Which aircraft would you cancel?

[FLYBOYJ]

Post war the Starfighter and save a lot of grief and lives!

There was nothing wrong with the Starfighter - "OPERATOR ERROR." Look at some of the accidents, almost all PILOT ERROR. Once pilots were trained properly and understood it's strengths and weaknesses, it had one of the best safety records in NATO. (The F-100 had the highest accent rate in NATO) It was made into a mini nuclear bomber and the Italians produced it into the 1980s.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jyBDEG9dg-Q

 

[GrauGeist]

...Post war the Starfighter and save a lot of grief and lives!

The F-104 was no different than the F4U or the Bf109 in the respect that it required strict attention to the lessons given to the pilot during training and following those lessons to the letter.

These (and other) aircraft were extremely capable machines *IF* you follow procedure...

 

[stona]

If you are considering cancelling anything as a part of the British Air Ministry/Air Staff you have the following conundrum to solve.
There is pressure to produce as many aircraft as possible. If aircraft A is cancelled in favour of aircraft B there will be a reduction in overall production. The conundrum was solved by phasing out (the phrase used at the time was 'fading out') production of type A gradually, whilst phasing in type B.
The result of this 'fudge' is inevitable. Type A will remain in production for some time after it has become obsolete, at least for front line service, and the introduction of type B will be delayed.
That is exactly what happened time and time again. In the case of my subject for cancellation, the Handley Page Halifax, this was the explicit reason why it was kept in production and not cancelled for more Lancasters. The Halifax never did get 'faded out' and we ended up eventually with less Lancasters than we might otherwise have had. In the shorter term the total number of four engine bombers was maintained.
Cheers
Steve

 

[syscom3]

For "end production", I mean no new orders to be placed and the blocks of aircraft in production or assembly, can be completed.

For the USN;
1) End F6F production in Q4 of 1944 and use resources for the Bearcat.
2) Cancel the Tigercat
3) Cancel the Lockheed Ventura's in 1944. The USN/USMC can use B25's to do the same thing.

For the AAF:
1) End B17 production in Q4 of 1944.
2) End B24 production in Q1 of 1945 (because of Pacific needs).
3) End B26, A20 and B25 production by Q3 of 1944. Convert to A26 production.
4) End P39 production for US needs in Q4 1942, and use freed up capacity solely for the Soviets.
5) End P40 production in Q4 1943.
6) End P38 production in Q1 1945.
7) End P47 production in Q4 1944 in favor of the "N" versions.

The following planes were just plain crap and production terminated in Q1 and Q2 of 1943.
Douglas A24, Vultee A31, Curtiss SO3c and C76, Anything Brewster.

 

[pbehn]

If you are considering cancelling anything as a part of the British Air Ministry/Air Staff you have the following conundrum to solve.
There is pressure to produce as many aircraft as possible. If aircraft A is cancelled in favour of aircraft B there will be a reduction in overall production. The conundrum was solved by phasing out (the phrase used at the time was 'fading out') production of type A gradually, whilst phasing in type B.

Great post but also the UK had a great need for aircraft in general, The Wellington was there at the start and you could say was obsolete when war was declared but 11,500 were produced and they were still finding new uses for it as the war drew to a close. Not producing Stirlings and Wellingtons in favour of Lancastes means you have fewer aircraft overall and you use lancasters to lay mines train crews or sweep for magnetic mines

 

[GrauGeist]

...Anything Brewster.

Including the license-built Corsairs (F3A Corsair)?

Also, while the F2A served little or no purpose in the U.S. war effort, it's absense in the Finnish aresnal would have left a huge vacuum.

 

[GregP]

There were a total of 2,578 F-104 Starfighters manufactured, mostly by NATO members.

The poor safety record brought the F-104 to the public's eye. Erich Hartmann was retired for opposing its deployment.

In Viet Nam, the type flew 2,937 combat sorties in 1965 and 2,269 in 1966 – 1967, for a total of 5,206 combat sorties. 12 were lost. 4 to AAA, 1 to a MiG-19 (actually a Shenyang J-6), 2 to mid-air collision, 3 to SAMs, and 4 operational losses including 3 engine failures. That's a loss rate of 0.27% to all causes … not too bad in a shooting conflict, and stellar when compared with WWII losses by ANY type.

German losses totaled 110 pilots. Operating in European weather at low altitude in mountainous terrain was vastly different from flying in Arizona in training. Also, the Germans were using it mainly as a fighter-bomber instead of as an interceptor as designed.

The German Air Force lost about 30% of its F-104s. Canada lost 46% of its F-104s. The Spanish Air Force lost none; go figure. In USAF service, the class A (write off) rate was 26.7 (Bowman 2000, p. 21) accidents per 100,000 flying hours (30.63 by 2007), the highest rate of any "Century-series fighter. By comparison, the loss rate of the Convair F-102 was 14.2 (USAF Safety & Inspection Center)/ 100,000 flying hours. 13.69 by 2007.The F-100's loss rate was 16.25 accidents (Jenkins 2005, p. 46)/ 100,000 flying hours.

So while it might have been OK as an aircraft if maintained correctly and flown correctly, it had a definite high accident rate when compared with almost anything else while being flown by pilots trained to fly it. I'm not sure if that is a red flag for cancellation, but it gets my attention if I'm a pilot assigned to unit about to fly F-104s.

It tells me to learn the systems, fly the numbers, and don't try stupid things below 300 knots or 10,000 – 15,000 feet, like pulling too hard in a low and slow turn. You can't do that in a T-38, either, but it has a low tailplane and can at least stay in there under control and wait for the engines to catch up. If you are high enough, you can hang in there and recover. When the T-tail lets go in an F-104, you will lose 30,000+ feet whether you have it or not, according to F-104 pilots, and may or may not EVER recover.

Moral of the story is don't get heavy-handed and stall it unintentionally; fly the numbers. From all reports, it's an A-ticket ride. There is a private example operated in Arizona and I have been in the pattern with it. I was turning base at Deer Valley and was told I was number 2 behind an F-104 out of 20,000 feet! I was almost ready to turn final when he touched down! If it can't do anything else, it DOES come down quickly when it wants to land. It was a magnificent aircraft, but I had zero desire to climb in the cockpit for a flight s PIC. I DID get to sit in it and look. Lottsa' tiny gauges meaning a super 1950's cockpit.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Not totally on topic but to me the F-104 definitely looks the part of a jet interceptor.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

There were a total of 2,578 F-104 Starfighters manufactured, mostly by NATO members.

The poor safety record brought the F-104 to the public's eye. Erich Hartmann was retired for opposing its deployment.

In Viet Nam, the type flew 2,937 combat sorties in 1965 and 2,269 in 1966 – 1967, for a total of 5,206 combat sorties. 12 were lost. 4 to AAA, 1 to a MiG-19 (actually a Shenyang J-6), 2 to mid-air collision, 3 to SAMs, and 4 operational losses including 3 engine failures. That's a loss rate of 0.27% to all causes … not too bad in a shooting conflict, and stellar when compared with WWII losses by ANY type.

German losses totaled 110 pilots. Operating in European weather at low altitude in mountainous terrain was vastly different from flying in Arizona in training. Also, the Germans were using it mainly as a fighter-bomber instead of as an interceptor as designed.

The German Air Force lost about 30% of its F-104s. Canada lost 46% of its F-104s. The Spanish Air Force lost none; go figure. In USAF service, the class A (write off) rate was 26.7 (Bowman 2000, p. 21) accidents per 100,000 flying hours (30.63 by 2007), the highest rate of any "Century-series fighter. By comparison, the loss rate of the Convair F-102 was 14.2 (USAF Safety & Inspection Center)/ 100,000 flying hours. 13.69 by 2007.The F-100's loss rate was 16.25 accidents (Jenkins 2005, p. 46)/ 100,000 flying hours.

So while it might have been OK as an aircraft if maintained correctly and flown correctly, it had a definite high accident rate when compared with almost anything else while being flown by pilots trained to fly it. I'm not sure if that is a red flag for cancellation, but it gets my attention if I'm a pilot assigned to unit about to fly F-104s.

It tells me to learn the systems, fly the numbers, and don't try stupid things below 300 knots or 10,000 – 15,000 feet, like pulling too hard in a low and slow turn. You can't do that in a T-38, either, but it has a low tailplane and can at least stay in there under control and wait for the engines to catch up. If you are high enough, you can hang in there and recover. When the T-tail lets go in an F-104, you will lose 30,000+ feet whether you have it or not, according to F-104 pilots, and may or may not EVER recover.

Moral of the story is don't get heavy-handed and stall it unintentionally; fly the numbers. From all reports, it's an A-ticket ride. There is a private example operated in Arizona and I have been in the pattern with it. I was turning base at Deer Valley and was told I was number 2 behind an F-104 out of 20,000 feet! I was almost ready to turn final when he touched down! If it can't do anything else, it DOES come down quickly when it wants to land. It was a magnificent aircraft, but I had zero desire to climb in the cockpit for a flight s PIC. I DID get to sit in it and look. Lottsa' tiny gauges meaning a super 1950's cockpit.

Great Info Greg - something else to consider; Many pilots transitioned from the T-33 into the F-86 and then into the F-104. As you know from the guys at Chino, the F-86 is a very easy aircraft to fly with few bad habits. No mach 1+ transition aircraft into the -104 until the T-38 came along. I read somewhere the F-104 killed low time pilots and a few WW2 vets who might have been high on experience but low on learning new things. Here's Joe Baugher's Take on the German F-104 program;

Starfighter with Luftwaffe

"The loss rate of Luftwaffe Starfighters was not all that extraordinary, since the Luftwaffe had suffered a 36 percent attrition rate with the Republic F-84F Thunderstreak, the Starfighter's immediate predecessor. There was nothing intrinsically dangerous about the Starfighter, since the Royal Norwegian Air Force operating identical F-104Gs suffered only six losses in 56,000 flying hours, and the Spanish Air Force lost not a single one of its Starfighters to accidents."

 

[Shortround6]

For "end production", I mean no new orders to be placed and the blocks of aircraft in production or assembly, can be completed.

For the USN;
1) End F6F production in Q4 of 1944 and use resources for the Bearcat.
2) Cancel the Tigercat
3) Cancel the Lockheed Ventura's in 1944. The USN/USMC can use B25's to do the same thing.

For the AAF:
1) End B17 production in Q4 of 1944.
2) End B24 production in Q1 of 1945 (because of Pacific needs).
3) End B26, A20 and B25 production by Q3 of 1944. Convert to A26 production.
4) End P39 production for US needs in Q4 1942, and use freed up capacity solely for the Soviets.
5) End P40 production in Q4 1943.
6) End P38 production in Q1 1945.
7) End P47 production in Q4 1944 in favor of the "N" versions.

The following planes were just plain crap and production terminated in Q1 and Q2 of 1943.
Douglas A24, Vultee A31, Curtiss SO3c and C76, Anything Brewster.

I am not at all sure what a lot of this gets you. Especially when you consider that it could take 3-4 months from when a fighter/single engine plane rolled out the factory door and when it reached a combat zone.

Ending F6F production to build F8Fs gets you what in 1945?
Please remember that the F6F and F8F did not use the same engine. The F6F used the R-2800 B series and the F8F used the "C" series engine and there were (by legend) only about two interchangeable parts between the two. The P-47M and N used the "C" series engine. Chevrolet built 327 "C" series engines in 1944, Ford built none, Nash built none and P & W built only token numbers (test engines basically) of the single stage engines that powered the F8F.

Canceling the Tigercat gets you basically nothing in WWII. More Panthers after WW II?

Air Force stopped ordering Ventura's in July of 1942 so the Lockheed factory could build Ventura's for the Navy. By 1944 you are into the PV-2 model with bigger wing and more fuel. Problems with the wing delayed mass production.

for the Air Force the A-24 is simply a renamed Dauntless dive bomber. Hardly a piece of crap. Only the A-24B was built in an army controlled plant, earlier A-24s came from initial navy orders. Army didn't get any A-25s to even issue to training squadrons until Q2 of 1943 .
More later

 

[GregP]

One of our volunteers (Yuri Vandervood) flew for the Dutch Air Force back in the day. Unfortunately, he passed away about 4 months ago, but he had some great stories of Meteors, Hunters, F-86Ks, and the F-104. He said they used to dogfight with English Electric Lightnings and had great fun for about 5 minutes, after which the Lightnings would slow down and glide in dead stick ... they had run out of fuel! So ... their "dogfight" area was between the two bases, but it was always the Lightnings that ran out of fuel. He allowed that he was shocked at how good a glider the Lightning was.

He said he was inverted, pulling level at about 60,000 feet one day in an F-104 when he realized he wasn't in a "severe environment suit" ... and that if the canopy cracked he was dead from bubbles in the blood. So he rolled upright and started down quickly. He allowed the F-104 was superb at going down, and not too shabby going up, either. He said the Meteor was a wonderful plane to fly ... when both fans were turning. If you got down to one, it wanted to kill you and was fairly persistent at it. You had to talk nice to it and be gentle to make it not happen.

Yuri had a way with words and was a consummate story-teller. He told of riding in our Stearman once and was at 5,000 feet in the middle of a loop when one of our hangar cats crawled up into his lap, sat down, and hung on with claws! He allowed that surprised him quite a bit. It wasn't the unexpected weight so much as the claws in his crotch that got his attention.

I can see it might get my attention, too, if it happened to me.

 

[merlin]

Using the term 'cancel' loosely, I would not have ordered the Short design that became the Stirling, but instead gone for the Bolton-Paul Design, IMHO would've seen service earlier. I would have reduced production of the Battle - Austin Shadow factory instead makes Hurricanes. Again, I would not have ordered the Botha, may have tried the Wellington design as a long-range torpedo-bomber (to be replaced by the Bristol design to P.13/36. This Bristol design is also used to replace the Blenheim (how on earth was in production for so long). And, just in case you wonder what Short's are doing with no Stirling - more Sunderlands, and a military version of the transatlantic S.25 flying-boat.

 

[tomo pauk]

Cancelling the F6F in order for F8F to be produced gains maybe nothing, and looses plenty. As SR6 noted, F8F needs C series of R-2800. It has 2/3rds of firepower of usual F6F, and less fuel on board. Nothing prevents the USN from ordering the F6F-6 from Grumman, that clocked 425 mph in XF6F-6 form, to feature just 4 HMGs and 200 gals of fuel for even better climb. The XF6F-6 was powered by R-2800-18W engine, same as F4U-4.

 

[syscom3]

Cancelling the F6F in order for F8F to be produced gains maybe nothing, and looses plenty. As SR6 noted, F8F needs C series of R-2800. It has 2/3rds of firepower of usual F6F, and less fuel on board. Nothing prevents the USN from ordering the F6F-6 from Grumman, that clocked 425 mph in XF6F-6 form, to feature just 4 HMGs and 200 gals of fuel for even better climb. The XF6F-6 was powered by R-2800-18W engine, same as F4U-4.

The need for a Kamikazi interceptor was desperately needed by the USN. That's why the Bearcat was needed and pushed into service so quickly.

By not wasting resources on the Hellcats which were already at the peak of their development and lasting longer than expected, and throwing everything at the Bearcat, we can get it into service faster.

There used to be a member here named Leonard whose dad was a USN test pilot in the 40's (even flew a couple sorties at Midway) and flew all of the Grumman fighters. He said that the Bearcat was better than the Hellcat in several catagories and was the best overall. And that was the opinion of a naval aviator that flew all three.

 

[tomo pauk]

Not to take away from (Ray?) Leonard's father's expertise, but did he flew the XF6F-6?
The 1st flight was on July 6th 1944, 2 prototypes delivered. USN can have the -6 on the decks in January 1945, looking at F4U-4 that was 1st flew 2 months later, with 1st series produced in Feb 1945. In combat by Feb/March 1945?
The Bearcat, even rushed as-is, will lag half a year, and it won't do the long range work and sustained air combat patrols as good as Hellcat or Corsair that have more fuel; it also has 33% less firepower, the firepower being one of main features of fleet defender.

 

[Shortround6]

The need for a Kamikazi interceptor was desperately needed by the USN. That's why the Bearcat was needed and pushed into service so quickly.

Unfortunately many "histories" get the time lines confused.

Kamikazis, as an organized force or tactic were NOT employed until Oct of 1944. Individual pilots or crews may have crashed their planes (usually already damaged) onto ships earlier (including pilots from several nations) but that October date is significant.
It is 1 1/2 to 2 years after work started on the F8F, it is two months after the Prototype first flew.
Until then the F8F was viewed as a much higher performing replacement for the F4F-4/FM-2 rather than a replacement for the F6F.
US Navy tactics for countering the Kamikazi threat were many and included radar picket ships and CAPs operating at some distance (long endurance) from the carriers, not fast climbing aircraft launched at the last minute.
Canceling F6Fs in the winter or early spring would have perhaps lead to shortages in early summer? And only a few effective squadrons of F8Fs by the end of the war.
The Battle of Okinawa was April to June of 1945 and the First F8F squadron was declared operational in May, in the US. Getting more than 2-3 squadrons into operation in time for Okinawa requires shorting the time line form first prototype flight (Aug) to operational service (May) from 8 months to 4-5 months or less. It took 7 months to go from the first flight of a P & W powered F6F to the first operational squadron. (8 months if you count the Wright powered XF6F-1). I am sure there was a sense of urgency in getting the F^F into service in late 1942/early 1943.

 

[Gixxerman]

Just have to say F104 Starfighters are one of the coolest meanest looking planes, especially the German & Italian G/S models with everything loaded up & hanging off, fantastic plane ('the missile with a man in it', wasn't it....and protective 'guards' on the leading edge of the wing cos it was so sharp it could cut you?).

 

[Shortround6]

Great post but also the UK had a great need for aircraft in general, The Wellington was there at the start and you could say was obsolete when war was declared but 11,500 were produced and they were still finding new uses for it as the war drew to a close. Not producing Stirlings and Wellingtons in favour of Lancastes means you have fewer aircraft overall and you use lancasters to lay mines train crews or sweep for magnetic mines

Some bombers (and fighters) saw a LOT of improvement over the years and some saw hardly any. Wellington for example seeing a 83% increase in HP between the prototype and the MK X. 100/130 fuel and later Versions of the Hercules did a LOT to keep the Wellington in service as a viable aircraft in secondary theaters or for secondary missions.
The Hampden stayed with 1000hp Engines for just about it's entire career.
Engine supplies also dictated which types stayed in production at times and the problems with the Hercules meant that many British bombers struggled without enough power for too many years.
Later Hercules engines could offer 20% or more power compared to the early ones on 87 octane and an extra 800hp at altitude on on early Stirling might have done wonders for it's reputation.
The goal of keeping numbers up kept not only older planes in production too long (and the gap the British had in the medium light/medium bomber field kept the Blenheim in service way too long) ) but also kept some improvements from being implemented as soon as they could have been. The problem with the Halifax's vertical stabilizers and rudders was known but any changes that would delay production were vetoed until the problem became too big too ignore, as in too many lost crews and aircraft as they hunted for a simple "fix" that wouldn't require new tooling.

Certain planes should have been easy to spot as being more than a bit dubious, like the Botha. Simple arithmetic would at least point to it being underpowered to begin with. A full scale wooden mock up (even with one wing left off) should have reviled the visibility problems.
It took actual combat to show that many prewar assumptions were completely off the mark. The Wellington not being called a night bomber until after it failed with tragic results in the fall of 1939 trying daylight attacks. Not even better gun mounts changed that.

Unfortunately the time to do change over of production was not when many people seem to think it was. Canceling Manchesters and Early Halifax's and Early Stirlings gets you, at best, a bunch of "early" Lancasters powered by Melrin X engines instead of Merlin XX, or perhaps early Hercules engines instead of the Merlins. The better engines don't become available in large numbers until a number of the factories were already tooled up to build Stirlings and Halifax's. Lets remember that BOTH Short factories building Stirlings were bombed in 1940 and delayed Stirling production ( and equipping of more than 1-2 squadrons) by a number of months. This meant the time delay between the Stirling going into large scale service compared to Halifax and Lancaster was shortened by those months making the Stirling look that much worse in comparison. Only 3 squadrons being equipped with Stirling's in 1941 and only 200 being delivered in 1941. If the factories not been bombed perhaps 5-6 squadrons might have been in service by the end of 1941 and dozens more built in 1941.

 

[Glider]

The list of Britsh aircraft that should have been cancelled is significant. Sterling, Botha, Albacore, Lerwick, Hampden, Lysander, Albemarle, Roc, Defiant, Bisley,

Its hard to think of any other nation that spent I don't know how much time, effort and money on the design, development, production and introduction into service of so many designs that achieved so little.

 

[stona]

Its hard to think of any other nation that spent I don't know how much time, effort and money on the design, development, production and introduction into service of so many designs that achieved so little.

Germany Maybe without the 'introduction into service bit'.

As early as 1934 Heinkel alone was building 9 different types and had several others in the design stage.

The RLM's 'Lieferplan Nr. 4' which laid out production plans for the last quarter of 1936 lists no fewer than 30 different types and the plan only covers 1,656 aircraft in total. They were still building 28 types being built a year later.

As examples of German inefficiency ( I know, not exactly the stereotype) Focke -Wulf spent 30,000 engineering hours to develop a sub type of the Fw 58 of which only 60 were ordered.
Ago spent nearly 1 million Reichmarks to modify assembly lines to build just 50 He 46s.

Nobody had a monopoly on inefficiency and the Germans with more centralised control and a brand new industry to develop had less excuse than the British who had neither.

Cheers

Steve