 'unavailable' (he doesn't specify why) and the 4 Polish squadrons were operationally limited, 'almost useless' are his words.
Bomber Command had been so ineffective in the preceding three years of war that it was probably saved not by Harris, Portal and some others' forthright and sometimes disingenuous support but more by Churchill's promises to Stalin of a bombing campaign in support of the Soviet Union, particularly as he had just had to explain to Stalin that there would be no new front opened anywhere, let alone Europe, in 1942.

There is a tendency to telescope history with hindsight. The huge and costly strategic offensives carried out by the Anglo-American bombing forces were very much a late war phenomenon, concentrated largely in the last 18 months of the war, not in 1939-43.
From 1937/8 through 1941 the emphasis and expenditure was very much defensive and from this it was Fighter Command that benefited, at the cost of other commands.

The argument that the Battle made a useful trainer must be flawed by the expense. I don't have figures to hand, but find it difficult to imagine that a supposedly front line bombing aircraft would cost less than a purpose built trainer. With hindsight the Battle (and Defiant) should both have been axed, but the decision makers at the time did not have hindsight.

Cheers

Steve