Which aircraft would you cancel?

[kool kitty89]

One continual problem, with the Hurricane was balance, and a very touchy CoG. Incidentally, the metal wings were lighter than fabric-covered.
In France, armour couldn't be fitted behind the pilot until the two-blade prop was replaced by a heavier 3-blade.
In the Sea Hurricane, the weight of the arrestor hook needed a metal prop as counter-balance.
In the Air Ministry's push to have aircraft Griffon-powered, Camm was willing, even keen, to build a Hurricane, but it required an extra bay between cockpit and rear fuselage, and a raked-forward centre-section to get the wings, and consequently the CoG, far enough forward to act as balance. He was told to forget it, and concentrate on the Tornado/Typhoon.

This is a better argument for the discontinuation of hurricane development than most of the others I've seen. My comments relating to leading/trailing edge wing root extensions might have gone part way to addressing those issues (along with possible total replacement of the outboard wings) but that wouldn't really help the griffon (or 2-stage merlin) getting nose heavier. Ballast is obviously a bad option as well.

That said, heavier modifications to the wing as part ot eh Mk.II development might have been more worthwhile. (and perhaps replacing the rear fusalage fabric and wooden stringers with aluminum stringers/skin -or maybe cheaper steel stringers if all aluminum ended up being too light)

Anyway, it still makes me wonder even more about the potential for Hawker/Glosters resources put towards production of the F.5/34 airframe and derivatives thereof. (if converstion to the merlin went at least as smoothly as the P-36 to P-40 -and had been pursued early in development- it may have ended up a compelling replacement on the production line for the hurricane, perhaps enough to forgo production of the Hurricane II at all)


One other thing I'd forgotten about the Hurricane: the steel framework may have been more succeptible to corrosion from salt air and spray than an all aluminum plane. (same problem for the Sea Gladiator)

Brewster didn't have teh factory space to handle the order and had to buy and equip factory space, The choice was bit short sighted.

This is the big problem, even more so than any internal management issues (in fact, the strain on limited capacity may have exacerbated any management troubles). If they could have secure a second source for manufacturing (as with the earlier SBN), it may have been another matter, but short of that or supplying enough funds to allow Brewster to rapidly expand their own capacity, there's no way the Buffalo could ever cope with war-time production demands. Trying to use Brewster as a second source for Corsairs seems rather ludicrous as well, not just in hindsight but simply after all the messes with delays, low production volume, and quality control issues cropping up when production demands ramped up.

It didn't help that the F2A seems to have been less overengineered for structural strength than most other american aircraft.

Without expanded capacity, it may have been best if the Buffalo had been left as an export-only design, carrier capable or otherwise. (also probably not worth expanding the design beyond the Buffalo Mk.I specs, aside from offering a fully carrier capable counterpart to that model)

As things were, it may have been more worthwhile to keep the F2A-3 in production and canceling the SB2A. (or ever producing the Corsair)

the big reason for ordering 500+ P-40s in the Spring of 1939 was that NONE of the other planes would be ready for one to two years. They built 13 P-39s in 1940, 10 of them in Dec. speeding up things by even 6 months gets you nowhere for 1939 and most of 1940.

Indeed, there was no substitute for the P-40 ... or P-36 for that matter. Had P-36 orders been undertaken more seriously pre-war and largely replaced all obsolete aircraft (including those stationed at overseas territories), it may have made a good bit of difference for resisting the initial Japanese advance.

The models of engines that would have been placed in production in 1938/39 were not the models that went into production in 1940. And usually greatly accelerated production came at the cost of less research and development. The companies just didn't have enough engineers and many of them did double duty. Helping design the engines/airframes and then helping design the production tooling. AS the plants expanded and added workers (at all levels) the engineering/design depts could be separated better.

That's another thing. Brewster didn't have the capacity to keep up with F2A development and production, let alone the slough of other designs they were developing (a few of which entered production). Had more effort been focused on the Buffalo alone, it might have made out better than it did.

Now if the US had ordered 500 aircraft all at once instead of planes being ordered in dribs and drabs over 2 1/2 years Brewster might have gotten a lot more serious about finding suitable factory space a lot sooner. But the chances of seeing more than a few dozen aircraft in 1939 are pretty slim unless you move the order date back to months before the June 11th 1938 date.

Indeed, and it seems more likely/plausible that licensing the F2A to at least one (more capable) second source would have addressed their production capacity issues, especially for aircraft intended for the USN and USMC. Leaving Brewster's own production to primarily cater to export buyers might have suited their limitations better.

 

[pbehn]

For the UK So many where do you start,

Botha, Albacore, Fulmar, Roc, Sterling, Whitley, Warwick, Albemarle, Battle, Defiant, Lerwick, Sea Otter, Albecore

The scary thing is that they all entered production, there not prototypes, the waste of resources is huge

With hindsight things are very easy. We now know that Germany invaded Poland in September 1939 and that France fell quickly in 1940.

It is fair to say the British were in a panic in the late 30s and anything is better than nothing. As others have said cancelling an aircraft doesnt mean getting more of another, the Roc was to be cancelled but production continued with the planes modified as target tugs. Most of aircraft considered better in performance in 1939/40 had Merlin engines so the problem is how to share out the Merlins. There are other political considerations. If the Skua was cancelled in favour of a modified hurricane for example. The Skua was used to protect Scapa flow, if it was protected by hurricanes would these be included in Dowdings last reserve when he turned off the "Hurricane tap". Britains front line strength at the start of the BoB had nothing to do with purchasing and everything to do with Anglo French politics.

 

[Glider]

With hindsight things are very easy. We now know that Germany invaded Poland in September 1939 and that France fell quickly in 1940.

It is fair to say the British were in a panic in the late 30s and anything is better than nothing. As others have said cancelling an aircraft doesnt mean getting more of another, the Roc was to be cancelled but production continued with the planes modified as target tugs. Most of aircraft considered better in performance in 1939/40 had Merlin engines so the problem is how to share out the Merlins. There are other political considerations. If the Skua was cancelled in favour of a modified hurricane for example. The Skua was used to protect Scapa flow, if it was protected by hurricanes would these be included in Dowdings last reserve when he turned off the "Hurricane tap". Britains front line strength at the start of the BoB had nothing to do with purchasing and everything to do with Anglo French politics.

A lot of good comments but some I would disagree with. The Skua wasn't on my list, in fact its one I would increase production of simply because it was quite a good dive bomber and would have done a lot better than the Battle. The Lerwick, Botha, Albermarle, Warwick and Albercore were never going to improve the situation and the waste in design, factory space/tools and production was huge.

 

[tomo pauk]

Just to add that I'd go with Skua production so the FAA can have more dive bombers around. As a land based crate, it won't work unless/until some good fighter cover is provided.

 

[pbehn]

A lot of good comments but some I would disagree with. The Skua wasn't on my list, in fact its one I would increase production of simply because it was quite a good dive bomber and would have done a lot better than the Battle. The Lerwick, Botha, Albermarle, Warwick and Albercore were never going to improve the situation and the waste in design, factory space/tools and production was huge.

In truth nothing was going to improve anything until night time navigation was mastered, all sides had to learn that bombers didnt get through in daylight without escorts.

 

[Shortround6]

The Skua wasn't on my list, in fact its one I would increase production of simply because it was quite a good dive bomber and would have done a lot better than the Battle. The Lerwick, Botha, Albermarle, Warwick and Albercore were never going to improve the situation and the waste in design, factory space/tools and production was huge.

The Lerwick is pretty much a red herring. They only built 21 of them. On a per pound basis you might get 11-13 Sunderlands instead?

2nd squadron issued Lerwicks (and first and only one to go operational) was flying Singapores.
View attachment 294068

ANd you get into the question of how much material was pre-ordered or being worked into shape before they found out how bad it was.

The Albermarle kind of shows up several things about British procurement. It shows how desperate they were and shows the uncertainty about the future. Design work starts in 1937/38 with mock ups completed in June of 1938. For context The first Hampden flew in May of 1938 and the first squadron to get Hampdens starts to get them in Sept of 1938. 200 Albermarles are ordered in Oct 1938 pretty much from drawing board/mock up. Now from Wiki "The aircraft was always expected to be of use as a contingency, and to be less than ideal." It was planned to use steel and wood construction to save light alloys and be built by firms/shops not normally used by the aircraft industry. Now in 1938/early 1939 nobody KNEW what aluminum production would be like in 1942/43. Nobody KNEW what problems the Hercules would have going into production or what the power levels would actually be in 1942/43. And nobody KNEW how well or how much the British aircraft industry could be expanded in next 3-4 years. The US was about 1 3/4 years from throwing it's own money into massive orders and 3 years away from Pearl Harbor and joining the war.
For contingency plans to really work you have to do more than put them on paper. You need to stock supplies and/or tools of the type needed for the plan. You have to at least build prototypes to see if it is going to work as needed. Waiting for the day you need it is a poor time to start. A bit like planing for a storm disaster. Planing to buy a generator in case of a power outage caused by a storm is just the first step in contingency planning. Waiting to stand in line behind 50 other people in the rain as the storm approaches is not good execution of the plan. Buying the generator before storm season and having every storm miss you by hundreds of miles might be considered a waste of money and storage space.
The Warwick kind of got caught in the engine problem the British had. It used a lot of common parts with the Wellington. Outer wings were the same and a good portion of the fuselage was the same, extra plugs being inserted to get the extra length. The Three British "big" engines were all late in development and a bit down on anticipated power. The American replacement, the R-2800, was also down in power from what was needed. BIG twins are not really a good idea as they almost always are under-powered if they loose an engine. Had the Warwick been able to go into service with 2200-2400hp engines instead of 1850hp engines is reputation might be somewhat better than it is now. The Warwick was sort of a low cost/low investment back up to the Manchester. However do to the engine problems (and other war work) it took 35 months to go from first prototype flight to 1st squadron use. At which time it had been passed by.

 

[Glider]

I totally agree about the almost panic situation that British aircraft procurement was in during the lead up to war. However it doesn't stop it being a huge waste of resources. The Lerwick was as you say only produced in very small numbers but the design, testing and production facilities are the same if 21 or 1021 are built and that was the waste. The situation is similar for the vast majority of aircraft on the list.
Staying with the Lerwick as one example, if you can produce the facilities to build the Lerwick you would be better off with another production line for the Sunderland. The design and testing staff could well have been put to use in other areas of the aircraft industry.

We all know of the various 'backup' designs the RAF had for fighters none of which entered production. For some reason the bomber 'backup' designs seem to have been built resulting in considerable waste.

 

[pbehn]

I totally agree about the almost panic situation that British aircraft procurement was in during the lead up to war. However it doesn't stop it being a huge waste of resources. The Lerwick was as you say only produced in very small numbers but the design, testing and production facilities are the same if 21 or 1021 are built and that was the waste. The situation is similar for the vast majority of aircraft on the list.
Staying with the Lerwick as one example, if you can produce the facilities to build the Lerwick you would be better off with another production line for the Sunderland. The design and testing staff could well have been put to use in other areas of the aircraft industry.

We all know of the various 'backup' designs the RAF had for fighters none of which entered production. For some reason the bomber 'backup' designs seem to have been built resulting in considerable waste.

What would those resources have been put into? Any bomber programme culminates with the Lancaster Halifax but they need the navigation systems and experience of the crews because every plane flew alone at night. As I said before it is easy to judge with hind sight in the late 1930s how could anyone decide what could or would work without trying it? Many things were tried and some failed. I doubt anyone in senior positions in the RAF in 1939 would have believed that the Spitfire would still be at the forefront as a fighter in 1945, the technology for merlin and the griffon was in its favour. Similarly with the Typhoon and Manchester the technology of the Vulture/Sabre was against their prospects.

 

[Shortround6]

I totally agree about the almost panic situation that British aircraft procurement was in during the lead up to war. However it doesn't stop it being a huge waste of resources. The Lerwick was as you say only produced in very small numbers but the design, testing and production facilities are the same if 21 or 1021 are built and that was the waste. The situation is similar for the vast majority of aircraft on the list.
Staying with the Lerwick as one example, if you can produce the facilities to build the Lerwick you would be better off with another production line for the Sunderland. The design and testing staff could well have been put to use in other areas of the aircraft industry.

We all know of the various 'backup' designs the RAF had for fighters none of which entered production. For some reason the bomber 'backup' designs seem to have been built resulting in considerable waste.

The facility that built the Lerwick already existed. It had built small numbers of 5-6 different flying boat designs by Saunders-Roe over the ten years before the Lerwick showed up. It was used to build Supermarine Walruses and Sea Otters thus freeing up Supermarine for Spitfire production. Saunders-Roe had another works in Beaumaris, Anglesey, and that one did conversion work and serviced RAF Catalina Flying boats.

The "Bomber Boys" tended to get what they wanted because it was only the bombers that could guarantee the future of RAF as an independent branch of the Military and put it on an equal footing to the Navy and Army. Army co-operation was seen as the path to being placed under overall Army control. Sub hunting and coastal Patrol had the danger of making them subordinate to the Navy. Anti bomber work (bomber interception) was good but it wasn't enough. The RAF had to be seen as a war fighting and war winning force all on it's own in order to gain equal footing and prestige with the other two services.

I tend not to be too critical of some pre-war designs because sometimes the knowledge just wasn't there yet. How seaplanes handled on the water was still the subject of much experimentation Consolidated went from getting a pretty good plane in the water, the PBY, to an lousy one, the XPB2Y-1

Which had to be changed into this

and still was not 100% satisfactory.

The Botha is another story, Increasing the size and weight of the aircraft while providing no additional power (?) OK The Taurus engines were expected to be short supply but flying under powered planes isn't going to end well. The poor visibility from the cockpit and observer windows/stations should have been figured out in the mock up stage, that is one reason to do mock ups, to catch 3 dimensional problems that don't show upon flat drawings. A Lockheed Hudson weighed about the same as a Botha but the Botha only had about 85% of the power and that is against Hudsons with 1100hp engines. You don't need a lot of specialized knowledge to know that an 18,000lb airplane with a pair of 750hp for take-off engines is a disaster waiting to happen. Less than 70% of the power of the Hudson for take-off. Throw in the very strong possibility of the Botha not being able to feather the prop on a dead engine and it's production and use was just short of criminal.

 

[pbehn]

Shortround.....excellent post and information but may I add the political imperative. Britain needed to hit back at Germany, planes that could do it and people willing to do it were therefore given priority, sometimes perhaps unwisely. Flying boats were a technology overtaken by time and runways and many countries went down the spruce goose route, maybe you have to build one to realise how impractical they are.

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you the compliment. Pre Sept 1939 the "bomber boys" got a lot of "stuff" without actually having to hit back at Germany. They did have to get ready and that is were the 2 stage Merlins went (and there weren't that many in 1939). it is were the bulk of the 2 pitch props went and most of the pathetically small number constant speed props. By the winter of 1940 Bomber Command was about the only way to hit back but they still got a bit more than their fair share.

The Problem I have with some of the pre-war decisions wasn't so much the type of aircraft but the almost blatant disregard for the crews while pursuing production numbers with the zeal of a Russian Factory manager with a NKVD man sitting in his office polishing his gun.
Botha aside, most British twins were under powered (OK so were many other 1938-39-40 twins) but the HP ratings don't show by how much. Wright had gone to 2 speed superchargers. Armstrong Siddeley had on the Tiger but that was like chrome plating a car with a blown engine. The Mercury used in the Blenheim was rated at 840hp at 14,000ft which is bordering on remarkable. What wasn't remarkable was but certainly understandable was the 725hp they gave for take-off on 87 octane fuel.
Put that together with 2 position props that won't feather and single engine performance was, shall we say, less than remarkable, as in some British twins could not maintain height on one engine which makes twin engine safety something of an illusion.
Many twins did not have duplicate accessories. One engine having the generator and hydraulic pump making an engine out situation a 50/50 crap shoot. The Hudson at about 18,000-18,500lbs had 2200hp for take-off with a pair of Cyclones. A Wellington on 87 octane had 1930hp for plane that went 26,000-30,000lbs.

AS for flying boats you are right, time and runways. Without WW II scattering concrete (or at least metal mat) runways thousands of feet long all around the world the Flying boat might have enjoyed another 5-15 years.

Saunders_Roe came back from the Lerwick with this.

 

[nuuumannn]

Good info as always SR. The Botha has been described as novel, yet fundamentally flawed, which is an apt description. Its badly underpowered engines were only the start of its woes; poor visibility other than forward, although in the A&AEE report on the Botha following trials at Boscombe Down it was stated that if the pilot stands up he can see aft to the tail!; here's some more comments "uncomfortable to fly: bad in pitch and yaw", "poor view from the cockpit makes it useless as a GR aircraft", "deficient in longitudinal stability and there is barely sufficient elevator control" and so on.Apparently the cockpit was subject to filling up with carbon monoxide with the close proximity of the engines. If ever there was an aeroplane that should have been cancelled because alarm bells were ringing about it at the time, then it was the Botha.

As for the Albemarle, even AW's own designer was less than interested in it, showing no enthusiasm for continuing its design.

Another aircraft that might have been cancelled if it weren't for the pressures of war was the Halifax. Have we covered that yet?

 

[Ottobon]

I like BF 109s quite a bit, but if canceling them, or atleast reducing Willie Messerchmitts weight with RLM would of let the FW 190C, Fiat G.56, and He 100 develop into actual fighter aircraft i would of happily have seen some of Messerscmitts projects cancelled and or backing reduced if we are strictly talking aircraft.

In the real world i'd rather the Germans NOT have better aircraft in the 1940s, but it would of been amazing to think of what any of those three aircraft could of developed into.

I suppose if not the BF 109 (not perfect or extraordinary in late war but it was atleast "good enough") then the Me 210 (and therfor 410) if it meant the FW 190C would of been been introduced sooner and thus the Doras somehow even better by late war. If i could have anything it would be a fully developed He 100 though, specifically if they could of somehow maintained the relatively light weight but boosted power a bit. I suppose in that sense the Fiat G.56 may be better as it was basically already fitted with a engine that had room to further improve compared to the He 100 which i have heard came with what was considered a "sick" engine.


Just really basic opinion i have held for awhile, despite my actual liking of BF 109.


Feel free to correct me if I'm being silly because i will fully admit i am not a expert on WWII aircraft.

 

[SpicyJuan11]

I suppose in that sense the Fiat G.56 may be better as it was basically already fitted with a engine that had room to further improve compared to the He 100 which i have heard came with what was considered a "sick" engine.

The G.56 came in 1944, a full 6 years after the He 100 first flew, also the He 100 probably could've been upgraded, albeit with pretty radical changes (something along the lines of the changes from Bf 109E to F or Fw 190A to C/D).

 

[Ottobon]

The G.56 came in 1944, a full 6 years after the He 100 first flew, also the He 100 probably could've been upgraded, albeit with pretty radical changes (something along the lines of the changes from Bf 109E to F or Fw 190A to C/D).

My point was only that all 3 of those aircraft basically, atleast so far as i can tell, were turned down largely in part because of Willie Messerschmitt fiddling.

Although again if i am wrong and it was more complicated then that i'd love to learn, working on fairly limited info.

 

[nuuumannn]

Saunders_Roe came back from the Lerwick with this.

I should interject and state that the Princess was the product of Arthur Gouge, who was chief designer at Short Brothers until 1944, being responsible for the Sunderland family - and the Stirling.

 

[Koopernic]

Quick estimates - mostly based on data from over at the great WWII Aircraft Performance website.

It's not pixel-perfect to the data but the idea is there:

View attachment 293076

The faster Typhoon is post upgrades: sliding hood, whip aerial, new exhausts, cannon fairings, etc.

I have two issue's with it.

Firstly:
No doubt the 'cleaned up Typhoon' was faster but the curves you are showing are a self made extrapolation achieved by shifting a graph from the ww2performance testing website by an amount obtained from a improved Typhoon at one speed point, 8000ft, and assuming the change in speed is the same at every altitude.

Secondly:
The curves don't do justice to the Fw 190;

In late 1943 the Fw 190 series received two quite independent power boosting systems not reflected in the above curves. These systems were the outcome of work done by the Luftwaffe at Rechlin, Focke-Wulf and BMW.

For the Fw 190F (and G) which were the ground attack versions (the former heavily armoured, the latter equipped for long range strike) "C3 einspritzung" was added, this roughly translates as "C3 injection". In this system a fuel line was run to the nose of the aircraft where the engine air intake was and during an emergency the pilot could pull on a knob labelled:

Erhöhte Notleistung (increased emergency power)
Ziehen (pull)
1,65 ata 2700 U/min (1.65ata 2700rpm

and two things would happen: firstly a large portion of the fuel would be diverted from the multi point injection system and a rich mixture was injected into the inlet. The rich mixture increased knock rating but also precooled the air thereby contracting it and allowing the subsequent supercharger to force more into the engine.

A Fw 190F would loose 50km/h when carrying 3 x SC250 kg bombs but with C3 enspritzung 45km/h would be restored. The system had some altitude restriction, ie use below 1200m or so was allowed only. It increased power to nearly 2050ps.

A fw 190 with this system could do 361 mph (for an A8) and 359 (for an A9) at sea level. (adding about 9-10 mph to your curves)

The other system was known as increased boost and was used on the fighter versions. This involved increased boost to 1.57 ata in 1st gear and 1.65 ata in 2nd gear simply by increasing the boost rating (the fuel line was not needed) this increase power from 1700 or so to 1900.

Both seems to have been made possible by the improved rating of C3 fuel which went from about 94/115 to 96/125 by 1943.

The two systems were combined by mid 1944 in Fw 190A8 with BMW 801D2 engines. Production then switched to the Fw 190A9 with the 801TS engine (there was a TQ as well). This engine removed the time restrictions and although no faster at sea level was much faster at intermediate and high altitude.

A clean up of the Fw 190 was also possible, one can imagine removing the cowling guns.

Do you know of how many cleaned up typhoons' entered service? The performance estimates you claim would suggest a Typhoon was as fast as a Tempest V and suggest that with 150PN number fuel it tool would reach 400mph at sea level. If that is the case, why bother with the Tempest V at all?

If you eliminate this cleaned up Typhoon the figures for the Typhoon show no advantage at all at low altitude and certainly non at high altitude.

 

[Greyman]

Firstly:
No doubt the 'cleaned up Typhoon' was faster but the curves you are showing are a self made extrapolation achieved by shifting a graph from the ww2performance testing website by an amount obtained from a improved Typhoon at one speed point, 8000ft, and assuming the change in speed is the same at every altitude.

I think the change in speed would be approximately the same at every altitude. Generally the 'shape' of speed curves don't change very much unless there is a power plant change (or the power plant is giving different power/rpm output).

But, as you said: self-made extrapolation (by a complete layman at that).

Secondly:
The curves don't do justice to the Fw 190;

Entirely possible. I just did a quick glance at WWII Aircraft Performance and grabbed a couple of Fw 190 curves I saw. My intention wasn't to give an exhaustive, comprehensive look at the speeds of the Typhoon and Fw 190 - it was just a response to "...it never was faster than the Fw 190 at any altitude despite the boasts..."

Tests during the war and the Luftwaffe themselves thought differently.

Do you know of how many cleaned up typhoons' entered service? The performance estimates you claim would suggest a Typhoon was as fast as a Tempest V and suggest that with 150PN number fuel it tool would reach 400mph at sea level. If that is the case, why bother with the Tempest V at all?

If you eliminate this cleaned up Typhoon the figures for the Typhoon show no advantage at all at low altitude and certainly non at high altitude.

The page I linked with the Typhoon figures lists the production blocks with some of the manufacturing changes listed. How many were retrofitted in the field I have no idea. A subject I'd like to look in to more in the future.

With regard to the Tempest, keep in mind the Tempest is the Typhoon. It would make sense that if you incorporated many of the improvements that made the Tempest faster to the Typhoon - there would be a similar improvement.

That said there were many more improvements to various aspects of the Tempest, and a good overview can be seen in the Tempest trials at the AFDU. Tempest V Performance Data

 

[stona]

The "Bomber Boys" tended to get what they wanted because it was only the bombers that could guarantee the future of RAF as an independent branch of the Military and put it on an equal footing to the Navy and Army.

This is a misconception. Bomber Command had to fight tooth and nail for everything it got, certainly motivated by that imperative, particularly in the face of such poor results in the first two years of the war.

The 'Bomber Boys' couldn't even keep hold of the men coming from its own OTUs at the very time it was attempting a huge expansion. From April 1941 it had to provide several, repeated, personnel draughts. It provided men to the MTO, to the Atlantic ferrying organisation and also three squadrons to Coastal Command. For the year 1941 of the 17 squadrons raised from Bomber Command's OTUs ALL went to other Commands.

Throughout 1941 Bomber Command saw a steady decline in its capability. Only 41 heavy bombers were produced in 1940 and just 498 in 1941. In August 1941 Bomber Command lost 525 bombers destroyed or severely damaged (more than that years total production) and received just 106 replacements. The '4,000 bomber plan' was really dependant on the availability to the British of US aircraft. The Slessor-Arnold agreement was to supply the British with US bombers from US production at a 50-50 ratio. In April 1941 Arnold agreed that four fifths of US bomber production would go to Britain. In August 1941, at the Argentia Summit, the Americans reneged on the deal, offering just 238 bombers (rather than 800+) with no further deliveries beyond July 1942.

Bomber Command never had enough aircraft. This caused an odd problem, the opposite problem to that the Luftwaffe had in 1940; by the end of 1941 the British had a stockpile of more than two million bombs of all types which it did not have the ability to drop. Monthly production was double monthly expenditure.

You can see why I find the popular 'Bomber Command took precedence over everyone else' trend hard to agree with
I often read about how resources would have been better spent on Coastal Command, fighting the U-Boats in the Atlantic. I would ask what resources and how was this fight to be carried out? Britain had neither the means nor the technology to fight this battle at the time.

There was also a large political element to the early bombing campaign that certainly helped Bomber Command to fight its corner. The one military promise that Churchill made in his speech on 22nd June following the German invasion of the USSR was 'to bomb Germany by day as well as by night with ever increasing measure'. On 7th July Churchill sent a telegram to Stalin explaining that the best Britain could offer as direct military assistance to the USSR was bombing which Churchill thought would divert German fighters to the west and ease the pressure on the Soviet front.
Stalin replied, unsurprisingly, that he would prefer Britain to open a second front in northern France or Scandinavia which says more about Stalin's ignorance of the situation in which Britain found herself than it does about his grasp of reality. Nonetheless it was the bombing of Germany that was offered as help and though the RAF still lacked the ability to carry out a meaningful campaign it would do what it could.

Cheers

Steve

 

[kool kitty89]

I suppose in that sense the Fiat G.56 may be better as it was basically already fitted with a engine that had room to further improve compared to the He 100 which i have heard came with what was considered a "sick" engine.

The DB-605 was the sick engine, the preceding 601 was not and it had 2-300 more horse power to gain and improved altitude performance compared to the versions used on the He 100. (record setting versions aside)